If the causes of the war are subject to debate, so too are the consequences. The United States has won most of its wars, often emerging with significant concessions from the enemy. But the War of 1812 was different. Far from bringing the enemy to terms, the nation was lucky to escape without making extensive concessions itself. The Treaty of Ghent (which ended the conflict) said nothing about the issues that had caused the war and contained nothing to suggest that America had achieved its war aims. Instead, it merely provided for returning to the status quo ante bellum—the state that had existed before the war.
The prosecution of the war was marred by considerable bungling and mismanagement. This was partly due to the nature of the republic. The nation was too young and immature—and its government too feeble and inexperienced—to prosecute a major war efficiently. Politics also played a part. Federalists vigorously opposed the conflict, and so too did some Republicans. Even those who supported the war feuded among themselves and never displayed the sort of patriotic enthusiasm that has been so evident in other American wars. The advocates of war appeared to support the conflict more with their heads than their hearts, and more with their hearts than their purses. As a result, efforts to raise men and money lagged consistently behind need.
Despite the bungling and halfhearted support that characterized this conflict, the War of 1812 was not without its stirring moments and splendid victories. American success at the Thames in the Northwest, the victories at Chippawa and Fort Erie on the Niagara front, the rousing defense of Baltimore in the Chesapeake, and the crushing defeat of the British at New Orleans—all these showed that with proper leadership and training American fighting men could hold their own against the well-drilled and battle-hardened regulars of Great Britain. Similarly, the naval victories on the northern lakes and the high seas and the success of privateers around the globe demonstrated that, given the right circumstances, the nation’s armed ships matched up well against even the vaunted and seemingly invincible Royal Navy.
The war also produced its share of heroes—people whose reputations were enhanced by military or government service. The war helped catapult four men into the presidency—Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, James Monroe, and William Henry Harrison—and gave a significant boost to the political or military careers of many others, most notably Henry Clay, Jacob Brown, and Winfield Scott. Indeed, for many young men on the make, the war offered an excellent launching pad for a career.
In some ways, the War of 1812 looked more to the past than to the future. As America’s second and last war against Great Britain, it echoed the ideology and issues of the American Revolution. It was the second and last time that America was the underdog in a war and the second and last time that the nation tried to conquer Canada. It was also the last time that Indians played a major role in determining the future of the continent. In this sense, the War of 1812 was the last of the North American colonial wars. The war was unique in generating such vehement political opposition and nearly unique in ending in a stalemate on the battlefield. Although most Americans pretended they had won the war—even calling it a “Second War of Independence”—they could point to few concrete gains to sustain this claim. In fact, none of the maritime issues that had played such a key role in propelling the young republic into war were even mentioned in the peace treaty.
It is this lack of success that may best explain why the war is so little remembered. Americans have characteristically judged their wars on the basis of their success. The best-known wars—the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II—were all great successes. Although many people remembered the War of 1812 as a success, in a very real sense it was a failure, and perhaps this is why it attracts so little attention today.
The obscurity of this war, however, should not blind us to its significance, for it was an important turning point, a great watershed, in the history of the young republic. It concluded almost a quarter of a century of troubled diplomacy and partisan politics and ushered in the Era of Good Feelings. It marked the end of the Federalist party but the vindication of Federalist policies, many of which were adopted by Republicans during or after the war. The war also broke the power of American Indians and reinforced the powerful undercurrent of anglophobia that had been spawned by the Revolution a generation before. In addition, it promoted national self-confidence and encouraged the heady expansionism that lay at the heart of American foreign policy for the rest of the century. Finally, the war gave the fledgling republic a host of sayings, symbols, and songs that helped Americans define who they were and where the young republic was headed. Although looking to the past, the war was fraught with consequences for the future, and for this reason it is worth studying today.
Special Notes
Troop terminology. There were four classes of American troops in the war: U.S. Regulars (who enlisted in the regular army for one to five years or for the duration of the war), U.S. Volunteers (who enlisted for one year in special units, mainly at the beginning of the war), militia (who were called into service for up to six months), and volunteer militia, also known simply as volunteers (who enlisted for up to a year, typically to take part in a campaign). There were also four classes of British troops: British regulars (who were long-term professional soldiers), fencible troops (who were locally raised soldiers that were trained and treated like regulars but could not serve beyond North America), provincial troops (who were local soldiers that were raised and paid by the provincial governments but were treated in some ways like regulars), and militia (who were generally called into service to help repel an invasion).
Troop figures. Most troop figures in this study have been rounded. The figures given in contemporary documents are often unreliable because record keeping was sloppy and field commanders had an interest in magnifying their victories and minimizing their defeats. Even with the muster rolls and other contemporary records before them, scholars sometimes find it difficult to determine exactly how many troops were engaged in a battle because some units were invariably detached to protect supplies, garrison temporary posts, guard prisoners, or perform other collateral duties. Casualty figures also vary, and those listed as killed or missing in action sometimes turned up after the fog of war had lifted.
