Figure 14.3 A Boeing B-52D in Vietnam. Photo 061127-F-1234S-017, National Museum of the U.S. Air Force
Communist forces infiltrated South Vietnam through the A Shau Valley, where they stored ammunition, rice, and equipment for an impending offensive in 1969. For years, “search and destroy” missions failed to eliminate the staging area at the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Beginning on May 10, the 9th Marine Regiment and elements of the 101st Airborne conducted Operation Apache Snow. In a familiar pattern, B-52s and howitzers bombarded the bunkers at Ap Bia Mountain. After torrential rainfall turned the denuded terrain into muck, American troops assailed Hill 937. The tenacious “grunts” reached the summit after 12 attempts and gave it the nickname “Hamburger Hill.” They found 630 dead NVA in the bunkers, but lost 241 comrades in the battle. In a controversial move, Abrams ordered U.S. forces to abandon the ground only a week after gaining it.
Meanwhile, Nixon formally began shifting the burdens of fighting the Cold War to allies. That June, he met with Thieu at Midway Island and announced the immediate withdrawal of an Army division from Vietnam. Moreover, he provided an arms package that reached $925 million that year. Consequently, ARVN received 700,000 M-16 rifles, 12,000 M-60 machine guns, 6,000 M-70 grenade launchers, and 1,000 artillery pieces. A month later at Guam, Nixon spoke with journalists about the evolving plan. While committed to providing Southeast Asia with assistance, Americans expected allies to employ their own troops to oppose communist aggression. With a thawing in the Cold War, the Nixon Doctrine reduced the U.S. responsibility for armed intervention in the Third World.
Even though Ho Chi Minh died on September 2, 1969, Hanoi pledged to continue the war for national unification. In Paris, the delegation at the negotiating table appeared resolute. First, they insisted on the withdrawal of all American troops. Next, they wanted the removal of Thieu from office. Finally, they insisted that the NLF participate in forming a new coalition government. While General Giap remained in command of the military, North Vietnamese leaders quarreled internally over the best way to deliver a deathblow to the regime in South Vietnam.
By the next year, South Vietnam appeared to achieve measurable progress. With ARVN assuming greater responsibility for military operations, the proportion of the enemy killed in action by the South Vietnamese reached one-third of the total number. Moreover, nearly all of the hamlets were deemed “relatively secure.” As the security data improved, the introduction of “miracle rice” produced record harvests. In fact, rice production across South Vietnam increased by 700,000 metric tons in one year. In Saigon, Thieu championed the “Land to the Tiller” program that turned peasants into landowners. Thanks to the subtle dimensions of military power, Americans facilitated innovative efforts that enabled the rural population to see improvements.
Nixon authorized a bold incursion in Cambodia to destroy the enemy's Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN. While supply bases stretched for miles along the border, COSVN served as a mobile headquarters for the insurgency. Beginning on May 1, 1970, a joint U.S. and South Vietnamese force crossed the border and pushed into the Parrot's Beak and Fishhook areas. In the weeks that followed, they cut a swath through guerrilla hideouts, storage sites, training camps, and field hospitals. One logistical hub became known as “The City,” because it contained mess halls, animal farms, supply stations, and weapon caches. Americans operated with their South Vietnamese counterparts in Cambodia until the end of June, but they never found the elusive COSVN.
The Cambodian incursion sparked public outrage in the U.S, where college and university campuses erupted with protests. Given the frequency of civil disturbances nationwide, National Guard units were dispatched by governors again and again. At Kent State University in Ohio, Guardsmen attempted to quell rioting after a group of students burned down the ROTC building. On May 4, they opened fire on a demonstration, killing four and wounding nine. In Washington D.C., domestic terrorists detonated a black powder explosive at the headquarters of the National Guard Association of the U.S. A month later, Congress passed the Cooper–Church Amendment that prohibited the use of American troops outside of South Vietnam. Evidently, the Nixon administration underestimated the domestic fallout of widening the war in Indochina.
