by Unknown
Göring knew that the RAF had suffered, but the Luftwaffe, too, had taken losses during the recent campaign. Indeed, Luftflotten 2 and 3 had lost over a quarter of their initial aircraft strength. Some 3,000 air crew had been killed and a further 1,500 wounded. The surviving crews were tired after six weeks’ continuous fighting, and many of the French airfields the Germans had taken over needed repair. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe’s signals network needed to be switched through 180 degrees to control operations against Britain effectively. To allow time for reorganization and recuperation, Göring issued a warning order on June 20, ordering Luftflotten 2 and 3, as well as Luftflotte 5 in Scandinavia, to be ready to mount full-scale attacks on England on July 1. In the meantime, numerous photographic reconnaissance sorties were to be flown to bring intelligence on RAF airfields up to date. Many of these missions were carried out by the Junkers 86P. With its twin turbo-supercharged Jumo 207 and pressurized cabin enabling it to fly at altitudes at well over 40,000 feet, no RAF fighter could intercept it. However, the photographs it could take at these heights lacked the definition needed to identify particular types of aircraft on the ground. Consequently, lower level reconnaissance had to be carried out, using types like the Dornier 215B. While this did produce photographs to identify the fighter airfields, a significant number of these aircraft were intercepted and shot down. It confirmed to Göring’s planners that the chain of radar stations on the English east and south coasts was crucial in the British defenses. They were certain that without radar, the RAF could not possibly have scrambled its fighters in time.
The German Plan
The Luftwaffe’s final plan was completed on June 29. As had been the tactic during the blitzkrieg campaigns, the objective was to destroy as much as possible of the RAF’s fighter strength on the ground. Simultaneously, the Home Chain radar system had to be destroyed. The latter task was given to the Stuka wings and the specialist precision-attack Me 110 fighter-bomber Erprobungsgruppe 210, which was commanded by Condor Legion veteran Hauptmann Walther Rubensdörffer. The Me 110 group had Bf 109s as part of its establishment, but additional Bf 109s would be provided to escort the Stukas. Simultaneous with the assault on the radar stations, the bomber wings of Luftflotten 2 and 3 would attack fighter airfields lying south of the River Thames. A few detachments would attack shipping targets of opportunity in the English Channel in order to draw RAF fighters away from their airfields. Hans-Jürgen Stumpff’s Luftflotte 5 would not take part in the initial assault, but would strike later to throw the British air defenses off balance. Once the Luftwaffe had achieved air supremacy, Hitler would issue an ultimatum to Churchill—make peace or London will be subjected to a devastating air attack. If there was no positive response, the attack would be carried out.
By the end of June the two German air fleets, on which the main burden of subduing Britain rested, were almost ready for operations. Some of the recently occupied airfields in France still needed work done on them, but with a certain amount of improvization, they were functional. Aircraft serviceability was more of a problem. The strains of the recent campaign meant that routine servicing had suffered, and it was imperative that the maximum possible strength of operational aircraft be achieved for the launch of the campaign against Britain. The July 1 deadline proved to be too ambitious, and Göring, having referred the matter to the Führer, agreed to a forty-eight-hour postponement.
The combined operational strength of Luftflotten 2 and 3 for what Göring codenamed Adlerangriff (“Eagle Assault”) consisted of some 650 Bf 109s, 250 Me 110s, 275 Ju 87s, and 920 bombers. Luftflotte 5 was smaller and had thirty-nine Bf 109s, which did not have the range to reach Britain, twenty Me 110s, and 100 bombers. Luftwaffe intelligence estimated the RAF’s strength as some 650 fighters and 750 bombers, but believed that the greater combat experience of its crews would tip the balance. Furthermore, they considered the RAF’s command and control structure to be too rigid. Their conclusion was that the initial strike would so cripple Britain’s air defenses that air supremacy would be quickly gained.
Dowding’s Dilemma
In fact, the Luftwaffe overestimated the RAF’s fighter strength. The ravages of the recent air battles over the continent meant that, at the beginning of July, Dowding could only muster nineteen Hurricane and the same number of Spitfire squadrons, with an operational total of 240 Hurricanes and 235 Spitfires, well below the Luftwaffe’s estimate. It was true that fighter production was on the increase—over 300 Hurricanes and nearly 100 Spitfires rolled off the assembly lines during June 1940 alone—but Dowding was suffering from a serious shortage of trained fighter pilots. Only thirty-nine were being produced by the training system every two weeks. He had just set up three additional operational training units, which would enable the output to be trebled, but it would be a few weeks before the operational squadrons could enjoy the benefits. In the meantime, they would have to get on as best as they could.
