Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome

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by Victor Davis Hanson


  tica, Hesperia Supplement 11 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), Josiah Ober,

  Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404–322 bc (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982),

  and Mark H. Munn, The Defense of Attica: The Dema Wall and the Boiotian War of 378–375

  bc (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). The latter two works have produced

  a lively exchange of opinion between the authors over the date, purpose, and efficacy

  of the ancient Athenian system of rural fortifications.

  Notes

  I am grateful to my friend, Matthew B. Kohut, for reading and commenting on several

  drafts of this essay.

  1 R. E. Wycherley, in The Stones of Athens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

  1978), writes (7):

  The history of the walls of Athens is the history of the expansion and contrac-

  tion of the city in its successive phases of growth and decline, in victory, disaster,

  and recovery. This was a dominant feature of the city in her greatest days, an

  object of immense expenditure of effort and resources by the Athenian Demos,

  a symbol of the power of Athens, and a notable example of Greek military ar-

  chitecture; and, with repeated repair and reconstruction of course, it remained

  more or less in being for sixteen centuries of varying fortunes, rising again and

  again after severe dilapidation.

  In a non-Athenian context—an event perhaps related to that described by Herodo-

  tus (1.168)—Anacreon wrote (frag. 100 [Bruno Gentili, Anacreon (Rome: Edizioni

  dell’Ateneo, 1958); Bergk 72; Diehl 67, p. 391]): “Now the crown of the city has been

  destroyed.” The Scholiast to Pindar, Olympiin 8.42c, explains the reference by quoting

  this line of Anacreon’s poetry, adding that “the walls of cities are like a crown.” Mogens

  Herman Hansen in Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State (Oxford: Oxford

  University Press, 2006) describes the general purpose of a Greek polis’s wall (104):

  By contrast [i.e., with the Middle Ages], in the ancient Greek polis the city wall

  served only military purposes, and no tolls were levied at city gates. In time

  of war, of course, the walls and gates were guarded, but in peacetime anyone

  could pass through the gates in the daytime. The gates were perhaps closed at

  night, but they were not guarded, and people could still enter and leave the city.

  In the polis the walls were not seen as a barrier between city and country, but

  rather as a monument for the citizens to take pride in.

  2 Prior to the Persian invasion, the Athenian Acropolis was guarded by the Pelasgic

  Wall. In addition to this wall, some scholars have postulated that the city was further

  Why Fortifications Endure 79

  fortified by a surrounding wall. Wycherley, The Stones of Athens, 9 (see also n. 4), draws

  attention to the dispute concerning the existence of a pre-Persian wall. The ancient

  literary testimonia for the wall’s existence are ambiguous and the archaeological evi-

  dence for its course is lacking. Nonetheless, E. Vanderpool (“The Date of the Pre-

  Persian City-Wall of Athens,” in Φόρος: Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt, ed. D. W.

  Bradeen and M. F. McGregor, 156–60 [Locust Valley, NY: J. J. Augustin, 1974]) concludes

  there was a pre-Persian city wall in Athens with a terminus post quem of 566 BC.

  3 Fornara 55, GHI 23. The translation is from Charles W. Fornara, Archaic Times to the

  End of the Peloponnesian War, vol. 1 of Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, 2nd ed.

  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 53–55. The inscription recording this

  decree is of a later date, thereby calling its authenticity into question. Fornara provides

  references both in favor of and opposed to its authenticity on p. 54. See also Herodotus

  8.41 and Demosthenes 19.303.

  4 Herodotus 8.50.

  5 Herodotus 8.51. Translations of Herodotus are by Andrea L. Purvis, The Landmark

  Herodotus: The Histories, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Pantheon Books, 2007).

  6 See Herodotus 7.141.3.

  7 For a discussion of Themistocles’ preparations for the Persian invasion and the

  Athenians’ subsequent evacuation of Attica, see Barry Strauss, The Battle of Salamis:

  The Naval Encounter That Saved Greece—and Western Civilization (New York: Simon &

  Schuster, 2004), 61–72.

  8 Herodotus 8.53.

  9 Herodotus 9.3. The quotation is from 9.13.2.

  10 John M. Camp, The Archaeology of Athens (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,

  2001), 56–58.

  11 Thucydides 1.89.3.

  12 In this context, it is interesting to compare the construction of the walls of Athens

  with the construction of the Freedom Tower in New York City. See the commentary

  of Nicolai Ouroussoff, architectural critic for the New York Times, in “A Tower That

  Sends a Message of Anxiety, Not Ambition,” February 19, 2007, and “Medieval Modern:

  Design Strikes a Defensive Posture,” March 4, 2007:

  Four years after the American invasion of Iraq, this state of siege is beginning to

  look more and more like a permanent reality, exhibited in an architectural style

  we might refer to as 21st-century medievalism. Like their 13th- to 15th-century

  counterparts, contemporary architects are being enlisted to create not only major

  civic landmarks but lines of civic defense, with aesthetical y pleasing features like

  elegantly sculpted barriers around public plazas or decorative cladding for bulky

  protective concrete wal s. . . . The most chil ing example of the new medievalism

  is New York’s Freedom Tower, which was once touted as a symbol of enlighten-

  ment. Designed by David Childs of Skidmore, Owings & Merril , it rests on a

  20-story windowless fortified concrete base decorated in prismatic glass panels in a

  grotesque attempt to disguise its underlying paranoia. And the brooding, obelisk-

  like form above is more of an expression of American hubris than of freedom.

