On April 11, Truman relieved one of the nation's most renowned military figures from command. “I could no longer tolerate his insubordination,” wrote the commander-in-chief. Marshall, now the Secretary of Defense, agreed to the sacking. Bradley also supported it, later testifying that “taking on Red China” would involve the U.S. in “the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong enemy.” Eight days later, MacArthur made his last public appearance before a joint session of Congress. After delivering his farewell address, a long and distinguished career in uniform came to an end.
Stalemate
Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur as the supreme commander of UN forces in Korea, demanded that Americans show “a toughness of soul as well as body.” He wore grenades on his webbing, which became his personal hallmark when appearing before troops and reporters. During the spring of 1951, he turned over command of the Eighth Army to General James A. Van Fleet and departed for his headquarters in Tokyo.
As Ridgway called upon UN forces to “stand and fight,” the communists focused their attacks on a demarcation north of the 38th parallel known as the “Kansas” line. In the Iron Triangle between Chorwon, Pynongyang, and Kumhwa, the 1st Marine Division bent but did not break. Nearly 25 miles to the west, a British brigade delayed several Chinese crossings in the Battle of the Imjin River that April. Next, Van Fleet regained a few miles of rock during Operation Piledriver. The opposing sides stalemated at the “No Name” line.
With casualties mounting, the stalemate pressured all sides to arrange peace talks. As Ridgway continued to pound communist forces that June, the Soviet delegate at the United Nations proposed a ceasefire along the 38th parallel. After China and North Korea responded favorably, Secretary of State Acheson endorsed the general concept. Representatives of the belligerents initially met in the communist-held town of Kaesong on July 10. The hosts claimed that their foes came to surrender, even seating Admiral C. Turner Joy of the UN delegation in a lower chair at the table. In one session, negotiators stared silently at each other across the table for over 2 hours. When the North Korean General Nam Il claimed that UN forces had attempted to murder his delegation, the peace talks abruptly ended.
UN forces renewed their battle for the Hwachon Reservoir, which provided water and electricity to Seoul. Almond's X Corps assailed a group of nearby hills and ridges that Americans dubbed “the Punchbowl.” By the fall, the 2nd Division had finally secured Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge. With the communists losing ground, they retreated farther north of the 38th parallel. At the neutral site of Panmunjom, peace talks resumed on October 25.
While the parleys at Panmunjom accomplished nothing for months, the boots on the ground fortified the “main line of resistance” – the MLR. Their forward positions featured barbed wire, minefields, trenches, and bunkers. Fighting involved patrols, raids, and skirmishes, which Ridgway termed “active defense.” Outposts and checkpoints ensured that refugees remained clear of the battlefield, though some prostitutes plied their trade in “rabbit hutches” a few hundred yards away. Less than 20 miles from the front, a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, or MASH, provided emergency medical care to the sick and wounded. Although most arrived at units via ambulances or jeeps, the use of helicopters for medical evacuation contributed to lower fatality rates. During the second year of the war, the Marine Corps began using “choppers” to transport infantrymen around the MLR.
In the skies over Korea, UN forces achieved almost undisputed superiority. F-84 Thunderjets conducted thousands of air strikes. B-29s dropped conventional ordnance to “strangle” the communists, but areas north of the Yalu River remained off limits. Interdiction missions racked up long lists of destroyed targets, including bridges, roads, trucks, trains, rails, dams, and hydroelectric plants. The northwestern corner of the peninsula formed “MiG alley,” where aerial “dogfights” occurred regularly between the Soviet jet fighters and the American aircraft such as the new F-86 Sabre. In fact, the Air Force downed 810 MiGs while losing only 78 Sabres. Among the most famous American “aces,” Captain Joseph C. McConnell counted 16 “kills” in fighter combat. Naval and Marine attack squadrons delivered close air support, but U.S. commanders did not regard the sortie rate as sufficient to break the stalemate on the ground.
