to a diminution of traditional notions of deterrence; the Spartans knew
in spring 431 that their hoplites would pay no immediate or great price
for their violation of Athenian sovereignty. Once the fear of reprisals
was removed, the invasions became chronic rather than exceptional,
until either the plague or the capture of Spartan prisoners on Sphacte-
ria reestablished the notion of deleterious consequences.34
During the Peloponnesian War, Athens had encouraged other dem-
ocratic poleis to join with them in extending their fortifications from
the city to the harbor, as seen, for example, in 417, when Thucydides
relates that the Argives renewed their alliance with the Athenians and
began construction of long walls to link their city to the sea.35 This oc-
curred after Argive democrats had already either killed or expelled the
leading oligarchs of the city. The walls were built so that “in case of a
blockade by land, with the help of the Athenians, they might have the
advantage of importing what they wanted by sea. Some of the cities
in the Peloponnesus were also privy to the building of these walls; and
the Argives with all their people, women and slaves not excepted, ap-
plied themselves to the work, while carpenters and masons came to
them from Athens.”36 The Athenians provided a manner of support
that was familiar to them, helping the Argive democrats to consolidate
their leadership and facilitating the alliance between the two poleis.
The walls that connected Argos with the coast were designed to permit
the city to be supplied in times of siege, and not to serve as the founda-
tion for imperial power. As a corollary, the ruling democrats in Argos
granted the Athenians access to their polis. Perhaps most important,
however, is the symbolic nature of this action. The walls were synony-
mous with the Athenian democracy and a symbol of Athenian power.
For the Argives to undertake the construction of these walls was for
them to reject Sparta.
The recognition of the centrality of the Long Walls to Athenian
strategy and their symbolic association with the democracy is perhaps
most clearly articulated in the Spartan insistence on destroying them at
66 Berkey
the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War (404 BC). The terms of sur-
render levied against the Athenians mandated the destruction of the
Long Walls, the reduction of the Athenian fleet to twelve triremes, and
the installation of pro-Spartan oligarchs, the Thirty Tyrants, to gov-
ern the city. Lysander’s victory in the preceding year at the Battle of
Aegospotami (405 BC) had elevated Sparta to the height of its power.37
Xenophon describes the panic of the Athenians when the news of the
disaster reached them:
It was at night that the Paralus arrived at Athens. As the news
of the disaster was told, one man passed it on to another, and
a sound of wailing arose and extended first from Piraeus, then
along the Long Walls until it reached the city. That night no one
slept. They mourned for the lost, but still more for their own
fate. They thought that they themselves would now be dealt
with as they had dealt with others—with the Melians, colonists
of Sparta, after they had besieged and conquered Melos, with the
people of Histiaea, of Scione, of Torone, of Aegina and many
other states. . . . They could see no future for themselves except
to suffer what they had made others suffer, people of small states
whom they had injured not in retaliation for anything they had
done but out of arrogance of power and for no reason except that
they were in the Spartan alliance.38
Lysander’s next action was to complete the encirclement of Athens
already achieved on land by now controlling its harbor as well. With
their grain supply dwindling, the besieged Athenians recognized that
the time for negotiation had arrived.39 The initial proposal was to join
the Spartan alliance on the condition that the treaty permit them to
retain their Long Walls and the walls of Piraeus intact. When Athenian
ambassadors arrived at Sellasia on the border of Laconia, the ephors
refused them entry to Sparta and rejected their terms.40 A later delega-
tion led by Theramenes would listen to the debate among the victors
as to the fate of the vanquished Athenians:
On their [Theramenes’ and the other Athenian ambassadors’] ar-
rival the ephors called an assembly at which many Greek states,
Why Fortifications Endure 67
and in particular the Corinthians and the Thebans, opposed mak-
ing any peace with Athens. The Athenians, they said, should be
destroyed. The Spartans, however, said they would not enslave
a Greek city which had done such great things for Greece at the
time of her supreme danger. They offered to make peace on the
following terms: the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Pi-
raeus must be destroyed; all ships except twelve surrendered; the
exiles to be recalled; Athens to have the same enemies and the
same friends as Sparta had and to follow Spartan leadership in any
expedition Sparta might make either by land or sea.41
Unwalled, oligarchic Sparta insisted that the walls of Athens be
destroyed. Following the Ecclesia’s acceptance of the Spartan offer,
“Lysander sailed into Piraeus, the exiles returned and the walls were
pulled down among scenes of great enthusiasm and to the music of
flute girls. It was thought that this day was the beginning of freedom
for Greece.”42 This scene of jubilation recalls the celebrations that at-
tended the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, at which joyous crowds
gathered both to witness and to participate in the symbolic dismantling
of the Iron Curtain, although the Athenian walls were designed to keep
enemies out, not citizens in.
