Whatever the national security risks, America's all-volunteer forces absorbed sizeable losses from the drawdown. Given the fiscal crisis created by exploding federal deficits, the Army, Navy, and Air Force struggled to maintain a force composition that projected a strong posture of defense. Nevertheless, each of the branches retained a remarkably diverse demographic pool. The reforms of the past decade improved racial and gender equity. Even though females were not permitted to join actual combat units, they effectively served in combat situations. The American military constituted “the greatest equal opportunity employer around,” or so Bush told West Point cadets.
After Bush lost his bid for re-election in 1992, the new president, Bill Clinton, sensed that it was time for a change. During the presidential campaign, he promised to lift the military's ban on the service of gays and lesbians. His first meeting with the Joint Chiefs focused almost entirely on the issue of homosexuals in the military. Whereas Powell defended the preexisting restrictions, Clinton wanted to extend equal opportunity regardless of sexual orientation. Eventually, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia helped to broker a compromise in Congress.
On November 30, 1993, Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act with revised provisions regarding the ban on homosexuals in the military. Subtitle G of the public law formulated what was popularly called “Don't ask, Don't tell.” Accordingly, military personnel faced a discharge from service for engaging in homosexual conduct but not for suspicion of sexual orientation. If a person openly acknowledged his or her homosexuality, then he or she seemed likely to engage in homosexual conduct. However, investigation became warranted only if “credible information” arose regarding homosexual acts. Otherwise, superiors were not to ask men and women in uniform questions about it. Though upheld in federal courts, the policy did little to reduce harassment of lesbians and gays in the armed forces.
While delivering a commencement address at Harvard University, Powell faced protests organized by the lesbian and gay community on campus. As he surveyed the crowd, he saw hundreds of balloons bearing the words “Lift the Ban.” He spoke about the role of the armed forces in ending the Cold War, but activists in the audience and on the stage literally turned their backs on him. “We took on racism, we took on drugs,” Powell responded to the protests, “and we will do the same with the controversial issue of homosexuals in the military.”
Often at odds with the Clinton administration, Powell opposed using the military to “do something” in the Balkans of southeastern Europe. After the fall of the authoritarian regime in Yugoslavia, the leaders of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared independence. In Belgrade, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic resolved to expand his territorial claims in the region. Accordingly, he authorized “ethnic cleansing” to remove and to eliminate non-Serbian populations. In a tense White House meeting, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN and eventual Secretary of State, asked Powell: “What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?”
Shortly before Powell retired, the Pentagon revised the “Base Force” concept through a process Clinton dubbed the “Bottom Up Review.” Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, a former congressman from Wisconsin, planned to draw down troop levels to match the president's promises for deeper cuts in the military. Although all of the branches lost personnel, the Army shrank to only 10 active duty divisions. The reserve component identified “enhanced readiness brigades” for national defense, which gradually replaced the “round out” program that existed for the previous two decades. While confronting the dangers posed by non-state actors such as terrorist cells, criminal gangs, and drug cartels, the nation maintained sufficient forces to fight “two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.” In the words of Clinton, the U.S. “must continue to lead the world we did so much to make.”
Unfortunately, the U.S. faced a widening gap between the rhetoric and the reality of “a new world order.” On the one hand, the end of the Cold War resulted in a steady and substantial decline in defense resources. On the other hand, the commitment to strengthening security and stability increased the demands upon the men and women in uniform. Throughout the 1990s, Americans called upon the military to do more with less.
Pax Americana
As the end of the millennium approached, the American military accepted challenging missions in troubled areas of the world. General John M. Shalikashvili, who became chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1993, expressed support for a new defense strategy named “peacetime engagement.” In addition to deterring wars by preserving peace, the armed forces performed non-combat roles to reduce the prevalence of conflict abroad. As both participants and observers, they fostered direct military-to-military relationships with foreign counterparts. They became more versatile, but their interpositions also made them potential targets for enemies. Though wary of possible casualties, the U.S. assumed greater responsibility for peace operations that promoted democratic ideals and relieved human suffering.
In conjunction with a United Nations relief effort, the Clinton administration endorsed a peace operation on the eastern horn of Africa. Bush originally sent the Unified Task Force in response to a catastrophic famine, but Clinton extended the mercy mission. From his Florida headquarters, General Joseph Hoar, the CENTCOM commander, directed the distribution of food to the people of Somalia. Nevertheless, Muhammed Farrah Aideed of the Habar Gidir sub-clan fostered violence, hoarded food, and starved thousands in defiance of UN resolutions. While conducting Operation Restore Hope, the American military made no effort before the summer of 1993 to disarm the rival warlords of Mogadishu, the capital city.
As the failed state became a lawless land, the U.S. presence in Somalia peaked at 25,400 service members. Force reductions, however, left the difficult mission of humanitarian relief to a few thousand U.S. soldiers working with multinational peacekeepers. The UN Security Council eventually authorized Aideed's arrest, which prompted the Pentagon to dispatch Task Force Ranger to pursue him during Operation Gothic Serpent. Reinforced by the elite Delta Force, Army Rangers conducted a month-long hunt for the elusive Aideed.
