Later in this book, we will examine how Western countries are faring in their undertaking to balance Muslim demands and fundamental rights and freedoms. But, before analyzing this, we must take a step back to examine whether such accommodation is desirable or even possible. We argue that the current imposition of curbs on perceived anti-Islamic speech—whether called blasphemy, defamation of Islam, insulting Islam, or anti-Islamic hate speech—is incompatible with the freedoms that define democracy and individual human rights.
The heart of the problem lies in determining precisely what specific forms of expression the OIC countries seek to limit in the West. There are no clear definitions of religious defamation or religious hate speech. Similarly, no common practice regarding blasphemy crimes exists within the OIC membership. Many Muslim expectations are based on amorphous rules expressed in practices that vary from country to country and evolve and expand over time. Within countries that have such restrictions, definitions are generally left to case law, commonly unwritten, and often determined by the subjective and sometimes self-serving opinions of local authorities. The nature of what is being asked of the non-Muslim world is, therefore, obscure.
Also, within most Western countries, discrimination and incitement to violence against Muslims and others are already understood to be crimes, which implies that speech crimes against Islam must include something far wider. As our survey reveals, the freedom to debate, to reject, to refuse to respect, to criticize religious ideas, and to worship according to one’s conscience are essential to religious freedom. Blasphemy restrictions coerce religious conformity and forcibly silence criticism of dominant religious ideas, especially when those ideas support, and are supported by, political power. When politics and religion are intertwined, there can be no free political debate if there is no free religious debate.
In contrast to the West, many OIC countries have their own limits on speech regarding Islam, which control not only ridicule and mocking language, but also what can be expressed, analyzed, and argued in the political, cultural, social, economic, and religious realms; in fact, these limits are major means of social and political control. To give a clearer understanding of what leading OIC governments mean when they call for the internationalization of legal bans on blasphemy and insults to Islam, we first examine the contemporary situation within those countries.
Muslim-Majority Countries
To demonstrate the wide-ranging effects of restrictions on blasphemy, in part II, we survey restrictions on purported blasphemy, apostasy, insulting Islam, and similar offenses as they are applied in leading Muslim countries. We pay special attention to countries in the forefront of the international campaign to ban “defamation of religions” and “incitement to religious hatred,” such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, as well as over a dozen other members of the Islamic Conference. This is a long survey—there is much to survey—but we make no claim to completeness in the countries covered or in events within those countries. Indeed we have documentation on many more cases (in the West as well as in Muslim-majority countries) that, for reasons of space, we have not included, and the number of cases increases daily. Our goal is simply to illustrate the range of actions, words, and thoughts that are being repressed in these countries and to suggest the degree of religiously based repression that is currently taking place.
Our findings are deeply troubling. They reveal social and political patterns that have disturbing implications for human rights, political freedoms, development, and security. Three themes emerge from our study that should be of particular concern to the West.
First, coercive measures in OIC states that are ostensibly intended to ensure respect for Islam are used to curb the freedom not only of far-flung irreverent cartoonists but also of native scholars, writers, dissidents, religious reformers, human rights activists, converts from Islam, members of post-Islamic religions, and anyone else whose utterances depart from locally dominant variants of Islam. These laws establish a broad deterrent to critiques of Islam and all matters Islamic. Frequently, this includes protections for those who rule in the name of Islam, such as governments themselves. Freedoms of religion and expression are sharply curtailed. Related political and academic freedoms and the right to due process are also circumscribed.
Second, blasphemy laws and restrictions, by their nature, foster a closed religious orthodoxy and punish independent and innovative thinking. In the contemporary struggle of ideas within Islam, those who are empowered by such restrictions are the extremists, who use law and intimidation to determine which ideas are accessible and acceptable in their society. In contrast, Muslim religious and political reformers, who protest the extremists’ agenda and work to lift their societies out of stunting, ideological conformity, are the first to be silenced. In other words, blasphemy laws suppress the very voices that seek to reconcile the Muslim world with modern pluralism.
Third, terms such as “blasphemy” and “insulting Islam” are invoked without precision. Protestors, complainants, and even courts frequently alternate between the terms, require no proof of intent, and offer novel understandings of what constitutes such transgressions, often without any historical foundation. For instance, Malaysia outlaws anything that might contain “twisted facts that can undermine the faith of Muslims.” Under Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, violations can be “by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly.” Basic principles of fairness are undermined, and speech is broadly deterred by such murky standards.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, providing perhaps the broadest scope to blasphemy and apostasy prohibitions. The Saudi government uses its position as custodian of Islam’s two holiest shrines, Mecca and Medina, to assert that its Wahhabi interpretation of the faith is the authoritative one. Effectively, this means that Muslims of different views, whether Shias, Sufis, reformers, or political dissidents, may find themselves condemned as apostates. For example, the opening fatwa of a Saudi government educational pamphlet rebukes a European imam for his “infidelity” because he “casts doubts about the infidelity of Jews and Christians.” This is a serious charge since, according to the country’s textbooks, which are available online, it is permissible to kill someone for such infidelity, though within the Kingdom itself, prison terms and flogging are more likely.
