by Simon Jones
Press and VIPs were assembled on specially built platforms on Kemmel Hill and from here Lieutenant Brian Frayling observed the detonation of Spanbroekmolen two miles away: ‘…a white incandescent light darting high in the air. We had calculated the enemy here would go up as gas at over 3,000 degrees Centigrade.’58 This mine was fifteen seconds late, but the infantry did not wait before advancing and some men of the 14th Royal Irish Rifles were already in no man’s land when they were thrown off their feet by the blow:
But there were no casualties, and the men quickly closed in to the barrage. The size of the craters to be skirted and the darkness made the keeping of direction a matter of difficulty. It would have been impossible but for the use of compasses by the platoon commanders. (Captain Cyril Falls)59
Frayling visited the site after the ridge was taken: ‘It left a deep crater and the largest piece of the enemy I could locate there in daylight was a foot in a boot.’60
Plumer’s Chief of Staff, General Harington, also went over the ridge the day after the attack:
I shall never forget the sight. I remember well going into a concrete dug-out near Spanbroekmolen…and finding four German Officers sitting round a table – all dead – killed by shock. They might have been playing bridge. It was an uncanny sight – not a mark on any of them. I can see their ghastly white faces as I write. In the wallet of one of them was found a copy of a message sent at 2.40a.m. – 30 minutes before zero – saying ‘Situation comparatively quiet.’61
The mine at Ontario Farm, placed beneath 90ft of running sand, threw up hardly any lips and for a long time after the blow gas from the explosion continued to rise to the surface: ‘…the crater resembled a seething cauldron, the semi-liquid mud bubbling like some gigantic porridge pot on the boil.’62
The explosion was understood to have caught two battalions of the 17th Bavarian Infantry Regiment during a relief, half of which were ‘as good as annihilated.’63
The Ontario Farm, Trench 127 and Trench 122 (Factory Farm) mines were on the front of the II Anzac Corps. The splitting of the advance, and the difficulties of visibility, added to those caused by the barrage, caused some Australian commanders to question whether ‘the difficulties created by the mines outweighed the advantages.’64 Where there was no mine at the Petit Douve salient, New Zealand troops still captured the German front line trench. On the southern flank of the attack, the Factory Farm crater lay just outside the attack area and 150yds within German territory, but Australian snipers succeeded in keeping the Germans from occupying it.
Harvey reflected the reservations held by infantry commanders in an evenhanded assessment of the value of the Messines mines. He pointed out that many of the objectives had been chosen fifteen months before June 1917 and many were completed for the postponed 1916 offensive:
The mines of an offensive system after being charged cannot be moved to suit altered surface conditions. They must be abandoned or fired for moral effect. In this case the moral effect is undoubted and is confirmed from many enemy sources.65
In the intervening period between the idea of the ridge first being mined in 1915 and June 1917 the British had acquired the technology and skill to capture such a powerful defensive position from the Germans. Harvey acknowledged that, by 1917, mining was being overtaken by other fighting methods:
Some consider that the destruction of enemy personnel and damage to his morale was worth the effort, while others, admitting the moral effect, consider that the objectives had not been selected with due regard to the tactical situation above ground, and that the casualties inflicted on the enemy, as he was holding his organization so lightly were not in proportion to the amount of labour and material expended in the construction of the mines. Most commanders think that with the introduction of gas, aeroplanes, tanks and all the other innovations of modern warfare, mining only adds a further complication to the operations without corresponding benefit.66
Messines was a limited objective battle and mining assisted with the first stage. Mines were particularly suited to dealing with concrete bunkers, which were hurled upside down by the explosions. The succeeding phases of the battle, however, relied on artillery and infantry and it is possible that the British could have taken the ridge without the mines. In combination the Germans were clearly unable to withstand the attack. Füsslein claimed unconvincingly that the German 2nd Division, by following the measures in his leaflet, held their ground better than the others, which could have withstood the mining attack had they done the same.