On October 3, 1993, Aideed's forces used rocket-propelled grenades to down two Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu. Wielding AK-47 assault rifles, Somalis trapped several members of Task Force Ranger at the crash sites. Amid the chaos, elements of the 10th Mountain Division conducted a rescue mission with tanks and armored personnel carriers. Tragically, 18 Americans died in the Battle of Mogadishu, while another 73 were wounded. As many as 1,000 Somalis died in the firefight. In America's bloodiest day of combat since the Vietnam War, the world witnessed television footage of corpses dragged through the city streets by a jubilant population. After Aspin resigned as Secretary of Defense, the Clinton administration announced the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia within six months.
The next year, a bloody civil war in Haiti prompted the Clinton administration to take action to restore the deposed President Jean Bertrand Aristide. After negotiations with the coup leaders failed, the UN Security Council passed a resolution permitting the “application of all necessary means to restore democracy in Haiti.” U.S. and coalition forces assembled off the coast in preparation for an invasion that September. However, a delegation led by Carter, the former president, convinced the coup leaders to step down. Under the command of General Hugh Shelton, members of the 82nd Airborne Division landed in Haiti without firing a shot.
More than 20,000 troops participated in Operation Uphold Democracy, which grew in size but not in scope. Most were welcomed by cheering crowds in Port-au-Prince, although dangers lurked in the shadows. In fact, the rules of engagement precluded U.S. soldiers from disarming Haitian military and paramilitary forces. Attempting to curb the violence, they patrolled the towns and the countryside. After Aristide resumed power, thousands of Haitian refugees returned home. On March 31, 1995, the U.S. handed over constabulary duties to the newly established UN Mission i
n Haiti.
For years, the U.S. kept several thousand troops at bases in the Middle East to contain Hussein and his brutal regime. His intelligence service encouraged militants to devise an elaborate plot to assassinate former president Bush, which prompted Clinton to order a cruise missile attack on Baghdad in 1993. While the Iraqi dictator forced UN weapons inspectors to leave his country, policymakers in Washington D.C. continued to support no-fly zones and economic sanctions. In 1998, the president signed the Iraq Liberation Act that called for regime change. “It should be the policy of the United States,” the federal law announced, “to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace the regime.” Operation Desert Fox that year featured aircraft and missile strikes against strategic targets within Iraq, whereas training exercises rotated U.S. forces into Kuwait. During Clinton's impeachment and trial, the media fostered derisive speculation about possible motives for a “push-button” war.
While the U.S. contemplated a new war against Iraq, stateless organizations threatened American lives in alarming ways. Back in 1993, terrorists detonated a truck bomb in the underground garage of New York's World Trade Center. Although six people died, the attack failed to topple the buildings. Three years later, an explosion in Khobar Towers at the Dharhan military base in Saudi Arabia killed 19 service members. Retaliating for another deadly attack on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton lobbed cruise missiles into Afghanistan and Sudan during Operation Infinite Reach. The missile strikes targeted the terrorist network of al-Qaeda – an anti-American group founded by a former Mujahideen and Saudi expatriate named Osama bin Laden. He issued a call for jihad, which summoned radical Muslims to kill Americans everywhere in the world. His followers steered a small boat with explosives into the U.S.S. Cole on October 12, 2000, and killed 17 American sailors on board.
Meanwhile, American airmen and soldiers became engaged in multilateral efforts to bring peace to the war-torn Balkans. During 1995, NATO launched tactical air strikes to disrupt the Serbian campaign of “ethnic cleansing” near Sarajevo. The U.S. remained reluctant to intervene but supported the Dayton Peace Accords that fall. Although Congress deemed the conflict peripheral to national defense, the Clinton administration dispatched troops to Bosnia. In total, NATO provided 60,000 peacekeepers to enforce the ceasefire agreement. Given the restrictive rules of engagement, the goal of force protection represented the top priority for U.S. commanders. Their unwillingness to arrest war criminals or to provide civil administration, though, made it more difficult to keep the peace.
Within months, renewed conflict between the armed forces of Serbia and Kosovo disturbed the peace. Over 90 percent of the Kosovars were ethnic Albanian Muslims, whereas the Christian Serbs claimed the rural region as their own sacred ground. Milosevic encouraged another outbreak of “ethnic cleansing,” which included burning villages, murdering men, raping women, and displacing Muslims. While thousands died in the mayhem, many refugees fled to Albania. Peace talks in Rambouillet, France, fell apart in early 1999, when Serbian forces launched a major offensive in Kosovo.
“We act to prevent a wider war,” explained Clinton, who called an American intervention in Kosovo “a moral imperative.” Aviators flew airlift missions to deliver humanitarian supplies. Combat engineers and military contractors hastily constructed camps and bridges for refugees. General Wesley K. Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, resolved to thwart Serbian aggression but insisted upon taking “no casualties.”