Naval armaments. Warships in the Age of Sail were rated to carry a certain number of guns (cannons), but the actual number they carried was up to the captain, and there was a tendency, especially on American ships, to cram as many aboard as possible. For warships as well as for privateers, I have given the number of guns in parenthesis. Thus, the U.S. Frigate Constitution (56 guns) and the American privateer General Armstrong (14 guns). Readers should bear in mind that some of these figures are an educated guess and that the size of the guns carried made a huge difference in any ship’s firepower. Heavy frigates carrying 24-pounder guns had a third more firepower than light frigates carrying 18-pounders. This was a significant difference.
Rate of exchange. Throughout the Age of Jefferson, the U.S. government used an exchange rate of £1 = $4.44. But this figure, known as the nominal par, was only used for certain purposes, such as computing the tariff on goods imported from Great Britain or settling accounts and satisfying claims that were kept in pounds sterling.2 The actual rate of exchange on the open market varied considerably. The rate averaged $3.62 in 1812; $3.75 in 1813; $4.24 in 1814; and $4.90 in 1815. Whenever I thought it might be useful, I have used these figures to present contemporary costs in both currencies. For the war as a whole, I have averaged the rate for 1812, 1813, and 1814, which works out to £1 = $3.87. For the entire period 1793–1815, the average is £1 = $4.37.3
Place names. For the sake of convenience, Canada refers to Great Britain’s North American provinces even though they were not formally joined in a confederation until 1867. The terms United States and America have been used interchangeably, as have Great Britain and Britain, Old Northwest and Northwest, and Old Southwest and Southwest. When U.S. and Canadian spelling of place names differs, I have followed the
practice at the location. Thus, the Battle of Chippawa (instead of Chippewa).
Chapter 1
The Road to War, 1801–1812
On March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson walked from his boardinghouse in Washington City, as the nation’s capital was then called, to the Capitol building, where he was inaugurated as third president of the United States. The walk was short but symbolic. Jefferson pointedly refused to take a carriage, a vehicle he considered a badge of aristocracy.1 The nation’s new leaders favored a more democratic style than their Federalist predecessors. They also planned to adopt a new set of policies. It was these policies—initiated by Jefferson and carried on by Madison—that put the United States on a collision course with Great Britain and ultimately led to the War of 1812.
Republicans did not differ with Federalists over the broad objectives of American policy in this era. During the long series of Anglo-French wars that lasted from 1793 to 1815, all Americans agreed that the nation should work to promote prosperity at home while protecting its rights and preserving its neutrality abroad. But what was the best way to achieve these ends? It was this question, more than any other, that divided Americans into two political camps.2
Federalist Policy: Preserving Peace, Preparing for War
Federalists believed in the old Roman doctrine, proclaimed and popularized by Washington, that the best way to preserve peace was to be prepared for war.3 “War is a great calamity,” said Federalist Congressman Benjamin Tallmadge, “and the surest way to avoid it, is to be prepared for it.” “Even in time of profound peace,” echoed the Boston Weekly Messenger, “it has been considered a maxim of wisdom to be prepared for war.”4 Toward this end, Federalists implemented a broad program of financial and military preparedness in the 1790s. Their aim was not only to deter war but to put the nation in the best possible position to defend itself if hostilities erupted.
The Federalists’ policy of financial preparedness was based on Alexander Hamilton’s program, which was adopted in the early 1790s. This program provided for the federal government to assume responsibility for more than $75 million of indebtedness incurred by the state and Continental governments during the Revolutionary War. It also provided for the imposition of internal and external taxes and the creation of a national bank. Together these measures initiated a financial revolution that restored public credit, created millions of dollars of investment capital, and established a stable and uniform national currency.5
To complement their financial policies, the Federalists also expanded the defense establishment.6 The peacetime army was gradually increased from 840 men in 1789 to 5,400 in 1801. The navy, which had been scrapped after the Revolution, was rebuilt so that by 1801 there were 13 frigates in service and 6 ships-of-the-line under construction. The Federalists also began a modest system of coastal fortifications, devoting $1 million to the construction and repair of forts to protect American cities from assault via the sea.7
Jay’s Treaty (1794)
While promoting preparedness at home, the Federalists pursued a pro-British foreign policy abroad. The sheet anchor of this policy was the Jay Treaty, an Anglo-American agreement forged in 1794 that regulated commerce and defined neutral rights in time of war.8 Although the Republicans were always critical of this treaty—one paper called it the “death-warrant to our neutral rights”—there is no denying that it achieved two important ends.9 It ensured peace with the one nation whose naval power could menace the United States, and it ushered in an era of Anglo-American accord that allowed American commerce—and hence the American economy—to flourish. American exports, which stood at $33 million in 1794, soared to $94 million in 1801, and the entire nation basked in the resulting prosperity.10
The only liability of the Jay Treaty was that it was deeply resented by the French, who regarded it as a betrayal of the alliance that had bound them to the United States since the Revolution. France responded to the treaty by severing diplomatic relations and unleashing her warships and privateers on American commerce. Between 1795 and 1799, the French seized upwards of $20 million in American mercantile property, mainly in the Caribbean.11 These losses were significant and cast a pall over all trade with the West Indies. “The risque is so great,” said a North Carolina Republican in 1797, “that to send a Vessel to the West Indies . . . seems like giving the property away.”12