Whilst on the Messines–Wytschaete ridge, the Germans failed to anticipate the scale of the British mining offensive. To the north in the Ypres Salient they overestimated British intentions, both before and after the Battle of Messines. The British dug tunnels at the Yser canal north of Ypres to conceal bridging equipment for the coming attack, which were taken by the Germans to be offensive mining. The Germans formed two new mining companies, which set about sinking defensive systems at Boezinghe and Het Sas, both in their front line, to 10–25m depth and from 100–300m behind, which they managed to sink to 30–40m. At both locations they ran tunnels with great difficulty under the canal, but they found no evidence of British mining as there was none taking place. At Railway Wood, just north of the Menin Road at Hooge, where the British 177 Tunnelling Company had been since late 1915, the fight became intense and the Germans brought in another Company alongside 352 Pioneer Mining Company. Füsslein believed that they forestalled the British at Railway Wood after the Battle of Messines with a series of mines blown in their own lines on 13 and 14 June 1917. The British had never planned a mining attack there and the German blows were nowhere near their galleries. This contradicts Füsslein’s claim that, after Messines, he resisted attempts to panic blow their systems in the Ypres Salient and was backed by the Army commander. He implied that the British did not begin the Third Battle of Ypres with mine blows because their tunnellers could not get close enough. In fact the British had not prepared mining attacks and the German efforts had been misplaced.67
Füsslein stated that the judgement of the German 4th Army and Headquarters vindicated the miners, and summed up his account of the Battle of Messines by blaming ignorance of mine warfare amongst infantry commanders:
It was astounding, after all the experience of mine warfare in Flanders, La Bassée, Champagne and the Argonne, the disregard and lack of awareness of this ancient and yet modern weapon. This ignorance came to light everywhere, where lack of historical knowledge, expertise and experience was combined with arrogance. Divisional commanders rejected mine warfare because they did not understand it; others made it the scapegoat, although they knew secretly that they had insufficiently valued this weapon. The miner in Flanders stands nevertheless upright and proudly there in the knowledge of having done his duty, recognized only by the few who know of his deeds.68
For the Commander of Miners of the German 4th Army, the battle was also a personal tragedy. On 7 June 1917, with the words: ‘A Prussian Ensign does not surrender’, his son, eighteen-year-old Hans Georg Füsslein, serving with the 25th Pioneers, died defending the village of Messines.69
Messines was the greatest and last mining attack of the war. Afterwards, the scale of mining reduced on the British as it had on the French fronts, although the British desire for dominance prolonged it in their sectors. The number of mine blows, 117 British and 106 German, was reduced in 1917 by six-sevenths compared to 1916, owing mainly to the Germans withdrawing or being driven from the active mining fronts.70 On the remaining mining front, at Givenchy-lez-la-Bassée–Loos, the opposing systems were so well developed that further progress by either side was virtually impossible.
