Marshall and Eisenhower were the two men most insistent on ANVIL. Because of their limited horizons, the argument goes, the military campaigns were run with no political objectives in view (this assumes that defeating the Nazis was not a political objective); as a result, the political fruits of victory fell to the Soviets instead of to the West. The great difficulty with this argument is that neither Clark nor Churchill nor anyone else mentioned the political imperatives at the time. Clark, for example, favored extending the campaign in Italy only because the Allied forces there had the Germans on the run and he did not want to see his army broken up.18 Churchill too insisted that he had no political aims in the Adriatic and was only advocating the militarily correct course.
The debate in June-July 1944 over what to do with the strategic reserve in Italy never involved any political differences. It was initiated, discussed, and settled on military grounds. To choose among five possible courses of action, strategists must set priorities. In this instance general agreement was easily reached—the first and only priority was the defeat of Germany. What was done with the Allied forces in Italy should be done to bring about unconditional surrender. There was disagreement on the question that followed the setting of priorities. There were two ways of approaching the problem: was OVERLORD the key to victory, and if so could the forces in Italy help SHAEF; or should Wilson’s troops make an independent contribution? Marshall and Eisenhower insisted that everything turned on OVERLORD and argued that the Italian forces could make a real contribution to it. Churchill felt that OVERLORD was going to be successful anyway, that the Allied forces in Italy could not help the armies in Normandy, and that Wilson and Alexander could help speed the victory through independent operations.
Churchill could point out that southern France was a long way from the main battlefield; the Americans could reply that Italy was too. Both sides were in fact proposing scattering the effort. Under the circumstances, it seems strange that no one discussed, much less advocated, a landing at the Pas de Calais, especially since the landing craft were already in England. That they did not only indicates how cautious everyone was, including Marshall. A landing in southern France made little sense, except as a method of preventing an extension of activities in the eastern Mediterranean, unless it were essential to opening ports. Even then, Marseilles was so far from northern France that much of what was unloaded there would be used up in transporting goods to the main SHAEF armies. An attack directed at Pas de Calais, if successful, would open Antwerp sooner, and Antwerp was the real key to the success of the campaign. Churchill was right in objecting to an operation that landed thousands of men hundreds of miles south of Normandy, but even he would not advocate the risk involved in an assault against the German defenses at Pas de Calais. The irony was that the Germans, who had always expected an attack at Pas de Calais for the very good reason that it offered great strategic advantages to the Allies, had finally decided there would be none and had pulled their troops out of the area.
More important by far to the debate than the then non-existent question of postwar control of central Europe was the fact that the Mediterranean was a British theater, while in practice northwestern Europe belonged to the Americans. Each side naturally emphasized operations in its own area. At the commanders’ level, the ANVIL debate at times seemed almost to be a simple case of the two theater commanders, Eisenhower and Wilson, asking for everything they could get for themselves. Time and again the two generals presented long, detailed arguments, based on a thorough analysis of the world-wide situation as it changed from week to week, but they always came to the same conclusions—the strategic reserve should be used in their particular theaters.
The debate began on June 7, when Wilson informed the BCOS that he would be ready to launch an amphibious operation about August 15. SHAEF planners were delighted, and immediately argued that ANVIL would be the most fruitful operation for the Mediterranean forces. If there were a stalemate in Normandy, the planners said, ANVIL would draw enemy forces from the battlefield. If Montgomery broke out, ANVIL would open ports through which American divisions could enter the Continent. On June 11 Marshall, King, and Arnold met in London with the BCOS to discuss the future. Brooke favored continuing the campaign in Italy until the Lombard plain was reached. So did Portal. The JCS held firmly to their preference for ANVIL. Having reached an impasse, the CCS avoided a final decision. Instead, they told Wilson to prepare to mount a three-division assault by July 25, without specifying an objective.19
Marshall and Arnold then left London and went to the Mediterranean, where they discussed the future with Wilson. The Mediterranean commander was impressed by Marshall’s argument, which “brought out clearly for the first time a point which seems to be of paramount importance … namely that there are between 40 and 50 divisions in the United States which cannot be introduced into France as rapidly as desired and maintained there through the ports of Northwest France.…” Marshall had emphasized that these divisions could not fight the Wehrmacht until the Allies had another major port.
