Some Federalists agreed with the British. The Maryland House of Delegates protested against the “system of sanguinary retaliation” which jeopardized American prisoners to protect “British traitors.” Gouverneur Morris went further. “If the horrible project of murdering our prisoners because the enemy executes her traitorous subjects in our service be carried into effect,” he said, “we shall soon be divested of everything which can check the savage temper of barbarous nations.”155
In Worcester, Massachusetts, Federalists complained that British officers were confined under intolerable conditions in the local jail. “We have never witnessed a more powerful excitement of the tender sympathies of the friends of peace,” commented a Republican paper, “than by the cruel duress imposed upon these ‘unfortunate captives’!”156 When the sheriff failed to search visitors to the jail, someone (presumably a Federalist) gave a pistol to the incarcerated officers, and nine of them escaped. Five were recaptured, but the others made their way to Canada. The state of Massachusetts subsequently prohibited the use of its jails for this purpose.157
The question of retaliation raised the whole issue of allegiance, much as the subject of impressment did. Langdon Cheves took a broad view of the matter and probably spoke for most Americans. “The right of retaliation,” he said, “does not depend on questions of allegiance, naturalization, or expatriation, but on the laws and usages of civilized war.” These laws “concede to belligerent sovereigns the right of protecting by retaliation, if necessary, not only their naturalized subjects, but all those who fight under their banners.”158
Ultimately, good sense prevailed on both sides, and none of the prisoners were harmed. The United States authorized Brigadier General William Winder, who was captured by the British at Stoney Creek and later paroled, to negotiate an exchange of all confined prisoners. But Winder, who was sympathetic to the British position and eager to escape close confinement, signed an agreement on April 15, 1814, that excluded the original twenty-three sent to England and the first round of hostages held by each side. Although American officials refused to ratify the agreement, the British had already released their hostages.159 Later, American officials learned that the original twenty-three prisoners were being treated no differently from other American prisoners in Great Britain. Hence on July 16, 1814, they signed a new convention that confirmed the terms of the April agreement and provided for the exchange of all remaining hostages. The original twenty-three remained in British hands until after the war, when all but two (who had died of natural causes) were returned to the United States.160
There were other incidents like this one. On numerous occasions the British learned that men captured in battle or taken from American warships or privateers had been born in the British Isles. Royal officials often threatened to try these men for treason, but in each case the prospect of American retaliation forced them to relent. Thus no one fighting on America’s side during the war was actually prosecuted by the enemy for treason.161
The Administration’s Record
All in all, President Madison had reason to be satisfied with his accomplishments in the winter of 1813–14. Besides facing down the British on the prisoner of war issue, the administration got most of what it wanted from Congress. By the time it adjourned on April 18—almost four and a half months after convening—Congress had Increased the army enlistment bounty, provided for the extension of short-term enlistments, strengthened the hand of military courts to discipline militia, appropriated money for a steam frigate, raised the bounty for prisoners of war, and authorized a new loan and a new issue of treasury notes. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the previous session, the Senate had confirmed all of the president’s appointments, and the House had been far less indulgent of Federalist opposition. On several occasions House Republicans had responded to Federalist arguments with silence or had used the previous question to cut off debate.162 All of this suggested that the Republicans were at last closing ranks.
