Freedom of belief for Muslims—particularly freedom to change religion—is one aspect of the right to religious freedom that is particularly targeted for criticism by many Muslims. They argue that this freedom, as conceptualized in international human rights instruments, is not in line with Islamic norms, values, and laws. According to proponents of this view, Muslims do not have the right to leave Islam and convert to another religion or to no religion at all. Under the classical Islamic law of apostasy, the penalty for leaving Islam is death. In the words of one Muslim religious leader: “The person who knows the truth [Islam] and believes in it, [but] then turns his back on it, does not deserve to live. The punishment for apostasy is prescribed for the protection of the religion and as a deterrent to anyone who is thinking of leaving Islam. There is no doubt that such a serious crime must be met with an equally weighty punishment.…”1
Nevertheless, classical Muslim apostasy laws, as well as other restrictions on religious freedom in the Muslim world, are increasingly being opposed by Muslims, as well as non-Muslims, at local, national, and international levels. There is growing pressure on Muslims to comply with international standards on human rights from major international bodies such as the United Nations and Amnesty International, as well as from influential powers such as the United States and the European Union.
A careful examination of the debate reveals that current human rights discourse is not just a Western one. It is shared by a large number of Muslims as well. Muslim-majority states, as members of the United Nations, accept in principle the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and many have even ratified major human rights conventions. Constitutions in Muslim states often reflect the principles of the UDHR. Moreover, as a sign of participation in this global discourse, even some more traditionalist Muslims have developed what they consider to be “Muslim” human rights documents. These are generally modeled on the UDHR or similar human rights instruments but use Islamic ideas and terminology.
The political background of the prophetic and post-prophetic period against which the classical Islamic law of apostasy was formulated played a significant role in the development of this law and associated restrictions on freedom of religion. In the political context of the Prophet’s time, a person either belonged to the community of believers (Muslims), the unbelievers (non-Muslims) who were at peace with Muslims, or the unbelievers who were at war with Muslims. If one leaves Islam and the Muslims and their allies, there is no option but to join the opposition. An apostate, therefore, was perceived to have automatically joined the non-Muslim side, becoming part of the enemy ranks and using apostasy as a means to attack and inflict maximum harm on the Muslim community. Thus the question of apostasy in early Islamic history was closely associated with the safety and security of the Muslims. Apostates were deemed a serious social and political threat to the whole community.
The punishment for apostasy—based on texts such as the hadith, “If anyone changes his religion, kill him”2—came about within this sociopolitical context. The person referred to in the hadith was a muharib or someone who was in a state of war against Muslims. Under classical Islamic law anyone who was engaged in war against Muslims could be put to death.3 Thus one could argue that in early Muslim reasoning, apostasy was more akin to treason, rather than a matter of simply changing one’s belief. The death sentence therefore was punishment for committing a serious political crime.
The years following the death of the Prophet Muhammad were also marked by a great deal of social and political tension in the body politic of the Muslim community. This also influenced early conceptions of apostasy and related offences, such as blasphemy and heresy. Problems developed among Muslims that were not simply about political leadership of the community but also about what and who represented religious authority. As the Muslim caliphate expanded and Muslims came into contact with customs, traditions, and practices from outside of Arabia, debates arose as to what was acceptable in Islam, who should be the legitimate political authority, and even who was a Muslim. Some Muslims remained politically neutral in these disputes, while others were eager to take sides. It was in this context that several groups with specific theological or religio-political orientations began to emerge in Arabia, Syria, and Iraq. Such groups included the Kharijis, the Shia, the Qadaris (supporters of free will), and the Jabris (supporters of predestination). Their divisions continued to create tension and conflict within the body politic of the Muslim community.
State involvement in theological matters also began relatively early in Islam, particularly in the Abbasid period (750–1258 CE), which succeeded in wreaking further havoc within the Muslim community. Some rulers played a major role in reducing the scope available for discussion and debate on theological issues when certain views clashed with the state ideology. A good example of this is the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (d. 833). Freedom of belief for Muslims became severely curtailed when those who did not conform to state-adopted theological positions had to flee their towns, remain in hiding, or face torture and persecution, while being branded heretics or blasphemers.
It is important to note the high degree of fluidity and diversity in the understanding of what constitutes apostasy in the course of the development of apostasy laws. This state of affairs has been used by political and religious figures throughout history and up through the present day to control, oppress, persecute, and eliminate opponents. For this reason, the potential for misuse of apostasy laws has always been considerable.
