In 1998, Biro was replaced as Special Rapporteur to Sudan. Sudan continued many of its atrocities, now widely recognized as genocide, in the south for several years and commenced new ones in Darfur.
United Nations and Blasphemy: An Overview
In recent years, in what they say is an effort to quash culturally insensitive “insults to Islam,” members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have sought to silence UN criticism of Islamic practices and values in their own countries and have used the UN human rights mechanisms as instruments for suppressing anti-Islamic speech generally. This effort began well before the Danish cartoon controversy and is a long-standing concerted campaign to shift international norms in the OIC’s favor. The attempts to stop “insults” to Islam were at first primarily defensive and aimed at shutting down UN criticism of human rights abuses. This included promulgating a separate and distinct version of “human rights in Islam,” whose entire content was declared subject to an undefined Islamic “sharia” law. The OIC members then sought, with some success, to give UN legitimacy to this parallel human rights regime—the only religion-based system to win such recognition. OIC members have also threatened several UN Special Rapporteurs for criticizing Islamic regimes. OIC governments did this on the grounds that, since the regimes claim to represent Islam, any criticism of them is necessarily an “insult” to Islam itself.
In 1999, some Muslim-majority states began to argue that the UN must condemn and prohibit what the OIC labels “defamation of religions,” particularly of Islam. They have acknowledged that these “defamation of religions” resolutions are meant primarily to shield Islam and Muslims from criticism. The “defamation” push effectively seeks to redefine human rights in five ways, by:
1. treating religious matters under hate speech bans as if they were akin to racial matters;
2. granting rights to religions themselves rather than to individuals;
3. creating a new right not to be offended in matters of religion;
4. claiming that freedom of religion stands in opposition to freedom of expression;
5. giving an expansive interpretation to the exceptions to the right of freedom of expression.
Underlying this strategy is a rejection of the closely linked freedoms of expression and belief as universal, individual, and fundamental human rights.
The OIC succeeded in altering the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance and eliminating the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Sudan. Pressure was also brought against the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression. At the OIC’s urging, the UN adopted nonbinding resolutions denouncing “defamation of religions” every year between 1999 and 2010, first by the UN Commission on Human Rights and then, when the commission was formally disbanded, by its successor, the UN Human Rights Council. Since 2005, the UN General Assembly also has adopted resolutions on “defamation of religions.” After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, these resolutions emphasized the negative repercussions of such “tragic events” for Muslims, including the verbal linkage of Islam with terrorism. Since the 2006 Danish cartoon controversy, resolutions have also stressed the importance of placing limits on freedom of expression.
Initially, such “defamation” resolutions were adopted by consensus, but, in 2001, Western countries began voting against them, pointing to the resolutions’ undue emphases on a single religion; to their protection of religion as such rather than of individuals; and to their potential for abuse in silencing debate within religions. The European Union (EU) and the United States have rejected the entire concept of “defamation of religions” as invalid in human rights discourse, which, they argue, should center on individual rights. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has also criticized this concept, pointing out that religious freedom “does not include the right to have a religion or belief that is free from criticism or ridicule” and that restrictions on this basis threaten both free expression and religious freedom itself.5 The West increasingly weakened support for these resolutions, and, at the sixteenth session of the Human Rights Council in 2011, the OIC refrained from introducing the resolution, sensing it would fail to pass.
Amidst these pressures, proponents began to adopt other tactics, including recasting their case as opposition to “hate speech.” This push for expanded curbs on free speech based on existing prohibitions against incitement to racial and religious hatred is one which Western states seem ill-poised to resist; it remains a major reason for concern, since it is used to silence criticism of and debate within Islam, as well as criticism of those who violate human rights in Islam’s name.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference
The OIC, a fifty-seven-member body, headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was founded in 1969 to respond to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.6 Particularly since the OIC’s “Extraordinary Summit” in 2005 in Saudi Arabia, when discussion of the Danish cartoons helped ignite a global uproar, the OIC’s leadership has grown vociferous in denouncing “Islamophobia.” At its 2008 summit on Islamophobia in Dakar, Senegal, the OIC called for a “legal instrument” to ban defamation of Islam. The meeting resulted in the creation of its Observatory on Islamophobia, to protest crimes already banned by Western law, particularly vandalism against mosques, and offenses prohibited only by Islamic blasphemy rules, such as the sale of autographed copies of Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard’s cartoon depicting Muhammad in a turban-bomb. This latter category also included calls to ban simple expressions of opinion, notably the “One Law for All” campaign against the establishment of sharia law in the United Kingdom. Also deemed “Islamophobic” was the association of internationally famous critics of Islam established by Danish parliamentarian Naser Khader. Khader is a self-described “cultural Muslim” who has sought to promote moderate Muslim voices and to emphasize the compatibility of Islam and democracy in Denmark.7
The latest 2008 OIC charter pledges the organization “to protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam, and encourage dialogue among civilizations and religions.”8 It has adopted a “Ten-Year Program of Action” that includes the resolution “Endeavor to have the United Nations adopt an international resolution to counter Islamophobia, and call upon all States to enact laws to counter it, including deterrent punishments.” The article on Islamophobia on the OIC’s website declares “offensive” the terms “Islamic fascists,” “Muslim terrorists,” and “Islamist fundamentalist extremists,” and the group has made inroads in having the United States, the United Kingdom, and other governments adopt such lexicons.9
The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam
Beginning with the adoption of the “Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam” in 1990, OIC governments have attempted to win acceptance of a human rights framework that they claim is based on Islamic tradition. In its introductory sections, the declaration lauds, “[T]he civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Ummah which God made the best nation,” and expresses the hope to define “… the role that this Ummah should play to guide a humanity confused by competing trends and ideologies.” In structure, the declaration mimics the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but in substance, it subordinates each of the UDHR’s guarantees to an undefined Islamic law. The guarantee of free expression reads: “Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Sharia.” Similarly, information “may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith.”
