by Unknown
In the spring of 1941, Zhukov tried to persuade Stalin of the need for a preemptive attack on Germany. The new chief of the General Staff wrote a “Report on the Plan of Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissar’s on May 15, 1941.” In this handwritten proposal, Zhukov argued for an immediate offensive using 152 divisions to destroy the estimated 100 German divisions assembling in Poland. Given the many problems the Red Army was experiencing at the time, Stalin ignored Zhukov’s proposal, believing such an attack would have been a desperate gamble. On June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Despite devastating losses, the Red Army survived to fight another day and defeat the Wehrmacht, entering Berlin four years later.
Bibliography
Andreev, V. A., et al, Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvenoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], vol. 1 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961).
Blair, Clay, Ridgway’s Paratroopers. The American Airborne in World War II (The Dial Press, Garden City, New York, 1985).
Boog, Horst, ed., Germany and the Second World War, vol. IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union (Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, 1996, translated by Dean S. McMurry, et al., Clarendon Press, New York, 1998).
Glantz, David, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union. A History (Frank Cass, London, 1992).
Glantz, David, and House, Jonathan, When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (University of Kansas Press, 1995).
Haupt, Werner, Army Group Center. The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-1945 (Schiffer Military History, Atglen, Pennsylvania, 1997).
Jentz, Thomas J., Panzer Truppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force 1933-1942, 2 volumes (Schiffer Military History, Atglen, Pennsylvania, 1996).
Krupchenko, I. P., Sovetskie Tankovye Voiska 1941-1945 [Soviet Tank Forces 1941-1945] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973).
Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, The Cavalry 1939-1945 (Historical Times, Harris-burg, Pennsylvania, 1987).
Radzievskiy, General of the Army A.I., Tankovyi Udar. Tankovaya Armiya v Nastupatel’noi Operatsii Fronta po opytu Velikoi Otechestvenoi Voiny [Tank Strike. The Tank Army in Front Offensive Operations from the Experience of the Great Patriotic War] (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1977).
Schlieffen, General Field Marshal Count Alfred von, Cannae (The Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1936).
Shukman, Harold, ed., Stalin’s Generals (Grove Press, New York, 1993).
The Soviet Air Force in World War II (Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1973). This is a translation of the Soviet Ministry of Defense official history of the Soviet Air Force in World War II.
Spick, Mike, Luftwaffe Fighter Aces. The Jagdflieger and their Combat Tactics and Techniques (Greenhill Books, London, 1996).
Stoves, Rolf O., 1st Panzer Division History, 1939-1945 (Podzun, Bad Nauheim, 1962).
Suvorov, Viktor, Den’ “M.” Logda Nachalas Vtoraya Mirovaya Voina? [D-Day. When Did the Second World War Begin?] (ACT, London, 1999).
———, Ledokol. Kto Nachal Vtoraya Mirovaya Voina? [Icebreaker. Who Started the Second World War?] (ACT, London, 1999).
Notes
1. Boog, Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, 318.
2. Ibid., 325. Estimate as of June 20, 1941.
3. Ibid., 343.
4. Ibid., 340; Haupt, Army Group Center, 18-19.
*5. Hitler, Adolf, Germany’s Supreme Warlord, 22 volumes (Das Reich, Berlin, 1950), vol. 2, 228. Unless otherwise cited, all references to Hitler are from this work.
6. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union, 88-91. See also Suvorov, Ledokol and Den’ “M.”
*7. Taken from Zhukov, General of the Army Georgi K., Operation Storm, two volumes (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1954), vol I, 102-22. Unless otherwise cited all references to Zhukov are from this work. Zhukov survived twelve years in a Soviet prison camp before being released and allowed to publish this account.
8. Viktor Anfilov, “Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov,” in Shukman, Stalin’s Generals, 343.
9. Glantz & House, When Titans Clashed, 41.
10. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union, 88-91.
11. Hoffmann, Joachim, “The Soviet Union up to the Eve of the German Attack,” in Boog, The Attack on the Soviet Union, 78-81, and Boog, Horst, “Military Concepts of the War with Russia,” in Boog, The Attack on the Soviet Union, 352.
12. Hoffman, op. cit., 66.
13. Radzievskiy, Tankovyi Udar, 8.
14. Ibid., 9.
15. Ibid., 22. Sovetskie Tankovye Voika 1941-1945, 22.
16. Andreev, Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945, vol. 1, 475.
17. Spick, Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, 78. Schiess scored sixty-seven air victories during the war.
18. The Soviet Air Force in World War II, 38; See also Horst Boog et al., vol. IV, Maps.
19. The Soviet Air Force in World War II, 39.
20. “Single Engine Fighters 28.06.41,” in German Order of Battle—Statistics as of Quarter Years 1938-1945, HRA 137.306-14 on microfilm roll A1128, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Military Analysis Division, USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
21. Spick, op. cit., 78-79.
*22. Danilov, General of the Army VI., Official History of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II, twelve volumes (Voenizdat, Moscow, 2000), vol. 2, 114. Unless otherwise cited all references to Red Army operations are from this work.
