Federalists in the middle and southern states did not favor rash action but were sympathetic to the plight of their friends in New England. The Pittsburgh Gazette, for example, said that Otis’s report summoning the convention “breathes the spirit of Old Massachusetts, is dignified and patriotic.”129 There was hope, too, that the convention would force the administration to modify its policies. John Stanly of North Carolina was not sure what the convention would do, but “if it frighten Madison from his course, I shall be glad of it.”130
Republicans, on the other hand, vigorously condemned the project. William Plumer’s view was typical. “I expect no good, but evil from it,” he said; “it will embarrass us, aid the enemy, & protract the war.”131 Most Republicans, however, were confident—or at least hopeful—that the convention would pursue a moderate course. “With respect to the object of the convention,” said an army officer, “I cannot believe that it is open Rebellion, an actual division of the States, or undisguised union with the public enemy.”132 “The publick,” added a Republican newspaper, “do not feel any distressing anxiety about the proceedings of the Convention of ‘choice spirits’ at Hartford. . . . There will be much smoke and no fire.”133
Some Republicans called for the federal government to suppress New England disaffection. “The people,” said one southerner, “wish now to see some strong steps taken with those traitors in Massachusetts[;] it will not do to temporize.”134 The administration, however, preferred a more cautious approach. The War Department dispatched Colonel Thomas Jesup to Hartford—ostensibly on a recruiting mission but actually to keep an eye on the convention. Jesup was instructed to pay special attention to the armory at Springfield (which had been threatened by Shays’s rebels thirty years earlier), and to assure “the friends of the union” in New England that the government would aid and protect them.135 The War Department also made plans to raise volunteers and to send additional regulars to New England if trouble arose.136
Republicans need not have worried because by the time the convention met in December, the crisis atmosphere in New England had largely abated. The campaigning season was over, and although the bills were still coming in, New England could expect a lull in British raids until the spring. Moreover, the new British terms, published on December 1, boded well for peace. With the publication of these terms, a wave of optimism swept through the country, and rumors of peace began to circulate freely.137
The character of the twenty-six delegates at the convention also boded well. George Cabot, Nathan Dane, and Otis headed the Massachusetts delegation; Chauncey Goodrich and James Hillhouse, the Connecticut delegation; and Daniel Lyman and Samuel Ward, the Rhode Island delegation. Except for Timothy Bigelow and perhaps one or two others, the delegates were moderates, hardly the sort to promote violent measures. Radicals like Blake, Quincy, and Fessenden were purposely excluded from the meeting.138 “I do not know that we have among [the] delegates a Single bold & ardent man,” lamented John Lowell, Jr.139
Although Otis talked of taking bold measures—of treating “the administration as having abdicated the Government”—it was not in his character.140 As Lowell said: “Mr Otis is naturally timid & frequently wavering. . . . He is sincere in wishing thorough measures but a thousand fears restrain him.”141 The other delegates did not even promise boldness. Dane reportedly said that he agreed to attend the meeting because “somebody must go to prevent mischief,” and Cabot made the same point.142 “We are going,” he told a friend, “to keep you young hot-heads from getting into mischief.”143
The Hartford Convention Meets
Although no site for the convention was mentioned in the official documents, Federalist leaders chose Hartford, probably to avoid the appearance of Massachusetts domination. Goodrich, who was mayor of Hartford as well as Connecticut’s lieutenant governor, procured the use of the state council chamber.144 Democrats welcomed the delegates to the city by flying their flags at half-mast and ringing bells, and later the town crier marched a body of regulars around the meeting house “playing the Death march with muffled drums and colors furled.”145 Although some people turned out to see what the convention would do, most ignored the proceedings. “I am astonished,” said Jesup, “at the little interest excited by the Meeting.”146
The Hartford Convention met from December 15, 1814, to January 5, 1815. “We sit twice a day Connecticut fashion,” Otis wrote, “and in the evenings talk politicks over the fire.”147 At the opening session Cabot was unanimously chosen president, and Theodore Dwight, editor of the Hartford Connecticut Mirror, was chosen secretary. To avoid the intrusion of popular feeling, the delegates conducted their proceedings in secret.148 Although public bodies often met behind closed doors, in this case the secrecy gave “more plausibility to the cry of treason.”149 The delegates were remarkably faithful in keeping their pledge of secrecy. Such an injunction, said a Connecticut delegate,” was never more faithfully observed.”150 Indeed, Federalists in Washington complained of the lack of information.151
Harrison Gray Otis (1765–1848) was a moderate Massachusetts Federalist who played a central role in the Hartford Convention. A successful lawyer and financier, he had amassed one of the largest fortunes in Boston by the time of his death. (Wikipedia)
