30. Virtually all references to Price say he was a native of Canning, Nova Scotia. In fact, he was born at Falmouth but grew up in a community known as Church Street, which lay between Port Williams and Canning.
31. John Parr is almost always described as being twenty years old when he died, and this is inscribed on his tombstone. In fact, he lied about his age when he enlisted in 1914 and was only sixteen.
32. Clements, 220, 221.
33. Leonard McGill, “How the 29th Received News of an Armistice,” The Gold Stripe 3 (June 1919): 51.
34. Quoted in Berton, 213. He was, without realizing it, expressing exactly the same opinion as the British Cabinet and War Office, which, recognizing that the German army had not actually been defeated in the field, expected a resumption of “the same war with the same allies within twenty years.” Winter, 239.
35. Clements, 221.
36. John English, “Foreword” in Schreiber, xi.
37. Worthington, Amid the Guns Below, 158.
38. Worthington, 159.
39. Clements, 222.
40. Quoted in Worthington, 159–60.
41. Cook, Shock Troops, 585.
42. Worthington, 160.
Chapter 15
The New Reality
New conditions must be met by new precedents.
—Robert Borden, 1918[1]
When the war ended on November 11, 1918, Borden was already at sea on his way to London to help plan for the peace conference. Lloyd George had alerted him on October 27 that the end of the war was imminent and thought it “very important” that he and the other Dominion leaders “should be here to participate in the deliberations” regarding the terms of the Armistice.[2]
In his response, Borden alerted Lloyd George that “the press and people of this country take it for granted that Canada will be represented at the Peace Conference” and cautioned him that “a very unfortunate impression would be created and possibly a dangerous feeling might be aroused” if this were not the case. “We discussed the subject today in Council and I found among my colleagues a striking insistence which doubtless is indicative of the general opinion entertained in this country.”[3]
He didn’t need to persuade Lloyd George of the validity of the Dominions’ claim to representation, but he knew there would be difficulties with President Wilson and Premier Georges Clemenceau of France. Indeed, what France initially proposed was that each of the major powers (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) should have five delegates, the “smaller” Allied powers three, new states recognized as Allies two, states in course of formation and neutral states one each.
What this implied was that the Dominions would have one representative each, while small powers like Belgium and Portugal would have three. This was totally unacceptable to Borden and the other Dominion leaders. As he forcefully told the Imperial War Cabinet on December 31, Canada had lost more men in the war than Portugal had put in the field, and if Portugal were given greater representation than Canada, the reaction “would be such as he did not care to suggest, or even contemplate.”[4]
Lloyd George took the battle to Clemenceau and Wilson. When he explained that the Dominions collectively had contributed a million soldiers, Clemenceau yielded, saying “Come—and bring your savages with you.”[5] The Americans were more difficult. When Secretary of State Robert Lansing wondered why Canada should be involved in the settlement of European affairs, Lloyd George bluntly reminded him that Canada, with a tenth of the population, had lost more men in the war than the United States. Wilson was more sympathetic but did suspect that the British were just trying to increase “imperial” representation at the Conference. Not unreasonably, he wondered why Canada and the other Dominions were entitled to separate representation if they were being included in the British Empire Delegation.
In the end, a compromise was reached: the larger Dominions would each have two representatives, but New Zealand would have only one, and Newfoundland would be represented through the British Empire Delegation. Because all of the Dominions were also represented in the British Empire Delegation, they (along with India) actually enjoyed dual representation at the conference, separately as powers in their own right and collectively as members of the British Empire Delegation.
The reality was that there was no clear principle or logic in the way that representation at the peace conference was finally determined. India, which no one claimed was an autonomous nation, received equal representation with the larger Dominions on the grounds that it had made a very significant contribution to the war effort, while Belgium and Serbia were allowed three representatives, and Brazil was raised to three because Wilson hoped this might offset the German influence in that country!
In the end, it really didn’t matter, except symbolically, because all the major issues were dealt with by the Council of Five: Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan. Indeed, all the major issues were decided privately by Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson. There were few plenary sessions, and they were not much more than formalities. In Stacey’s words, the conference was “in many respects a gigantic sham.” Because nothing was settled by voting, “the complicated apparatus of representation on which so much time and ink had been spent was meaningless.”[6] When it came time to sign the treaty, the Dominions were only allowed to sign it under Britain’s name.
Even so, Borden saw this as a significant advance in Canadian autonomy. Perhaps just as important, at least to him, was that the Dominions were able to play a larger role at the conference than other small powers because they were part of the British Empire Delegation. This gave them, as Loring Christie rightly observed, “a peculiarly effective position.”[7] Borden personally played a very active role in the Delegation, because he was the most respected of the Dominion leaders, and served as its chairman whenever Lloyd George was unable to attend.
Canada’s autonomy was also recognized when it was allowed to join the International Labour Organization, and more importantly, the new League of Nations. The real significance of this was qualified, however, by the fact that India was also admitted to the League despite being governed from London.