Saudi Arabia’s Shia minority, including Ismailis, suffer disproportionately for blasphemy offenses. Among those of the majority Sunni population convicted in recent years were democracy activists, who were imprisoned for using “un-Islamic” terminology, such as democracy and human rights. Among those given prison terms and lashes for “mocking religion” were teachers who discussed the Bible in class and made favorable comments about Jews and who had written articles arguing that the dominance of radical Islamists over Saudi university culture had harmed the quality of cultural programs.
In chapter 3, we describe trends in Iran. Since its 1979 revolution, Iran has had few rivals in suppressing its population in the name of enforcing the state’s religious orthodoxy. Private attacks on those deemed religiously deviant are relatively scarce, but the regime itself targets Baha’is, Jews, converts, Sufis and Sunnis, and increasingly, anyone seen as a political threat. Those deemed possibly dangerous to the powers-that-be include human rights and women’s activists and, especially, Shia intellectuals and clergy who criticize the regime. Since the government claims that Shia Islam is its source of authority, it is particularly susceptible to critiques based on alternative interpretations of Islam. For example, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the architects of Velayat-e Faqih, Iran’s system of rule, was detained for six years for his religious criticism of the structure he had helped create. He mocked Ayatollah Khomeini’s edict calling for the death of novelist Salman Rushdie and stated that Iran’s “jailing the enlightened and the elite of society for false reasons” is “condemned and illegitimate.”
In applying the regime’s statutes on blasphemy and apostasy, Iran
’s judges frequently reference their own interpretations of sharia. With little consistency, they convict people on undefined charges such as “friendship with the enemies of God,” “dissension from religious dogma,” or “propagation of spiritual liberalism.” Punishments for these charges include amputation, burning, starvation, and execution. Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, conditions have deteriorated even further, and the increased demonization of Baha’is, Jews, Sufis, and opposition figures may indicate darker days ahead.
In contrast to Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt has been regarded as a moderate or secular country. It is also one of the leading international proponents of a universal blasphemy law, and, in 2009, Egypt joined with the United States in sponsoring a UN resolution urging states to take “all necessary measures” against religious hate speech. As chapter 4 shows, Egypt’s own laws against insulting a heavenly religion or “creating sectarian strife” have been used to repress criticism of the government and to prevent religious moderation and heterodoxy. Egypt’s reformist Muslim intelligentsia, as well as the Christian community and other minorities, have borne the brunt of the repression. Quranists—a Muslim religious reform movement stressing political freedom—have been sentenced for “insulting religion due to unorthodox Islamic beliefs and practices.” Quranist Sheikh Subhy Mansour sought political asylum in the United States after being persecuted for his reformist writings, including his book arguing against the death penalty for apostasy. The late Muslim reformer Abu-Zayd, whose essay appears later in this book, was declared an apostate by the court of Cassation, Egypt’s highest court, and had to flee Egypt before his marriage was compulsorily dissolved by the courts. The state-funded Al-Azhar University, which the regime consults, has issued a fatwa against the Baha’is, calling on the state to “annihilate” them as a “lethal spiritual epidemic.” It has also called for the punishment of Muslims who convert to Christianity, and it has taken the lead in banning books by reformers.
There are other dangers apart from the Egyptian government for those accused of blasphemy. Charges of insulting Islam inflame passions, and extremists have manipulated crowds to incite deadly riots. In 2005, for example, a newspaper reported that a play performed in St. George’s Church in Alexandria had “insulted Islam,” resulting in a 5,000-strong mob attack on eight churches, with four killed and ninety injured. In another incident, the late Naguib Mahfouz, the only Arab winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature, was stabbed and partially paralyzed by an extremist who thought that his novels insulted Islam.
Pakistan, which has also taken the lead in introducing the OIC’s annual antidefamation resolutions at the UN, has codified some of the world’s most draconian anti-blasphemy laws, which can carry a life sentence or the death penalty. As chapter 5 details, in Pakistan, while there have been no official executions for blasphemy, extremists have frequently murdered the accused before, during, or after adjudication, even when there was an acquittal. Lynch mobs, whipped into hysteria by accusations of blasphemy broadcast from mosque loudspeakers, have assaulted, typically with impunity, thousands of coreligionists and families of the accused, attacking their houses of worship, homes, and businesses, and destroying entire villages.
Muslim reformers are silenced. Author Younus Shaikh was sentenced to life in prison for “deviating from the teachings of the Quran” by criticizing rajam (stoning for adultery). A vastly disproportionate number of cases involve the Ahmadi and Christian minorities, who are particularly vulnerable since, in blasphemy cases, their testimonies count for less than that of Muslims. In Punjab in 2009, after an unsubstantiated accusation that a Qur’an had been desecrated, at least seven Christians were burned alive and over fifty houses torched. Credible reports indicated that extremist groups linked to Al-Qaeda were involved. In 2011, extremists murdered Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti and Governor Salman Taseer for calling for abolition of the blasphemy laws.
