The Special Court for the Clergy reached its verdict on the same day as Nouri’s arrest and trial. It found him guilty on fifteen counts, including publishing sacrilegious articles, opposing the teachings of the founder of the Islamic Republic, antireligious propaganda, insults against Khomeini, destabilization of public opinion, and advocating relations with the United States. Under the vagaries of Iranian legal practice, these charges could amount to heresy, with an attendant death penalty, but he was instead sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and fined fifteen million rials. However, in October 2002, he was released after his brother, Alireza Nouri, a member of Parliament, was killed in a car accident. Mehdi Karroubi, the Speaker of the Parliament, wrote to the Supreme Leader asking that Nouri be freed out of consideration for his grieving father.112
Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri and Mojtaba Lotfi
After religious student and blogger Mojtaba Lotfi posted on the Internet a sermon from the oppositionist Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, he was arrested in the city of Qom on October 8, 2004, and charged with “spreading false information about the Supreme Guide.” Montazeri’s son-in-law, Mojtaba Feiz, also had his home searched but he was not detained.113 Three days after the arrest, the pro-regime newspaper Jomhouri Eslami said that Lotfi was “one of the carriers of false information via the anti-revolutionary media.”114 This was not Lotfi’s first arrest. In 2004, shortly after posting an article titled “Respect for Human Rights in Cases Involving the Clergy,” he was arrested and sentenced to three years and ten months in prison, though he was released on bail, pending an appeal hearing that was never scheduled.115
Many commentators believe that the real target of the arrest was Montazeri, a prominent religious critic of the regime who also met with political reformers and encouraged them to unite to challenge Ahmadinejad in the then-upcoming elections. Montazeri had major religious stature, being a grand marja, a source of emulation, and, until 1989, was believed to be the designated successor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. However, a falling-out with Khomeini over Montazeri’s criticism of the regime’s restrictions on freedom and human rights ended that possibility. Montazeri strenuously objected to the mass executions that took place in the period leading up to Khomeini’s death and stated after the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie that “[p]eople in the world are getting the idea that our business in Iran is just murdering people.” He also taught that apostates should not be subject to earthly punishments.116 He was placed under house arrest in October 1997, and his religious school was forcibly closed. However, in part through use of the Internet, he continued to criticize the regime and issue dissenting religious fatwas, including one demanding equal rights for Baha’is.117
Due to Montazeri’s religious stature, advanced age (born 1922), and large following, the regime remained cautious about targeting him directly and so tried to intimidate and silence him by attacking those, such as Lotfi, who posted his sermons. The sermon Lotfi posted called Ahmadinejad to task for calling Iran “the world’s freest country.” It challenged Ahmadinejad: “Why do your words not match your deeds inside the country? You call Iran the freest country in the world when you are outside, but inside Iran you deprive us of our basic and legal rights.” He went on to say that even he, a key participant in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, had had his property confiscated and his speech censored and, if this could happen to him, how much worse it must be for the average people of Iran.