Nixon crossed another line, authorizing MACV to organize an invasion of Laos. Operation Lam Son 719 began on February 8, 1971, when 21,000 ARVN troops advanced to Tchepone. As they passed the Ho Chi Minh Trail, U.S. forces supported them indirectly with B-52s, fighter-bombers, helicopters, and artillery. They battled 36,000 NVA troops, while heavy rains and poor coordination slowed the advance. In early March, Thieu ordered a withdrawal from Laos. The Ho Chi Minh Trail remained functional, because the North Vietnamese simply shifted traffic farther westward. Nevertheless, MACV claimed that ARVN suffered 9,000 casualties compared with 14,000 NVA casualties. While expanding the field of battle with fewer resources, Lam Son 719 preempted a communist offensive that spring.
A year later, the North Vietnamese launched the Easter Offensive to pursue a decisive victory in the war. On March 30, 1972, approximately 200,000 men poured across the borders on three fronts. Surprised by the ferocity of the invasion, the South Vietnamese retreated everywhere. The most devastating assaults occurred at Quang Tri Province, which fell to the North Vietnamese a month later. While refugees fled to Hue, NVA troops severed the highway connected to Saigon. They captured Loc Ninh and Dak To and began a risky drive to cut South Vietnam in half.
Nixon responded vigorously to the Easter Offensive with aerial bombardments. From April to October, Operation Linebacker involved strategic nonnuclear strikes across North Vietnam. With more than 41,000 bombing sorties, the Air Force and the Navy delivered the first sustained campaign against the enemy since 1969. In addition, the Navy mined the ports of Haiphong, Cam Pha, Hon Gai, and Thanh Hoa while blockading the entire coast. To signal U.S. resolve, Kissinger halted the negotiations in Paris. As the last American combat units departed on August 23, 1972, the communist momentum in South Vietnam actually stalled. North Vietnam sacrificed more than 100,000 soldiers in the offensive without achieving their military objective. Shaken by the unexpected outcome, Hanoi replaced Giap with General Van Tien Dung.
Despite the tug of gravity away from the theater of operations, the approach of the Nixon administration permitted the “Vietnamization” of the war. MACV arranged a reduction in American troop levels along with a strengthening of ARVN. At the same time, the aid to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union and China declined significantly. Bolstered by air power and naval gunfire, Saigon appeared to slow the military advances of Hanoi.
Ending the Draft
With social unrest in the U.S. mounting, the war in Vietnam became the defining event for the baby-boom generation. The draft-age population grew disillusioned, as millions of young men faced the prospect of fighting for a cause that seemed misguided. At the end of the 1960s, cultural shifts on the home front encouraged public opposition to an increasingly unpopular war.
In contrast to earlier periods of the twentieth century, the Selective Service system struggled to generate quality recruits. Although a lottery made the calls more equitable after 1969, many draftees conspired with doctors to contrive physical and mental ailments. The average age of the soldier in Vietnam fell to 19, because most were fresh out of high school. Working-class Americans seldom escaped the conscription pool and often resented the indifference of “the thinking man” to military service.
The privileges of money and status enabled many to escape military service. Between 1964 and 1973, around 65 percent of the draft-age males found routes to avoid donning uniforms. Deferments enabled undergraduate students to postpone entering the draft until they received a degree or reached the age of 24. Some went on to graduate school to make sure they never reported for duty. At least 200,000 individuals simply refused to obey draft notices, though only 4,000 of them ever served prison sentences for violating the law. Several thousand fled to Canada or Sweden, while record numbers sought
conscientious-objector status. Of the 1,200 men in the Harvard senior class of 1970, only two went to Vietnam. Whatever their motives, the beneficiaries of American higher education eschewed military service.