Wilson then raised, for the first time, a crucial question. Within the context of assigning the first priority to defeating Germany, there was the question of timing. The CCS had to make a decision, Wilson declared, “as to whether our strategy in the coming months is to be aimed at the defeat of Germany this year, or, while making every endeavor to defeat him this year, at ensuring his defeat in the first half of 1945.” If the Allies decided to try for victory in 1944, ANVIL would be a mistake, for it would take too long to make its effects felt. If they decided to go for a long range target date, ANVIL was strategically sound. Wilson had offered a reasonable basis on which to make a decision, but the Americans paid no attention to it, possibly because he was right—that is, if the CCS decided to try for victory in 1944, ANVIL was unsound.
This was so because the CCS had agreed to continue operations in Italy until the Pisa-Rimini line was reached, which could not be done before August 15; thus ANVIL could not be launched until mid-August. ANVIL had other disadvantages. It would break up the Allied force in Italy, “a force which has proved itself to be a first class fighting machine.” Switching the offensive effort in the Mediterranean from Italy to ANVIL would involve a five-week pause in all operations in the Mediterranean, giving the Germans a breathing space. How then to defeat Germany in 1944? “The course that holds out the best chance of really decisive results in this Theater,” Wilson maintained, “is to exploit the present success in Italy through the Pisa-Rimini line across the Po and then to advance towards Southern Hungary through the Ljubljana Gap.”20
Wilson’s suggested plan was based on his assumption that the OVERLORD bridgehead was secure. His written formulation arrived in London on the same day as the great storm that wrecked the artificial harbors, at a time when SHAEF was growing increasingly worried about Montgomery’s inability to break out. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that Eisenhower’s reaction to Wilson’s plan would be hostile. The Supreme Commander in Europe accused the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean of ignoring the fact that the CCS had long ago decided to make western Europe the decisive theater. “To authorize any departure from this sound decision,” Eisenhower said, “seems to me ill advised and potentially dangerous.” He thought that even to contemplate “wandering off overland via Trieste to Ljubljana” was unsound, for it failed to meet the “overriding necessity for exploiting the early success of OVERLORD” and was simply another British tactical mistake of scattering instead of concentrating forces. He could not understand why it would take until August 15 to mount ANVIL, which after all had been under active consideration for a year. SHAEF was prepared to send landing craft to the Mediterranean to help. Time was the vital factor, Eisenhower said, even though he completely ignored Wilson’s question regarding the date the Allies wished to aim for in the defeat of Germany. “To speculate on possible adventures in south central Europe in the coming autumn … has no repeat no reference to current operations in this the
ater.” Eisenhower asked Marshall to see to it that the CCS send a directive to Wilson ordering him to mount ANVIL. He concluded his long cable, “We need big ports.”21 Marshall said he agreed completely.22
On June 23 representatives from AFHQ came to London to discuss future plans with Eisenhower. He insisted on ANVIL, but for reasons not directly connected to his earlier advocacy of the operation. In the first ANVIL debate Eisenhower followed Marshall’s lead and at times seemed to want the invasion of southern France only because Marshall favored it. At that time he had hardly mentioned the additional port capacity ANVIL would provide. Now, with stalemate in Normandy, and with the lesson of the storm of June 19—that he could not rely on artificial harbors when winter weather set in—Eisenhower emphasized the importance of ports. Montgomery was still months away from Antwerp, and ANVIL would give SHAEF the port it needed.23
In addition, the Rhône Valley provided a direct route to northern France, and forces advancing up the valley would give direct assistance to OVERLORD, drawing enemy troops from Montgomery’s front. He stressed that OVERLORD was the decisive campaign of 1944, and a stalemate in Normandy would be regarded by the world as a major defeat, with possibly far-reaching effects in Russia. An advance through Ljubljana would not divert any German divisions from France, nor would it give SHAEF any additional port capacity. In any case, France was the decisive theater, and the Allies could not afford to maintain two major theaters in the European war. Eisenhower therefore recommended that ANVIL be launched by August 15. If this was impossible, he wanted all French divisions in the Mediterranean, plus those American divisions previously allocated to ANVIL, to be brought to England for use in OVERLORD as soon as shipping and port capacity permitted.24 Wilson’s chief of staff put it more succinctly when, following his meeting with the Supreme Commander, he wired Wilson: “He [Eisenhower] said he wanted ANVIL and he wanted it quick.”25
