I reply to Vietor via email: “I would point out that I included all of your on the record comments to me in my story and I would also repeat my request for an on-camera interview should you decide to provide someone from the administration to address these issues further.”
After all the stonewalling, it borders on humorous when, at a press conference two weeks later, on November 14, 2012, President Obama incorrectly tells reporters that his administration has provided all information regarding what happened in Benghazi.
“We have provided every bit of information that we have,” Mr. Obama tells reporters.
Does the president simply think that if he says it, people who don’t know better will be convinced? Or is he disconnected—misled by his staff into thinking all the questions have been answered? From my perspective, very few answers or documents have been given. Some were still dribbling out for the first time in 2014 as a result of a Freedom of Information lawsuit the conservative watchdog group JudicialWatch filed against the State Department.
In January 2013, I’m still seeking answers. The trajectory of this story seems to be following a course similar to Fast and Furious. The administration has deflected attention from its missteps by declaring the Benghazi story a scandal manufactured by Republicans for political purposes. Many in the media adopt the narrative and lose interest. The stories they do publish are often written as political reports without a thorough examination of what I consider key apolitical issues at heart.
I send a list of my unanswered questions in an email to Vietor to jog his memory. In case he’s forgotten.
What were the President’s actions that night?
What time was Ambassador Stevens’ body recovered, what are the known details surrounding his disappearance and death including where he/his body was taken/found/transported and by whom?
Who made the decision not to convene the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) the night of the Benghazi attacks?
We understand that convening the CSG is a protocol under Presidential directive (NSPD-46). Is that true? If not, please explain. If so, why was the protocol not followed?
Is the administration revising the applicable Presidential directive? If so, please explain.
Who is the highest-ranking official who was aware of pre-911 security requests from U.S. personnel in Libya?
Who is/are the official(s) responsible for removing reference to al-Qaeda from the original CIA notes?
Was the President aware of General David Petraeus’ potential [sexual scandal] problems prior to Thursday, November 8, 2012? What was the earliest that any White House official was aware? Please provide details.
What is your response to the President stating that on September 12, he called 9/11 a terrorist attack in light of his CBS interview on that date in which he answered that it was too early to know whether it was a terrorist attack?
Is anyone being held accountable for having no resources close enough to reach this high-threat area within 8+ hours on September 11 and has the administration taken steps to have resources available sooner in case of emergency in the future?
A Benghazi victim’s family member stated that Mrs. Clinton told him she would find and arrest whoever made the anti-Islam video. Is this accurate? If so, what was Mrs. Clinton’s understanding at the time of what would be the grounds for arrest?
If true, what is the administration’s view regarding other videos or future materials that it may wish were not published, but are legal?
What is the administration’s criteria in general for requesting removal of a YouTube or other Internet video?
Vietor, like Josh Earnest, apparently hasn’t been given the you-serve-the-public talk, either. He replies to me that he has no intention of giving answers unless I “correct all the stories about how we didn’t act fast enough to send troops to Benghazi when the [State Department’s Accountability Review Board] clearly said it wasn’t possible.”
“Our stories were entirely accurate and no correction is warranted,” I answer.
I then point out that the law doesn’t permit him to hold public information hostage to his demands for a certain behavior on the part of the media.
“[T]he info I’m asking for is public information, and you guys work for the public. We pay your salaries.”
“Thanks for paying my salary,” Vietor replies. “Your stories were terrible, misleading and did a disservice to all who read them.”
“Tommy, we’re not looking for thanks. We’re looking for the information that we own that you’re keeping secret. Politicians, government employees and their staff are not entitled to limiting the release of public information only when they like reporters or stories.”
“Thanks for the note,” writes Vietor. “I thoroughly reject your rationale for the response. I would point you to the [Accountability Review Board] report and hours upon hours of testimony for your answers.”
Of course, the answers to my questions aren’t in the Accountability Review Board’s report or the “hours upon hours of testimony.”
It’s spring 2014. An impeccable source who cannot go on camera tells me that Special Operators from the Commander’s in-Extremis Force (CIF) were launched on a C-130 airframe and headed toward Benghazi during the attacks. They traveled for about an hour before having to turn around and return to base. A second aircraft attempted to depart, but the pilot was late arriving and an argument ensued between the pilot and U.S. Special Operations Command Africa Commander Brigadier General James B. Linder. The general wanted an immediate departure but the pilot was objecting to gear that was being loaded. The pilot was concerned that the equipment had a lot of hazardous and unstable material. Apparently the pilot refused for long enough that the second aircraft never actually departed before the mission was canceled.
The administration has repeatedly denied that any such happenings occurred.
It’s another day. I’m somewhere out of state living my private life when another source affiliated with Special Forces approaches me. “We should’ve gone in to help,” he tells me. “We could have. We were ready. Someone at the highest level stopped us.”
| DYING FOR SECURITY
The entire Benghazi debacle begins with security threats ignored and security requests denied. But for me, the story begins three weeks after September 11, 2012.
