by Simon Jones
Arnall’s Folly, the tunnels dug beneath the Nek through which troops were to pass to capture the Turkish position from the rear. From Bean, The Story of Anzac, Vol. 2.
In September, when Australian offensive activity was almost entirely moved underground, an ambitious project was put forward by Major General J.G. Legge, commanding the 2nd Australian Division, which echoed that discussed by Swinton and Norton Griffiths in France. Two deep-level galleries, wide enough for troops to move through two abreast, were to be driven beneath the Turkish rear trenches to emerge in the rear of the Nek position. The chief engineer of the Division opposed the scheme, but it was approved by Birdwood on 21 September. The work was carried out under Captain Harry Arnall, a Cornish-born New South Wales miner, with a party of miners from the infantry, and special efforts were made to keep it secret. When, in early December, Arnall’s tunnels approached the Turkish lines, the engineers working on the 60ft deep-level mining system heard Arnall’s miners working below them. Not having been told of the scheme, they assumed it to be a Turkish mine and began tunnelling to meet it. Despite the secrecy of the project, knowledge of the scheme became current in the 2nd Division: ‘some critics, putting it down as a wild venture, gave the tunnel the nickname of “Arnall’s Folly” by which it was generally known.’23
The tunnels were not complete before evacuation and it is not clear where or how the tunnel was intended to emerge behind the Turkish lines, or how the attackers would exit safely without being detected.
The area of the attack at Krithia Nullah on 19 December 1915 by the 5th Highland Light Infantry. Based on the map in The Fifth Battalion Highland Light Infantry in the War.
The problems that might have been encountered if Arnall’s tunnels had been used are seen in an attack made on 19 December, one of three made on the Helles front to cover the withdrawal at Anzac. The 5th Highland Light Infantry attacked a Turkish trench between the west and east Krithia Nullahs which was overlooked on either side by cliffs about 40ft high. The trench was too heavily defended by a thick expanse of barbed wire to allow attack from the front. During the previous month a tunnel was driven inside the western cliff, through which troops were to emerge on the left flank of the Turkish position. In late November Joseph Murray was sent to complete the delicate work of tunnelling through the cliff:
I have been working to-day in what is known as Beri’s Sap on the left of the Gully. It is a special job and we have been brought into this sector to put the finishing touches to it. Considerable work has already been done; a gallery has been driven down very close to the edge of the Gully and we now have to go forward parallel with the cliffs and keeping as near as possible to them. Measurements have to be taken almost continuously to prevent our breaking through prematurely. We have a long way to go – beyond the Turkish firing and support lines, getting beneath that part of the support line which is in the Gully. The Turkish firing line in the Gully is only a short trench but the redoubt and the mass of barbed wire have made the position unassailable... Some other way has to be found and this is our job. (Able Seaman Joseph Murray, 26 November 1915)24
The intention was to leave just a thin crust of earth, to be broken through immediately before the attack was launched. However, on 10 December, as the miners neared the edge of the cliff, Joseph Murray relates that they miscalculated and suddenly earth gave way to reveal a faint glimmer of daylight. They at once erected a barricade to prevent further falls of earth, but Murray was well aware of the danger of Turkish discovery of the tunnel.25 In fact the premature opening of the tunnel was probably to have serious consequences for the planned attack. By 19 December, Murray recorded that they had nine charges in place, three of which would bring part of the cliff crashing down. The gallery running up to the cliff face had three short branches, which were to be rapidly opened out. The tunnel, however, presented problems. The attackers needed to reach the trench before the Turkish defenders, as a member of the Highland Light Infantry described:
The attack… was obviously handicapped in this race by the fact that it must be initiated from the mouth of a tunnel, entrance to which was difficult and from which it would be necessary to emerge into the nullah man by man. Time was bound to be lost in hastily assembling each party at the mouth of the tunnel and getting it started on its mission, while to rush men forward individually as they left the tunnel would inevitably result in confusion, disorganization and possible disaster.26
The troops were still emerging from the tunnel as the attack was in progress, and those equipped for consolidation with picks and shovels as well as rifles had great difficulty passing along it. Most seriously, the Turks appear to have detected the tunnel. This might have been after the premature partial break-in and possibly also because of a small ‘man-hole’ opening which had been used to reconnoitre the position at night. The attackers concluded afterwards that they had detected this or the noise of the tunnelling, for the Turks directed heavy fire on the opening of the tunnel from the start of the attack:
…whether he had heard mining operations being carried out on the cliff or not cannot be definitely stated, but this fire was responsible for a great number of the casualties which we suffered. (Anon. Officer, 5th Battalion, Highland Light Infantry).27
A portion of the Turkish trench was retained, but of those attacking from the tunnel one-third of the force, three officers and six other ranks, were killed. The survivors had mixed feelings about the value of the tunnel:
It was a great piece of engineering work and in some ways proved very useful when the attack was ultimately carried out, although in others it probably accounted for a number of the casualties which the battalion suffered.28
It is a matter of speculation whether this experience contributed to caution in the use of Russian saps by VIII Corps when it reached the Western Front following evacuation from Gallipoli. The experiences of using tunnels for the assault on the peninsula highlighted the hazards of their use in the attack: emerging from a tunnel was highly dangerous as secrecy was very difficult to achieve if a tunnel was to be advanced close to the enemy positions. A rapid assault was also very difficult to achieve by men emerging from a small number of tunnel openings. On the Western Front the British developed the Russian sap as a means of reinforcing the position immediately after capture, rather than as a means of getting troops across no man’s land for the initial assault. Instructions for preparations to be made before large-scale attacks, issued by GHQ in February 1916, instructed that:
Saps must be pushed forward as far as possible to facilitate making communication trenches between the two opposing lines after the assault. The entrances to these saps should be dug under the front parapets and if time allows continued by making Russian saps instead of saps above ground.29
These were considered necessary because very soon after an attack was launched the Germans would render no man’s land impassable with highly effective artillery barrages and British troops who might have gained the German front trench were cut off from reinforcement and supply. They were then highly vulnerable to counterattack, which would drive them from the captured positions. The Russian saps were designed to form a protected means of communication across no man’s land, either as a covered tunnel or broken out to form a trench. Two Russian saps were dug before the Hohenzollern attack of 2 March 1916 to prepare communication trenches to the flanking craters, and these were broken open as the attack began.
An ambitious scheme of Russian saps was prepared for the Somme offensive of 1 July 1916. Saps driven across no man’s land were to have mortar emplacements constructed in branches on either side and were to be opened out prior to zero hour. In the north 252 Tunnelling Company prepared twelve, requiring a large force of attached labour, and by April 1916 the Company had 1,900 infantry attached (see map). As the saps neared the German lines, work was ceased at night to prevent the Germans from detecting them, but patrols succeeded in locating the northernmost sap, from John Copse, and twice blew surface charges in an attempt to des
troy it, killing nine men.30 The Germans also directed shellfire at the saps, but despite detection the saps were completed on time.
Drawing by Col F.G. Guggisberg RE, showing experiments with extending saps by forcing jack, and also the method of including mortar positions in branches from tunnels. From 8th Division CRE War Diary, 7 June 1916.