Given the limitations of their operations, U.S. commanders awaited the results of negotiations at Panmunjom. After abandoning their demands for territorial concessions, both sides quarreled about exchanging prisoners of war. The UN delegation insisted upon the return to freedom of all combatants held by the communists. Furthermore, they objected to the forced repatriation of Chinese and NKPA prisoners. Conversely, the communist delegation produced a dubious prisoner list that left unaccounted more than 8,000 Americans. They also claimed that thousands of ROKA soldiers in their custody were slain in air raids or were unavailable. With the impasse over prisoner exchanges, the negotiations stalled.
Communists began infiltrating UN prison camps, which held some 170,000 Chinese and NKPA combatants. Surrendering to UN forces on the battlefield, subalterns carried orders to organize prison riots and to discipline potential repatriates. While interned on the island of Koje-do, some captives attempted to create a “second front” during 1952. To the delight of propagandists from Peking to Moscow, the casualty lists that emerged from the prison camps became the focus of an international controversy.
The controversy served to deflect attention from the systematic brutality of communist prison camps. Of the 7,140 American POWs, 2,701 perished in captivity. Though noted for massacring prisoners immediately, the communists interned most captives in Manchuria. Dysentery, pneumonia, starvation, and abuse took a terrible toll, which contributed to what survivors dubbed “give-upitis.” Amid the filth and squalor, a few drowned in latrine pits. Owing to the indoctrination program behind the wire, “brain-washing” techniques became the subject of American novels such as The Manchurian Candidate (1959).
Weary from a war that nobody seemed able to win, Americans paid for the stalemate in blood and treasure. The size of the armed forces doubled prewar levels, reaching 3.6 million personnel in 1952. Although the Selective Service system and the reserve call-ups addressed most of the manpower needs, the Truman administration worked with governors to activate more than 1,000 National Guard units during the war. Citizen soldiers reinforced defenses in the U.S., Germany, and Japan, while the 40th and 45th Divisions entered combat against the Chinese and the NKPA. Overall, the American military maintained eight fighting divisions in Korea – one Marine and seven Army. Outfits generally observed the “one winter rule,” that is, no man was expected to endure more than a season of cold at the front. To dampen complaints about deployment, the Pentagon instituted an individual rotation policy with long-term implications. Rather than remaining on active duty for the duration, American troops earned points to rotate out of service in Korea.
Figure 13.3 Fighting with the 2nd Infantry Division north of the Chongchon River, November 20, 1950. Integration of Armed Forces in Korea, U.S. Army, http://www.army.mil/media/32791/
Under the banner of the United Nations, American troops persevered in a “forgotten” war. Whenever the Chinese and NKPA attacked the forward positions, UN forces conducted delaying actions. Once they paused, a counterattack began. The counterattacks rarely involved tanks, because the slopes and knots of the rugged terrain made them ineffective. Instead, infantrymen maintained constant contact with the enemy and directed massive firepower against them. They fought night and day in places named Old Baldy, White Horse, Triangle Hill, Hill Eerie, Outpost Harry, and the Hook. They battled with bayonets, knives, grenades, and rifles – even their bare hands. Their only relief from the frigid winters and sweltering summers was a cold shower in the rear or “R&R” in Japan. Despite occasional breaches, neither side made significant advances beyond the MLR in Korea.
As a presidential candidate during 1952, Eisenhower pledged to “go to Korea” if elected. Soldiers knew war best and hated it most
, or so he claimed. With frustration feeding a “Red Scare” nationwide, he offered to resolve the unpopular conflict as soon as possible. On November 5, the U.S. elected Eisenhower to the presidency.
Less than a month later, Eisenhower fulfilled his campaign promise by visiting Korea for three days. Upon his return to the U.S., he cryptically remarked: “We face an enemy whom we cannot hope to impress by words, however eloquent, but only by deeds – executed under circumstances of our own choosing.” After his inauguration, the Joint Chiefs recommended direct air and naval operations against Manchuria. John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, communicated a back-channel threat to China regarding the possible use of an atom bomb. At a meeting of the National Security Council, the commander-in-chief suggested that Kaesong in North Korea represented “a good target” for tactical nuclear weaponry. While the Eisenhower administration rattled sabers, the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, appeared to increase the odds for peace.