How well the apostasy laws are supported by the Qur’an and the practice of Prophet Muhammad is also debatable. There are significant counterarguments to the view that the punishment of apostasy by death is based on clear Qur’anic or prophetic instructions. Critics argue there is nothing in the Qur’an to justify a temporal punishment, such as death, for apostasy, and little to justify many of the apostasy laws that one finds in classical Islamic legal texts. Many of these laws were developed on the basis of certain isolated (ahad) hadith or their interpretations or on the basis of analogy (qiyas) and ijtihad. For example, the hadith, “Whoever changes his religion, kill him,” could be understood to mean converting from any religion to another, and therefore could be taken as a prohibition against converting to any religion. Even if its interpretation was restricted to simply prohibiting conversion from Islam, there are other versions of the hadith that seem to imply a clear connection between the instruction to kill the apostate and rebellion against the Muslim community. In reading such hadith, classical Muslim jurists favored readings and interpretations that supported the death penalty at the expense of those readings that opposed such a penalty. Clear textual proofs that guarantee certainty of knowledge (̀ilm qat́i) were lacking in this debate.
The point is that, because none of the textual proofs provided by Muslim jurists to support the death penalty for apostasy guarantees certainty of knowledge as understood in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), Muslims now have the opportunity to go back and rethink the law. Moreover, if the law is no longer practicable or relevant for the majority of Muslims, there is strong justification for reconsidering it. The argument that such laws have been traditionally backed by consensus (ijma’) should not be a deterrent. Numerous other laws in which there previously was a Muslim consensus have been subject to revision; some, as in the cases concerned with slavery and the caliphate, have been dropped altogether.
The nature of today’s debate on apostasy and apostasy laws in Muslim states is also important to consider. Malaysia, for example, is a multireligious society in which apostasy laws have been long debated. In various states of Malaysia’s federation, apostasy laws, not necessarily with the death penalty, are in place and arguably violate constitutional guarantees of religious freedom by requiring Muslims who want to renounce Islam to repent or endure detention for the purpose of rehabilitation and education.
The apostasy debate in Malaysia is also linked to Malay identity and politics. Both main political parties—th
e United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and the opposition and more Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)—use the debate to score political points by demonstrating their commitment to Islam. PAS has supported introducing the death penalty to deter Muslims from renouncing Islam, so the more secularist UMNO has been trying to demonstrate its Islamic credentials. As part of this agenda, UMNO has supported the introduction of Islamic banking, insurance, and mortgages and the increase of Islamic programming on television and radio and in other government-controlled media; and it has given more coverage to Islamic festivals than in the past. Several UMNO-governed states within the federation also have introduced or are preparing to introduce legislation making it difficult for Muslims to renounce Islam. Thus support for apostasy laws, along with other features of Islamization, is among the tactics being used to garner political support.
A number of important issues emerge from the Qur’anic treatment of the subject of freedom of religion. It is clear that the Qur’an supports the notion of religious freedom, including religious faith as an individual choice. Religious freedom is presented in the Qur’an in a variety of contexts and ways. Under Muslim rule historically, non-Muslims were allowed to govern their lives under the rules and values of their religious traditions. Muslims were instructed not to abuse or slander adherents to other religions—including idolaters—even though their beliefs, values, and practices were not supported or respected by the Qur’an. The Qur’an also rejected forced conversions, as emphasized in the well-known verse, “There shall be no coercion in matters of faith …”4 The principle of personal responsibility that is a strong current through the Qur’an also emphasizes that each person is given the capacity to discern right from wrong, and it is a personal decision as to which belief system, if any, to follow. According to the Qur’an, God’s plan for humankind is not that everyone should follow the same path.5 The Prophet’s task was primarily to explain the difference between right and wrong. Individuals then had the choice of whether or not to follow God’s path. This principle applies equally to Muslims who choose to leave Islam. Every person will be asked about his or her actions on the Day of Judgment and it will be the individual who will ultimately bear the responsibility for that choice in the afterlife.
Despite this, Muslim scholars of the classical period largely limited the scope of freedom available to a Muslim in choosing and adopting a religion or a belief system. They opted instead for a narrow definition of the right to religious freedom, confining it to the freedom given to non-Muslims either to remain under Islamic rule as “protected religious minorities” (ahl al-dhimma) or to convert to Islam. Conversion from Islam was banned absolutely. These scholars went against the general ethos of the Qur’an when they argued for state coercion to prevent Muslims from converting to other religions. The view of these early scholars is unsurprising as they functioned at a time when religious freedom and the concept of individual human dignity were not related in the way they are today. In the social and political environment of that earlier time, an individual generally became a “person” through association with a particular religion or tribe; and in the case of Islam, it was the religious tradition rather than the tribe that mattered most. In joining Islam, an individual automatically became part of the community of believers, which also functioned as a political unit, within the caliphate or emirate. Thus there was a conjunction between corporate religious identity rooted in the community and political identity. If someone rejected the community of believers, he or she was automatically excluded from the membership of the political community as well. This meant the complete loss of an individual’s basic rights, including the rights to life and to own property, which were conferred upon becoming a Muslim. Since an individual’s basic rights were dependent on being part of this community, the whole notion of apostasy and the punishment associated with it in the premodern period made sense.