The five tunnels on the 31st Division front were opened at 6.30am, one hour before zero, and at least one contained emplacements for Stokes mortars. The failure of the attack meant that the tunnels became blocked with wounded and never functioned as a link to the German line. On the northern flank John sap, 458ft long, was opened to form a communication trench called ‘Russian Trench’ into a mine crater in no man’s land. Many of the 12th York & Lancaster sheltered in this trench when unable to cross no man’s land.31 From the southern tunnel in the 31st Division, Bleaneau, the mortars each opened fire with 150 rounds at 7.20am, but the rate of fire was so high with this weapon that their ammunition was expended within eight minutes. By 7.28 there was no fire on the German front line, and German survivors were manning their parapet ready to repel the attack. The opening of the sap attracted grenades and the mortar commander was killed. The tunnelling officer at the end of this sap, Captain Alexander Donald, believed that machine guns would have been more effective in these forward posts given that the German front line was still capable of resistance.32
In fact the 4th Division, next in line to the south, placed Lewis machine guns in its four sap heads instead of mortars. However, of four Lewis gun teams in the head of Cat Street and Beet Street tunnels, two were put out of action by a British shell during the final bombardment of the German front line shortly before zero. The remainder were all casualties by the early afternoon of 1 July, especially from German grenades, with the exception of one officer and three men.33
After hearing Donald’s account, an assistant of Brigadier Harvey reported that the ends of these saps, which were very close to the German lines, should have been used to blow charges to deal with the resistance in the enemy front line: ‘The failure to utilize the northern saps for blowing destructive & demoralising charges at the moment of attack appears to have been an error.’34
Prior to the attack the divisions attacking on the northern front had opposed firing mines from the ends of the saps as they believed that the artillery would have dealt with the resistance in the front line and they would not be necessary.35
On the 29th Division front, of three saps driven either side of the Hawthorn mine, two reached within 30yds of the German front line and contained Stokes mortar positions. The third, Sap 7, connected a sunken lane which ran across no man’s land midway between the British and German lines. This was used to file the two leading companies of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and a mortar team into the cover of this lane prior to the attack. An official cameraman, Geoffrey Malins, also passed through Sap 7 to film the men waiting to attack:
The tunnel was no more than two feet six inches wide and five feet high. Men inside were passing ammunition from one to the other in an endless chain and disappearing into the bowels of the earth.
The shaft took a downward trend. It was only by squeezing past the munition bearers that we were able to proceed at all, and in some places it was impossible for more than one to crush through at a time. By the light of an electric torch, stuck in the mud, I was able to see the men. They were wet with perspiration, steaming, in fact; stripped to the waist; working like Trojans, each doing the work of six men.
The journey seemed endless. I could tell by the position that I was climbing. My guide was still in front, and letting me know of his whereabouts by shouting: ‘Straight ahead, sir! Mind this hole!’
The latter part of the shaft seemed practically upright. I dragged my camera along by the strap attached to the case. It was impossible to carry it. We were nearing daylight. I could see a gleam only a few feet away. At last we came to the exit. My guide was there.
‘Keep down low, sir. This sap is only four feet deep. It’s been done during the night, about fifty yards of it. We are in No Man’s Land now, and if the Germans had any idea we were here, the place would soon be an inferno.’
‘Go ahead,’ I said. It was difficult to imagine we were midway between the Hun lines and our own. It was practically inconceivable. The shell-fire seemed just as bad as ever behind in the trenches, but here it was simply heavenly. The only thing one had to do was to keep as low as possible and wriggle along. The ground sloped downwards. The end of the sap came in sight. My guide was crouching there, and in front of him, about thirty feet away, running at right angles on both sides, was a roadway, overgrown with grass and pitted with shell-holes. The bank immediately in front was lined with the stumps of trees and a rough hedge, and there lined up, crouching as close to the bank as possible, were some of our men. They were the Lancashire Fusiliers, with bayonets fixed, and ready to spring forward.36
The Germans, having been warned by the detonation of the Hawthorn mine at 7.20am, were ready when the Lancashire Fusiliers attacked and opened heavy fire on them as they left the cover of the lane, completely stopping their attack.
