On the morning of December 18, “the weather became worse and no attempt was made to fuel.” Krauchunas described the scene over breakfast in the wardroom, where officers conversed with the captain, and the engineering officer told Andrea that the ship was operating on one boiler and had enough fuel for another twenty-four hours. Krauchunas said he understood the captain as wanting to take on ballast if fueling was not imminent. He told of going to his stateroom, then learning of water flooding the engine room and electrical circuits, and “all the lights going out” about 10:50 A.M. About twenty minutes later, “we took a hard list to port and stayed there momentarily, and then came back. Our next roll to port capsized the ship.”
The court heard testimony from six Spence survivors. Some of the most detailed information emerged from Quartermaster Edward Traceski due to his position on the bridge the morning of the typhoon. Traceski, who would never forget “how many men called out for God” as the ship went over, confirmed Andrea’s order to begin ballasting about 10:30 A.M., not quite an hour before Spence sank. He also described in detail the sea and wind conditions. He remembered the swells coming from “directly aft,” which would tend to eliminate them as the cause of Spence’s fatal roll. However, Beaufort force 12 winds (over 75 miles per hour) were blowing from Spence’s starboard side, suggesting they could have been a culprit in causing—or at least worsening—the last, steep roll to port. When asked about which damage control condition was set, Traceski said, “Baker was set. The normal wartime condition.” This allowed transit between spaces through open hatches, as opposed to condition Affirm, in which more hatches to watertight spaces were closed, restricting traffic and limiting any flooding.
The next witness called was Chief Water Tender James Felty, one of the ten raft survivors rescued by Tabberer. The judge advocate returned to the topic of ballasting, as the loss of stability from being light of fuel and riding so high in the water—in conjunction with the typhoon’s powerful winds—was looming as a likely cause for the capsizing. Felty testified to Spence receiving approximately 12,000 gallons of seawater ballast, a relatively small amount given the ship’s low fuel level.
Another water tender, Chief George Johnson, twenty-five, of Fresno, California, also among the raft survivors saved by Tabberer, thought Spence might have received about 16,000 gallons of ballast, and estimated it would have required another hour and a half to take on an additional 30,000 gallons of seawater.
A picture could be drawn from the testimony of Traceski, Felty, and Johnson of a concerned Andrea on the bridge, aware of his ship’s precarious condition and realizing that fueling would not happen anytime soon. In the last hour of his and Spence’s life, Jim Andrea, desperate to ballast for stability, simply started too late and ran out of time.
Johnson was asked if he saw his ship after he went into the water.
“Yes, sir.”
“In what condition was the ship then?” asked Gates.
“She stayed up, I’d say, about seven or eight minutes. She broke in half and went down.”
“Did you observe any explosion after the ship capsized?”
“Yes, sir.”
“Was this before or after the ship broke in half?”
“After.”
With the end of testimony from selected survivors, the court of inquiry moved toward concluding the investigative process. It met again on New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day—the court’s last day of proceedings—to query a number of experts in various fields, including weather forecasting and ship engineering, on largely technical issues.
One of the final witnesses was Captain Wilbur M. Lockhart (Annapolis 1918), the Pacific Fleet’s senior aerology officer, based at Pearl Harbor Weather Central, which was responsible for sending out regular weather advisories and maps to U.S. ships and stations. Initially without current weather observations or reports “within a radius of 600 miles of the Third Fleet,” Pearl Harbor was “lacking” in early knowledge about the developing typhoon, Lockhart stated. He was neither asked nor volunteered information about Pearl Harbor receiving early typhoon warnings from the naval weather station at Saipan or elsewhere.* As “indications” came in on the seventeenth that differed from what the Third Fleet had broadcast in terms of the location, intensity, and track of the storm, Pearl Harbor decided not to place “another forecast on the air entirely different from what Third Fleet had sent [because] it was decided that it would rile the waters too much to change this forecast.” Not until the afternoon of December 18, as the latest reports left “little doubt” about the storm’s position and track, did Pearl Harbor broadcast warnings of a “deep typhoon” at 15°N, 128°E—the approximate area where Hull, Monaghan, and Spence were already down.
Asked about Kosco’s inaccuracies in forecasting the approaching typhoon, Lockhart said, “With the report as sent out [by Third Fleet on December 17], I believe the evaluation was considerably wrong and that the storm no doubt was much closer.” Lockhart’s indictment did not stop with Kosco, however. “I do not believe that most forecasters in the fleet broke out a compass and laid down the possible positions that the typhoon might be in. As indicated by the averages over a great number of years, there is a possibility of about three [out of four] storms forming where this one formed and moving to the northwest or north, but there always remains one possibility that it could move to the west. This possibility was apparently lost sight of completely.”
On January 3, 1945, having “thoroughly inquired into all the facts and circumstances” asked of them by Nimitz in his authorizing letter, and after considering “the evidence adduced,” the court of inquiry announced its finding of facts, opinions, and recommendations.