Meanwhile, the New Left and the counterculture emboldened the “anti-draft” movement. Around the country, organizations popularized draft-card burnings and denounced “the system.” They chanted: “Make Love, Not War” and “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh – The NLF is Gonna Win.” At faculty and student “teach-ins,” the Army surplus jacket became an ironic statement of fashion. Protestors assailed military recruiting offices, poured blood on draft board records, and marched on the Pentagon. With disapproval of the war on the rise, U.S. newspapers published classified documents known collectively as the Pentagon Papers. In Congress, the “Winter Soldier” hearings publicized the alleged atrocities by American troops. John Kerry, a member of the Vietnam Veterans against the War, famously questioned a Senate panel: “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?”
As service members endured a prolonged conflict, their morale began to dissipate. The one-year tour of duty contributed to the “short-timer” syndrome, which made some reluctant to risk their own lives for their “buddies” in combat. Green lieutenants often lacked the field experience and practical skills necessary to lead their platoons on patrols. Knowing that all U.S. forces would soon leave Vietnam, no one wanted to be the last casualty. Unfortunately, the absence of a clear military objective contributed to the deterioration of unit cohesion.
The American military seemed to degenerate into a disgruntled, undisciplined mass. In 1971, an article in the Armed Forces Journal warned about an impending “collapse.” In the Army, desertion rates skyrocketed to 73.5 per thousand that year. Likewise, other branches recorded surges in desertions and AWOLs. The most alarming trend was “fragging,” that is, the killing or wounding of a superior by a subordinate using a fragmentation grenade. Between 1969 and 1971, the Army reported 730 incidents. While outright revolts remained rare, the Army compelled commanders to institute measures to prevent the dereliction of duty.
To compound the problems on duty, the proliferation of drugs redefined the meaning of recreation. Many recruits abused drugs before entering military service, but the narcotics trafficking in Southeast Asia fed addictions throughout the ranks. Heroin, opium, and marijuana flowed from Laos, Burma, and Thailand into Vietnam. The Pentagon responded with programs for testing, detoxification, and treatment, yet most came too late. Tragically, drug use plagued the American military for years to come.
The American military in Vietnam grappled with the same racial tensions that afflicted the U.S. during the period. African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans in uniform confronted prejudice at almost every turn. From barracks to firebases, skin color affected training, assignments, and promotions. Military personnel traded ethnic and racial slurs. Antagonism sometimes led to fistfights in chow lines or near latrines but seldom impeded the war effort. Despite the persistence of racism in the armed forces, most officers downplayed the racial unrest until the turmoil became disruptive enough to lead to major disturbances.
Racial unrest produced occasional outbursts on Navy warships. On October 11, 1972, around 200 black sailors armed with clubs and wrenches roamed sections of the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. They beat dozens of their fellow sailors before the Marine detachment and senior officers dissuaded them from further violence. A few weeks later, 50 black sailors staged a “sit-in” on board the U.S.S. Constellation. After removal from the carrier, many received discharges from active duty. Commanders worked to gain the trust of African Americans in uniform, but discrimination remained a chronic problem in the nation overall.
Larger social and political trends in the nation contributed to the demise of the military profession. Public opinion polls rated soldiering among the least attractive jobs, ranking slightly above garbage collection. In civil society, heightened individualism, widespread permissiveness, and deepening cynicism undermined the allure of national service.
After becoming the commander-in-chief, Nixon pledged to end “permanent conscription in a free society.” Army officials conducted a classified study called Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation, or PROVIDE, which highlighted concerns about recruitment and retention. Although the DOD preferred reforming and retaining the Selective Service system, the Nixon administration pushed ahead with plans to replace the draft.
To study the feasibility of replacing the draft, Nixon appointed an advisory commission chaired by Thomas S. Gates, a former Secretary of Defense. Meeting for the first time on May 15, 1969, the Gates Commission featured renowned intellectuals such as Milton Friedman, W. Allen Wallis, and Alan Greenspan – all free-market economists. They concluded that conscription imposed a “hidden tax” on civil society and should be ended as soon as possible. Through voluntary enlistments, competitive pay, and enhanced benefits, a smaller but more highly trained armed force represented a preferable alternative to the one created by “involuntary servitude.” They released the report to the public a year later. Nixon sent a message to Congress endorsing their call for an All-Volunteer Force, or AVF.