  13 Diodorus 11.29.3.

  80 Berkey

  14 The translation is by C. H. Oldfather in the Loeb Classical Library. See also Tod,

  GHI 2.204, 21–51, Lycurgus Against Leocrates 80–81. Contra: Theopompus, FGrHist 115

  F153. Russell Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 504–7,

  accepts the validity of the Oath of Plataea, while P. J. Rhodes, CAH 52.34, doubts the

  existence of a clause requiring temples to be left in ruins.

  15 Jeffrey M. Hurwit, The Athenian Acropolis: History, Mythology, and Archaeology from

  the Neolithic Era to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 135–42.

  The archaeological evidence of the Persian sack of Athens, and the Agora in particular,

  is presented in T. Leslie Shear Jr., “The Persian Destruction of Athens,” Hesperia 62

  (1993): 383–482. See also Homer A. Thompson, “Athens Faces Adversity,” Hesperia 50

  (1981): 343–55. He writes (346), “To sum up: their triumphs in the Persian Wars undoubt-

  edly stimulated the Athenians in some of their finest achievements in art, literature and

  international affairs. But the evidence of the excavations reminds us that the sack of

  480/79 BC caused a long and distressed disruption of the domestic, civic, and religious

  life of the city.”

  16 Simon Hornblower ( A Commentary on Thucydides, I [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
<
br />   1991], s.v. 1.89.3–1.93.2, 135) cites R. A. McNeal (“Historical Methods and Thucydides

  1.103.1,” Historia 19 [1970]: 306–25) on the significance of walls in Thucydides. McNeal

  writes (312), “In Thucydides’ elaborate theory of power, a fleet permits commerce,

  commerce brings revenues, revenues create treasure, treasure means stability and walls,

  and walls permit political domination of weaker states. For Thucydides the wall is the

  ultimate symbol of power.” See also Hornblower’s commentary on 1.2.2, where he

  quotes from Yvon Garlan (“Fortifications et histoire Greque,” in Problèmes de la guerre en

  Grèce ancienne, ed. Jean-Pierre Vernant, 245–60 [Paris: Mouton, 1968], quotation at 255)

  that “la notion d’enceinte urbaine est inseparable du concept de cite.”

  The author of the Athenaion Politeia credits both Themistocles and Aristides in the

  construction of the circuit walls (23.3–4, trans. P. J. Rhodes [Aristotle, The Athenian Con-

  stitution (London: Penguin Books, 1984)]):

  (3) The champions of the people at this time were Aristides son of Lysimachus

  and Themistocles son of Neocles: Themistocles practised the military arts,

  while Aristides was skilled in the political arts and was outstanding among his

  contemporaries for his uprightness, so the Athenians used the first as a general

  and the second as an adviser. (4) The two men were jointly responsible for the

  rebuilding of the walls, in spite of being personal opponents; and it was Aris-

  tides who saw that the Spartans had gained a bad reputation because of Pausa-

  nias and urged the Ionians to break away from the Spartan alliance.

  For a discussion of this passage, see P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athe-

  naion Politeia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 292–95.

  See Diodorus 11.39–40 (incorrectly dated 478–477 BC). Plutarch also emphasizes

  the clever manner in which the Athenians launched their ambitious quest for empire

  ( Themistocles 19):

  No sooner were these great achievements behind him, than he immediately

  took in hand the rebuilding and fortification of Athens; according to Theopom-

  pus’s account he bribed the Spartan ephors not to oppose his plans, but most

  Why Fortifications Endure 81

  writers agree that he outwitted them. He arranged a visit to Sparta, giving him-

  self the title of ambassador, and the Spartans then complained to him that the

  Athenians were fortifying their city, while Polyarchus was sent expressly from

  Aegina to confront him with this charge. Themistocles, however, denied it and

  told them to send men to Athens to see for themselves; this delay, he calculated,

  would gain time for the fortifications to be built, and he was also anxious that

  the Athenians should hold the envoys as hostages for his own safety. This was

  just how things turned out. The Spartans, when they discovered the truth, did

  not retaliate against him, but concealed their resentment and sent him away.

  17 Thucydides 1.90.1–3.

  18 Thucydides 1.93.1–2.

  19 John M. Camp, The Archaeology of Athens (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,

  2001), 59–60; Gomme, HCT, s.v. 1.93.2, 260–61; Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucy-

  dides, I, s.v. 1.93.2, 137–38.

  20 For a description of these wal s, see Wycherley, The Stones of Athens, 13. The Athe-

  nians placed unbaked bricks on top of a stone socle, which was “composed of several

  courses of massive wel -shaped bricks on either face of a core of rougher stone. The mate-

  rial was poros or harder limestone, with increasing use of conglomerate in later phases.”