Unfortunately, peace talks at Panmunjom deadlocked over the fate of the prisoners of war. As a “gesture of peace,” the UN agreed to a Red Cross proposal for the exchange of the sick and wounded. With pressure from Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang finally consented to Operation Little Switch. Accordingly, the opposing sides exchanged a limited number at Panmunjom from April 20 to May 3. When the delegations restarted their negotiations at the table, they disagreed about procedures to “quarantine” those refusing to repatriate. By early June, they worked out an agreement in principle that placed most in the hands of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. However, Rhee attempted to disrupt the agreement by suddenly releasing over 25,000 prisoners – many of them South Koreans previously impressed into service by the NKPA. Eventually, he relented to an armistice upon receiving assurances of more economic and military assistance from the U.S.
As the belligerents finalized an armistice, the Battle of Pork Chop Hill raged on the MLR. General Maxwell D. Taylor, who took command of the Eighth Army in February, pulled his troops back after the Chinese attacked the high ground. Nevertheless, he soon ordered them to retake it. Back and forth, the combatants exchanged the position multiple times. With an armistice imminent, he finally abandoned Pork Chop Hill on July 11. The firing ceased within weeks, but the weaponry remained locked and loaded.
At 10:00 a.m. on July 27, the UN and communist delegations met at Panmunjom without a word or a gesture to one another. In less than 12 minutes, each affixed signatures to documents and exited the building on opposite sides. General Mark Clark, who succeeded Ridgway in command of UN forces in Korea, signed nine blue-backed copies of the armistice a few hours later at Mansan-ni.
To fulfill the armistice terms, Operation Big Switch commenced inside a demilitarized zone on August 5. The UN sent 75,823 prisoners northward, while the communists reciprocated by releasing 3,597 Americans and 7,862 South Koreans. Of the 22,604 prisoners of the UN handled by the Repatriation Commission, only 137 agreed to return to their homeland. Whatever their motives, 325 South Koreans, 21 Americans, and one Brit adopted the nations of their captors. “We went away to Glenn Miller,” noted an American POW after returning to the U.S., and “came back to Elvis Presley.”
From an American perspective, the war in Korea represented one of the nastiest conflicts in the twentieth century. During 37 months of fighting, the U.S. sent 1.3 million service members to the peninsula. While 33,629 of them were killed in action, another 105,785 suffered wounds. The ROKA reported 415,000 fatalities and 429,000 wounded. Though estimates varied, NKPA and Chinese losses reached as many as 2 million. Few doubted that the American military saved South Korea from doom.
No More Koreas
While maintaining close to 30,000 troops in Korea, the U.S. began to refine the containment strategy of the Cold War. Given the likelihood of future confrontations with the Soviet Union, national security experts anticipated that 1954 would be the “year of maximum danger.” For years, the Soviets appeared to ready their forces for an impending nuclear attack against the continental U.S. The threat of a swift but fatal blow raised doubts about the capabilities of the United Nations to deter communist aggression. Unwilling to fight another indecisive war, the American military wanted “no more Koreas.”
The Eisenhower administration concluded that the costs of fighting in hot spots such as Korea actually represented a threat to national security. Worried that military expenditures undermined American affluence, the president and Congress agreed to reduce appropriations for conventional forces. Beginning in 1954, the Army downsized from 20 to 15 divisions. Furthermore, the Navy and the Marine Corps reduced their personnel lines. Over the course of the decade, the defense budget fell from 64 percent of federal spending to 47 percent. Since 10 reservists in uniform matched the expense of one full-time soldier, the reserve component actually expanded in order to save money. Attempting to balance the demands of the armed forces with the constraints of fiscal discipline, Eisenhower called for “security with solvency.”