No record of the debates was kept—only a bare-bones journal of the proceedings.152 “The wise speeches,” said Goodrich, “[were] all left behind within the walls of the venerable chambers.”153 Even though Otis had originally opposed the convention, he became the driving force in its deliberations. The only known radical, Bigelow, was given no committee assignments and apparently did not play a major role in the proceedings. Nor was there any sign of dissension. “We are progressing very pleasantly, & with great unanimity,” said one delegate, “& shall, I am confident, arrive at a result which ought to satisfy every reasonable man & true friend of his country.”154
At their first meeting the delegates established a committee headed by Goodrich to draw up an agenda. It was indicative of the moderate bent of the delegates—and the passing of the crisis atmosphere—that the first draft of the agenda was devoted exclusively to war-related issues: the need for local defense, the waste of money on Canada, the dispute over the militia, and the administration’s plans for enlisting minors and conscripting militia. There was no mention of New England’s long-term problems nor any reference to constitutional amendments. Since this was hardly likely to satisfy radical opinion—particularly among the party’s “country friends”—the delegates subsequently added constitutional reform to their agenda.155
Report of the Hartford Convention
The final report of the convention was largely the work of Otis.156 About half of the report was devoted to immediate concerns: the defense problem, the minor enlistment law, and the proposals for drafting men into the army and navy. To finance defense measures, the report recommended that the states seek authority from the national government to preempt federal tax money collected within their borders. To deal with unconstitutional measures for filling the ranks of the army and navy, the report recommended nullification, asserting that it was the right and the duty of a state “to interpose its authority” to protect its citizens.157
The other half of the report was devoted to long-term problems. After cataloguing the failures of Republican policies, the report recommended seven constitutional amendments “to strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the union of the states.”158 These amendments called for: (1) a two-thirds vote in Congress to declare war, interdict trade with a foreign nation, or admit new states to the Union; (2) a sixty-day limit on embargoes; (3) an end to counting three-fifths of slaves in apportioning representation in Congress; (4) a ban against naturalized citizens holding federal office; and (5) a provision that would limit presidents to one term and bar the election of a president from the same state twice in succession.159
These amendments represented a catalogue of New England’s grievances over the past decade. They struck at the over-representatio
n of white southerners in Congress, the growing political power of the West, the restrictive system and the war, the influence of foreign-born office holders (like Albert Gallatin), and the Virginia Dynasty and its domination of national politics. Federalists hoped that the adoption of these amendments would restore sectional balance and prevent a renewal of those policies that had threatened New England’s vital interests.160
Although the report of the Hartford Convention called for nullifying federal laws, the tone of the document was generally moderate. The report expressly opposed any “irrevocable” step that might lead to disunion and recommended instead “a course of moderation and firmness.”161 Even if New England’s grievances were not redressed, the report simply recommended that another convention be held in June 1815, or sooner if necessary.162
The report of the Hartford Convention was published as an extra in the Hartford Connecticut Courant on January 6 and subsequently reprinted in newspapers across the country.163 The publication of the report, Otis later recalled, “had the immediate effect of calming the public mind throughout New England.”164 Federalists everywhere praised the results. Theodore Dwight called the report “an able performance,” and Christopher Gore claimed that the delegates had executed “a difficult task . . . with wisdom and discretion.”165 Daniel Webster described the proceedings as “moderate, temperate & judicious” and reported that Federalists from the middle and southern states were “very highly gratified” with the results.166 A Virginia paper predicted that the report would “command respect” and “diffuse light,” and the New York Evening Post said that alarmists would “read with vast satisfaction this masterly report, and rejoice to find [their] fears and alarms groundless.”167
Even the extremists professed satisfaction. Pickering thought the report “bears the high character of wisdom, firmness and dignity,” and William Sullivan said that even though he was “prepared to pursue much more efficient measures,” he was satisfied with the results. “It must be born in mind,” he said, “that this may be considered as the first of a series of well considered measures.”168 A Boston paper made the same point. “No sensible man,” said the Gazette, “ought to expect, that the first New England Convention would do as much as the last out of several congresses of the patriots of the revolution.”169
Republicans were relieved by the moderation of the report. The Washington National Intelligencer said that “the proceedings were tempered with more moderation than was to have been expected,” and John Armstrong claimed that the report proved that New England was engaged in nothing more than “a game of bragge.”170 The Worcester National Aegis considered the report laughable, and the Boston Patriot said that the entire convention project was “so pitiful and insignificant, and so truly contemptible” that no counter-convention was necessary.171 Andrew Jackson, on the other hand, later said that if he had been stationed in New England, he would have court-martialed the “monarchists & Traitors” who were behind the Hartford Convention.172 Given his record in the Southwest and later in Spanish Florida, this was probably no idle boast.
