Rumors of Marshall’s prospective appointment arrived in North Africa during the critical week at Salerno. On September 16, after the crisis was passed, Eisenhower chatted with Butcher and Smith at breakfast about it. According to the American press, Eisenhower would replace Marshall as the Army Chief of Staff. The prospect made him unhappy. If it happened, he said, he would be forced to tell the President that it was a “tremendous mistake,” for he was “not temperamentally fitted for the job.” He feared it would destroy him. Eisenhower pointed out that he had no patience with politicians because he could not bear to continue an argument “after logic had made the opposition’s position untenable, yet politicians persist against all logic.”
Eisenhower’s personal preference was to remain in the Mediterranean. If he had to leave, he said, there would immediately arise a problem of command in the Mediterranean. He thought his British deputies would insist on working under an American, since none of them would be willing to serve under a colleague. Each felt that because his service was represented by a ministry in the War Cabinet he should not be in an inferior position, yet each worked “superbly” under Eisenhower. The commander in chief thought the only American who could pick up the reins was Smith, but this would require promoting Smith to full general. Such a rapid advance “would throw out of joint the noses of other and more senior American generals,” particularly Bradley and Patton. Smith said he did not want the job anyway, since his own desire was to serve out the war under Eisenhower.
Eisenhower offered a solution for the problem. Marshall could become the global field commander for all American forces and set up a staff in London to run his European Theater, with a field commander under him who would be responsible for the attack. When he had the European Theater properly organized, he could go to Hawaii to do the same thing in the Pacific. Back in Washington he could leave a deputy chief of staff, probably Somervell, to handle supply and administration problems. The proposal had little to recommend it beyond simplicity, since it involved no basic change in the existing structure. It did, however, open the way for Eisenhower to go to London and stay out of Washington. He could be the field commander of OVERLORD while Marshall would have the title of Supreme Commander. But with his continuing world-wide responsibilities, clearly Marshall would leave the conduct of operations to Eisenhower.
There was an even simpler solution. Butcher told Eisenhower that in his opinion “You are the logical and inevitable choice for the European command.” Eisenhower liked the idea but thought it impossible. He felt the obvious choice for OVERLORD was either Brooke or Marshall, since they had been dealing on the highest level with the heads of government and would be less subject to harassment from officials in London. He thought the best he could realistically hope for was a solution which would allow him to remain in the Mediterranean, where he was relatively free from interference.2
In the first week of October, AFHQ began to fill with rumors on what was being decided and with stories about what had been done. Mountbatten paid a visit to Algiers and told Eisenhower that Brooke had been scheduled to take OVERLORD but Harry Hopkins had insisted on Marshall. Brooke had been working on the assault plans for three months, but since the Americans were going to make the larger contribution to the operation he had agreed to step aside. Churchill and the BCOS had also gone along, although Mountbatten reported that they felt “badly hurt.” Cunningham confirmed Mountbatten’s version. He also said that because Brooke had been “on the job it was impossible for anyone on a lesser level to be considered. This automatically threw out Ike.”3 Eisenhower meanwhile had no official word on his future, except that he had recognized that if Marshall took command of OVERLORD it was politically necessary to give the Mediterranean to a British officer in order to retain balance. A suitable post would then have to be found for Eisenhower. On October 1 a visiting VIP, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, covered that problem during lunch with Eisenhower at Amilcar. The Secretary reported that Marshall had been named to OVERLORD and it was “probable” that Eisenhower would be recalled to Washington to be Chief of Staff.4
Eisenhower was anxious to avoid such a fate. If he had to leave the Mediterranean, the job he wanted was command of an American group of armies under Marshall in OVERLORD. He had already decided to send Smith to Washington to confer with Marshall on AFHQ plans and future operations, and now he gave Smith the additional responsibility of finding out about his future. Under no circumstances, Eisenhower told Smith, was he to raise the subject, but if Marshall brought it up he wanted Smith to make clear to the Chief that his personal desire was to command in the field. Even if Marshall did not bring up Eisenhower’s future, he “naturally hoped that Beetle would find the lay of the land.”5
Before Smith left on October 5, Eisenhower gave him a detailed memorandum on points to take up with Marshall. Most of them concerned AFHQ problems, but Eisenhower did cover one that involved OVERLORD. He told Smith to discuss, “most secretly,” the need Marshall would have in his new job for a top airman “who is thoroughly schooled in all the phases of strategic bombing and more particularly in the job of supporting ground armies in the field.” Eisenhower had experience in the field in World War II, and Marshall had not—thus Eisenhower felt qualified to give some advice, especially since, from that experience, he had “earnest convictions” on the matter. The great danger was getting an air commander who was totally wedded to the concept of strategic bombing or one without experience in the problem of air-ground co-ordination. Before and during the assault Marshall would need every plane he could get, but without the proper man at the top he would find that the airmen were scattering their effort on strategic raids inside Germany, making no direct contribution to the battle for the beachhead.