Xenophon’s account of the fall of Athens marks the end of the po-
litical alignment of the Greek poleis that had been in existence during
the Peloponnesian War and, in many instances, for decades prior.43 The
Spartans’ decision to spare Athens from annihilation was a tribute to
the Athenians’ service to Greece during the Persian War. It appears to
have been especially magnanimous considering the severity and dura-
tion of the Peloponnesian War. Perhaps most significant, Sparta chose
to ignore the recommendation of its principal allies, Corinth and The-
bes, in favor of preserving Athens. Nonetheless, Sparta tried to cripple
Athenian democracy by destroying the city’s fleet and its walls and rul-
ing the city in a manner that resembled Lysander’s model of decarchies,
with harmosts and armed garrisons. By having a military presence in
Attica, the Spartans could curtail the expansion of Thebes in central
Greece, and perhaps some Spartans hoped to employ the Athenians’
frontier fortresses for this purpose.44
68 Berkey
Sparta’s victory over Athens changed the structure of the interstate
system.45 The absence of Athenian leadership from what had been a
bipolar state system encouraged Sparta to enlarge its ambitions as the
&
nbsp; leader of the victorious coalition of states. Instead of establishing Sparta
as the exclusive leader, however, the years 404–395 produced an uneasy
transition from bipolarity to multipolarity. During this period of transi-
tion, the structure of the interstate system, being neither bipolar nor
multipolar, was inherently unstable. This instability resulted from the
elimination of Athens as a major power and the uncertainty of what
power or col ection of powers would take its place. Fol owing its defeat
in the Peloponnesian War, Athens’s recovery in part depended on the
Athenians’ ability to acquire financial resources to refortify their city.46
Fortunately for the Athenians, they had a wil ing financier with comple-
mentary strategic interests. When the Persian satrap Pharnabazus met
with representatives from Thebes, Corinth, and Argos and the Athenian
general Conon, whom the Persian king Artaxerxes had appointed to
command his fleet in 397,47 at the Isthmus of Corinth, he supplied them
with encouragement and financial support, and (according to Diodorus)
formed an al iance with them.48 Xenophon records Conon’s argument
to Pharnabazus and the satrap’s subsequent actions:
Conon, however, asked to be allowed to keep the fleet. He said
that he could support it by contributions from the islands, and
that he proposed to sail to Athens and to help his countrymen
rebuild the Long Walls and the walls of the Piraeus. “I can think
of no action,” he said, “which would hurt the Spartans more. By
doing this you will not only have given the Athenians something
for which they will be grateful but will have really made the
Spartans suffer. You will make null and void that achievement
of theirs which cost them more toil and trouble than anything
else.” This proposal was welcomed by Pharnabazus. He not only
sent Conon to Athens but gave him additional money for the
rebuilding of the walls. And Conon, when he arrived, erected
a great part of the fortifications, using his crews for the work,
hiring carpenters and masons and meeting all other necessary
expenses.49
Why Fortifications Endure 69
Pharnabazus thereafter returned to Persia, leaving Conon in com-
mand of the fleet. Conon himself returned to Athens, where he un-
dertook the task of rebuilding Athens’s fortifications. Ancient sources
generally recognize Conon’s objectives to have been the overthrow of
the Spartan Empire and, in the process, to reestablish Athenian power.50
Without the support of Persia, it would have been virtually impossible
for the Athenians to finance a war against Sparta, the defeat of which
reemerged as the primary objective of Athenian foreign policy.51 The
Athenians had already begun to rebuild the walls of Piraeus, and work
now proceeded on the Long Walls in earnest.52
Amid the rubble of defeat, ancient Athenians sought to reconstitute
both their power and their image. Unlike the victors who had constructed
the Themistoclean wal s at the end of the Persian War, the Athenians
who built these wal s were the vanquished. This onerous task, which
represented continuity with Athens’s former military strategy, was not
a work of innovation. As a way to project “soft power,”53 however, the
rebuilding of the Long Wal s, the symbol of Athens’s fifth-century em-
pire, demonstrated the Athenians’ urge to restore the status of their polis
in the eyes of neighboring city-states that might look for an attractive
al y against Sparta.54 The completed fortifications signaled to other Greek
poleis the return of Athenian autonomy and its vibrant democracy.