At Eisenhower's behest, policymakers in Washington D.C presented a strategic framework known as the New Look. The Joint Chiefs agreed to reductions in end strength as long as atomic and hydrogen bombs enabled the nation to counter aggressors. In Project Solarium, teams of analysts came to the White House to thoroughly review strategic alternatives while underscoring the concept of deterrence. Moreover, an internal document known as NSC 162/2 offered guidelines for a nuclear option in either a general or a limited war. “The basic decision,” Secretary of State Dulles held forth, “was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.” Essentially, the New Look offered a way to deter Soviet-sponsored wars around the globe with a credible bluff.
Because the New Look threatened massive retaliation, the U.S. attempted to maintain nuclear superiority over all rivals. Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, said that it provided “more bang for the buck.” Receiving the lion's share of appropriations, the Air Force increased the intercontinental capabilities of SAC by procuring long-range bombers for around-the-clock delivery of ordnance. Though facing cuts to shipbuilding programs, the Navy soon concentrated on nuclear-powered submarines as invulnerable launch platforms for Polaris missiles. Since the defense budget divided along service rather than functional lines, political sniping over allocations reinforced inter-service rivalries.
Unsatisfied with the leftovers in the defense budget, the Army brass voiced concerns about the New Look. After becoming the Army Chief of Staff in 1955, General Maxwell D. Taylor foresaw a durable role for conventional forces as another deterrent to communist aggression. Accordingly, basic combat units gave the U.S. a reasonable option, if warranted, that complemented the grand strategy. The Army perfected tactical assets that included a 280-mm gun known as “Atomic Annie” as well as a radar-controlled antiaircraft rocket named Nike. In addition, they trained Special Forces to operate in unconventional battlefields. The plea for a “flexible response” resonated with intellectuals, who doubted the logic of mutually assured destruction.
Faced with scenarios of massive destruction, the Army began to reorganize its elements for both nuclear and nonnuclear combat. The “triangular” infantry and airborne divisions of 17,000 soldiers, which constituted the standard formation of the Army in Korea, no longer seemed appropriate for combat operations in the Cold War. Instead, the new “pentomic” divisions placed 13,500 soldiers into units of five battle groups capable of nimble yet quick action. Fighting from a circular battle position, divisional troops maneuvered with the fire support of artillery and missile units. They concentrated or dispersed based upon changes in enemy dispositions. Exploiting gaps created by a nuclear blast, they moved effectively in any direction with fast ground and air transportation, reliable communications, and better logistics. Thanks to the steady supply of manpower through conscription, the force structure adapted to fighting in complex environments.
The complex environment of French Indochina gave rise to the “
domino theory,” that is, the belief that the fall of one regime to communism would inevitably topple others. In what was known as the Third World, developing countries contemplated alignment with models for either centralized economic planning or free market capitalism. The dominos in Southeast Asia might fall in any direction and thus threaten American interests stretching from Japan to the Philippines and from India to Southwest Asia. According to exponents of the Cold War, communists conspired to take over French colonies.
During 1954, the French government begged the U.S. to intervene in Vietnam. Admiral Arthur Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, recommended air strikes against communist guerrillas at Dien Ben Phu. In fact, Operation Vulture outlined the possible advantages of atomic warfare in an effort to rescue French forces from certain defeat. The dire situation prompted Dulles to posit that the U.S. needed to “go to the brink.” Recalling the lessons of his predecessor in Korea, however, the president refused to take military action without an authorization from Congress. He sent funds to assist France, but their troops lost decisively in Vietnam. “No one could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region than I am,” Eisenhower announced.
After Communist China began shelling the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait, Eisenhower sought a congressional resolution to protect Taiwan. In 1955, he received a sweeping authorization to wage war. In another example of brinkmanship, the administration ordered the Navy to escort Taiwanese ships and sent an Army–Marine task force to the islands. At the urging of the Kremlin, Peking avoided escalating the conflict.
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