True, the Holocaust evoked Leftist sympathy for the Jews as the quintessential victims of Fascism. Jean-Paul Sartre came out in favor of the creation of Israel, and even the Soviet Union temporarily reversed its anti-Zionist position, supporting the UN partition plan in 1947. In the early years of Israel, the Left was also sympathetic to Israel because of the Kibbutz movement. However, within a few years the Soviets became hostile, breaking off diplomatic relations in 1967. Similarly, following 1967 the radical Left in the West became vociferously anti-Zionist, viewing the conflict from a postcolonial perspective.
According to postcolonial theory, all the major problems of the Middle East are the result of malevolent outside forces of imperialism, led by the United States with the assistance of its “lackeys” such as Israel.124 The West and, by extension, Israel are viewed as essentially “reactionary,” while the status of the Third World, including the Palestinians, as “victims of colonialism” makes them essentially “progressive.”125 Their very weakness and their status as victims put them in the right. Zionism has become a code word for the forces of “reaction” in general,126 and since the end of the Cold War, virulent anti-Israel sentiment has become a major unifying theme among radicals within social movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).127 The radical Left has also been the major force behind the campaign to impose boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) on Israel. The BDS movement as a whole takes “no position” on Israel’s right to exist, but its core activists are anti-Zionists, opposed to Israel’s existence in any borders.128 In the UK, they succeeded in getting the largest trade union – UNISON with several million members – and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) itself to support a partial boycott of Israel.129
With the onset of the second intifada a number of important Europeans on the Left questioned Israel’s right to exist,130 while others compared Israeli actions to those of the Nazis131 (as per Soviet propaganda after 1967) – for example, the Nobel Prize–winning Portuguese author (and self-proclaimed libertarian Communist) Jose Saramago,132 and the renowned Greek composer and icon of the European Left Mikis Theodorakis.133
Meanwhile, according to a poll commissioned by the Italian newspaper Il Corriere della Sera in 2004, more than a third of Italians agreed that “the Israeli government is perpetuating a full-fledged genocide and is acting with the Palestinians the way the Nazis did with the Jews.”134 According to the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia,135 denying the Jewish people the right to self-determination and drawing comparisons of Israeli policy to that of the Nazis constitute a new form of anti-Semitism. A core motif of traditional anti-Semitism is that Jews represent absolute evil. Nowadays Nazis are considered the embodiment of absolute evil. In this sense comparing Israel per se to the Nazis, constitutes anti-Semitism.In addition, the 2006 report of All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Anti-Semitism in the UK136 concluded that left-wing activists and Muslim extremists were using criticism of Israel as a pretext for anti-Semitism and that as such anti-Semitism was entering the mainstream.
Leaving aside the new anti-Semitism, it is clear that the discourse within the highbrow press in Europe was far more anti-Israel than in the U.S. This is evident when comparing the discourse in the five broadsheet British papers: the Daily Telegraph, the Times, the Guardian, the Independent, and the Financial Times; with their closest U.S. equivalents: the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Chicago Tribune.137 Between September 1991 and April 2010, 1,703 articles in all these publications combined contained articles in which Israel or Israelis were tied to the words: Apartheid, racist/racism, and colonial(ism). These phrases are usually associated with the Palestinian narrative or with especially harsh criticism of Israeli actions and policies. Two-thirds of these articles appeared in the British papers, and two-thirds of the British articles appeared in the left-wing newspapers the Guardian and the Independent.138 Anti-Zionism and comparisons between Israel and the Nazis were also made by the American radical Left, as is discussed in depth in Chapter 3. However, because both the Marxian Left and traditional anti-Semitism are much stronger in Europe than in the US, those ideas have been far more marginal to the American discourse compared to Europe.
In addition, Europe’s history of imperialism and colonialism means that postcolonial guilt has had greater resonance there than in the United States. Consequently, the Far Left’s anti-Zionism and support for the Palestinians based on their status as victims has had greater resonance in Europe, especially since the late 1960s. During this period, the rise of postcolonial guilt coincided with the decline of Israel’s own victim status, as the Holocaust became more distant and Israel became stronger, occupying the West Bank and becoming increasingly allied with the “imperial” United States.139
Regarding the identification with the Palestinians as victims, there is an important qualitative distinction here between liberal criticisms of Israeli policies, which are increasingly common in the United States, and left-wing identification with the Palestinians as victims – which has far greater purchase in Europe. A defining characteristic of liberalism is its belief that the choices people make are meaningful and significant, and that consequently they are responsible for those choices. Accordingly, liberals reject in principle the postcolonial premise that because the Palestinians are weak, suffering, and hail from the Third World they are ipso facto in the right and a progressive force. Also, in contrast to much of the postcolonial left, liberals are unwilling to explain away Palestinian terrorism and political extremism with the excuse that it is the inevitable and desperate response of the victim for which the powerful Israelis are ultimately responsible.140
Thus, virtually all of Israel’s mainstream friends in Europe actually oppose settlements and support the creation of a Palestinian state, including those on the liberal Left, like the journalist Nick Cohen (not Jewish) in the UK and Pascal Bruckner in France. Cohen and Bruckner reject the postcolonial guilt complex and are highly critical of the radical Left across the board, because they perceive it as representing a threat to liberal values per se, not simply to Israel.141
Finally, it is important to note that the Muslim factor plays little or no role in explaining the transatlantic opinion divide on Israel. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, far fewer Americans held negative views about Muslims than did the citizens of France, Spain, and Germany, and yet the public in those countries were far less sympathetic to Israel than were Americans.142 As for Muslims themselves, there are many more in Europe than in the U.S.,143 but they still constitute less than 5 percent of the population of the European Union. So even though they are much more sympathetic to the Palestinians than non-Muslim Europeans, they do not constitute a large enough group to explain the breadth and depth of the transatlantic divide on Israel.