23. Boog, 93.
24. Ibid.
25. For the organization and order of battle of Soviet airborne forces on the eve of the German invasion, see Glantz, David M., Research Survey No. 4 The Soviet Airborne Experience (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, November 1984), pp. 21-22, 26.
26. Based on an actual experience of the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division during World War II. See Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers, 101-03.
27. For an English translation, see the edition of Schlieffen’s Cannae cited in the bibliography above.
*28. Rommel, General Field Marshal Erwin, ed., Official History of the German Armed Forces in World War II, ten volumes (Das Reich, Berlin, 1960), vol. 3, 98. Unless otherwise cited, all references to German armed forces operations are from this work.
29. Stoves, 1st Panzer Division History, 1939-1945, 882.
30. This is the actual number of tanks in the four Panzer formations, which, in reality, arrived in the Eastern Front after the beginning of Barbarossa. See Jentz, Panzer Truppen, vol. I, pp. 212-13, “Panzer Units Sent to the Eastern Front After the Start of the Campaign.” For the number of horses in the 1st Cavalry Division, see Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry 1939-1945, 238-40.
*31. Extracted from Rommel, General Field Marshal Erwin, Rommel hat nach Gomel gegangen! (Das Reich, Berlin, 1942), 99-224. Unless otherwise cited, all references to Rommel or the operations of his Panzer group are from this work.
*32. Extracted from Schulenberg, Count Friedrich Werner von, Victory in the East: The Second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Das Reich, Berlin, 1942), 302.
The Hinge1
Alamein to Basra, 1942
Paddy Griffith
“So that every man understands, the objective is the Suez Canal.”
—Erwin Rommel, April 10, 1941
The White House, Washington
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed the telegram announcing the fall of Tobruk to his distinguished guest in the Oval Office, he was taken somewhat aback by the depth of feeling with which the information was greeted. “Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another,” gloomily intoned Winston S. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, who was visibly shaken by the news. He went on to compare the loss of the desert fortress—together with some 33,000 prisoners of war and immeasurable logistic resources—with the equally bitter humiliation of Singapore a mere four months ea
rlier. Even more than Singapore, perhaps, Tobruk had been held up as a symbol of determined resistance, since it had successfully withstood an eight-month siege all through the summer of 1941, effectively halting a brilliant German offensive dead in its tracks. Now, on June 20-21, 1942, the same fortress had fallen within the space of just thirty-six hours, almost before anyone noticed that it was again being attacked. From symbolizing the British bulldog spirit, it had instantly been transformed into a telling icon of unfocused British ineffectiveness; of feebleness, congenital bumbling, and apparently unending defeat. The general public reaction in Britain would be demonstrated within a week, when the government lost the Maldon by-election, after which a vote of no confidence was moved in the House of Commons.
It was no consolation to Churchill that Erwin Rommel, the tireless “Desert Fox,” was promoted field marshal (the youngest in the German Army) just one day after he had accepted Tobruk’s surrender. Nor did it help the British Prime Minister that his generals had repeatedly warned him that they never had any intention of holding Tobruk once the main Gazala position, farther to the west, had been broken. A series of military experts had carefully itemized all the gaping deficiencies in the Tobruk defenses, which had been comprehensively pillaged to strengthen the front line. Finally, it was very cold comfort to be told that 2nd South African Division, assigned as the Tobruk garrison, had been raw, inexperienced, and far from the high-fighting efficiency of the veteran Australians who performed the same duty so staunchly in the previous year. The division lost in Tobruk represented no less than one-third of the total manpower contributed to the war by the Dominion of South Africa, and its capture dealt a shattering blow to the already shaky solidarity of the Commonwealth worldwide.
Far from lessening the force of the blow, the many preparatory warnings about Tobruk made its dramatic but obviously inevitable fall all the more difficult for Churchill to swallow. He was only too well aware that he was personally directly responsible for the scale of the debacle. In his heart of hearts he well knew that he had ignored all the warnings, out of personal pride and a misguided view of press relations. From Washington, some 4,000 miles distant, he had tried to will the success of Tobruk’s defenders, as if he could somehow create minefields, ditches, antitank guns, and high-fighting morale solely by the prodigious charismatic force of his thought waves. In the case of Tobruk, this technique had failed in the most signal and public manner possible, with the result that Churchill now knew that he should never have attempted it at all. He had almost unilaterally overruled his military experts, throwing a monkey wrench into their plans with his last minute insistence that Tobruk should be defended. He must secretly have seen himself as a man who demanded bricks to be made without straw, and who caused the 8th Army’s smooth evacuation eastward to be fatally disrupted by a politically motivated attempt to hold an untenable town merely because its name was known to the public.