Eisenhower told Smith, “I seriously recommend he [Marshall] insist upon getting Air Chief Marshal Tedder” for his air commander. Eisenhower would hate to lose Tedder in the Mediterranean, but he thought the AFHQ team had developed to the point where he could afford to let Tedder go. Tedder was ideal for the OVERLORD job for two reasons. First, he was an expert in air-ground co-ordination. Second, he had the complete confidence of Chief of Air Staff Portal, which meant that “during critical junctures of the land campaign” Tedder could call on Portal for “every last airplane in England” for support. Tedder was a warm personal friend as well as an outstanding officer, Eisenhower said, “but I am ready to make this sacrifice in favor of a solution that I believe will be of the utmost advantage to the General.”6
Eisenhower was anxious to share other lessons he had learned with Marshall. He did not presume to tell the Chief how to organize or train his forces, but he did feel that his comments on individuals would be helpful. Eisenhower knew that Marshall intended to have at least two American armies in the operation. Bradley had already been picked to lead one of them. Eisenhower suggested Patton for the other. “Many generals constantly think of battle in terms of, first, concentration, supply, maintenance, replacement, and, second, after all the above is arranged, a conservative advance,” Eisenhower told Marshall, probably with Clark in mind. But he did add that “this type of person is necessary because he prevents one from courting disaster.” Marshall’s idea was to hit the beach with the untested divisions coming from the United States, holding back the experienced divisions until he was firmly ashore. The veterans would then lead the drive through the German defensive positions. Eisenhower recommended that he use Bradley to command the first wave, with Patton taking command of the veterans and leading the breakout.
“Patton’s strength is that he thinks only in terms of attack as long as there is a single battalion that can keep advancing,” Eisenhower declared. He would never consider Patton for an army group command, “but as an army commander under a man who is sound and solid, and who has sense enough to use Patton’s good qualities without becoming blinded by his love of showmanship and histrionics, he should do as fine a job as he did in Sicily.”7 The implication was that Eisenhower was the army group commande
r who could handle Patton.
The pressure to get a commander for OVERLORD appointed, meanwhile, was mounting. The operation was scheduled for early May, only a half year away, and Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, head of the COSSAC planning group, insisted that a commander had to be named so that firm decisions could be made. On that main point, as far as AFHQ could tell from the stroies told by visiting VIPs, Roosevelt’s mind was made up. It would be Marshall. According to the reports, the President felt that Marshall should have the chance to command in the field the army he had created, for if he did not his name would be lost to history.