Starting on March 24, 1999, NATO forces – primarily U.S. aircraft – conducted a strategic bombing campaign known as Operation Allied Force. While flying at high altitudes to avoid anti-aircraft defenses, they targeted command-and-control sites, vital infrastructure, and power plants in and around Belgrade. Nevertheless, Serbians inside Kosovo held their dispositions in defiance of air power. Armed with tanks, helicopters, and artillery, U.S. soldiers in Task Force Hawk deployed nearby but never fired a round. After 78 days of aerial bombardment, Milosevic finally began withdrawing Serbian forces from Kosovo. Without incurring a single American combat death, Clark boasted that the “accuracy of our strikes and minimal collateral damage set new standards for a military operation of this size, scope, and duration.”
At the behest of the commander-in-chief, an American contingent of NATO peacekeepers entered the occupation zones of Kosovo. Called the Kosovo Force, or KFOR, they disbursed provisions, conducted patrols, established checkpoints, and maintained security under a UN mandate. The tensions eased, though everyone remained on guard. When venturing beyond their bases, Americans dressed in “full battle rattle” with Kevlar helmets and body armor.
Because of the American response to the Kosovo War, Milosevic eventually faced justice. He received indictments from an international criminal tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He soon lost power in Serbia. NATO's first offensive campaign in its 50-year history achieved impressive results from the air, while the U.S. provided boots on the ground for a peace operation that secured “safe havens” in the Balkans.
U.S. commanders remained divided over the proper role of the military in peace operations. As the 1990s unfolded, the brass in the Pentagon began referring to them as “military operations other than war.” The phrase turned into the acronym MOOTW, which some pronounced awkwardly as “mootwah.” It included such disparate missions as countering terrorists, protecting ships, interdicting narcotics, delivering relief, aiding refugees, and enforcing agreements. Even though “peacetime engagement” implied a new kind of doctrine, the armed forces remained largely unprepared for the road ahead in the next millennium.
Conclusion
No period of American history produced a more striking transformation of the armed forces than the Reagan era. With defense spending rising to unprecedented peacetime heights, the Pentagon attempted to find a balance between conventional and nuclear forces. Innovations in weapons programs paralleled refinements in the force structure, which depended upon volunteers in all branches of uniformed service. SDI resulted in investments in multiple-use technologies that did not yield dividends in the short run, but defense-related research and development gave a tremendous lift to the U.S. as a whole. As Soviet power waned, the United Nations authorized coalition warfare against Hussein's regime in Iraq. The unambiguous victory for U.S. forces in Operation Desert Storm resonated with the Powell Doctrine, even if Washington D.C. insisted that America was not the “world's policeman.” The peaceful yet sudden end to the Cold War made the U.S. the only remaining superpower on the planet.
Americans in the military achieved an extraordinary degree of professionalism in the last days of the Cold War. Whatever the operational imperatives, the transition from conscription to recruitment for filling the ranks reaffirmed the bonds between service members and civil society. While civilizations throughout history claimed to field “peoples' armies,” the Reagan administration actually built one to confront communist foes. Developing nations around the world turned to the U.S. to furnish well-trained personnel for humanitarian interventions. All too often, Americans – and only Americans – were prepared to act in Latin America, Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Peacekeeping involved handling low-intensity combat in threat environments, especially in what amounted to small wars against disorganized enemies. Despite a general reluctance to engage in nation-building, the DOD embraced the concept of full-spectrum dominance as a joint vision for the American military during the late 1990s.
With the dawning of the information age, new assets gave the American military unrivaled power and knowledge. For years, U.S. commanders used detailed maps, grease pencils, and GPS surveillance to track military actions in the theater of operations. Before the coming of the Internet, staff officers obtained a photo of a target, confirmed its coordinates, outlined the mission, and delivered fresh orders to a unit in a matter of hours. Network-centric warfare promised to achi
eve even better results in less time, because of intelligence sensors, synchronous communications, and precise weaponry. Making U.S. forces faster and more lethal than ever, state-of-the-art technology enhanced situational awareness, provided target assessment, and distributed appropriate firepower. Headsets and lasers helped to guide movements, while grainy images bounced off satellites in space. As a result of the feedback, a real-time picture appeared on computer screens for the benefit of new-age warriors.
Perhaps nothing helped Americans to remember new-age warriors more than the simulacra of military action on the big screen. Released in 2001, the motion picture Black Hawk Down depicted what happened when a U.S. mission in Somalia went awry. In pursuit of accuracy and authenticity, the filmmakers paid the Army $3 million for the use of helicopters, equipment, and troops. The resulting film unveils a postmodern battlefield with scenes of unrelenting violence. While portraying the valor of celluloid soldiers, the boggling clashes in the Bakaara Market highlight the challenges of operating in ambiguous situations around the globe. Command-and-control issues contribute to a series of unfortunate events, even as technology makes firefights quite remote from the experience of the audience. Without questioning the validity of peacekeeping in a combat zone, the blockbuster reminds Americans of the warrior creed: “Leave no man behind.”
Essential Questions
1 What factors contributed to the revival of the American military?
2 Which technologies affected the outcome of Operation Desert Storm?
The American Military Page 59