Chapter 6 describes how Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution, drafted with the financial support and legal guidance of the United States and the United Nations, contains a clause asserting that no law can contradict Islam—a law that is often the basis for punishing apostasy and blasphemy. Abdul Rahman, a Christian convert who was imprisoned, was later freed, and subsequently fled the country after international pressure, is the most widely known instance, but there is an ever-lengthening list of such cases, especially involving Muslim journalists. The editor of the magazine Haqooq-i-Zan (Women’s Rights) was imprisoned for blasphemy for arguing against the apostasy law. Sima Samar, the minister for Women’s Affairs, was accused of blasphemy for her criticism of the adoption of Islamic law but was spared after international protest erupted. In 2008, a student journalist was condemned to death, a sentence later commuted, for downloading and circulating material on women’s rights under Islam. Despite the presence of NATO forces and UN agencies, religious repression—even in government-controlled areas of Afghanistan—appears to be increasing.
Chapter 7, “The Greater Middle East,” describes some events in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Yemen, and elsewhere in the area. Despite their very great differences from one another, each also represses expression deemed insulting to Islam. Algeria has been cracking down on Christians because of fears of conversions, especially among the Kabyle people. There has been a similar pattern in Morocco. In both countries, this might also be tied to fears of conversions by Sunnis to Shiism, and the connection this might have to Iranian influence. Jordan is similar and has also pressured Muslim journalists and a poet. Libya, though varying with Qadafi’s idiosyncrasies, has usually been far harsher in its treatment of converts. In Yemen, Jews, Baha’is, converts, and journalists have been persecuted, and several leading Muslim scholars have declared that those pushing for the reform of marriage laws were apostates. In Turkey, the minority Alevi Muslims suffer widespread discrimination, while writers and other reformers, as well as converts, can be accused of insulting the “Turkish nation,” which can incorporate a religious dimension because Islam is regarded as an integral part of the Turkish nation.
Chapter 8, “Africa,” covers three countries: Nigeria, the largest by population; Sudan, the largest by area; and Somalia, which is, in 2011, probably the most religiously repressive area in the Muslim world. In Nigeria, with the growth of more militant forms of Islam, accusations of apostasy and blasphemy have led to riots and murders, with certainly hundreds, and probably thousands, dead. There are also violent militias, such as Boko Haram, which appear to regard everyone else as a blasphemer or apostate who must be attacked. Somalia is torn between rival jurisdictions and rival militias, none of which is open to political or religious difference. Among them is the radical Islamist Al-Shabab—the Union of Islamic Courts—movement. It enforces its radically repressive version of sharia, which bans music and bells, destroys graves and anything else that it believes smacks of Sufism, and is embarked on a policy of exterminating every Christian in the country, including by beheading children. Apart from its genocide of minorities and political repression, Sudan executed its leading Muslim scholar for apostasy and implicitly charged a UN Special Rapporteur with blasphemy, and its agents declared hundreds of thousands of Nuba Muslims apostates who deserved death.
Chapter 9, “South and Southeast Asia,” covers Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Maldives. The Maldives bans all religion except Sunni Islam and has used religious restrictions to crack down on religious and political reformers. The other three countries have reputations for moderation, some of them deserved, but there seems to have been an intensification of religious repression in recent years. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, Ahmadis are repressed, as are heterodox groups and Muslims who express reformist and modernist views. While there is government repression, a larger problem is violence by mobs and militias that the government cannot or will not control. Malaysia has had ongoing legal struggles over the conversion of Muslims to other religions, is trying to restrict the religious words that non-Muslims may use, and, claiming that it
s population is easily confused and so should not be exposed to a range of views, is also repressing heterodox and reformist Muslims.
This survey of Muslim countries provides insights into the wide range, significance, effects, and baleful consequences of laws and vigilante actions against those accused of insulting Islam in the Muslim world. It is only against this background that the dangerous possibilities such restrictions pose to the rest of the world—either through the United Nations or by direct pressure on Western governments—can be seen.
Attempts to Internationalize Blasphemy Restrictions
In part III, “The Globalization of Blasphemy,” we give an overview of attempts to transplant restrictions on “insulting Islam” to the West. These instances have occurred in particular Western countries and in the United Nations, taking place in commissions, conferences, courts of law, or in the streets through vigilante action. Some of the larger and more famous examples in the West have had such a complex and long-lasting international backlash and effect that they must be treated as special cases. These are detailed in chapter 10 and include the continuing affair of The Satanic Verses, renewed when author Salman Rushdie was given a knighthood by the British government. We also focus on the so-called Danish cartoons crisis of 2005–6, which continues to reverberate when the images are republished or forbidden to be printed, as in 2009 when Yale University Press censored them and other images from a book detailing the cartoons crisis itself. Other examples include the Newsweek account of a Qur’an flushed down a toilet at Guantanamo, a report which was later disproved; Pope Benedict XVI’s controversial speech at Regensburg; and Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders’s provocative film, Fitna. One feature of these upheavals was that they frequently involved political manipulation. For example, the Danish cartoons were first published in September 2005 and later republished, even in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia, without any outcry. It was only in January 2006, following a decision by the OIC in its Mecca meeting to make an issue of the caricatures, when riots, violence, and boycotts erupted and some 200 people were killed.
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