The importance of Borden’s role at the Paris peace conference has not been generally recognized outside of Canada, either then or since. More than any other person, he was responsible for the new status that the Dominions achieved there. Borden was not a boastful man, but he did subsequently claim that Canada had led the way among the Dominions in insisting on their rights, for the most part “without active assistance” from the other Dominions.” As Stacey says, “if this was an exaggeration, it was not a very great one, and there is a good deal of evidence to support Borden’s statement.”[8]
Canada’s contribution to the Paris peace conference was more significant than that, however, because Borden was also deeply committed to doing whatever he could to preserve the Anglo-American alliance. The British government shared this goal, but its achievement was sorely tested by Australian, New Zealand, and South African territorial ambitions. They had captured and occupied German territories in the South Pacific and southwestern Africa and were determined to keep them. President Wilson was equally determined that colonialism should be replaced in the postwar world by a new concept of international trusteeship.
This issue proved to be the most dangerous threat to Anglo-American harmony at Paris. Britain, while prepared to accept the American position, understandably felt obliged to support the three Dominions in the interest of imperial unity. Borden, however, playing a mediating or “linchpin” role in the Imperial War Cabinet and in the British Empire Delegation, did much to persuade Britain and the other Dominions of the wisdom of accepting Wilson’s point of view. The result, which applied to British and French territorial ambitions in the Middle East as well, was to transfer the areas in question to the League of Nations, which then assigned them to the various governments to administer on its behalf. Instead of colonies, these places became mandated territories
.
Throughout these discussions, Canada self-righteously proclaimed that it had no territorial ambitions of its own, but this was not quite true. In 1916 Borden had shown real interest in a proposal by a Canadian business group that Canada should take over the administration of the British West Indies. And during a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet’s Sub-Committee on Territorial Desiderata in April 1917, the Canadian representative, J. D. Hazen—Minister of Marine, Fisheries, and the Naval Service—expressed Canadian interest in acquiring St. Pierre, Miquelon, Greenland, and the Alaska Panhandle. In view of the fact that these places all belonged to Allies or a neutral power—France, the United States, and Denmark—this curious proposal obviously went nowhere.
In August 1918, Leo Amery, assistant secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet (he was also a member of parliament and a future first lord of the admiralty, colonial secretary, and secretary of state for India), revived the idea of Canada taking over the British West Indies, throwing in Newfoundland and the Falkland Islands for good measure. Borden was still interested, believing that their acquisition would be “some recognition of if not compensation for Canada’s sacrifice in this war,”[9] and Lloyd George later claimed to have had “many a talk” with him on the subject.[10] Although Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, was not supportive, Borden persisted even after the peace conference. He only finally abandoned the idea in the spring of 1920 because he had reservations about potential racial problems and declining public support for imperialism, and feared the possible negative American reaction to the consolidation of British colonies in the Caribbean region under Canadian control.[11]
Meanwhile, even though the war had ended in November 1918 and Allied leaders were formulating the peace treaty, Canadian troops continued to serve overseas and engage in combat until the autumn of 1919. Indeed, troops were actually sent overseas in December 1918, a full month after the war had ended. It is worthwhile to examine briefly this largely forgotten footnote to the war.
Three Allied interventions in Russia took place in 1918–19, and Canada participated in all of them. These interventions were initially prompted by the collapse of the Eastern Front in February 1918 when the new revolutionary government in Russia signed a peace treaty with Germany. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave Germany major territorial gains in the east and enabled it to transfer large numbers of soldiers, equipment, and supplies to the Western Front, making possible the massive spring offensive discussed in the last chapter. The treaty also gave Germany access to critical resources such as wheat and coal in Ukraine, oil in the Caspian region, and large stockpiles of military equipment and supplies that had been sent by the Allies to Archangel in northwestern Russia.
Allied leaders claimed that their goal was not to bring down the Bolshevik government because it was communist but only to support those in Russia who were committed to carrying on the war. This argument might have been more persuasive if the military interventions had terminated with the Armistice in November 1918. They did not, and there can be little doubt that Lloyd George, Wilson, and Borden saw Bolshevism as a threat to the established order not just in Russia but in their own countries. Social and political unrest was rampant in 1918–19 because of the horrendous cost of the war in human lives, conscription, inflation, and wage controls, but politicians preferred to blame it on the subversive influence of Bolshevism or radical socialism. While many, including Borden, did believe that the war should lead to a better world, they certainly didn’t have communism or socialism in mind.
Thus, when the War Office called in January 1918 for volunteers to serve in a military intervention in Azerbaijan, 41 Canadian soldiers were among the approximately 1,000 soldiers who formed the unit, which became known as Dunsterforce after its commanding officer, Major General Lionel Dunsterville. Canadian pilots served in RAF units operating in the area at this time as well. These were not the first Canadians to serve in the region during the war. Five officers and twenty-five men from the Canadian Pioneer Depot in England had served in Britain’s Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.