The administration failed to get its way on only three issues. Most of the president’s requests for additional trade restrictions were ignored. So too was a recommendation that French warships and privateers be explicitly authorized to use American ports.163 The president hoped to ensure continued access to French ports for American privateers, but Congressional Republicans (fearing the cry of French influence) buried this proposal in committee.164 The president also asked Congress to retain the double duties on imports beyond the end of the war in order to protect American manufactures.165 No action was taken on this proposal because neither Republicans nor Federalists were ready for such overt protectionism. Even Daniel Webster, the great champion of protection in later years, declared that he was in no hurry “to see Sheffields and Birminghams in America.”166
These setbacks for the administration were minor. Far more ominous were the growing difficulties that the government faced in prosecuting the war. Public credit was declining, trade with the enemy continued, and the tide of the conflict appeared to be turning against the nation. Moreover, developments in Europe had stripped the nation of its last great weapon. Commercial sanctions had been at the heart of Republican foreign policy ever since 1806, but the collapse of French power on the Continent had rendered them useless. When the embargo was repealed, Daniel Webster had expressed hope that “the immense losses and sufferings which the people of the United States have endured, uselessly endured, under the operations of the restrictive system, will insure a long abhorrence of its memory.”167 Webster got his wish. The embargo of 1813 was the nation’s last great trade restriction. Never again would the United States cut off all its trade to achieve a foreign policy objective.
Chapter 8
The British Counteroffensive
By the time the campaign of 1814 opened, the initiative in the war had shifted to the British. The Battle of Leipzig the previous October had forced Napoleon to retreat to France with the Allies in pursuit. At the same time, a British army under the Duke of Wellington had shattered French power in Spain and invaded France from the south. On March 31, 1814, the Allies entered Paris—the only time that Russian troops have ever occupied the French capital. On April 11 Napoleon abdicated unconditionally and shortly thereafter was exiled to the Mediterranean island of Elba. For the first time in more than a decade, Europe was at peace.1
Federalists celebrated the defeat of the Antichrist, and some Republicans joined them.2 “I rejoice with you,” Jefferson told a friend, “in the downfall of Bonaparte. This scourge of the world has occasioned the deaths of at least ten millions of human beings.”3 Federalists assumed that Napoleon’s defeat would pave the way for peace with England, but Republicans were skeptical.4 The United States was now alone in the field against Great Britain, and most Republicans expected the British to be vindictive. “We should have to fight hereafter,” said Joseph H. Nicholson, “not for ‘free Trade and sailors rights,’ not for the Conquest of the Canadas, but for our national Existence.”5 As the character of the war changed, so too did the nation’s motto. “Don’t give up the soil” replaced “Don’t give up the ship.”6
The Rival Armies
Ever since Leipzig, the British had been cautiously detaching veterans from Europe for service in America. After Napoleon’s exile, the trickle of troops to the New World turned into a torrent. By September 1814 some 13,000 veterans had reached Canada, bringing British troop strength there to 30,000. Additional men continued to arrive, so that by the end of the year there were close to 52,000 British troops in the American theater.7 With the balance of power shifting in their favor, many British subjects wanted to punish the United States. “I have it much at heart,” declared Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, who had succeeded Sir John Borlase Warren as the naval commander on the Atlantic station, “to give [the Americans] a complete drubbing before Peace is made.” “Chastise the savages,” said the Times, “for such they are, in a much truer sense, than the followers of Tecumseh or the Prophet.”8
Fortunately for the Un
ited States, the American army was steadily improving with experience. Two years of campaigning had weeded out many incompetent officers, and Secretary of War John Armstrong, who was a fair judge of talent, continued to advance capable young men. “It was under the auspices of his administration,” a sympathetic Congressman later said, “that Wilkinson, Hampton, Lewis, and Boyd had to make room for Brown, Scott, Gaines, Ripley, and Macomb.”9 Moreover, despite the large number of discharges in the winter of 1813–1814, the enhanced bounty attracted a host of new recruits and induced many veterans to reenlist.10 As a result, by the spring of 1814, there were about 40,000 men in uniform—a third more than the year before. Enlistments continued to mount in the remaining months of the war, so that by early 1815 the army’s strength was close to 45,000.11