Lotfi was held for six months and unofficially released on August 28, 2005. Because of the nature of his release, the regime did not confirm the completion of his sentence, and so the original charges and sentence remained in force. Due to the poor conditions under which he was held, as well as prior medical problems, Lotfi’s health deteriorated in prison, and he was seriously ill at the time of his release.118 In late 2008, he was rearrested, spent fifty days in solitary confinement, and was eventually sentenced to four years in prison and five years of exile. Charges included spreading the views of Ayatollah Montazeri. He was ordered to cease any activities related to cultural issues and not to publish his works.119
On September 14, 2009, following the disputed Iranian elections, Montazeri wrote on his website that Iran had become a “military regime” rather than an Islamic government: “The regime has savagely suppressed million-strong protestors who were legally objecting to the election outcome. A large number were arrested, and an unknown number were martyred in notorious jails.” He called upon senior clergy to stand in solidarity with the Iranian people and urged them to speak out: “The grand ayatollahs are well aware of their influence on the regime.… Their silence may give the wrong impression to people that the grand ayatollahs approve of whatever is underway.”120
Montazeri’s death from a heart condition on December 20, 2009, sparked student protests, while thousands flocked to Qom to pay their respects. Other grand ayatollahs visited his home. A number of travelers to Qom were arrested before reaching the city, and mourners there clashed with the Basij after what was perceived as insulting behavior by the latter.121 In the wake of his death, fellow Grand Ayatollah Youssef Sanei, also a source of emulation, sent a condolence telegram interpreted by Al-Ahram as a sign that Sanei hoped to take Montazeri’s place as a spiritual leader of the reformists. Shortly thereafter, the pro-government Qom Theological Lecturers Association ruled that Ayatollah Sanei’s religious pronouncements should no longer carry weight, although other clerical bodies quickly opposed the move. Sanei’s residence in Qom also came under attack by pro-government demonstrators.122
Post-Election Opposition Protesters
After the renewal of protests in Iran in December 2009, Ayatollah Khamenei and government loyalists called for protesters to be arrested and put to death for offending God and the prophet, as well as for insulting Ayatollah Khomeini.123 As part of this effort, the government charged opposition members with religious crimes, especially mohareb, or “making war against God and His Prophet.” As early as June, a regional prosecutor issued a warning to “the few elements controlled by foreigners who try to disrupt domestic security” that “the Islamic penal code for such individuals waging war against God is execution.”124 Hard-line General Muhammad-Ali Aziz Jaafari has been quoted as saying, “Those who demonstrate against the system are waging war on Allah,” and cleric Abbas Vaez-Tabasi has asserted that “[t]hose who are behind the current sedition in the country… are mohareb [enemies of God] and the law is very clear about punishment of a mohareb.”125
The charge of mohareb has also been raised in a number of cases involving protesters but in some cases has been thrown out by the courts. Several members of a group of sixteen protesters, arrested over their involvement with demonstrations on the holy day of Ashura in 2010, were charged with mohareb, a decision that drew protest in an open letter from sixty Iranian intellectuals, largely expatriates. Their letter asserted, “[I]f protesting is making war against God, then we are all warriors.” Exiled Iranian former president Abolhassan Bani Sadr also criticized the regime for abusing the term “enemy of God.”126 Nonetheless, a twenty-year-old university student connected with the Ashura protests was charged with mohareb, among other offenses, on February 3. The prosecutor claimed that part of the student’s crime consisted in his participating in a prayer service at which former President Rafsanjani gave a sermon.127 At least two oppositionists had been executed for mohareb by this time, and at least ten death sentences for mohareb had been issued by February 10.128 On March 4, 2010, mohareb was among the list of charges leveled against another group, this time of nine people, sentenced for their involvement with the Ashura demonstrations. Eight of those accused were sentenced to prison terms, and the ninth to death.129
Closing
The Iranian regime uses accusations such as apostasy, blasphemy, heresy, and even sorcery in a profligate and inconsistent manner to punish those individuals it sees as a threat to its rule, including religious reformists, intellectuals, student activists, religious minorities, an
d women’s rights activists.130 When expedient, it adds other charges not defined in statute such as “propagandists against the government of Islamic Republic of Iran,” “friendship with the enemies of God,” “hostility towards friends of God,” “corruption on earth,” “fighting against God,” “obstructing the way of God and the way towards happiness for all the disinherited people in the world,” “dissension from religious dogma,” “spreading lies,” “insulting the Prophet,” “distributing propaganda against the government of Islamic Republic of Iran,” “attracting individuals to the misguided sect of Baha’ism,” “insulting Islam,” “propagation of spiritual liberalism,” “promoting pluralism,” “calling into question the Islamic foundations of the Republic,” and even, our personal favorite, “creating anxiety in the minds of the public and those of Iranian officials.” Court reasoning in such cases may be taken from the writings of Khomeini or others considered authoritative, and the resulting punishments include beating, lashing, solitary confinement, amputation, life or lengthy imprisonment, execution, and extrajudicial punishments such as rape, sexual abuse, burning, starvation, and strangulation.