Our correspondents have already broken some major news. There’s a feeling that much is yet to be uncovered. On the morning of Wednesday, October 3, I walk into the Washington, D.C., bureau newsroom and drop my bag near an empty desk and computer. The senior producer for Evening News is on a telephone conference call. He spots me and puts the call on mute.
“Pick up, they’re talking about you,” he says.
I join the call. The subject is the Benghazi story. On the phone are CBS News journalists conferencing in from New York, Washington, D.C., and London who are already working various angles. They share the latest about what they know and review the unknowns, inconsistencies, and controversies. The head of the CBS News investigative team in New York, Len Tepper, suggests I join in and see what I can dig up.
Rumors are circulating that the State Department denied the U.S. diplomats in Libya security they requested leading up to the brutal attacks. But there’s no proof. The witnesses and survivors are being kept secreted away. Nobody has seen or heard from them in public. It’s as if a strangely tight clamp is being kept on the information and people who hold the truth.
I start reading up on the public info and calling my contacts and sources. Two days later, I’m lucky to connect with the man who would provide the biggest break in the story to date: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wood. When I first contact him, Wood is in the middle of nowhere in Utah working in his civilian job to keep the nation’s dams secure from terrorist threats. Cell phone coverage is spotty. He tells me he’ll call back later.
I’m reaching out t
o Wood because my sources tell me that he led the last U.S. military security team in Libya. One that left just a month before September 11. What’s the story behind his team’s withdrawal? What was the security profile before and during the attacks? Most important, will he talk about any of this with me off or on camera?
Wood is a patriotic, mild-mannered Mormon family man. A longtime M-day soldier in the Utah National Guard. M-day is slang—short for “man day,” meaning he serves normal Guard duty one weekend a month and two weeks a year. But he’s no ordinary M-day soldier. He has thirty years of Special Forces experience: a highly decorated officer with expert training in counterterrorism. He wouldn’t blink if he needed to crush an enemy’s throat to save an American life. His National Guard duty has taken him on assignment in Afghanistan near the Pakistan border as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (2003–2004) and on a dangerous counterterrorism deployment in the Philippines (2006–2007).
In the Philippines in 2006, Wood’s expertise was applied to the insurgency and terrorism that have dominated the southern region for years. Terrorists exploit the area as a transitional route for entry into the United States and elsewhere. Planning for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center was conducted against the glorious backdrop of the Philippines’ coral-filled ocean and tropical forests. In fact, shortly after 9/11, President George W. Bush quickly opened a second front in the War on Terror in the Philippines. When Wood and his hundred-member team of specialists arrived on the volcanic island of Jolo in the Sulu province, it was ground zero for the Muslim extremist violence. They joined five thousand Filipino marines and soldiers in Operation Ultimatum, targeting an Islamic separatist movement linked to al-Qaeda called Abu Sayyaf. The Abu Sayyaf fighters proved to be proficient in the deadly arts of improvised explosive devices, bombings, and kidnappings. In 2006 and 2007, they murdered 53 people and injured 270. They’re also suspected in the November 2007 bombing of the Philippine House of Representatives, which killed a local congressman and four staffers. Wood’s men trained Filipino forces how to sniff out roadside bombs and take on the bad guys themselves. By February 2007, Jolo was deemed to be clear of terrorists.
Five years later, on February 12, 2012, Wood hit the ground in Tripoli, Libya, to be the commander of a sixteen-member counterterrorism military team put into place a few months before. The element was a joint force primarily made up of senior noncommissioned officers from Army Special Operations and Navy SEALs. His arrival rounded out a thirty-four-member elite security contingent that also included three U.S. State Department six-man SWAT-style Mobile Security Deployment teams.
I’m still waiting for Wood to call me back from Utah after he finishes the day’s fieldwork. Hours pass and I’m worrying that I might not hear back from him, when my cell phone finally rings. It’s Wood. He tells me he’s seen the news reports about Benghazi and heard a lot of speculation. He says that much of what the government is saying simply isn’t true. He’s grown increasingly agitated as no one steps forward to correct the information and fill in the blanks. I can tell he’s eager for the truth to be told, even though he’s not terribly eager to be its public face.
He agrees to talk to me about his assignment—and what went wrong. It’s Friday and there’s a sense of urgency for me to check out his story and, if warranted, get him on camera. If I’ve managed to locate him, other reporters can’t be far behind. If I try to fly out to him in Utah, it’s a day out and a day back with a day in the middle for the actual sit-down interview. The travel would cost me valuable research time on a fast-moving story. It would also require me to find a good camera crew in Utah. Getting that ball rolling late on a Friday night isn’t ideal. My regular producer, Kim, would normally help, but it just so happens that she’s off.
But I have an idea. If Wood will come to Washington, D.C., I can continue my research while he flies. I can easily get a camera crew here. So I check flights from Utah, run the idea by him, and he agrees to fly to D.C. the next morning. Next, I book him a hotel room close to his airport in Utah so that he can get an early flight out with no worries about battling traffic. Putting him in a hotel also gets him away from his house, where other reporters might otherwise be able to find him. Meanwhile, I work to check him out further. In addition to my own reliable sources, the Pentagon verifies Wood’s identity to our military correspondent David Martin, and one of our foreign correspondents happens to know Wood from a previous assignment overseas. He’s the real deal. By Sunday morning, Wood and I are sitting down in the CBS bureau in Washington, D.C., for a one-on-one interview.