British and American Strategy
Because British officials still focused on European affairs, they did not develop a coherent plan for the American war in 1814 but instead developed their strategy piecemeal over time. They planned to reestablish their position in the West with a winter campaign against Detroit, but to supply their advancing army they needed frozen roads and rivers. Unseasonably warm weather in January forced them to cancel this campaign. This spared British settlements on the east bank of the Detroit River from the torch because the local American commander had ordered them burned if a British force threatened.12 British plans further east called for extending their naval blockade to New England, using their naval power against targets on the Atlantic coast, and occupying territory in New York and Maine and on the Gulf Coast. The coastal campaigns were supposed to draw American troops from Canada (although they never did), and the occupation of territory was designed to improve Canadian security and enhance Britain’s bargaining power in the peace negotiations.13
The United States was forced on the defensive in 1814, but it remained strong where the British were weak. American command of Lake Erie, coupled with shorter and more secure supply lines, meant that Americans could remain aggressive in the West. They hoped to consolidate their power there by building new posts and retaking Mackinac. They also hoped to drive the British from the Niagara frontier. If these operations were successful, then British strongholds further east, most notably Kingston and Montreal, might be targeted.14
The Contest in the West Continues
The American campaign in the West went awry from the beginning. In May the governor of the Missouri Territory, William Clark (the famous explorer), drove a small Anglo-Indian force out of Prairie du Chien, which was strategically located near the confluence of the Wisconsin and Mississippi rivers. Clark built Fort Shelby there to serve as an American outpost and then returned to St. Louis. On July 17 a large Anglo-Indian force under Major William McKay arrived from Mackinac and attacked Fort Shelby. After two days of desultory fighting, McKay threatened to use hot shot against the post, and the outnumbered defenders surrendered. Prairie du Chien remained in British hands for the rest of the war.15
Americans were no more successful at Mackinac. To retake this post, the army and navy prepared for a joint operation in the summer of 1814. Captain Arthur Sinclair, who had succeeded Perry on Lake Erie, ferried 700 regulars and volunteer militia under Lieutenant Colonel George Croghan (the hero of Fort Stephenson) into Lake Huron. The squadron’s progress was slow because the ships had to be unloaded to get across the flats of Lake St. Clair, but once the armada got into Lake Huron, it picked up speed. Sailing north, the American force burned an abandoned British post on St. Joseph Island and confiscated or destroyed British property at Sault Ste. Marie. Sinclair reached Mackinac in late July.16
According to Sinclair, Mackinac was “a perfect Gibraltar, being high inaccessible Rock on every side except the West.”17 Unable to elevate his naval guns enough to hit the British fortifications, Sinclair landed Croghan’s men on the western end of the island near a forest. But Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, who was in charge of the defense of Mackinac, was waiting in the forest with some 450 regulars, militia, and Indians. In the ensuing battle on August 4, the Americans could not break through the British lines. Croghan, who never had much faith in the operation, became disillusioned when he lost several key officers and called off the attack. In the Battle of Mackinac Island, he lost about seventy-five men, the British and their Indian allies around a dozen.18
The British on Lake Huron
Sinclair next set sail for the Nottawasaga River on Georgian Bay in search of H.M. Schooner Nancy (3 guns), a converted merchantman that one contemporary described as “a beautiful and swift sailing vessel.”19 This was the only British warship on the lake. Nancy’s commander, twenty-three-year-old Lieutenant Miller Worsley, sailed up the river (which ran parallel to the lakeshore) in the hope of evading detection, but on August 14 Sinclair’s men spotted the British ship from the lake and opened fire. The bombardment destroyed the Nancy and a nearby British blockhouse, although Worsley escaped into the wilderness with his walking wounded. Sinclair next sailed back to Lake Erie, leaving two schooners, the Tigress (1 gun) and the Scorpion (2 guns) to maintain American control of Lake Huron.20