The repercussions of shifting Marshall, however, were far from settled. Averell Harriman, passing through Algiers on his way to Moscow, told Eisenhower that the President would insist on Eisenhower’s coming back to Washington “to take over General Marshall’s job.” Secretary Stimson, it seemed, was a strong advocate of such a shift. Eisenhower still hoped for something better. He did not accept at face value the secondhand reports he was receiving and was anxious for Smith to return from Washington with the straight word from Marshall. On October 19 Butcher reported that they were still waiting for Smith and “sweating it out in big drops. This uncertainty takes the pep out of everyone.…”8
The opposition to removing Marshall from Washington, meanwhile, was growing. Admiral King told Roosevelt that the Chief was a great teammate and should stay where he was. The elder statesman of the Army, General John J. Pershing, warned the President in mid-September that the proposed transfer of the Chief would be a “fundamental and very grave error in our military policy.” Marshall himself remained aloof from all the discussions. He never intimated to the President or to anyone else what his personal preference was.9
While Smith was gone and AFHQ marked time, another possibility for Eisenhower’s future opened. With a presidential election a year away, Republicans and other opponents of Roosevelt had started casting about for a candidate. MacArthur was one obvious choice and a boom of sorts began to develop for him. Inevitably, Eisenhower’s name also began to pop up. Arthur Eisenhower was bothered by this. He told his brother that MacArthur’s reputation was suffering because he refused to deny that he had political ambitions, and urged Eisenhower to make an emphatic denial of his own ambitions. On October 20 Eisenhower told his brother he had seen some “careless and ill-considered items in the newspapers” about his supposed candidacy, but he felt this would happen to any man whose name “appears with some frequency in the public print.” He felt no need to make “any statement whatsoever because to do so would, I think, merely be making myself ridiculous.”
Eisenhower did admit, however, that it would be disastrous for him to have the idea spread that he was interested in politics. “I flatter myself that such a development would constitute also some small injury to our national war effort.” He said he lived by one doctrine—to serve his country. The President had given him a responsible position, and “nothing could sway me from my purpose of carrying out faithfully his orders in whatever post he may assign me.” In conclusion, Eisenhower declared he would “not tolerate the use of my name in connection with any political activity of any kind.”10
Removing himself from the field was not that easy. In early October the World War Tank Corps Association passed a resolution supporting Eisenhower for the presidency. The members said they had no knowledge as to his political affiliations or beliefs but considered him presidential timber by virtue of his outstanding leadership qualities. A number of newspapers played up the story, and George Allen, an old friend, sent Eisenhower one clipping from the Washington Post. In a covering note, Allen asked, “How does it feel to be a presidential candidate?”
Eisenhower glanced at the clipping, grasped a pencil, and at the bottom of Allen’s note scribbled, “Baloney! Why can’t a simple soldier be left alone to carry out his orders? And I furiously object to the word ‘candidate’—I ain’t and won’t.”11 Then Walter Winchell, in a radio broadcast, said that if the Republicans ran MacArthur, Roosevelt would take Eisenhower as his running mate on the Democratic ticket. Eisenhower’s comment was short: “I can scarcely imagine anyone in the United States less qualified than I for any type of political work.”12 Lacking any encouragement at all from the prospective candidate, the Eisenhower boom quickly faded from the infinitesimal into total obscurity.