Even if the drive behind the AVF came from civilian authorities, it led to profound institutional and cultural changes in the American military. At the Pentagon, Secretary Laird promulgated the “total force” concept as a means to achieve manpower goals without the expense of maintaining a large military. Specifically, the National Guard and Reserves contained the replacements to complete the force structure as a whole. Going forward, they would bear a greater burden for national defense. James R. Schlesinger, who became the Secretary of Defense in 1973, championed the policy, because it meant that the “total force” operated within the budgetary constraints imposed by Congress. Removing support capabilities from the active units and placing them in the reserve component permitted the augmentation of forces at a fraction of the cost.
General Abrams, who left Vietnam in the summer of 1972 to become the Army Chief of Staff, linked the “total force” policy to fighting wars in the future. With the Army outfitting 16 divisions, he insisted that the National Guard and Reserves supplied personnel to “round out” active units. Moreover, he integrated the reserve with the active component so closely as to make the latter dysfunctional without the former. Once conscription terminated on July 1, 1973, no commander-in-chief would be able to take the nation to war without mobilizing citizen soldiers. According to what was called the Abrams Doctrine, any large-scale mobilization of the reserve component would affect communities nationwide and engage almost everybody in the war effort. Struggling with declining health, his last directives gave form to a new and improved Army. After the draft ended, military leaders rebuilt the force structure based upon Abrams's refrain: “The Army is people.”
The Fall of Saigon
After Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1971, the balance of power in Southeast Asia shifted rapidly to North Vietnam. By the end of the following year, American troop levels in South Vietnam fell to 24,000. Once withdrawn, they seemed unlikely to return.
While Nixon campaigned for re-election in 1972, Kissinger resumed private talks with the North Vietnamese representative, Le Duc Tho, in Paris. They generally agreed on a final withdrawal of American troops while allowing the North Vietnamese to retain their forward positions in South Vietnam. Hanoi dropped the demand for the removal of Thieu, as the U.S. signaled a willingness to abandon Saigon. Upon hearing word that “peace is at hand,” Thieu threatened to sabotage the deal. In one White House briefing session, Kissinger shouted: “I want to end this war before the election!”
After Nixon won a landslide electoral victory, the talks in Paris stalled once again. Hanoi suspended negotiations, which prompted the U.S. to unleash air strikes to end the delay. Dubbed the “Christmas Bombings,” Operation Linebacker II constituted the heaviest aerial assault of the entire war. Starting on December 18, it included 729 sorties by high-flyin
g B-52s as well as more than 1,000 by F-105s, F-4s, and F-111s. Over the course of 11 days, around-the-clock bombardments destroyed rail yards, power plants, radar sites, petroleum stores, supply depots, installations, roads, bridges, and vehicles. Owing to the massive application of air power, the Air Force soon found no more “worthwhile” targets. Hanoi reversed course and agreed to return to the table. Privately, the Nixon administration assured Thieu that the American military would take swift and severe retaliatory action against North Vietnam if its leaders violated any multilateral agreement.
The next month, all parties finalized the Paris Peace Accords. The framework provided for the release of American POWs and the dissolution of MACV within 60 days. Military activities in Laos and Cambodia ceased temporarily, while an international commission monitored the ceasefire in Vietnam. Kissinger promised extensive aid to the regime in Saigon but accepted the formation of a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to address internal political matters. On January 27, 1973, the U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam signed the accords.
Within weeks, American POWs began to return home. Although a number remained missing, North Vietnam returned at least 591. More than five years earlier, Lieutenant Commander John S. McCain III, a naval aviator, was shot down, badly injured, and immediately captured. The enemy transported him to Hanoi's main Hoa Lo Prison – nicknamed the “Hanoi Hilton.” Like many other POWs, he suffered abuse and torture throughout his years of captivity. The son of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, he remained a POW until his release on March 14, 1973.
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