Caesar won almost every battle he fought and never lost a campaign.
Yet from the beginning of his time in Gaul, he realized that battlefield
success alone was not enough. Rome had existing alliances with many
tribes, especially those bordering Transalpine Gaul. Defending these al-
lies provided the main pretext for Caesar’s initial intervention and most
of the subsequent campaigns. As he advanced farther into Gaul, new
allies were acquired. Caesar was always considerably more brutal in
dealing with enemies from outside Gaul than with the tribes already
established there. Ariovistus, the Helvetii, and the migrating German
tribes were treated with extreme savagery and ejected. On the whole,
The General as State 213
Gallic tribes that fought against him were treated more generously.
Allied tribes provided him with troops and shared in the benefits of
victory. The Aedui, a well-established Roman ally, were granted many
favors, and expanded their own influence as it became clear that their
subordinate allies would also enjoy Roman protection.
Individual chieftains and leaders benefited even more from Caesar’s
friendship. Every year he summoned the tribal leaders to a council
at least once, and frequently more often. He also met and consulted
with them individually. Some served with his army for long periods.
Commius of the Atrebates played an especially prominent role in the
expeditions to Britain, and was rewarded for this and other services,
becoming king of his own people and being given overlordship of the
Menapii. Diviciacus of the Aedui proved a staunch ally and gained
many adherents from other tribes because it was known that Caesar
often granted him favors.
Caesar kept a close eye on politics within the tribes and supported
the leaders who seemed most likely to be loyal to him. For such men,
the arrival of the Roman army was an opportunity to strengthen their
own position. It was also a reality they could not afford to ignore. The
same had been true of Ariovistus, who had been invited in by the Se-
quani, but who had then used his army to dominate them as well as
their neighbors. Caesar drove out any rival power so that his would be
the only outside influence on the politics of the tribes.
Caesar’s conquest of Gaul did not introduce large numbers of Ro-
man colonists to the region. The province he created—as indeed was
the case with virtually every other Roman province—would be pop-
ulated by the people already living there. For this to be successful,
enough of the inhabitants needed to be persuaded that it was in their
best interests to accept Roman rule. The power of the Roman army
acted as a deterrent to resistance, but on its own was not enough.
Caesar increased his forces from four legions to more than a dozen
during the course of the Gallic campaigns, but even after this increase
these troops could not be everywhere simultaneously. It was not prac-
tical to hold down a province by force alone, nor was it desirable. A
large army could easily cost as much as or more than the revenue from
the province. The need for such a garrison would also make clear that
214 Goldsworthy
the war was not really won and would greatly reduce the glory of any
victory.
Therefore, from 58 BC on, Caesar devoted considerable time and ef-
fort to diplomacy, hoping to win over the tribal leaders. Old al ies were
strengthened and defeated enemies were shown leniency in order to
turn them into new al ies. This was the normal Roman method, and in-
deed it has been that of most successful imperial powers. He was helped
by the fact that he possessed both civil and military authority, which
meant that in each campaign, his strategy was molded to fit a political
objective. This is perhaps harder in the modern world, where things are
likely to be less neat and more than one authority is frequently involved.
At the time of writing, the United States and its al ies are involved in
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where military force in itself cannot
achieve victory without the creation of a stable political settlement.
However, it is worth remembering that Caesar was not attempting to
create a viable democracy and then withdraw. He was engaged in per-
manent conquest and could be considerably more ruthless in his behav-
ior. The Romans did not have to worry about world opinion.11
Yet some factors do remain in common. For every tribal leader who
gained from Caesar’s arrival, there were others who did not. Politics
were as fiercely competitive within and between the tribes as they were
in the Roman republic. If a chieftain saw his rivals preferred over him,
he had little personal incentive to support Rome. One alternative was to
seek aid from another outside source, such as one of the German tribes,
accepting their dominance as the price. Alternatively, the chieftain could
directly attack and defeat his rival. Ideal y this could be done swiftly and
so completely that Caesar might be wil ing to accept the change, al-
though in general, he took care to resist and punish anything of this
sort.12 If not, then the Romans would need to be driven out as wel . It is
too simplistic to think of purely pro- or anti-Roman factions or leaders
within each tribe, in the same way that it is mistaken to speak of a sim-
ple divide between pro- and anti-Western groups in modern conflicts.
Men like Commius and Diviciacus had agendas and ambitions of
their own. Such leaders felt that they were using Caesar as much as he
was using them, adding to their own power through Roman support.