Smith, meanwhile, had returned from Washington, and Eisenhower could concentrate on the important matters at hand. He eagerly pumped his chief of staff for information, but the results were disappointing. Smith confirmed that Marshall was to go to OVERLORD, taking command on January 1. He had already called Morgan to Washington for planning conferences. Beyond that nothing had been settled. Eisenhower would be either the American army group commander for OVERLORD or Army Chief of Staff. Smith reported that Marshall was afraid that putting Eisenhower in charge of the army group would be a comedown and would look bad. Smith said he assured the Chief that no one at AFHQ, least of all Eisenhower, minded, but Marshall still felt that Eisenhower should become Chief of Staff. Smith had also had an interview with Roosevelt, who said he too wanted Eisenhower in Washington.13
That seemed to settle it. To console himself, Eisenhower said that he did not really want a command in OVERLORD anyway. He had studied Morgan’s plans, which were based on a three-division assault. Morgan had been forced to limit the size of the attack because of the small number of landing craft the CCS had assigned to him. Under those circumstances, Eisenhower said, he was just as happy he would not be involved.14
But though the question of who would command OVERLORD was seemingly settled problems remained. One major remaining objection to Marshall’s leaving Washington was that he would have to leave the CCS. This objection was later to prove a decisive one. It meant that the strongest advocate of OVERLORD would not be at the CCS meetings to force the British to keep their commitment to the cross-Channel attack. This appeared important because the British seemed to the Americans to be showing signs of wanting to back out. Their proposal to invade Rhodes and step up operations in the Balkans was only the most recent evidence of this desire. OPD and the War Department, therefore, wanted to give Marshall control of the operational forces in OVERLORD while allowing him to retain his seat on the CCS. This would give the Americans both ends of the stick, since they would have command of OVERLORD and still have the OVERLORD viewpoint fully represented in the CCS.15 In one version of the plan, Marshall would command all United Nations forces in Europe and the Mediterranean and would sit as a voting member of the CCS whenever that body discussed European matters. The advantage of the proposal was that it would give Marshall a position commensurate with his rank and ability. For him to become a mere theater commander, albeit in charge of OVERLORD, would be a definite demotion.
From the start the British objected strenuously. The American scheme had the effect—probably unintended—of destroying the authority of the CCS. In the Pacific and in Asia the theater commanders were responsible to their respective chiefs of staff, not the CCS. Europe was the only theater in which the CCS had real authority. If Marshall took command of both Europe and the Mediterranean and in addition sat on the CCS, he would in fact make the CCS superfluous. The British pointed out that there were “immense political implications” in the American scheme and asked that the existing machinery for the high-level direction of the war be retained. Changes should be confined to improving the machinery rather than embarking “upon an entirely novel experiment, which merely makes a cumbrous and unnecessary link in the chain of command, and which will surely lead to disillusionment and disappointment.”16
The implications were clear enough, although apparently neither Marshall, Roosevelt, nor the others involved saw them immediately. The Americans could not allow Marshall to step down to the level of theater commander, and the British could not allow him to stay on the CCS and in addition command in western Europe, Italy, North Africa, and the Middle East.17 The only solution seemed to be to give command in w
estern Europe to a man of lesser stature than Marshall.
At British insistence, the CCS and heads of government were about to meet again, first at Cairo and then with the Russians at Teheran. They would take up the vexing questions of command structure as well as a review of the strategy for 1944. The Americans were suspicious of British intentions, fearing that Churchill was trying to back out of OVERLORD. For Eisenhower and Smith these suspicions were increased as a result of a meeting with Churchill and the BCOS. On November 18 the AFHQ heads flew to Malta to confer with the British, who were en route to Cairo. Smith decided that the coming conference would be the “hottest one yet,” as Churchill was still unconvinced about the wisdom of OVERLORD and persisted in his desire to strike Germany through the “soft underbelly.” Churchill did say that if OVERLORD stayed on the agenda, with Eisenhower handing over the Mediterranean to a British theater commander and becoming Chief of Staff, he wanted Smith left with AFHQ to help the new boss there. Eisenhower said no—Smith would have to stay with him. He insisted that “this was one point on which I would not yield, except under directions from the President.”18
Two days later, on Saturday, November 20, Eisenhower flew to Oran to meet the President and his party, also en route to Cairo. The American delegation had come via the battleship Iowa. After it docked, Eisenhower accompanied the President and his party to the airport and flew with them to Tunis, where Roosevelt was to spend two days. Eisenhower went on a motor trip with the President, inspecting battlefield sites, both recent and ancient, and had a long talk. Roosevelt shifted quickly from subject to subject and Eisenhower found him a fascinating conversationalist. At one point the President touched on OVERLORD. He said he dreaded the thought of losing Marshall in Washington, but added, “You and I know the name of the Chief of Staff in the Civil War, but few Americans outside the professional services do.” Eisenhower confined his comments to saying he would do his best at whatever job Roosevelt gave him.19
The Supreme Commander Page 39