Halsey’s fleet movements—including his attempts to fuel his ships—were “logical” in view of his war commitments. At the first sign of the growing storm, however, Halsey should have ordered special weather flights and reports from vessels, and the “large errors made in predicting the location and path of this storm” were ultimately his responsibility. Halsey was also at fault for not broadcasting definite danger warnings to all his vessels early on the morning of December 18 “in order that preparations might be made and that inexperienced commanding officers might have sooner realized the seriousness of their situations.” Another finding was that in the group containing Hull, Monaghan, and Spence, “vessels were maneuvering to maintain formation up to the times they were disabled or lost,” suggesting criticism of Halsey for not issuing orders “to the fleet as a whole to disregard formation keeping and take best courses and speeds” to ride out the storm before it was too late.
Although the court found the “aerological talent assisting Halsey was inadequate in practical experience and service background” and would recommend “that older and more experienced aerological officers be assigned” to the Third Fleet, Kosco got off lighter than some of the testimony—including his own—indicated that he might. The court judged that on the morning of December 18 the Third Fleet aerology officer had given his “best information” to Halsey on the position of the storm and advised him “correctly as to the best course to steer to get in the safe [navigable] semicircle of the storm which was then in progress.” The northeasterly courses steered by the fleet from about 7:00 A.M. on December 18 in an attempt to fuel certain destroyers contributed to the disaster; “this maneuver held the fleet in or near the path of the storm center and was an error in judgment” on the part of Halsey.
The court offered opinions as to why each ship sank. In the cases of the Farragut-class destroyers, the losses of Hull and Monaghan were “due primarily to insufficient dynamic stability to absorb the combined effects of wind and sea.” The court did not believe that Hull and Monaghan “would have survived” that morning even had they ballasted, given the basic instability of the Farragut-class ships, which “is materially less than other destroyers.” With the high winds and mountainous seas, there was “no safety margin left for stability.” While the quantity of free surface water that ma
y have been present in Hull and Monaghan “is not known,” there was little doubt in the mind of the admirals that “under the existing weather some amount of free water was present in the ships” and that such a condition could “contribute to their instability.” In conclusion, the court decided, “it is believed that the sea and wind then existing, together with the fact that both ships had lost steering and were rolling heavily in the trough of the sea, could have combined [with their instability] so as to cause capsizing.”
The newer Spence, which had “greater stability” and could be expected to “withstand heavier seas and winds than the Farragut destroyers,” was another matter. In addition to effects of the typhoon, the factors contributing to her loss included the small amount of fuel in the ship, little or no water ballast, and the presence of free water below deck.
The commanding officers of all three ships “failed to realize sufficiently in advance” the necessity for them to “give up the attempt to maintain position” and to give “all their attention to saving their ships.” The court acknowledged that such “good judgment” could “require more experience than had the commanding officers” of the three destroyers.
The court concluded that although there was “extremely limited…reliable and direct evidence” about Spence, the “available evidence indicates the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander James P. Andrea, probably failed to set the highest material condition (Affirm); that he delayed ballasting until too late; that topside ammunition, provisions and other portable topside weights were not struck below.” Inasmuch as Andrea was “lost with his ship,” however, the admirals pointed out that “he is not available to the court” for further questioning or proceedings.
As for the captains of Hull and Monaghan, the court decided that “no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred” by James Marks or Bruce Garrett. As a result, “no further proceedings” were recommended for the only defendant named in the inquiry: Marks, who two days later would write a letter to Henry Plage arranging for the return of the “gear” and $150 Marks had borrowed from him, and revealing also that he “expects to emerge from this ‘deal’ with a clean record as everyone seems to realize the situation we went through was a most unusual one!”
The court of inquiry formally listed three reasons for the “storm damage and losses incurred” by the Third Fleet:
Maneuvering the Fleet unknowingly into or near the path of a typhoon under a false sense of security and a belief that danger did not exist until too late. The lack of appreciation of storm danger was in turn due to unsound aerological advice based on insufficient data, coupled with wishful reasoning in connection with desired operations.
A certain amount of delay and maneuvering in the face of the storm and near its track, in an effort to fuel destroyers, after the storm had struck the Fleet.
In some cases a lack of appreciation by subordinate commanders and commanding officers that really dangerous weather conditions existed until the storm had taken charge of the situation, thus delaying until too late the preparation for security which would be expected.
“The preponderance of responsibility for the above falls on Commander Third Fleet, Admiral William F. Halsey, U.S. Navy. In analyzing the mistakes, errors and faults included therein, the court classifies them as errors in judgment under stress of war operations and not as offenses. Those pertaining to subordinates are attributed to errors in judgment, or in experience, or both. The court fully realizes that a certain degree of blame attaches to those in command in all disasters, unless they are manifestly ‘Acts of God.’ The extent of blame as it applies to Commander Third Fleet or others, is impractical to assess.”
A FEW DAYS LATER, an old wooden minesweeper chugged out of Ulithi lagoon, headed in a “column of ships” for Eniwetok. Aboard were three Hull officers who were to pick up other transportation at Eniwetok to Pearl Harbor, and from there to fly home on a PBY amphibious plane. Don Watkins and Ed Brooks, who had held their surprise reunion at the court of inquiry, were on the minesweeper along with Lloyd Rust, the CIC officer and new Texas lawyer who, tumbling endlessly in the churning sea upon his escape from the sinking ship, had resigned himself to possibly dying.