Dunsterforce’s task was to prevent both revolutionary Russia and Turkey (which was allied with Germany) from seizing control of the Baku oilfields. The mission proved to be a farce because when a Turkish force attacked Baku in September the British promptly evacuated the city. A week later Turkey signed an Armistice with the Allies. Baku was then reoccupied by a British-Indian force until 1920, when the Soviet Union established the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic with Baku as its capital. Farce or not, one Canadian was left behind: Sergeant Donald MacDonald of Calgary, formerly of the 10th Battalion, had contracted smallpox and was evacuated to Bombay, where he died on December 5, 1918.[12]
Meanwhile, Allied troops were also sent into northwestern Russia to occupy Murmansk, a town established during the war on the White Sea near Archangel because its ice-free harbor could receive Allied shipments of war materiel. At the end of 1917 there was believed to be more than 163,000 tons of materiel at Archangel which had neither been delivered to the Russian army nor paid for.[13] When the Bolsheviks began to ship these supplies south in February 1918, but obviously not to support the war, the Allies decided to occupy Murmansk. This, they rather vaguely hoped, would prevent the Germans from occupying the port and would also encourage a reopening of the Eastern Front. The North Russian Expeditionary Force (NREF) comprised 13,000 troops from Britain, the United States, and France, along with smaller numbers of Serbs, Finns, Poles, Australians, Italians, and even Chinese.[14]
When invited to contribute troops to the NREF, Borden naturally agreed. Volunteers were called for, and twenty-seven officers and NCOs were seconded from units in England, particularly the 18th Reserve Battalion of the Canadian Railway Troops Corps. Another ninety-three officers and NCOs joined a “special mobile force” that was being organized to instruct the White Russian (i.e., Russians opposed to the Bolsheviks) troops. They were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Leckie of Vancouver, who had commanded the 16th Battalion in France. Then, when it was discovered that the American troops participating in the NREF were taking no artillery with them, Borden agreed to send the Sixth Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel C. H. L Sharman as well.[15]
By this time, the Germans were in full retreat on the Western Front, and there was no need to reopen an Eastern Front. The intervention carried on, however, its justification now being that the White Russian forces had to prevail over the Bolsheviks if a lasting peace and the new boundaries of Eastern Europe were to be secured. How serious the British and American leaders actually were seems questionable, however, in view of the fact that the troops sent by the British were “B” category men (i.e., men not deemed fit for combat), while none of the Americans had ever seen action. The Canadians were the only combat veterans. The expedition was supported by eight RAF aircraft operated by thirty pilots and observers, but the aircraft were obsolete and most of their crew had just completed their training in England and therefore had no experience. Almost half of them were Canadians.
In contrast to the Baku affair, real fighting took place during the North Russian intervention. It began on November 11, 1918, when two Canadians, Walter Conville and Stanley Wareham, were killed along with twenty-six other Allied soldiers. Sporadic fighting continued through the winter, even as it became increasingly obvious that the anti-Bolshevik forces were in retreat everywhere. The United States decided in February 1919 to withdraw its forces as did the Imperial War Cabinet in March. It was not until June that the Canadians actually pulled out, however, and their artillery instructors remained in Russia until September 18. The last Canadian killed in Russia was Dugald MacDougall of Lockport, Manitoba, an RAF captain seconded to the Royal Navy, who died near Archangel on August 25, 1919.
Meanwhile, the third Allied intervention had taken place when Vladivostok on the Pacific coast of Siberia was occupied by 73,000 Japanese troops plus 35,000 more from thirteen other countries, including Britain, Canada, and the United
States. Its mission, according to the War Office, was “to restore order and a stable government” in Siberia, provide assistance to the hapless Czech Legion which was thought to be fighting its way through Siberia to reach Vladivostok, and—of course—help to reopen the Eastern Front.
Newton Rowell, the senior Liberal in the Unionist government, inadvertently revealed the absurdity of the Siberian venture when he told the Canadian Club in Victoria, British Columbia, in September 1918 that failure to intervene in Siberia would allow Vladivostok to fall into the hands of Germany, giving it a base of operations on the Pacific and threatening the security of Canada’s west coast.[16] In September 1918, the German army was in full retreat on the Western Front.
Clearly, this made no sense. As with the two other interventions, the true explanation appears to be that the Allies hoped that the anti-Bolshevik forces could regain control of Russia if supported by the Western powers, although Borden’s motivations with respect to all three interventions were somewhat more complicated. In addition to agreeing that Bolshevism should be suppressed, he also believed that Canadian autonomy within the empire involved not just a meaningful voice in determining imperial foreign policy but a willingness to play a role in carrying out that policy. Thus, he warned Canadians that the country’s “present position and prestige would be singularly impaired . . . unless we proceed with [the] Siberian Expedition.”[17] There is also some evidence to suggest that Canada hoped to develop significant economic benefits from trade with and investment in Siberia if Bolshevism could be defeated.
Canada's Great War, 1914-1918 Page 30