The declaration effectively bars debating Muslims about their religion, stating that “Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism.” Article
25 stipulates, “The Islamic Sharia is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration.”10
Thus, an undefined sharia is the governing rule, and other human rights principles must yield to it. The declaration is also premised on the fiction that there is a consensus in the Islamic world on sharia. Hence, if a state declares that its structure, policies, or acts are manifestations of sharia, and finds a compliant jurist to say that this is so, then it could claim a warrant to override any conflicting human right.
OIC efforts to win acceptance of the Cairo Declaration at the UN have met with some success. The declaration has been invoked in a number of official UN reports and in a resolution and is repeatedly cited in communications from OIC-member governments to the UN.11 The UN has in effect, and without precedent, given stature to an instrument of an institution of one particular religion that undercuts the civil and political human rights enshrined by the world body and is controversial even among Muslims themselves.12
The UN has implicitly endorsed the notion of a unique Islamic version of human rights by staging several events on the subject. In 1998, at the suggestion of Iran, the UN hosted an OIC-sponsored seminar, “Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” which provided a platform for government-approved “experts” to promote sharia, while shutting out UN-registered nongovernmental organizations.13 In 2002, the UN held a second seminar on human rights in Islam at whose conclusion, Mary Robinson, then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, declared that “[n]o one can deny that at its core Islam is entirely consonant with the principle of fundamental human rights, including human dignity, tolerance, solidarity and equality” and that it “bestowed rights upon women and children long before similar recognition was afforded in other civilizations.”14 Even though demands for a separate, culturally specific rights regime would seem to suggest the contrary, Robinson declared, “No one can deny the acceptance of the universality of human rights by Islamic states.”15
Attacks on UN Rapporteurs and NGOs
The first Muslim government attempt to exempt their states from human rights critiques occurred in 1994, when—as noted—the Sudanese government accused UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan Gaspar Biro of committing “blasphemy” with his human rights report. Sudan had support for its stance. In 1999, the Arab League submitted to the UN a pointed resolution defending Sudan from “foreign intervention” in its internal affairs. This resolution declared that all allegations of slavery in Sudan constitute “part of the campaign to mar the image of the Arabs and the Muslims and offend their community and civilization.”16 Sudan’s massive human rights violations and war crimes against humanity continued and escalated to become what is now widely recognized as genocide.
In 1997, Indonesia’s delegate for the OIC accused the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism of blasphemy for a passage in his report dealing with anti-Semitism. The rapporteur had included the statement, “Muslim extremists are turning increasingly to their own religious sources, first and foremost the Qur’an, as a primary anti-Jewish source.” After Pakistan called it “an insult to Islam” and other states complained, the Commission on Human Rights adopted—without a vote—a resolution in which it protested the reference to the Qur’an and requested that it be deleted.17 Thereafter, the section on anti-Semitism mentioned only Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as specific problem areas.18 Thus, in the name of sensitivity to religion, an entire region of the world was exempted from UN scrutiny on anti-Semitism. Also under OIC pressure, the commission suspended its monitoring of Iran in 2002. As in the Sudanese case, Iranian human rights abuses continued apace. It was not until March 2011 that the UN’s premier human rights body, which was by then the Human Rights Council, again decided to resume special reporting on human rights violations in Iran.