Conclusion
Public sympathy for Israel in America is akin to a large oak tree. It has very deep roots in American political culture and many different branches. The seed was planted prior to the establishment of a large Jewish community in the United States, and it continues to flourish for reasons largely independent of that community. The deepest roots are the very foundations of American identity itself: Puritan Protestantism, the American creed, and a pioneering spirit. Aside from this, Americans also support Israel because they view it as a strategically important and reliable ally against the common threats posed by terrorism, Islamism, and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the rising strength of this conviction provides the main explanation for the increase in sympathy for Israel to record levels in decade following 9/11, though it was also reinforced by the belief that the Palestinian side was mainly responsible for the failure to achieve peace. On this issue, Americans’ pro-Israel disposition means that the burden of proof is generally on the Arab-Palestinian side, but the behavior of the parties causes significant variation. Moreover, when it comes to the question of whether U.S. foreign policy should favor Israel or adopt a more evenhanded polic
y, American have been more divided. A closer look at public attitudes reveals that important subgroups hold significantly different opinions on this issue and others related to the conflict. The most important division is between Republicans and conservatives on the one hand, and liberals and Democrats on the other hand; this divide is examined in the following two chapters.
Part I Party and Ideology
2 Republicans, Conservatives and the Right: The Surge in Support for Israel
The acrid and unexpungable odor of terrorism, which has hung over Israel for many years, is now a fact of American life … Americans are targets because of their virtues – principally democracy, and loyalty to those nations that, like Israel, are embattled salients of our virtues in a still-dangerous world.
—George Will, September 12, 20011
Introduction
For many years support for Israel was associated more with liberals and Democrats than with Republicans and conservatives. However, in the first decade of twenty-first century, this was no longer the case. George W. Bush is widely regarded as the most pro-Israel president ever, while in the 2012 Republican primaries, candidates were falling over themselves to demonstrate support for Israel. The candidates were not just expressing their own convictions, they were responding to the fact that Israel has become an important issue for the Republican base. Indeed, between 2000 and 2010, sympathy for Israel over the Palestinians among Republicans rose from 60 to 85 percent, far outnumbering the percentage for Democrats,2 and conservative Republicans were the most pro-Israel of all.3
This chapter surveys and analyzes conservative and Republican approaches to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The chapter begins with a look at levels of identification with conservatism among the general public and within the Republican Party. A brief survey of conservative attitudes to Israel during the Cold War is then presented. Subsequently, the three main approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East among Republicans and conservatives in the post–Cold War era are sketched out, with the focus being on the intellectual and political elites. First, there is the “old conservative establishment,” whose approach towards Israel is one of “unfavorable neutrality.” Second, there is Kissingerian realism, which adheres to an approach of “favorable neutrality” toward Israel. Third, there is the “new conservative mainstream” that strongly identifies with, and sides with, Israel. This has become the dominant approach among Republicans and conservatives in the twenty-first century. Following this, narratives of the rise and fall of the peace process from the early 1990s until the end of the first decade of the new millennium are surveyed through the coverage of the relevant issues in the main conservative magazines and columns of a number of leading conservative columnists. Finally, attention turns to the attitudes of rank-and-file Republicans and conservatives.
Conservatives and the Republican Party
In the United States, conservatives tend to favor limited government; many are also nationalistic, socially conservative and hawkish on foreign policy. Between 1992 and 2010 the percentage of self-identifying conservatives among the general public rose from 36 to 40 percent. As a consequence, conservatives became the largest ideological group in America, overtaking moderates.4 Moreover, since the 1980s, the amount of conservatives who identify as Republicans has almost doubled,6 so that in 2010, almost three quarters of Republicans defined themselves as conservative (see Figure 2.1);7 while about half were evangelicals.8
Figure 2.1. Recent Political Ideology Trend among Republicans (From Saad, “Conservatives Continue to Outnumber Moderates in 2010.” Copyright © 2010 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. The content is used with permission; however, Gallup retains all rights of republication. This graph is an interpretation of data compiled by Gallup, Inc. However, Gallup, Inc. had no part in the creation of this graphic interpretation.)5
American Conservatives and Israel, 1948–1991
Before 1967, conservatives were generally cool toward Israel, and sometimes hostile. The leading conservative publishing house, Regnery, published a stream of books championing Arab culture and sympathizing with the Palestinians. Ironically, at a time when the leading conservative magazine, National Review, was still defending Jim Crow segregation, the magazine referred to Israel as “the first racist state in modern history.”9
There were numerous reasons for this bias. In the 1940s and 1950s the largest domestic anti-Zionist lobby was located in the mainline Protestant church, which in that period was closely associated with the Republican Party, and had a lot of influence in the Bureau for Near East Affairs inside the State Department.10 Then, there was the anti-Semitism of the Old Right, which viewed Jews as outside their definition of a white Christian American national identity. The fact that Israel was run by social democrats and that it generally received strong support from American liberals served to further tarnish Israel in conservative eyes. Moreover, while the Holocaust was an important factor in generating sympathy for Israel in liberal eyes, National Review tended to belittle the evils of Nazism, including the Holocaust. Finally, mainstream conservatism in the 1950s was stanchly anti-Soviet, and to the eye of a senior editor of National Review, James Burnham, Israel looked like a strategic liability. Supporting Israel, it was held, would alienate the strategically more significant Arabs.