In contrast, most Muslims today have moved away from this conjunction between religious community and political identity to a sort of separation between the two. Today, a political community in the sense of a nation-state does not have to be based on a religious community, and, in fact, most nation-states in the world are not based on this strict identification. As a rule, an individual can become a citizen of this political unit regardless of religious affiliation. This is true even in the majority of Muslim states, in which modern constitutions often guarantee religious freedom and equality before the law for all. Thus, in general, religious freedom has become a prima facie right in the modern period within the functioning of the nation-state. Notions of apostasy, driven by classical Islamic law that depended on the meshing of religious identity and political community, have therefore lost much of their political meaning.
With few exceptions, today’s societies are not “closed.” People move from one area to another and from country to country in an unprecedented manner. Migration, travel, and dual residence serve the purposes of education, business, recreation, and employment in a world driven by technologically advanced communication networks. Muslims migrate in large numbers to non-Muslim countries and, to a lesser extent, vice versa. Consequently people of diverse religions may live in close proximity or even side by side in the same neighborhood.
This unprecedented interaction and pluralism places substantial pressure on all Islamic scholars to offer new ideas about religious freedom relevant to today’s multireligious and multicultural world. The reaffirmation of classical laws, developed for a different time, place, and circumstance, is not particularly practical. In any event, many Muslims have in practice abandoned key aspects of the apostasy laws, particularly punishment by death. It is only in a few Muslim states that the law is still in force. Despite this, the question of apostasy continues to be hotly debated among Muslims. It finds its way into contemporary Islamic legal texts and discourse, with many traditionalists continuing to argue for the implementation of these laws.
On the practical problems posed by apostasy laws, one may argue that these laws have a great potential for abuse. There is a high degree of diversity in Muslim theological, legal, and religio-political positions and thought, and it is difficult to devise a creed that is applicable to and accepted by all Muslims. In addition to premodern divisions, new divisions have emerged among Muslims today, and Muslims from one group still often accuse their opponents of apostasy, heresy, and unbelief. Similarly, in a number of Muslim countries, the government assumes the responsibility of “protecting” local orthodoxies. Those who do not adhere to the government-sanctioned orthodoxy can be branded as deviants, heretics, or apostates. The potential for abuse is all the more real because governments in a number of Muslim countries are either semi-authoritarian or fully authoritarian; thus civil, political, and religious rights remain severely curtailed there. Moreover, religion and religious institutions in these countries are subordinated to the government, which can use its authority to persuade or, if necessary, force religious officials and institutions to question the religious beliefs of political opponents and dissidents. The authoritarian tendencies inherent in these countries also mean that there are very few, if any, institutional safeguards to check abuses, safeguards such as elected representatives of Parliament, independent courts, or a free civic society and media.
For these reasons, it is essential to formulate a concept of religious freedom that is in harmony with our current realities, taking into account both Islamic belief and religious diversity within nation-states. It is premature to believe that nation-states in the Muslim world are going to disappear or that, somehow, a new single Muslim state will emerge with a caliphal system in which one caliph leads the faithful. This idea, modeled on the premodern “caliph,” can only be described today as utopian, unrealistic, and impractical. Even a cursory look at the map of the Muslim world—with all its political, theological, economic, and cultural differences—reveals that there are considerable divisions and differences among Muslims that would prevent the realization of such an idea. It is in
conceivable that these Muslim states could be politically united under one umbrella, as some Muslims seem to believe, or that all Muslims will one day be residing in a dar al-islam (abode of Islam) that accommodates only Muslims as full citizens.
If we are right about world trends, we will see less, not more, compartmentalization of the world into religious blocs. On the contrary, globalization will bring far more linkages and mixes of people from a variety of religious backgrounds into the same space. With the increasing intensity of globalization, interaction, and multiculturalism, many of the classical ideas that Muslims inherited from the past are now impractical and unrealistic. Recognizing these new realities, many Muslim social and political systems have adopted modern ideas associated with religious freedom.
Two important but rarely discussed challenges to laws on apostasy are the increasing religious diversity in the world and the issue of “silent apostasy.” Today, nearly all Muslim countries are multireligious societies, and among a nation’s Muslim population are people with different legal, theological, or mystical traditions. Even in Saudi Arabia, where all citizens are required by law to be Muslims, there is a significant Shia minority population, in addition to the Sunni majority. Several million Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists also live there as long-term guest workers.
The number of Muslims living as minorities throughout the world is also increasing. Several million Muslims live in the United States and Europe as minorities. There are approximately 50 million Muslims in China and 150 million in India. In those places, apostasy laws have no legal consequences. Muslims are free to convert, apostatize, or simply not follow any religion at all, without any detriment to their basic rights. Today, the classical Islamic law categories of the “abode of Islam” (dar al-islam) and “the abode of war” (dar al-harb) are not useful to determine where Muslims are located. Given globalization and increasing fluidity and mobility, it is common for people of various faiths to live side by side. In a world of information exchange in which proselytizing is widely practiced, religious conversions will undoubtedly occur and religious boundaries will break down.
Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide Page 48