Following a protracted struggle with a group of NGO speakers, OIC states also demanded and obtained a de facto ban on mentioning Islamic institutions in the Human Rights Council. Despite the fact that these same governments have sought to promulgate a specifically faith-based declaration of human rights within the UN—in many cases citing Islam as a source in national laws and constitutions, and even organizing themselves into a self-proclaimed Islamic voting bloc—their sudden contradictory contention that Islam is not a proper topic for discussion within the council won over the council’s leadership.
OIC-member states then used this implied ban as a means directly to silence their NGO critics within UN human rights fora.19 Sudan charged in August 1997 that Christian Solidarity International (CSI)—an NGO that had spoken and worked against slavery in that country—had “offended Islam … by implying that [Islam] condoned an ideology of genocide, and by alleging that what CSI termed an ‘Arab-Islamic State’ could order the collective punishment of communities that resisted its programs by consigning them to slavery.” Sudan also worked to get CSI’s status as an official NGO with the UN revoked.
In March 2008, several NGOs questioned the Cairo Declaration’s compatibility with the UDHR in a joint written statement to the council. The joint statement particularly noted references to sharia law and their implications for gender equality, religious freedom—specifically the right to change one’s religion—and freedom of expression, and it criticized the “defamation of religions” resolution.20 At the reference to sharia, both Egypt and Pakistan interrupted, the latter declaring that “[i]t is insulting for our faith to discuss sharia here in this forum.” The council’s president, Romanian Doru-Romulus Costea, accepted this point and asked the NGO to move on.21 In June 2008, David Littman, speaking for several NGOs, attempted to read a statement on the situation of women in Muslim countries and was stopped by the Pakistani delegate, who voiced “strong objections on [sic] any discussion, any direct or indirect discussion, any out-of-context, selective discussion on the sharia law in this Council.” Egypt rejoined, claiming that the council’s discussion of sharia law was inadmissible.
Council president Costea affirmed that “this Council is not prepared to discuss religious matters in depth. Consequently we should not do it.” His promise was put to the test when Littman, in the context of discussing female genital mutilation, stated, “We believe that only a fatwa from Al-Azhar Grand Sheikh Sayyad Tantawi … will change this barbaric, criminal practice.” Egypt immediately responded, protesting, “This is an attempt to link bad traditional practices to Islam,” and “Islam will not be crucified in this Council.” The president once again ruled in Egypt’s favor, seemingly placing out of bounds any discussion, not only of the contents of a fatwa or other religious edict, but also quite possibly of any legal system with a purported sharia basis.22 Costea explained to reporters that, since discussions about religion would be “very complex, very sensitive, and very intense,” only religious scholars should enter into such questions and that mention of religious causes for rights abuses would be “unhelpful, to say the least, for both the human rights in question and for a true, genuine dialogue among followers of various religions.”
As an Amnesty International spokesman put it, “If Pakistan can come and say that that murder of women for some perverse sense of honor has nothing to do with universally recognized human rights, we’re in trouble.” Even outgoing UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, who had previously expressed some support for the OIC’s campaign, said she feared that a council “which should be … the guardian of freedom of expression” was promulgating “constraints or taboos, or subjects that become taboo for discussion.”23
While the Human Rights Council’s president had cast his decision as an evenhanded effort to avoid amateur theologizing, the selectivity of the OIC states’ concern was clear. Despite their distress at the invocation of the name of Sheikh Tantawi, they had been remarkably unperturbed when Doudou Diène chastised evangelical leaders Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and Franklin Graham for their “Islamophobic rhetoric.” Meanwhile, Pakistan, for the OIC, had used the council itself t
o declare in September 2006 that “[t]he recent reference by Pope Benedict XVI to the Prophet Muhammad had hurt the sensibilities of Muslims.”24 Discussions of “hurtful” pronouncements by Islamic leaders, on the other hand, were to remain off-limits.25
The UN as Blasphemy Monitor: Resolutions 1999–2002
Beginning in 1999 in the UN Human Rights Commission, OIC members began a more coordinated campaign of blanket condemnation of any commentary they could construe as a “defamation” of Islam. Resolutions to this effect were then adopted regularly until 2011, when the OIC, sensing defeat, did not introduce the resolution in the council. (At this writing, it can not be foreseen whether the defamation resolutions will be reintroduced in subsequent years and what their prospects for adoption would be.) Meanwhile, the West moved from unsuccessfully seeking compromise resolutions in 1999 and 2000 to opposing such resolutions altogether. The origin of these resolutions was a 1999 statement before the General Assembly made by Jordan’s foreign minister, which protested purported efforts to “establish a linkage between Islam and those extremist and terrorist movements that hurt Islam and Muslims by using religion as a tool.”26 This opened the possibility that, since terrorists and rights violators themselves invoked Islam, criticism of them could be construed as an act of “defamation.”
Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide Page 34