The turning point was Israel’s victory in the Six Day War, which highlighted Israel’s military prowess as a strong, independent American ally, at a time when America was suffering greatly from the absence of just such an ally in Vietnam. Subsequently, conservatives began to relate to Israel as a strategic asset. This shift was facilitated by National Review founder William F. Buckley Jr.’s campaign to remove anti-Semitism from the conservative movement.
The first significant practical expression of this shift came during the first administration of Richard M. Nixon, which dramatically increased military aid to Israel. However, the influence of solidly pro-Israel groups within the GOP, namely evangelicals and neoconservatives, did not begin to be felt seriously until the Reagan presidency. In the 1980s and 1990s Republicans and conservatives were divided between these pro-Israel groups and more neutral and hostile groups led by, among others, George H. W. Bush and Pat Buchanan. However, in the wake of 9/11, the pro-Israel outlook came to dominate Republican politics and the conservative discourse. The section below examines the three main conservative approaches to Israel in detail, with a focus on the post–Cold War era.
The Old Conservative Establishment: Unfavorable Neutrality
Foundations
Old-establishment conservatism in America contains within it three interrelated orientations: paleoconservatism, libertarianism, and Arabist Realism. The roots of these groups are in the Old Right that supported isolationism in the 1930s.
For paleoconservatism, the particularistic Anglo-Christian culture that prevailed in the eighteenth century defines the American nation, not the universal values of the American creed.11 In the 1960s it opposed civil rights legislation. Today, they are conservative on social issues, favor limited government, states’ rights, and protectionism, while remaining hostile to immigration.12 Russell Kirk was the intellectual mentor to contemporary paleoconservatives like Paul Gottfried. There was also the syndicated columnist Robert Novak. The main organs for disseminating paleoconservatism have been the Rockford Institute’s Chronicles magazine, and the American Conservative magazine founded in 2002 by Pat Buchanan, who previously campaigned for the Republican Presidential nomination. Buchanan summed it up thus: “We are old church and old right, anti-imperialist and anti-interventionist, disbelievers in Pax Americana.”13
Libertarians champion limited government, civil liberties, individualism, and market economics. They oppose an interventionist foreign policy, because they fear it will strengthen central government, lead to increased taxes, and threaten civil liberties. Their leading politician was long-serving congressman Ron Paul, the presidential candidate of the Libertarian Party in 1988 who ran for the Republican nominati
on in 2008 and 2012. The libertarian perspective is promoted by the Cato Institute. Then there is Andrew Sullivan, one of the first prominent political journalists to start his own blog.
Arabist Realism is a version of the Realist approach to international relations that favors the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Realism defines itself in opposition to Wilsonian liberal idealism. For Realists, foreign policy is about state interests understood in terms of material power and physical security, not spreading democracy or constructing international institutions.14 While more internationalist than libertarians and paleocons, the dread of getting bogged down and being overstretched is central to Realist thinking, as is evident in the (Caspar) Weinberger and (Colin) Powell doctrines, which severely circumscribed the terms under which the U.S. would commit military forces abroad to combat.15
For them, the Vietnam War is a powerful symbol. The lessons of Vietnam, especially the Tet offensive of 1968, are understood as demonstrating the strategic futility of military interventionism, for while the U.S. won many battles militarily, including Tet, it was the willingness of its indigenous opponent to suffer greater losses that ultimately determined the course of the war. Realism is influential among the old Republican business elites and diplomats, as well as figures such as George H. W. Bush, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell and Robert Gates. Within academia, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer are leading proponents.
Grand Strategy: Defensive Realism in the Middle East
The “old conservative establishment” views international relations in terms of state interests and nationalism, while discounting other ideologies. Thus, in the 1930s, the Old Right’s support for isolationism and appeasement was grounded in the perception that Nazi Germany’s agenda was driven by nationalism in a way that was not qualitatively different from that of traditional German nationalists. Some even ended up as apologists for Fascism.16 Even with the benefit of hindsight, Buchanan referred to General Francisco Franco as a “patriot” while rejecting the existence of Fascism as a coherent ideology.17
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