The JCS accepted Eisenhower’s arguments, adding reasons of their own for preferring ANVIL and saying they hoped it could proceed by August 1.26 The BCOS were not convinced. Feeling that a threat against the Marseilles-Toulon area would hold German troops in the south of France as surely as the real thing, they wanted to accept Eisenhower’s second proposal—i.e., to send the French divisions in the Mediterranean to England as soon as shipping resources would permit. This would be a long time in the future, however, and meanwhile they wanted Alexander to press the campaign in Italy north of the Pisa-Rimini line. The JCS reply to the BCOS proposal was, if hardly tactful, at least straightforward: “We wish you to know now, immediately, that we do not accept statements in your paper in general, with relation to the campaign in Italy as sound and as in keeping with the early termination of the war.” The CCS, in short, had reached another impasse.27
Churchill now entered the fray, going over the heads of the CCS and appealing directly to Roosevelt. He told the President he was disturbed by the “arbitrary” tone the Americans were adopting. He asked Roosevelt to “consent to hear both sides” before making a decision. Churchill claimed that he was willing to help Eisenhower, but not at the expense of the complete ruin “of our great affairs in the Mediterranean and we take it hard that this should be demanded of us.” In effect, he accused Eisenhower of being narrow-minded and pointed out that the selection of future operations should be based on the largest possible considerations, not just aid for OVERLORD. Specifically, he felt that the general strain on Germany and political considerations (the possible revolt of German satellites in central Europe) should play a dual role in future policy decisions. As for aid to OVERLORD, Churchill argued that this could best be achieved by landings in the Bay of Biscay. The Prime Minister called ANVIL “bleak and sterile” and said he found it difficult to believe that it could have any influence on OVERLORD in the coming summer or fall. He concluded, “Whether we should ruin all hopes of a major victory in Italy and all its fronts and condemn ourselves to a passive role in that theatre, after having broken up the fine Allied army which is advancing so rapidly through that Peninsula, for the sake of ANVIL with all its limitations, is indeed a grave question for His Majesty’s Government and the President, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to decide.”
The President refused to be swayed. He immediately cabled Churchill, “You and I must … support the views of the Supreme Allied Commander. He is definitely for ANVIL and wants action in the field by August 30th preferably earlier.” In another message Roosevelt added, “For purely political reasons over here, I should never survive even a slight setback in OVERLORD if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans.”28
Because the Americans had twelve million men in arms, the British five million, Churchill was forced to give Roosevelt the deciding vote in disputes, which galled Brooke. What made it worse from the CIGS’s point of view was the basis on which Roosevelt cast his vote. Brooke charged that the “basic reason” for Roosevelt’s support for ANVIL was “the coming Presidential Election,” which made it “impossible to contemplate any action with a Balkan flavour on its strategic merits.” Brooke saw further trouble ahead, for “the Americans now begin to own the major strength on land, in the air and on the sea. They, therefore, consider that they are entitled to dictate how their forces are to be employed. We shall be forced into carrying out an invasion of Southern France.…”29
While the debate raged, Eisenhower and Marshall urged each other to stand firm. On June 29 Eisenhower told the Chief that although it was obvious Churchill and the BCOS were honestly convinced that greater results would flow from a drive toward Trieste than from ANVIL, his impression was that in the end they would agree to mount ANVIL. He warned that this view was conjecture, but said that it represented both his own and Smith’s impressions gathered in separate conversations with Churchill.30 In turn, in all his messages to Eisenhower, Marshall said that the JCS was holding and were continuing to inform the BCOS that an operation in the Balkans was unacceptable.