The desire to revive their empire was alive in Athens, but whether or
not this was a realistic goal for the Athenians is another matter. Athens
and the other major Greek poleis had failed to wrest hegemony from
the Spartans during the Corinthian War. To outfit a fleet to a size com-
mensurate with their past imperial power had proven to be beyond the
Athenians’ reach. The vital role played by Persia was clear for all to see:
the King’s Peace contained provisions for an end to hostilities on the
basis of Artaxerxes’ terms. The treaty stipulated that all the poleis of
Asia Minor, as well as the islands of Clazomenae55 and Cyprus, were
to be Persian possessions.56 All other poleis—with the exception of
the Athenian possessions of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which were
strategically vital in their efforts to protect grain shipments destined
for Piraeus57—were to be autonomous.58 Any polis that did not accept
these terms would be an enemy of the Persian king and subject to at-
tack by Persia and whoever else was willing to join forces.59
70 Berkey
The conclusion of the war was a Spartan victory. Sparta dissolved
the Boeotian League, broke apart the union of Corinth and Argos, re-
gained Corinth as an ally, and halted Athens’s expansion. Xenophon
recognized that Sparta’s victory in the Corinthian War was a diplo-
matic victory and not a military victory: “In the actual fighting the
Spartans had just about held their own, but now, as a result of what is
known as ‘The Peace of Antalcidas,’ they appeared in a much more dis-
tinguished light.”60 The fact that the leading Greek poleis accepted the
conditions set forth in 387 provides important indications about shifts
in the relative power of those states under consideration, and hence in
the balance of power.61
The King’s Peace is considered the first example of the fourth-cen-
tury phenomenon of common peace treaties.62 In comparison with
their fifth-century predecessors, these treaties were general y multilat-
eral (as opposed to bilateral), were accepted by the leading Greek poleis
(even if not formal y signed by them), were of theoretical y unlimited
duration (as opposed to a specified period of time), and adhered to the
principle of autonomia for al Greek poleis. From this perspective, the
King’s Peace adequately meets some of these criteria, but it fails in other
regards.63 It is perhaps more accurate to view the King’s Peace as a ne-
gotiated peace that sought to respond to the shortcomings of earlier
treaties. The treaty ending the Peloponnesian War created more antago-
nism among the contestants—and thereby generated more problems
than it solved—in large measure as a result of its bilateral nature. The
Peloponnesian War was a hegemonic struggle that engulfed the entirety
of the Greek world. Sparta’s treaty with Athens put an end to the con-
flict between the two leading powers but did not address the myriad
concerns of the other participants. Bilateral negotiations were insuffi-
cient to address the complexity of fourth-century interstate relations,
which often involved numerous poleis with competing foreign policy
objectives. The King’s Peace, although it purported to involve al Greek
poleis, was nonetheless a product of similar bilateral negotiation.64
The autonomy clause of the King’s Peace (387–386 BC) precluded the
formation of an empire along the fifth-century model, but the Athenians
implemented a clever solution to the problem of how to return them-
selves to a prominent position in the Greek interstate system. Perhaps
Why Fortifications Endure 71
shortly after Sphodrias’s raid on Piraeus in 378, the Athenians founded the
Second Athenian League.65 His advance through the Attic countryside to
the Thriasian plain alerted the Athenians to his presence, and they sub-
sequently mobilized. After laying waste to the plain of Thria, Sphodrias
retreated without having gained his objective, although the Athenians
sensed their own vulnerability. They would again need to rely on the sta-
bility of the city’s network of fortifications if they hoped to restore their
former imperial glory, and they appealed to their al ies to join together
for the sake of common freedom.66 They recognized that while the King’s
Peace deprived them of overseas possessions (excluding the islands of
Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros), it also provided them with some measure
of protection. They careful y abided by the terms of the peace settle-
ment and exploited the Spartans’ transgressions of it. In promulgating
the King’s Peace, the Athenians sought to restore their reputation among
the poleis of Greece and with Persia by serving as a counterbalance to
the tyrannical rule of Sparta. The stele of Aristoteles records the league’s
provisions and is an expression of Athenian policy. It assures both current
and future member poleis that their freedom and autonomy are guar-
anteed, that Athens wil not place garrisons or military officials in their
poleis, that Athens wil not exact tribute from them,67 and that Athens
wil restore al land, both publicly and privately held by Athenians, to the
league’s member poleis and halt the formation of cleruchies. The stele
then lists the members of the Second Athenian League.
Athens needed to distance this new league from its old empire and
to make concessions to its allies in order to acquire and subsequently
retain them. This alliance is an example of weaker states joining to-
gether to balance the power of a stronger state. It provided protec-
tion for Thebes and Athens with its deterrent force: Sparta would not
control central Greece without a major confrontation involving a large
coalition of poleis. Both the Athenians, with their bold plan to form
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