When President Roosevelt tried to probe the inner mood of his distinguished guest, he was quickly met with an outward wall of optimism and reassurance. Churchill might have been suffering from personal turmoil and even guilt, but he’d been active in public life long enough to cover such setbacks with the minimum of detectable consternation. Having made his acid observations on how closely Tobruk reminded him of Singapore, he quickly returned to the business that had brought him to the Second Washington Conference in the first place; namely, the vital plans for an early U.S. amphibious landing somewhere within the German area of operations. The Americans and Russians wanted this to be in France, but to Churchill, such an attempt appeared both premature and highly dangerous. His preference was for the landing to be made in Morocco and Algeria, as a means of hastening the complete conquest of North Africa. Once that had been achieved, the whole “soft underbelly” of southern Europe, east as well as west, would lie open to allied attack. Indeed, if it were not achieved, the awful news from Tobruk suggested that the whole British position in Egypt might itself be in dire jeopardy.
With considerable difficulty, Churchill would eventually manage to secure American agreement for the landing in Algeria, but he was always acutely aware that his more urgent business was to stop the rot in the desert, and sooner rather than later. The developing news was far from reassuring. As early as June 23 the proposed Sollum position to cover the Egyptian frontier had been outflanked and abandoned without a fight, as Gen. Neil Ritchie’s battered 8th Army determined instead to make its all-out stand at Mersa Matruh, some 120 waterless miles farther to the rear. On this same day, Ritchie’s immediate superior, Gen. Claude Auchinleck, the Commander in Chief, Middle East (CinC ME), offered his resignation to Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, the chief of the Imperial General Staff. The “Auk” by now had little confidence in either Ritchie or the Matruh plan, and he was acutely aware that this supposed “coastal fortress” was no more than a dangerous cul-de-sac that could easily be bypassed on the landward side, and in which a large force could all too easily be imprisoned. It could boast a number of aging minefields and a plentiful infantry garrison, but its essential armored backup was hastily assembled, badly coordinated, and—perhaps most important—weighed down by a crushing awareness of defeat at Gazala and the vast distances that had subsequently been covered in the retreat. Auchinleck knew that the responsibility for all the recent defeats ultimately rested on his own shoulders, so he felt he should now ask for either an official endorsement of his position or a replacement.
Auchinleck’s letter arrived on Churchill’s desk during the trickiest part of the American negotiations, so it was not perhaps accorded the full reflection it deserved. What Churchill did know was that he had been mightily disappointed by the fall of Tobruk, and so was psychologically ready to accept the offer of a new broom in the Middle East. Auchinleck’s resignation was therefore duly accepted, and Gen. Sir Harold Alexander, who fortuitously happened to be on his way through Cairo on his way to the UK from India, was made CinC ME in his place. Alexander in turn dismissed Ritchie on June 26, replacing him in the 8th Army command by Gen. W.H.E. “Strafer” Gott, a veteran desert hand who was currently commanding XIII Corps outside Matruh.
The “Alamein Line,” Egypt
“Strafer” had an enviable and a bellicose fighting record—as his nickname suggested—which extended back through the whole of the Libyan campaign since the start of the war. He was in many ways the ideal savior for the flagging 8th Army, and even, in his own solid British way, a warrior who sprang from much the same mold as Rommel himself. But by late June 1942 even his friends found Gott tired and mentally oppressed by defeat and by the scale of his responsibilities—he had, after all, risen from command of a brigade to that of an army corps within a short eight months. As a corps commander he had perhaps been promoted one rank above his competence, or at least above the arena in which his sense of aggressive maneuver could operate freely. Maybe it was simply that he had always enjoyed a certain brand of intermittent success when commanding a brigade or a division, but no such result had been accorded to him in the bruising Gazala battle, when he commanded a corps.
In these circumstances, Churchill’s high hopes for his radical hand-over of command were not, alas, destined to be gratified. Alexander was still very new to the theater, and essentially an infantry general coming from the relatively slow moving and tank-free warfare in the Burmese jungle, so he was still feeling his way in this totally novel mechanized environment. In contrast, Gott, who had previously been holding the XIII Corps armor ready to strike from the inland flank, was a true armored warrior, but he was fatally distracted at a critical moment in the battle. He found himself brusquely called into the coastal town of Matruh, introduced to a whole new staff and modus operandi, and in particular was suddenly and disorientatingly invited to share in all the anxieties of W. G. Holmes’s inexperienced, infantry-heavy X Corps. No good could possibly come from this mixture, and in fact Rommel’s first spearhead of just twenty tanks in 21st Panzer Division almost effortlessly managed to bluff the British (who
had a total of over 150 tanks in the area) into a precipitate and undignified withdrawal from the Matruh area. By the morning of June 29, after “a night of chaos,” Gott’s totally disorganized command had escaped eastward out of the clutches of its heavily outnumbered attackers, leaving behind some 6,000 prisoners and over forty tanks. In strictly military terms, this actually represented a far more shameful and humiliating outcome than the far bigger loss of Tobruk, which had been a politically designed battle, fought against the advice of the soldiers.