Chapter 8
Miners and Technology
One of the results of the recruitment of civilian experts into mining and tunnelling units was the application of modern technology and mechanisation to the underground war. The side which was able to make the most effective use of civilian skills and technologies gained the advanta
ge. In some cases technology had to be developed, but in most it was already available. In terms of basic mining, the sinking of shafts and driving of galleries, the French had far more detailed instructional manuals than the British or Germans in 1914. The Germans reissued their old mining regulations and these manuals were used to carry out mining during 1914–15.1 From the start, the British were reliant on civilian specialists and this was to become the major strength of their tunnelling operations. This is not to say that the French and Germans did not make use of civilian expertise. For example, the German 4th Division, part of the 7th Army Corps which was recruited in Westphalia, included many miners in the ranks. During 1915, the mining operations in the La Bassée sector were carried out by mining battalions formed from each infantry regiment:
The working practices followed those of conventional mining very closely. Three to five men work in a tunnel. A foreman oversees the work; he is responsible for the proper working and keeping the correct direction. Three to four tunnels are each under a foreman-NCO, who leads the personnel from their quarters to the workings, and is responsible for the necessary supply of materials. Several workings, usually twenty to twenty-five tunnels, are brought together under the command of a head foreman-NCO; he reports to a Duty Mining Officer, but can make urgent decisions himself; he gives a daily report to the Duty Mining Officer, who enters these into the Mine Book. The company commander receives a copy of the entries. The working hours in a three-shift system are twelve hours; this long shift was chosen so that the traffic on the roads leading to the workings could be kept to a minimum. Drill takes place at the quarters, where the miners are organized in twenty to thirty man sections, according to which company they belonged. Head foremen and mining officers are on duty for forty-eight hours. Each shift has a three-man pumping-squad; this is responsible for the necessary hoses. Two explosives squads, trained by the pioneers, report to the Duty Mining Officer for duty in the front line. The measurements are made by a mine surveyor. (Reserve Lieutenant von Klingspor of the 2nd Mining Company, Infantry Regiment No.56)2
We have already heard, however, Colonel Füsslein’s complaints about the difficulties of forming specialized German mining units. The extreme shortage of engineers in the British Expeditionary Force forced commanders to allow civilian experts freedom to employ their own methods. Much of the skill amongst British officers was derived from mining engineers returned from mineral mines in North and South America, Canada, Africa, Australasia, Malaya and elsewhere. This brought not only a range of skills, but also a tough and adventurous temperament. The first question that a newly arrived officer would be asked in a tunnelling company was ‘coal or metal’? It was held by the overseas mineral miners that they were more cosmopolitan and imaginative than the mining engineers from the collieries in Britain, although the many examples of bravery and audacity from this source suggest that there was a strong degree of prejudice. Commanders will have distrusted and feared the militancy of miners, but the British discovered, perhaps to their surprise, that miners already possessed qualities that armies tried to instil into recruits: mutual dependence, personal bravery and remarkable powers of physical strength and endurance.
By the end of 1915 the British had learned that the Tunnelling Companies could function effectively with the right civilian mining engineer in command. The best company commanders possessed not only technical skill and powers of leadership, but also both mental and physical stamina. Norton Griffiths rejected men in whom he did not see the necessary degree of ‘go get’. This process was enhanced enormously by the arrival of Tunnelling Companies from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. A Canadian Tunnelling Company was created in France in December 1915 from personnel in the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions, and this was joined in France in March 1916 by two more companies recruited in Canada. A New Zealand Tunnelling Company and an Australian Mining Corps arrived in France in spring 1916 and from the personnel of the latter three Tunnelling Companies and an Australian Electrical and Mechanical Mining and Boring Company were created. The best qualities of the mineral miners were found amongst all ranks of these units and the immediate result was the relief of companies, such as 172, which had been engaged for over a year in the worst conditions of the Ypres Salient.
The British often commented on the difference between their work and that of the French and Germans. When the British took over French workings on the Somme in 1915 and Vimy in 1916, they regarded their galleries, especially the rameaux de combat, as too small for effective working. The British adopted a standard size of 4ft 10in high by 2ft 9in wide in chalk. For infantry subways the dimension was 6ft 4in high by 2ft 9in.3 The New Zealand Tunnelling Company historian claimed that the former size was too small for the size of their men and that they adopted a much larger size of 6ft 3in by 3ft 6in.4 This would seem to be accounted for by the fact that the New Zealanders were withdrawn from front-line mining after a few months to work in Arras on infantry communication tunnels, where the larger size was standard. In fact all companies adopted their own methods and tools and claimed that they were superior. An officer of 250 Company described the methods needed for the deep mines in the clay levels at Messines:
A typical mine entrance of the design constructed by New Zealand tunnellers. From The New Zealand Tunnelling Company 1915-1919.