Worsley, however, refused give up. Returning to the Nottawasaga River, he led his men in two bateaux and a canoe on harrowing trip of 380 miles across open water to Fort Mackinac. There he hatched a plan to capture the American schooners by surprise. With additional men supplied by McDouall, Worsley led four bateaux to the Tigress, and in the dark of night on September 3 fought his way onto the American vessel and seized control. Still flying American colors, the Tigress made contact with the Scorpion three days later, and Worlsey captured that vessel as well. In seventy-two hours, Worsley had given the British control of Lake Huron, which enabled them to resupply Fort Mackinac, provide food and trade goods to their Indian allies, and protect British fur traders. With their supply lines to Mackinac re-established, the British and their Indian allies had a secure base from which to launch raids into American territory.21
American Raids into Upper Canada
After the American victory in the Battle of the Thames in 1813, the British maintained no military presence in Western District and only a small one in the London District. This meant that the western part of Upper Canada was vulnerable to attack and had to rely heavily on militia for protection. In February 1814 Captain Andrew H. Holmes led a force of 180 regulars and militia from Detroit into the London District to target the small British outposts at Port Talbot and Delaware. When Holmes reached a forest known as Longwoods, he learned that a British force was marching to meet him, and he established a strong position on a hill on the west side of a steep ravine. On March 4 the British force, about 200 strong under the command of Captain Alexander Stewart, attacked, but the American position was so strong that the British got mauled, suffering almost seventy casualties compared to fewer than ten for the Americans. The Battle of Longwoods was a clear American victory that further eroded Britain’s position in the district.22
Making good use of Lake Erie as well as overland routes, American raiding parties repeatedly targeted the exposed districts. Some of the raiding parties were guided by renegade Canadians who belonged to the unit of Canadian Volunteers that had been organized by Joseph Willcocks after the fall of Fort George in 1813. On two occasions in 1814 Americans raided Port Talbot on the north shore of Lake Erie, and on a third Indians allied to the United States raided the village. Oxford was also raided several times.23
Dover or Dover Mills (now Port Dover) was the target of a larger raid in the spring of 1814. On May 14 Captain Sinclair ferried Colonel John B. Campbell and 700 troops to Dover. The following day Campbell marched into the village. Relying on information supplied by Canadian Volunteer Andrew Westbrook, Campbell claimed that Dover was inhabited by “revolutionary tories and halfpay officers,” some of whom had taken part in the burning of Buffalo the previous winter. Hence he ordered the town and nearby settlements put to the torch.24 “A scene of destruction and plunder now ensued,” reported a Pennsylvania soldier, “which beggars al
l description. In a short time the houses, mills, and barns were all consumed.”25 British officials were livid, and the mild reprimand that Campbell received from a court of inquiry did little to mollify them. Later that year they used Campbell’s lawlessness as a justification for plundering the Chesapeake.26
In the fall of 1814, the United States launched an extended raid from Detroit that reached 180 miles into Upper Canada. Brigadier General Duncan McArthur assembled an army of 720 mounted men that consisted mainly of volunteer militia from Ohio and Kentucky but also included fifty U.S. Rangers and seventy Indians. McArthur put the word out that he planned to attack Potawatomi Indians, but his real target was the economic resources of Upper Canada. Departing from Detroit on October 22, McArthur’s men moved quickly through the Thames River Valley, reaching Brant’s Ford on the Grand River on November 5. McArthur then turned south, defeated 400 militia on November 6 in a minor engagement known as the Battle of Malcolm’s Mills (near present-day Oakland), and returned home, reaching Detroit on November 17.
During the campaign McArthur’s men lived off the land and burned and plundered as they went. They took special aim at the many mills that were full of grain from the recent harvest. Although the mills were private property, they were legitimate military targets because they supplied the British army with food. The widespread plunder, however, was not justified by any military logic. McArthur blamed the excesses on his Indian allies, “whose customs in war impel them to plunder after victory.”27 Since there was already a shortage of food in Upper Canada, the raid worked a hardship on soldiers and civilians alike. Governor George Prevost was livid over the destruction of so much private property and ordered Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond to seek out mills in American territory for retaliation, but the war ended before this order could be carried out.28
The War of 1812 Page 27