Alexander raised a controversy on June 29 when he asked for an immediate decision, at the same time informing Brooke that the Americans were already taking independent action by withdrawing small units from the front lines in Italy in preparation for ANVIL. Such action hardly helped solidify the alliance, but there was nothing the British could do about it. On June 30 the BCOS informed Churchill that although they remained “completely unshaken” in their unfavorable view of ANVIL they would defer to the Prime Minister’s views “in the broadest interests of Anglo-American co-operation” if Churchill thought ANVIL necessary to hold the alliance together.
But the Prime Minister was not quite ready to give up. On July 1 he sent one last, long appeal to the President. In it, for the first and only time, he raised long-range political possibilities. Roosevelt had suggested that they lay their differences before Stalin. Churchill pointed out that the Russian leader “might prefer that the British and Americans should do their share in France in this very hard fighting that is to come, and that East, Middle and Southern Europe should fall naturally into his control. However, it is better to settle the matter for ourselves and between ourselves.”
The Prime Minister quickly backed off from the political argument and returned to military considerations. Churchill concluded his note by saying it would be a dreadful mistake to break up the Italian offensive, “with all its dazzling possibilities,” under the assumption that in several months’ time ANVIL would be of some help to Eisenhower. Still, if the Americans insisted, there was nothing to do but to go ahead, and Churchill promised that the forces of the Empire would do their best.31 He then called Eisenhower on the telephone and told him substantially the same thing. Eisenhower immediately wired Marshall, telling the Chief that, while the information was not verified and was extremely confidential, Churchill was ready to give in.32 Marshall probably relayed this information to Roosevelt, and the next day, July 2, the President told the Prime Minister that he still wanted ANVIL. “I always think of my early geometry,” Roosevelt concluded. “A s
traight line is the shortest distance between two points.”33 That afternoon the CCS sent a directive to Wilson, instructing him to launch a three-division ANVIL as early as possible.34
Arrangements now moved forward smoothly. After discussion, SHAEF agreed to shift landing craft to the Mediterranean on July 15, with warships to follow. As the commander in whose interests ANVIL was being undertaken, Eisenhower was given authority to outline the objectives of the operation. On July 6 he told Wilson that these should be: (1) containing forces that might otherwise oppose OVERLORD; (2) securing a port for the entry of additional forces; (3) advancing northward to threaten enemy flanks, and (4) developing lines of communication to support ANVIL and OVERLORD forces. Wilson would retain over-all command of ANVIL until such time as SHAEF assumed it (which would happen when the ANVIL forces linked up with those from OVERLORD). Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch would command the Seventh Army in ANVIL; the American divisions involved would be organized into the VI Corps, under Truscott. The French forces, under General de Lattre de Tassigny, would be organized into an army as soon as the beachhead was secure, and at that time Devers would step in as commander of the Sixth Army Group.35
The operation and disagreements about it now seemed settled, but in fact were not. British anger and foreboding remained. Churchill had not accepted the final decision in good grace and he composed (but did not send) several protests to Washington. He told the BCOS “an intense impression must be made upon the Americans that we have been ill-treated and are furious.”36 On July 12 the BCOS cabled Washington that they did not consider ANVIL the “correct strategy” and had given way only to dispel the view that they were using delaying tactics to gain their point. Still, they assured the JCS, they would do their best to make it work. Churchill, meanwhile, told Hopkins on July 19, “We have submitted under protest to the decision of the United States Chiefs of Staff even in a theatre where we have been accorded the right to nominate the Supreme Commander. You can be sure we shall try our best to make the operation a success. I only hope it will not ruin greater projects.”37
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