  21 Gomme, HCT, s.v. 1.92, 260.

  22 See T. 1.1.1: “The preparations of both the combatants were in every department

  in the last state of perfection; and he [Thucydides] could see the rest of the Hellenic

  race taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having it in con-

  templation” (1.18.3):

  For a short time the league [the Hellenic League of 481] held together, till the

  Spartans and the Athenians quarreled, and made war upon each other with their

  allies, a duel into which all the Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though

  some at first might remain neutral. So that the whole period from the Median

  war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power in war, either

  with its rival, or with its own revolted allies, and consequently afforded them

  constant practice in military matters, and that experience which is learnt in the

  school of danger.

  23 Hansen, in Polis, writes (95–96):

  Already in the Archaic period, then, walls were an important aspect of the

  Greek perception of what a polis was, and an overview of surviving walls only

  serves to strengthen that point. . . . In the written sources, 222 poleis in all are

  referred to as walled in the Archaic and Classical periods, and only in nineteen

  cases is it expressly said that a city is unwalled; there are only four poleis of which

  we know positively that they did not have any walls at the end of the Classical

  period: namely, Delphi, Delos, Gortyn and Sparta.

  24 Plato Laws 778d–779b (trans. A. E. Taylor):

  As for walls, Megillus, I am of the same mind as your own Sparta. I would leave

  them to slumber peacefully in the earth without waking them, and here are

  82 Berkey

  my reasons. As the oft-quoted line of the poet happily words it, a city’s walls

  should be of bronze and iron, not of stone, and we in particular shall cover

  ourselves with well-merited ridicule, after taking our young men in annual

  procession to the open country to block an enemy’s path by ditches, entrench-

  ments, and actual buildings of various kinds—all, if you please, with the notion

  of keeping the foe well outside our borders—if we shut ourselves in behind a

  wall. A wall is, in the first place, far from conducive to the health of town life

  and, what is more, commonly breeds of certain softness of soul in the towns-

  men; it invites inhabitants to seek shelter within it and leave the enemy unre-

  pulsed, tempts them to neglect effecting their deliverance by unrelaxing nightly

  and daily watching, and to fancy they will find a way to real safety by locking

  themselves in and going to sleep behind ramparts and bars as though they had

  been born to shirk toil, and did not know that the true ease must come from

  it, whereas dishonorable ease and sloth will bring forth toil and trouble, or am

  I much mistaken.

  25 Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day. How

  Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny (New York: Free Press, 1999), 72–104. On 101–2,

  he writes,

  Again, modern students of Greek history, to gain full insight into the real con-

  temporary view of Spartan culture, must visit the remains of Messenê, Mega-

  lopolis, and Mantinea. That such vast circuits could arise so quickly after the

  Spartan defeat at Leuctra and subsequent invasion of Laconia should tell us ex-

  actly what Sparta’s neighbors thought about Spartan society. Battlements—the

  Berlin Wall and the current fieldworks arising on the American-Mexican border

  are good examples—often provide more honest testimony than literary sources

  and government proclamation
about the respective apprehensions, fears, and

  ideologies of the cultures on either side of the ramparts. Just as tremors in the

  Soviet Union caused walls to crash in Germany, so too the check on Sparta of-

  fered by Epaminondas immediately prompted thousands to go out into the

  Peloponnesian countryside to cut and raise stone while they still had the chance.

  26 Aristotle Politica 2.8 (1267b22–30). See R. E. Wycherley, CAH 52.203–8, and M. Ost-

  wald, CAH 52.315.

  27 Thucydides 1.93.3–7.

  28 See also the comments of Plutarch on the impact of this policy for the Athenians

  ( Themistocles 19):

  After this he proceeded to develop the Piraeus as a port, for he had already

  taken note of the natural advantages of its harbors and it was his ambition

  to unite the whole city to the sea. In this he was to some extent reversing the

  policy of the ancient kings of Attica, for they are said to have aimed at drawing

  the citizens away from the sea and accustoming them to live not by seafaring

  but by tilling and planting the soil. It was they who had spread the legend about

  Athena, how when she and Poseidon were contesting the possession of the

  country, she produced the sacred olive tree of the Acropolis before the judges

  Why Fortifications Endure 83

  and so when the verdict. Themistocles, however, did not, as Aristophanes the

  comic poet puts it, ‘knead the Piraeus on to the city’; on the contrary, he at-

  tached the city to the Piraeus and made the land population dependent on the

  sea. The effect of this was to increase the influence of the people at the expense

  of the nobility and to fill them with confidence, since the control of policy now

  passed into the hands of sailors and boatswains and pilots. This was also the

  reason why the platform of the people’s Assembly in the Pnyx, which had been

  built so as to look out to sea, was later turned round by the Thirty Tyrants, so

  that it faced inland, for they believed that Athens’ naval empire had proved to

  be the mother of democracy and that an oligarchy was more easily accepted

  by men who tilled the soil.

  29 See the new study of the Long Walls by David H. Conwell, Connecting a City to

  the Sea: The History of the Athenian Long Walls, Mnemosyne Supplements, vol. 293 (Leiden: Brill, 2008). After describing the walls’ physical characteristics, nomenclature, and the

 

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