Diviciacus’s brother Dumnorix looked elsewhere for the support needed
The General as State 215
to dominate the Aedui. As his sibling became more and more powerful,
Dumnorix began covertly to resist Roman rule. Later, probably after Di-
viciacus’s death, Dumnorix encouraged a rumor that Caesar planned to
make him king of the tribe. He was eventual y kil ed on Caesar’s orders,
having tried to avoid being taken on the first British expedition.
Allegiances could change. Personal interest more than anything else
dictated whether leaders supported Rome or resisted Caesar. This in-
terest could change. In the winter of 53–52, many Gaulist leaders de-
cided that the Roman presence was hindering their own freedom of
action. In the great rebellion that followed, chieftains who had ben-
efited from Caesar’s favor joined with those who had consistently re-
sisted to expel the Romans. Vercingetorix, the man who became the
main leader of the rebellion, had been a favorite of Caesar, although
this is not mentioned in the Commentaries.13 A more conspicuous defec-
tion was Commius’s.
Caesar came close to defeat in 52 BC, and suffered a serious reverse in
his attack on Gergovia. He did not give up, and, after winning a small-
scale action, seized back the initiative and cornered Vercingetorix at
Alesia. After an especially brutal siege, Vercingetorix was forced to sur-
render. The war was not quite over. For more than a year, Caesar and
; his legates launched a succession of punitive expeditions against any
tribe that still showed resistance. Leaders like Commius were hunted
down, although in his case he managed to escape to Britain. When the
walled town of Uxellodunum was captured, Caesar ordered that the
captured warriors have their hands cut off as a dreadful warning.
Yet as always, along with reprisals and the use and threat of force
came concerted diplomacy. As one of his officers put it, “Caesar had
one main aim, keeping the tribes friendly, and giving them neither the
opportunity nor cause for war. . . . And so, by dealing with the tribes
honourably, by granting rich bounties to the chieftains, and by not im-
posing burdens, he made their state of subjection tolerable, and easily
kept the peace in a Gaul weary after so many military defeats.”14 This
task took more than two years. As always, much of the diplomacy was
personal. It worked. In 49 BC, Caesar led away almost his entire army to
fight in the civil war. Gaul did not erupt into rebellion when the Roman
troops left and Caesar was kept busy elsewhere.
216 Goldsworthy
Yet this success came at a price. Caesar had misread the situation in
the winter of 53–52 BC and had been surprised by the rebel ion. Although
he recovered and won, it took much time and effort to rebuild the peace.
Rumors spread in Rome of serious defeats in Gaul, encouraging his op-
ponents in the belief that he was vulnerable. Caesar had less time to pre-
pare for his return to Rome. Had he been able to spend a year or more
in Cisalpine Gaul, closer to Italy, had he been more accessible to mes-
sages and visits from influential men, then it is possible that the civil war
could have been avoided—possible, but not certain. In the end, much
depended on the attitude of Pompey. It was his shift toward Caesar’s
enemies that gave them the military capacity to wage a civil war. 15
Private Armies
None of the civil wars could have been fought without the willingness
of Roman soldiers to kill each other. By the first century BC the army
was effectively a professional force, its ranks filled mainly from the
poorest sections of society. For such recruits the army offered a steady,
if not especially generous, wage, and fed and clothed them. Unlike the
old conscript army recruited from property owners, such men had no
source of livelihood once they were discharged from the army. The
Senate generally proved reluctant to deal with this problem, and it was
usually only with considerable effort that a commander was able to
secure grants of farmland for his discharged veterans. This encouraged
a bond between general and soldiers that often proved stronger than
that between the legions and the state itself. Securing land for his vet-
erans was one of Pompey’s chief motives for allying with Crassus and
Caesar. The latter brought forward the necessary legislation in 59 BC.16
There was more to the bond between general and soldier than sim-
ple economic dependency. Shared victories helped create mutual trust
but in themselves were not enough. Lucullus was one of the ablest
tactical commanders of this period, but nevertheless he was not liked
by his men, being seen as mean when it came to rewarding them. Men
like Pompey were far more generous in sharing the spoils of victory.
Caesar had immense charisma, and the loyalty of his soldiers dur-
ing the civil war was almost fanatical in its intensity, in a way matched
The General as State 217
throughout history by only a few individuals, such as Napoleon. The
bond was not instant, nor did it spring out of nothing. In 58 BC, Caesar
took charge of four legions raised by someone else. He immediately re-
cruited two new legions, and the following winter he added two more.
In twelve months the size of his army doubled. It would soon triple.