The 29th Division wished to keep the tunnels clear for establishing secure signals communication with the captured position and supplying water and ordered before the attack: ‘The tunnels will only be used for runners and for getting telephone wires and water pipes forward. They will not be used as communication trenches.’37
Sappers were stationed in the tunnels with a water pipeline ready to run into the captured German front line.38 Pioneers were detailed to dig trenches to link the tunnels, named First Avenue and Mary, with the captured trenches, but found the British trenches congested with wounded and dead from the failed attack and the German barrage. They found the tunnels impossible to pass through as they were full of wounded, with signallers and orderlies trying to get through.39
Saps in front of Thiepval, Ovillers and La Boisselle were the task of 179 Tunnelling Company. On the 36th Ulster Division ten saps were run from the front line north-east of Thiepval Wood (see map). The intention was for each of the ten tunnels to have two mortars, firing from T-headed emplacements. On 1 July, mortars fired from at least six of the saps at five minutes before zero and, under the cover of this fire, the Ulstermen left their trenches to lie down in no man’s land about 100yds from the German lines. This fire and the British bombardment had a powerful effect on the German defenders and the forward waves of the 36th Division were able to take the front line and push deep into the German positions. During the day, however, the effects of the German counter-barrage and the failure of the units on either side of the division reduced the gains to the German front line only, where the attackers could not be resupplied. None of the ten tunnels approached close to the German front line and attempts to connect them with trenches across the remaining distance proved impossible owing to German fire. At 8.40am a company of the 16th Royal Irish Rifles Pioneers was sent to dig a trench from the end of Sap No.5, which was about 900ft from the German line (about 320ft north-west of the present day Connaught Cemetery). They made several attempts but were shot down each time they left the end of the tunnel, losing about twenty men before they could begin.40 Following the attack, the Division recommended narrowing no man’s land before an attack and using Russian saps running across no man’s land:
The 36th Division successfully crossed a No Man’s Land of 400 yards but found the passage of reinforcements and runners afterwards of the greatest difficulty. Parallels should therefore be pushed forward to 200 yards or even nearer and should be supplemented by Russian saps as far as possible across No Man’s Land. These saps should be close below the surface so that the top can be thrown off; the roots of the grass serve as a useful guide. Deep underground tunnels of any length are not desirable.41
On the 32nd Divisional front, two medium trench mortar emplacements and two communication tunnels, Inverary and Sanda, were prepared. The attack was not a success, with troops in the Leipzig
Salient again beleaguered in part of the front line, but in these circumstances the tunnel positions were found to be of value. The two mortar positions extended to within 111 and 115ft of the German line and contained emplacements for 2in trench mortars firing a 60lb ‘toffee apple’ projectile. The Division reported favourably on the value of the tunnelled positions despite some difficulties:
For two days the guns in these Saps fired without having any German shells near them. On the third and fourth day of firing they were heavily shelled. Our own gas, when liberated from the front line, slightly gassed two of the gun team waiting in the Saps and some time elapsed before these positions were again fit for use. … As battle positions they were undoubtedly a great success and enabled targets to be engaged 500 yards behind the German front line.42
After initial success, troops were forced back into the Leipzig Salient, which was packed with troops cut off from their own lines by the German fire in no man’s land. Inverary and Sanda were driven to within 86 and 170ft of the German front line and the 17th Northumberland Fusiliers Pioneers were ordered to open them as soon as possible after the assault and dig a trench to link them to the German line. Such was the congestion of dead and wounded and the heavy fire in the British trenches that the platoon responsible for Sanda tunnel, under Lieutenant H. Shenton Cole, was unable to even reach it until about 4pm:
Cole found the sap choked with dead and wounded men of the assaulting battalions, who had crawled in there for safety from the incessant machine-gun and whiz-bang fire which swept the whole front. A few men were sent along the sap who, with great difficulty, crawled through among the dead and wounded and broke through at the far end, which had been blown in by a chance shell. Having thus ascertained the point from which the trench was going to start, Cole led out the rest of the platoon across the open, going warily from shell-hole to shell-hole under heavy fire, till he had men distributed in a rough line, four men in each shell-hole from the sap end to the enemy’s front line opposite, which was now in our hands. The men worked towards each other, two each way, and thus, with the loss of only two or three men wounded, the trench was completed…43