The Quasi-War with France (1798–1801)
The French depredations led to the Quasi-War, an undeclared naval war that lasted from 1798 to 1801.13 This contest provided the first real test for the Federalist navy, a test that it passed with flying colors. Cruising mainly in the Caribbean, the navy defeated or destroyed three French warships (while losing only one of its own), captured 82 privateers, and recovered 70 American merchant vessels.14 No less important was the performance of American merchant vessels, which were authorized to arm for defense. Besides capturing six privateers and recapturing eight prizes, armed merchantmen forced many small French privateers, which invariably were more interested in booty than battle, to shear off rather than risk a fight.15
As a result of the successful defense of American commerce, rates for shipping insurance dropped sharply all along the Atlantic coast. Rates which had peaked at 25–30 percent in the spring of 1798 fell to 10 percent by the end of 1799.16 In the Convention of 1800, which brought this war to an end when it was ratified the following year, the United States waived any claim for compensation for the depredations that had occurred since 1795. In return, France agreed to suspend the treaties that had bound the nations together since the Revolution.17
By the end of the Quasi-War, the Federalists had been in power for more than a decade, and their policies had served the nation well. Their program of preparedness was in place, and the nation was at peace with France and on especially good terms with Britain. Best of all, because of the mounting profits from neutral trade, Americans were enjoying an unprecedented level of prosperity.
In spite of the success of their policies, the Federalists suffered from several liabilities that doomed them at the polls. The additional taxes necessitated by the Quasi-War and the attempt to target immigrants and suppress opposition with the alien and sedition laws alienated many voters. In addition, the Federalists’ approach to politics was too elitist for this era of rising democracy, and their foreign policy too pro-British for a people whose revolutionary experience had left them steeped in anglophobia. As a result, the Federalists were defeated in the election of 1800.
When the Republicans took office in 1801, they began to reverse the policies they had inherited. They had no love for the Jay Treaty and no desire to maintain such a cozy relationship with Great Britain—at least not on the terms laid down in that treaty. Moreover, they were committed by their ideology as well as by their campaign promises to reforming public finance and reducing government expenditures. “We shall push you to the uttermost in economising,” Jefferson told a Congressional leader in 1801.18
The Republican Ascendancy
Determined to overhaul the nation’s finances, the Republicans took direct aim on Hamilton’s program. They regarded the national debt as a curse—a source of unearned profit for the rich and a heavy burden on current and future taxpayers. Hence, they devoted a large share of the government’s annual income to paying down the debt. They were equally hostile to the internal taxes, which they considered an excessive burden on their constituents, particularly in the West. Hence these duties were swept away in 1802. The Republicans had no love for the national bank either. Most considered it an engine of aristocracy of doubtful legality that was vulnerable to British control (even though foreign stockholders had to be in the country to vote for the bank’s directors). The bank was protected by a twenty-year charter, but this charter was not renewed when it expired in 1811.19
The Republicans were also determined to cut defense spending. As a matter of principle, they were opposed to a large defense establishment, believing that it increased the likelihood of war and fostered special
interest groups that posed a danger to republican government. They considered a cut in spending essential anyway because the internal taxes had been repealed at a time when large sums were being devoted to debt retirement.20
Accordingly, the peacetime army was trimmed from 5,400 to 3,300 men in 1802.21 Many good officers were lost in the process.22 Although the authorized level of the army was increased to almost 10,000 men during a war scare in 1808, Republican leaders used the expanded officer corps to reward the party faithful.23 Winfield Scott, who served with these officers in the War of 1812, claimed that most were “imbeciles and ignoramuses.” Those from Federalist states, he said, were mainly “coarse and ignorant men,” while those from Republican states were “swaggerers, dependants, decayed gentlemen, and others—‘fit for nothing else.’”24 By 1810 incompetence in the officer corps had so demoralized the army that Republican Nathaniel Macon suggested that it might as well be disbanded. The men hated their officers so much that they could not be counted on to obey them in time of war. “The state of that Army,” concluded Macon, “is enough to make any man who has the smallest love of country wish to get rid of it.”25
The Republicans were even more hostile to the navy. “Every nation,” said one Republican, “which has embarked to any extent, in Naval Establishments, has been eventually crushed by them.” “Show me a nation possessed of a large navy,” said another, “and I will show you a nation always at war.”26 The Republicans never resumed construction on the ships-of-the-line (which had been halted at the end of the Quasi-War), and they took most of the frigates out of service. Six of the frigates were subsequently lost to rot or other causes so that by 1812 only seven survived. The only concession that Republicans made to naval defense was the construction or purchase of six sloops needed for service in the Tripolitan War (1801–1805).27
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