At first the soldiers did not know Caesar and did not especially trust
him. In the campaign against the Helvetii he made mistakes, notably a
botched night attack on their camp that left a force stranded out on a
limb while Caesar and the main body sat and did nothing. In the event,
the Helvetii were either oblivious to the opportunity or not inclined
to take advantage. Later in the summer came the mutiny at Vesontio,
where for a while his army refused to march against Ariovistus. Caesar
flattered and cajoled them into moving, and then rapidly defeated the
enemy. The victories in 58 BC were followed by the hard-won success at
the Sambre in 57 BC. During that battle Caesar went personally to rally
the most hard-pressed section of the line, demonstrating that he would
not abandon his men. Over time, the legionaries came to feel that they
could rely on their commander to support them and to win. The fixed
belief that they would prevail in the end made Caesar’s soldiers ex-
tremely difficult to beat.
Confident of victory, Caesar’s soldiers were equally confident of
sharing in its rewards. These were considerable. One source claims that
a million people were sold into slavery during the course of the Gal-
lic campaigns. Another mentions the looting of local shrines and their
hoarded treasure. Caesar expected tight discipline on campaign and im-
posed a rigorous training regimen, but mitigated this by granting the
soldiers considerable freedom at other times. Conspicuous gallantry
was rewarded with money and perhaps promotion—and also with a
mention in the narrative of the Commentaries. Caesar and other sources
claim repeatedly that Roman soldiers fought better when they were
being watched by their commander, who had the power to reward or
punish them.17
Many of Caesar’s senior officers became extremely wealthy during
these campaigns, something lampooned by the poet Catullus. Com-
mand of an army gave a Roman governor considerable patronage,
allowing him to make appointments as legates and tribunes and to a
218 Goldsworthy
whole range of other posts. He could also award contracts to business-
men. The profits of war were also of great value in winning friends at
Rome. Caesar gave a loan to Cicero and a legate’s commission to his
brother Quintus, who is portrayed in a very favorable light in the Com-
mentaries. Vast sums were rumored to have been spent to purchase the
support of Aemilius Paullus and Curio, respectively consul and tribune
of the plebs, in 50 BC.18
Caesar’s massive expansion of his army was not officially sanctioned
at first. He carried this out on his own initiative and authority, funding
it through the revenue from his province. He treated the people of Cis-
alpine Gaul as if they were citizens and enrolled them in the legions.
Later he would do the same in the Transalpine province, eventually
forming an entire legion, Legio V Alaudae, from this source.19 In 55 BC,
Pompey and Crassus arranged not only the extension of Caesar’s com-
mand but the retrospective approval and funding from the Senate for
the enlargement of the army. It was probably not until the dictatorship
that Caesar himself was
able to confirm the grant of Roman citizen-
ship to the Gauls recruited into his army.
Expanding the army gave Caesar not only greater forces but also
much greater patronage. Each new legion raised created sixty com-
missions for centurions, as well as half a dozen or so tribune posts. In
the Commentaries, Caesar notes that he promoted centurions to higher
grades for conspicuous service, often transferring men from a veteran
legion into a new formation. By the end of the campaigns in Gaul, it
is likely that every centurion in the army owed his original commis-
sion or one or more steps in promotion to Caesar. By 48 BC, Caesar’s
legions were on average below half strength, and by the time it reached
Alexandria, the veteran Legio VI numbered fewer than 1,000 men, just
20 percent of its full complement. We do not know how often fresh
recruits were drafted into existing legions, but it is possible that the
preference was always to raise new formations, creating more commis-
sions with which to reward loyal followers.20
Ordinary soldiers— nostril, “our men”—are praised for their cour-
age and prowess in the Commentaries but are almost never named. Even
the eagle bearer of the Tenth Legion who famously jumped over the
side of a ship and led the charge up the beach during the landing in
The General as State 219
Britain in 55 BC is anonymous. Centurions are singled out and identified
far more often. When Caesar was rallying the line at the Sambre, he
encouraged the men as groups, but called to the centurions by name.
(There were 480 centurions in the army at that time, a number it is not
impossible for one man to know. Today, battalion commanders could
be expected to recognize each of the soldiers under their command,
in a way that would not be possible for leaders of brigades or larger
formations.)21
Although there is a persistent myth that centurions were promoted
from the ranks, Caesar never once mentions doing this. Many, if not
all, seem to have been directly commissioned, and probably came from
the moderately well-off classes and local aristocracies of Italy. Substan-
tial numbers of centurions were given leave by Caesar to assist in vital
elections at Rome. In part this was through intimidation, but given that
the Roman voting system gave more weight to the better-off, this also
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