Dowding recognized only too well that the Germans needed to establish at least overwhelming air superiority over southern England to ensure that an invasion was successful. Southeast England was clearly the region under greatest threat, since it was closest to the continent. Keith Park’s number 11 Group was responsible for its defense, and Dowding allocated it the largest number of squadrons—seven Hurricane and seven Spitfire. But he also had to guard against invasion farther west, and so gave Quintin Brand and his number 10 Group, which covered the remainder of southern England, six Hurricane and five Spitfire squadrons. Trafford Leigh-Mallory’s 12 Group north of the River Thames provided immediate backup to the two forward groups, with five Hurricane and five Spitfire squadrons. Finally, there was Air Vice Marshal Richard Saul’s 13 Group, which covered the north of England and southern Scotland. Dowding considered the threat to this region significantly less than that faced by the other three groups so he merely gave Saul the slender balance of operational squadrons—one Hurricane and two Spitfire, together with two squadrons of inferior Defiants.
Dowding’s plan was that new fighter squadrons should form in number 13 Group’s area and, once operational, replace tired and depleted squadrons from the forward groups. Each group was divided into a number of sectors and had its own operations room from which it controlled the squadrons allotted to it.
Dowding knew that unless his fighters could intercept the German aircraft before they reached their targets, the battle would be lost. This could only be done through timely warnings of attacks. Radar had the key role to play, but the information it provided on the Luftwaffe aircraft forming over northern France and beginning their flights across the Channel would only be effective if passed quickly enough to the relevant agencies. His system of direct communications between the radar stations and his own headquarters at Bentley Priory on the outskirts of London would provide such timely information, especially with the addition of the newly installed filter room. This brought coherence to the plot reports from the individual radar stations and passed results simultaneously to the Bentley Priory ops room and those at Group and Sector HQs. Dowding did not intend to run the detailed operations himself. He believed the system would work more effectively if he delegated to the group commanders. They decided which of their sectors should deal with an incoming raid and scrambled the squadrons, while the sectors controlled the fighters once they were in the air, directing them on to the enemy.
Preliminary Moves
On June 22, 1940, the day Hitler presided over the French surrender ceremony in the very same railway carriage that the Allies had used to formalize the armistice that ended the fighting on the Western Front in November 1918, the Luftwaffe began more active operations against Britain. These took the form of attacks against shipping convoys in the English Channel. Their object was twofold—to demonstrate to the Royal Navy that the Channel was a “no go” area, and to draw the RAF fighters out. Ju 87s were primarily used for the attacks, with Bf 109s providing top cover. While a number of merchant vessels were sunk, the air battles themselves were
little more than skirmishes, with the RAF having a slight edge in planes shot down.
On June 24, after the French signed an armistice with Italy, the Führer broadcast a speech in which he pointed out to the British that they were on their own and there was little point in carrying on the struggle. Much better that they sought peace with honor, rather than suffer needless damage and casualties. Hitler stated that if Britain made the necessary approaches within the next week, she would be granted more favorable terms than those the French had been forced to accept. If the British government ignored this generous offer, it would have to accept the consequences.
The British cabinet discussed the speech, and one or two of its members, notably Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax and former Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, were in favor of putting out feelers to establish precisely what terms Hitler was offering. But Churchill was adamant—the country must fight on; to allow itself to become a vassal of the Third Reich would be a betrayal of not just the British people, but the Empire as well. His sheer force of personality won the cabinet to his point of view. On June 25, after addressing the House of Commons, he spoke to the nation on the BBC. He dismissed the Führer’s offer out of hand, declaring that it would be a fight to the death and that Nazism would ultimately be vanquished. There was silence from Berlin, and as the skirmishes over the Channel continued, the tension grew.
The Main Assault
The Battle of Britain began at dawn on July 2. During the night, the airfields of Luftflotten 2 and 3 in Belgium and northern France had been a hive of activity. The Luftwaffe had an ambitious program of operations. First, the bombers would take off during the hours of darkness, their objective the Group 10 and 11 airfields, which they intended to strike at first light, before the British fighters could get airborne. They would be joined by escort fighters, which would take off at dawn and then cover the bombers’ return flight. As the bombers recrossed the Channel, Ju 87s and the Me 110s of Rubensdörffer’s specialist group would strike at the Home Chain radars, concentrating on those on the English south coast. The two air fleets planned to launch two similar attacks later that day—in early afternoon and late evening—against airfields and radar stations.
Dowding’s first intimation of the impending onslaught came some twenty minutes before dawn when the filter room at Bentley Priory reported a number of groups of hostile aircraft crossing the French coast. His staff recognized that the Luftwaffe had suddenly changed its tactics, but they could not be sure of the target. Nevertheless, Groups 10, 11, and 12 reacted immediately by bringing all their squadrons to readiness. At the time, Groups 10 and 11, in the front line, were operating on the principle of having one flight per squadron on automatic dawn readiness, while the other two groups merely had one flight per airfield. In the meantime, AA guns engaged the bombers as they crossed the English coast, but with little tangible result. The bombers, organized in eight groups of some thirty planes each, flew on to their targets—seven Group 11 airfields (Westhampnett, Lympne, Tangmere, Kenley, Gravesend, West Mailing, and Biggin Hill) and Middle Wallop in Group 10’s area. They reached them as dawn broke. Simultaneously, the RAF readiness flights began to take off, but it was too late.