As noted above, this inconsistency suggests that, when there is nothing else with which to charge a person, the regime uses some variant of apostasy, which conveniently can carry the death penalty. The targeted undesirables can be Baha’is, whose very existence is treated as a crime, converts to Christianity, Jews, Sunnis, Sufis, or Shia religious or political reformists whom the state punishes for speaking their minds. Those charged with “apostasy” include Mahrami, who was never a Muslim; the Soodmans, father and son, who chose a religion other than Islam; Talibi, because he allegedly signed a document that stated his religion as Islam; and Rowhani, because he allegedly converted a Muslim woman to the Baha’i religion. Mekhoubad was executed because he spoke to relatives in Israel and America, and Hovsepian Mehr was murdered because he preached Christianity. Aghajari was charged because of speeches in which he challenged some Islamic practices. The only apparent consistency is the use of these laws to persecute and silence religious minorities and Muslim dissidents.
Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, conditions have deteriorated, and the increased demonization of Baha’is, Jews, and Sufis indicates darker days ahead. This is especially so in light of proposed reforms to the penal code that would give the regime a sharper tool with which to eradicate its undesirables. Although Ahmadinejad’s victory in the June 2009 elections remains disputed in the eyes of many reformers, and although the massive demonstrations in its wake may have revealed fractures in the regime’s political support system, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s iron grip is likely to remain firm against dissenters, and may even tighten, as long as clerical rule survives.
4
Egypt
On July 15, 2005, Sayed Al Qimni, one of Egypt’s most accomplished writers on religion—and one who has been heavily censored—received a death threat from Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Though he asked the police for protection, none was forthcoming. Two days later he received another letter from Al-Qaeda, this time saying that a team of five assassins had been organized and planned to “cleanse their own sins through his blood” by “ripping his head off.” The letter called Qimni “one of the walking dead” and threatened him with “the bullet of a passing car or a nearby rooftop.” Qimni was given a week to repent. He decided to stop writing, giving interviews, and attending debates, explaining that, while he had resisted numerous threats to himself personally, recent letters had also threatened to kill his children and had described their whereabouts in detail. A year later, however, he announced his return to writing and fighting the Islamists.1
On July 16, 2007, Shaymaa al-Sayed, a twenty-six-year-old woman who had converted to Christianity several years before, was attacked in the street, along with her husband, by members of her family—they had been searching for her for four years. Police took al-Sayed into custody, ostensibly to protect her from the family, but then transferred her to the custody of State Security in Cairo. There she was tortured, including by electric shocks, and was photographed naked. On July 23, she was released to her family in Alexandria, who dragged her screaming from the police station and beat her severely before driving away with her.2
On March 29, 2009, during a discussion of the Baha’i religion on the Al-Haqiqa television program, Press Syndicate Board Member Gamal Abdel Rahem denounced one of the guests, Baha’i activist and dentistry professor Basma Gamal Musa. He declared that Musa was an “apostate” and ranted to his viewers, “This woman should be killed.” A Baha’i caller to the program reported that his Egyptian village, al-Shuraniya, was “full of Baha’is.” For five days after this announcement, Baha’i homes in the village, 200 miles south of Cairo, were attacked with firebombs, their water supplies were cut off, and local Baha’is received death threats. Although no one was reported injured, the police detained six people.3
Country Overview
Gamel Abdel Nasser, who led a coup in 1952 that overthrew Egypt’s monarchy, established a repressive police state and restricted the role of Islamic sharia to family law. However, in 1971, his successor, Anwar Al-Sadat, revised Article 2 of the constitution to read, “Islamic jurisprudence [sharia] is the principal source of legislation” (emphasis added), a change whose influence is still percolating through the legal system. Though the main body of law remains civil, the influence of sharia has been increasing, especially with the pressure exerted by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen, which emerged in the 1920s with the goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state. Until the 2011 revolution, the Brotherhood was illegal in Egypt under a law prohibiting political parties based on religion, but it fielded “independent” candidates and remains strong despite years of persecution and official banning. The Muslim Brotherhood functions today as one of the most powerful Islamist movements in the world.