After making it through his first night in the water, Rust in the morning had kicked off his shoes and removed his pants, “figuring it would be easier to swim.” At one point he pulled his white undershorts off, too, and waved them at a plane crossing overhead that kept going. Doubting there would be many more chances for rescue, he again “made my peace.” As it started to get dark, “a ship came up” heading right for him. Close enough to spot “men walking back and forth on the deck,” he could see “she was one of our destroyers.” Rust hollered, but the ship turned away. That was “another low point.” As the ship steamed from sight, Rust got “mad at God.” Was he being teased? Tortured? As it got dark and the sky cleared, twinkling stars appeared. Rust got to thinking that God doesn’t torture people. He decided the only reason a ship in the middle of the ocean would make a “hard right turn” would be as part of a search pattern. If that were the case, the ship would be turning at right angles, heading back in his direction. Figuring he would swim closer to the ship’s next leg, he swam until the moon came up and he became “completely worn out.” Saying to himself, You’ve done all you can do, he passed out. The next thing he knew, a rescue swimmer was in the water with him, pulling him by his life jacket toward the destroyer Knapp (DD-654). It was 8:28 A.M. on December 20. Rust had been in the water for forty-four hours. Resting on the ship, he began to think he might practice law after all. That morning Knapp picked up two more survivors and a third man who was dead—only “half a body” left by sharks.
The minesweeper bound for Eniwetok had a small complement of officers, so the Hull officers stood watches on the bridge. When it was Watkins’ turn, he got the lowdown from one of the watch officers. “Oh, yeah, the fire bell is out there under the bridge,” the officer said before departing. Guess I won’t need that, Watkins thought. A short time later, the bridge filled with smoke, and Watkins ran for the alarm. When the minesweeper went dead in the water, a ship behind them collided with a ship from up ahead that had turned around to assist. By then the other Hull officers had rushed to the bridge. “You guys want to fight the fire or go back in the water?” one of them asked. The three agreed it would be best to fight the fire.
THE RECORD OF THE COURT of inquiry, as well as its findings and recommendations, was reviewed and accepted by all higher authorities—Admirals Nimitz and King, followed by Secretary of Navy James Forrestal. King believed the characterization of Halsey’s mistakes—which Nimitz called “a commendable desire to meet military commitments”—needed to be tougher. The Navy’s top admiral added a line to the official record: “The mistakes made were errors in judgment resulting from insufficient information, committed under stress of war operations, and stemmed from the firm determination to meet military commitments.”
In February 1945 Nimitz signed a four-page typed letter—classified as confidential but copied to every ship commander in the Pacific Fleet—with the heading “Lessons of Damage in Typhoon.” In what amounted to a lecture on the history and lessons of marine navigation and safety, Nimitz suggested further readings, such as the Bowditch and Knight classics, as well as books on ballasting instructions, damage control, and stability. On the latter subject, Nimitz said, “steps must be taken to insure that commanding officers of all vessels, particularly destroyers and smaller craft, are fully aware of the stability characteristics of their ships.”
Nimitz concluded that at times in bad weather “a ship’s safety must take precedence over further efforts to keep up with the formation or to execute the assigned task. This time will always be a matter of personal judgment. Naturally no commander is going to cut thin the margin between staying afloat and foundering, but he may nevertheless unwittingly pass the danger point even though his ship is yet in extremis. The time for taking all measures for a ship’s safety
is while still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.”
ACTING ON A RECOMMENDATION of the court of inquiry, the Bureau of Ships conducted stability testing on two Farragut-class ships. The decade-old destroyers, however, were deemed “stable,” with “no major alterations to improve stability” necessary. The five remaining ships of that class—Farragut, Dewey, Macdonough, Dale, and Aylwin—served out the war in the Pacific, although one of them, Aylwin, caught in a second typhoon in June 1945, “again rolled excessively and came dangerously close to capsizing.” They all earned ten or more battle stars. Eight weeks after the war ended, the Navy declared those five “unfit for other than limited service” and concluded that “the poor stability characteristics of the vessels preclude [their] being altered and equipped for other than limited service.”
The Farragut-class ships, once the “goldplaters” of the U.S. Navy, were sold for scrap. The appraised value of their steel was set at $4,000 per ship.
Postscript
Operating off Okinawa on the night of June 2, 1945, Halsey’s Third Fleet received typhoon warnings from a number of sources, including one of “Japanese origin which predicted that the typhoon would pass over Okinawa.”
Commander George Kosco, still serving as Halsey’s aerologist, “digested all the forecasts” but did not believe that the fleet was in danger of being hit by a typhoon for the second time in six months. Kosco estimated Okinawa “would not be in the path of any typhoon that could develop from the present weather situation.” He recommended to Halsey that the “best course of action” was to “maintain [our] present position and await future developments.”
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