This cartoon of the Hartford Convention depicts the King of England inviting Harrison Gray Otis to bring the New England states into the British Empire. The three delegates considering the “leap” represent Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Governor Caleb Strong below prays for a successful leap so that he can join the British aristocracy as Lord Essex—a play on the phrase “Essex Junto,” which was thought to be an influential political faction in Massachusetts. Note the heroes of the war whose names are inscribed on the left. (Etching by William Charles. Library of Congress)
Emissaries and Amendments
The Massachusetts and Connecticut legislatures formally approved the convention report.173 Both states also sent emissaries to Washington to secure federal tax money. Otis was opposed to the mission because he thought the state’s congressional delegation “could do all which can be done.”174 Other Federalists disagreed, and Otis was chosen to head a three-man commission that included William Sullivan and merchant Thomas H. Perkins. Connecticut sent Calvin Goddard, a delegate to the Hartford Convention, and Brigadier General Nathaniel Terry, head of the state army.175
On their way to Washington, the commissioners learned of Jackson’s victory at New Orleans, and as they completed the final leg of their journey they were the butt of much humor. “The grievance deputies from Massachusetts & Connecticutt,” said Winfield Scott from Baltimore, have “afforded a fine Subject of jest & merriment to men of all parties.”176 The Massachusetts delegation reached the capital on February 13, the Connecticut commissioners two days later. In between, on February 14, the peace treaty arrived. “The joyful event of peace,” said Perkins, “has suspended the mission on which I came.”177
In Washington Madison was careful to keep his distance from the “ambassadors.” That “mean and contemptible little blackguard,” complained Otis, ignored the commissioners and told everyone that their mission would have failed anyway.178 The administration had already rebuffed attempts by Ohio and Virginia to preempt federal tax money, so in all likelihood Massachusetts and Connecticut would have fared no better even if the war had continued.179
The commissioners remained in Washington in the hope of persuading Congress to reimburse the states for their militia costs. Massachusetts Republican Joseph Varnum shepherded a bill for this purpose through the Senate, but it was postponed in the House after “a very animated and rather acrimonious debate.”180 Massachusetts and Connecticut were partially reimbursed in 1831, but not until thirty years later—when the nation faced a secessionist threat from another quarter—did Congress finally authorize full payment.181
Massachusetts and Connecticut approved the seven constitutional amendments recommended by the convention, but they were the only states to do so.182 Although the amendments were introduced in Congress, no action was taken on them. Eight states, including Vermont, adopted resolutions against the amendments.183 The New York legislature declared that their effect “would be to create dissentions among the different members of the union, to enfeeble the national government, and to tempt all nations to encroach upon our rights.”184
Significance of the Hartford Convention
The Hartford Convention was the climax of New England’s opposition to the war. As one scholar has put it, it was “a normal product of abnormal conditions.”185 New England Federalists called the meeting to let off steam and to ensure that the moderates in their party retained control. They were also looking for a solution to their defense problem and a vehicle for airing their long-term grievances. The Hartford Convention, in other words, was designed to meet several needs. It was not only a party caucus and constitutional convention but a defense conference as well. Although it represented a triumph for moderation, few people remembered it that way in the rush of events at the end of the war.
Chapter 11
The Treaty of Ghent
In the military and naval campaigns, the record of the United States during the War of 1812 was decidedly mixed. There were some successes—most notably on the northern lakes and at New Orleans—and some failures—particularly in the Chesapeake Bay and on the Canadian frontier. In the peace negotiations, however, the nation’s record was much better, not because of what the envoys won but because of what they avoided losing. No single campaign in the field loomed as large as these negotiations. It was here—in Ghent, Belgium, rather than on the Canadian-American border—that the United States consistently outmaneuvered the enemy, and it was here that Americans could claim their most significant victory.1
American success at the negotiating table was fitting because it was here that Republicans expected to win the war. Some Republicans—the “scarecrow” party—had supported military preparations in the War Congress in the hope of persuading the British to make concessions. When this failed, some voted for the declaration of war for the same reason. Although most Republicans believed that the conquest of Canada would be a mere matter of
marching, many hoped that no marching would be necessary—that the decision for war itself would be enough to win concessions from the British. In this sense, the declaration of war was a kind of bluff designed to force the British to take American demands seriously.2
U.S. Peace Feelers
That the president himself harbored these views is suggested by the haste with which he sent out peace feelers in the early days of the war. “The sword was scarcely out of the scabbard,” Madison reported, “before the enemy was apprized of the reasonable terms on which it would be resheathed.”3 On June 18, 1812, the day that war was declared, Secretary of State James Monroe summoned the British minister, Augustus J. Foster, both to inform him of the decision for war and to urge him to work for peace.4 Five days later Madison invited Foster to the White House to outline America’s terms. Expressing a desire to avoid “any serious collision,” the president told Foster that the British could restore peace by giving up the Orders-in-Council and impressment.5 Although Foster had no authority to negotiate on these issues, he was expected to pass the terms on to his superiors in London.
The War of 1812 Page 41