The galleries were first constructed 5 feet high by 3 feet wide, as anything smaller would not allow a man to swing a pick properly. It was found, however, that the clay was so hard and tough that a pick could not be driven into it more than a couple of inches, and this would only dislodge a small piece on the end of the pick. Progress was painfully slow, until the sewer men came to the rescue and taught us clay kicking. In this, an instrument shaped like a small spade – very strong, with a razor edge and heavy shoulders – known as a push pick was used. In operation, the miner sat on the floor with a pile of sand bags behind him to give him purchase. By putting both feet on to the shoulders, he would work the blade into the face and then, by pushing the handle upwards, bring out the clay in chunks. The bottom cut was awkward, but after that the rest of the face was brought out with ease and rapidity. This method, besides being quicker, was much more silent and allowed us to reduce the size of the gallery to 3ft 10ins x 2ft 4 ins. When our men became expert in this method an average day’s drive was 25 to 30ft. It was in this respect we were far ahead of the enemy. His galleries were far cleaner and better timbered than ours, but his best speed was 6 feet per day. (Anon. Officer, 250 Tunnelling Company)5
The British regarded the German and French close-timbering of galleries as excessive, and accused the Germans of working by the book and lining all their galleries with timber regardless of whether the ground required it. Timbering had the advantage of lessening the damage caused by camouflets, but slowed progress and required a lot of wood. The German officer quoted above stated that, for the system opposite Givenchy-lès-la Bassée, where they were indeed necessary, 12,000 to 15,000 mining frames were used for close-timbering (as well as 500,000 sandbags for removing the spoil).6 Again the New Zealanders claimed superiority in their lack of timbering, but this was nothing special when set alongside the British, Australian and Canadian tunnellers, who all knew what the ground required for particular conditions. In the most extreme conditions of the deep Messines mines, where the galleries had to support perhaps 100ft of wet sand, and the clay expanded on exposure to moisture, 250 Company found that the standard 9in by 3in timbers shattered, and they replaced them with 6in to 8in pit props with 6in by 4in timbers, and eventually spaces were left between the mining sets to allow for the expansion. At this depth 5in by 3in steel girders were also used to support the galleries.7
The British and Commonwealth units regarded their speed as superior to the French and Germans, and there is no doubt that speed was one means by which they were able to obtain an advantage over the Germans. There was also a strong rivalry for footage between Tunnelling Companies, with frequent claims of record speeds through clay or chalk. The f
act that the expertise resided in the companies rather than the command in respect of tunnelling practice was acknowledged by the leeway that the British gave units. Information was distributed in ‘Mining Notes’, which described practice as carried out by companies so that experience might be shared. Any pre-war information about military mining was quickly discarded by the British, even to the extent that the trade of ‘miner’ was replaced by that of ‘tunneller’ and the units were known as Tunnelling Companies. In the French and German armies, the pre-war instructions were still used as the basis for underground warfare. The extracts from the old mining regulations, which the Germans reissued in 1915, having excluded them from those issued in 1911 and 1913, contained some practices which were still relevant, but caused the Germans to be hidebound. Likewise, in 1915 the French thought too much in terms of traditional siege warfare methods of classical sapping and shallow mining attacks as a response to trench warfare. The British were willing to allocate very large numbers of men to mining and a tunnelling company might exceed 900 men, including the attached infantry for carrying spoil. By the middle of 1916 the British had 25,000 men employed on underground work.8 Yet the workings in the most active area in 1916, on the 1st Army front around Loos, were never used in a major offensive and resulted in underground stalemate.
The Sydney Shaft at Hill 60, sunk by the 1st Australian Tunnelling Company. From the shaft chamber at 18ft depth, 6ft diameter steel tubbing was forced down by 4.5-ton jacks over 90ft through wet sands to reach the dry clay. The joints were caulked with greased hemp to prevent the water under pressure flooding the shaft. From Woodward, ‘Notes on the Work of an Australian Tunnelling Company in France’ (1920).