During the next ten minutes, the Luftwaffe aircraft bombed with impunity, dropping down to as low as 5,000 feet to ensure accuracy. They then turned for home, gaining altitude as they did so. The RAF readiness flights that did manage to get airborne set off in pursuit, but as they closed in, they were attacked by the freshly arrived Bf 109 escorts, which had the advantage of both height and sun. In the ensuing battle, the RAF came off much worse, losing twenty Spitfires and Hurricanes shot down, as against four Bf 109s, three He 111s, and a single Do 17.
As for the airfields themselves, the German bombers had caused serious damage:
Westhampnett—runway severely cratered, one hangar destroyed, five Hurricanes destroyed on the ground (including two under repair)
Lympne—runway damaged, huts badly damaged
Tangmere (sector HQ)—runway rendered unusable, one hangar destroyed and one seriously damaged, six Hurricanes written off, ops room and other buildings badly damaged
Kenley (sector HQ)—runway partially damaged, one hangar damaged, two Spitfires destroyed, administrative buildings damaged and destroyed
Gravesend—one hangar badly damaged, two Hurricanes and two Spitfires destroyed, ops room and other buildings damaged
West Malling—huts destroyed, much cratering
Biggin Hill (sector HQ)—extensive damage, including to ops room, runway unusable, four Spitfires totally destroyed and several others damaged
Middle Wallop (sector HQ)—one hangar destroyed, together with four Spitfires and three Hurricanes, some cratering to runway, and damage to administrative buildings
Map 4. Luftwaffe Assault on Group 11
Of greatest immediate concern was the damage done to Tangmere and Biggin Hill, which had a serious affect on command and control. Both had alternative ops rooms, situated outside the bases, but these were cramped and had only limited communications. The damage to runways also revealed another shortcoming in Fighter Command’s organization—limited airfield repair resources. Some airfields did have specialist Royal Engineer repair teams, but others had to rely on civilian labor. Worse, there was a serious shortage of plant equipment—three airfields (Manston, Hawkinge, and Lympne) had just one bulldozer among them. A further problem was the number of unexploded bombs. Consequently, it would take time to repair the damage, and the aircraft at bases rendered temporarily unusable had to redeploy to satellite airfields. But this lay in the future. In the meantime, while Group 11 reeled from the initial shock of this attack, it was about to be struck again.
As the bombers recrossed the English coast, groups of Ju 87s and the Me 110s of Erprobungsgruppe 210 were heading toward the coast from France. Their mission was to attack the radar stations at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight, Poling, Truleigh, Beachy Head, and Pevensey. The tall towers of the stations made them easy targets to find, but the Luftwaffe planners recognized that these were difficult to destroy. The crews were therefore directed to aim their bombs at the huts at their base. While the stations themselves identified the approaching raiders, the early airfield attacks had thrown Group 11 into confusion. All the controllers could do was try to redirect those fighters grappling with the bombers and their escorts, but only a few heeded the call. As a result, the Ju 87s and Me 110s were able to launch their attacks without interference. Erprobungsgruppe 210 was tasked with taking on Ventnor and Poling and put its specialist training to good effect. Both were extensively damaged and went off the air. The Ju 87s also succeeded in blinding the station at Beachy Head, but while they damaged the remaining two radars, these continued to function. Four Ju 87s were lost—two to antiaircraft fire and two shot down by fighters on their return flight—and one Me 110 also fell victim to the AA guns.
As the Luftwaffe crews landed back at their bases and the initial debriefings took place, it became clear that the first major German attack in the Battle of Britain had been highly successful. Hermann Göring, who had established a temporary headquarters in his personal train on the outskirts of Paris, was elated by the reports he received. He issued a special order of the day, congratulating his air crews and exhorting them to maintain the pressure—“just a few more blows like those of this morning will fatally cripple the RAF and bring Britain to its knees!”
On the airfields themselves, the ground crews labored to rearm and refuel the aircraft for the second strike of the day. While the air crews ate an alfresco meal near their planes, they were briefed for the second attack. Having begun to clear a defense-free path to London, it was the Luftwaffe’s intention both to widen it and to build on the damage already inflicted. In the meantime, small groups of Bf 109s and 110s trailed their coats over the Channel to distract the RAF.
Dowding’s most pressing immediate concerns were the gaps that now existed in his radar coverage. He ordered the deployment of mobi
le radar units (MRU) to cover these, but it would take some hours for them to become fully operational and they lacked the range of the static Chain Home stations. Realizing the aircraft casualties suffered by Group 11, he decided to move one Spitfire and one Hurricane squadron from Group 10. Meanwhile, Park put priority on reestablishing the communications at Tangmere and Biggin Hill. Certain that the Luftwaffe would shortly strike again, neither he nor Dowding was tempted by the German activities over the Channel.