“My assignment there was to command what they call SST, or Site Security Team, to assist the State Department with security in Libya,” Wood tells me. “It was a military organization put together to assist [the State Department] in their ability to reestablish the embassy after it was evacuated during the revolution.”
This SST is a unique arrangement, with the military loaning forces to help the State Department mission on the ground. The United States had abandoned its embassy in Tripoli just a year earlier at the start of the uprising against Qaddafi’s regime. Pro-Qaddafi forces obliterated the embassy to retaliate for a NATO bombing that killed Qaddafi’s son. With the bad guys officially “out,” the State Department was anxious to cut through the chaos and normalize the post-Qaddafi relationship between the United States and Libya. Wood and his team were part of the effort to help make sure no Americans died in the process. They were tasked with supporting whatever the State Department regional security officer needed, whether it was help right there on the embassy compound in Tripoli or mobile security for travel by the principal officers and the ambassador himself. It was a flexible assignment that changed day to day, which made it both exciting and dangerous. And it demanded a heavy dose of knowledge about terrorism.
Wood had a nagging sense of déjà vu. As in Afghanistan and the Philippines, Libya was suffering under an unstable and deteriorating security situation. Terrorists and antigovernment forces had found a firm foothold among the disorganization and chaos. There was potential danger around every corner.
Many Libyans appreciated the fact that Americans were there. Others did not. The Americans never knew exactly how the locals would react. For Wood and his team traveling between neighborhoods, they could run into the same friendly guys for four days and then, on the fifth, have one of them point a loaded pistol at their head. It took a lot of diplomacy just to move about. It took a lot of explaining about who they were and why they were there.
Wood didn’t know it at the time, but a major terrorist plot had been thwarted in December 2011, not long before his arrival. It was a chilling foreshadowing of the September 11 attacks. In what was called Operation Papa Noel, pro-Qaddafi elements had planned to launch a sophisticated attack on foreign diplomatic missions and oil fields in Libya. Fortunately, the plot was exposed when several insurgents responsible for the planning were arrested before it was executed. Some details were later disclosed in the written emergency-evacuation plan for the U.S. mission in Benghazi, which warned, “the majority of Loyalist insurgents tasked with carrying out this plan are still active and free in Benghazi” and “Islamic terrorist elements do exist in this area of the country, and have been reported by open sources to be gaining operational capability.” Islamic terrorist elements . . . gaining operational capability.
The current security status in Libya was precarious at best, in Wood’s view. There were no organized services and there was no real government infrastructure. No police on the street, no trash pickup. Litter was strewn everywhere. The lights didn’t work. In an attempt to instill some sense of safety and order, civilians had established their own neighborhood watches. Most any Libyan man with a gun could form a self-standing militia. And plenty of them were wary of Americans.
Partnering with Wood in the security mission was Regional Security Officer Eric Nordstrom, who requested additional security help from headquarters in March
2012, but got no response. It was becoming clear to everyone on the ground that as things grew more dangerous, they were going to have to do more with less.
On April 10, an explosive device is thrown at a convoy traveling in Benghazi carrying United Nations envoy Ian Martin. On May 22, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) hits the Benghazi offices of the International Red Cross and the agency decides to pull out. As the incidents pile up, they become more troublesome. They’re dissected, documented, and digested into reports sent regularly to State Department headquarters. Hundreds of pages. Week in and week out. There can be no doubt about the dangers in Libya. The security officers live with persistent concern. What’s the threat to the ambassador? To the embassy staff? To themselves? It’s work day and night. If they’re awake, they’re on duty. If they’re asleep, they’re on call.
Even more alarming, in an online posting, al-Qaeda had stated its intent to attack the Red Cross, the British, and then the Americans in Benghazi. With the first two promises fulfilled, the attack on Benghazi was the last outstanding threat. It seemed just a matter of time.
“This isn’t Afghanistan or Iraq,” the State Department’s Charlene Lamb at headquarters in Washington would tell the Libya contingent. The guys on the ground were made to feel as if they were being melodramatic, maybe even a little cowardly in asking for more resources to protect the U.S. mission and its diplomats. Wood couldn’t believe the disconnect. How little the bureaucrats in D.C. understood about the reality that he and the rest of the Americans were living in Libya. A disintegrating country that, in some respects, was as dangerous as Afghanistan. He knows because he’s been there, too. Washington seemed to have no concept of prevention. It was all about reacting.
Nordstrom later testifies before the House Oversight Committee, “It was abundantly clear we were not going to get resources until the aftermath of an incident. . . . The question that we would ask is, again, ‘How thin does the ice have to get before someone falls through?’ ”
Stonewalled: My Fight for Truth Against the Forces of Obstruction, Intimidation, and Harassment in Obama's Washington Page 18