After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Hosni Mubarak became president and declared a state of emergency that was renewed every three years since. Numerous radical Islamist groups became particularly violent in the 1980s and ’90s, attacking security forces, tourists, Christians, and moderate Muslims. These attempts at insurgency were met with heavy repression by the authorities, as well as restrictions on political and civil liberties, which have continued even after the armed infrastructure of radical Islamist groups was largely eradicated by 1998. To control extremism, the government has extended its legal control to all mosques, which, by law, require licenses. However, a large number of Egypt’s mosques remain unlicensed and operate outside of state control.
While Iran and Saudi Arabia are well known for their repression of religious dissent, Egypt has also been cracking down on departures from official Islam. The result is that the country’s intellectual and cultural life, which once set the pattern for much of the Arab world, has become increasingly stultified. Although Articles 40, 46, 47, and 48 of the constitution guaranteed equality before the law—freedom of belief, freedom of opinion, and freedom of the press—the political reality has been very different. The religious establishment has defended the government against political Islamist groups and in return is given authority over religious matters, including banning books, issuing fatwas on apostasy, and filing court suits.4 The doctrine of hisba, which entitles any Muslim to take legal action against anyone he considers harmful to Islam, provides Islamists extensive opportunities to harass intellectuals and others who arouse their displeasure. While no law specifically forbids blasphemy or apostasy, Article 98(f) of the penal code, which prohibits “ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions,” functions as a de facto blasphemy or apostasy law. The law, in principle, also forbids insulting Judaism and Christianity, but in practice only alleged insults to Islam are prosecuted, including by Muslims who object to the official version of Islam.5 This situation fans religious violence and bigotry.
In the early months of 2011, Egypt entered a period of turmoil. Beginning on January 25, 2011, hundreds of tho
usands of demonstrators, inspired by the overthrow of the regime in Tunisia, began to gather in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, calling for a democratic and free Egypt. When the military refused to repress the demonstrators by lethal force, on February 11, 2011, longtime President Mubarak resigned. The military announced that elections were slated for approximately fall 2011, a deadline that many opposition parties said was too soon to allow them to organize. Meanwhile, Egypt’s repression of religious minorities has continued and intensified with violent attacks on Copts in particular.
The majority of Egypt’s eighty-three million people are Sunni Muslims. There is a small number of Shias and Baha’is, and fewer than 100 Jews. Egypt’s Christians, predominantly Coptic Orthodox, comprise some 10 to 15 percent of the population and thus constitute by far the largest non-Muslim minority in the Middle East. The Coptic Orthodox Church is an ancient community, dating from the first century of the church.
Religious Minorities
Baha’is
Due to widespread accusations that they are heretics, blasphemers, or apostates, Baha’is are probably the most repressed religious group in Egypt. The community originally consisted of people from Iran, but Egyptians have also converted, and Egypt’s Baha’i population now numbers several thousand. In the 1920s, Egypt’s highest ecclesiastical court declared the religion’s independence, saying, “The Baha’i Faith is a new religion, entirely independent, with beliefs, principles and laws of its own, which differ from, and are utterly in conflict with, the beliefs, principles, and laws of Islam. No Baha’i, therefore, can be regarded a Muslim or vice-versa. …”6 Law 263, passed in 1960, deprives Baha’is of legal recognition and also prohibits Baha’i institutions and community activities, while all Baha’i community properties, including cemeteries, were seized by the government under Nasser. On December 15, 2003, the state-funded Islamic Research Center (IRC) of Al-Azhar University issued a fatwa declaring Baha’is apostates and urging the state to “annihilate” the community. Most Baha’is are known to the security services, and many are harassed and subjected to surveillance. State security cracked down on them in 1965, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1985, and 2001, arresting several hundred people. In early 2001, the government arrested eighteen people in Sohag on suspicion of insulting a heavenly religion and violating the law abolishing Baha’i institutions. They were released in October of that year.7
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