Given the determination of both Truman and Churchill to maintain good relations with the Russians, and Eisenhower’s eagerness to get the war over, being meticulously careful was highly important. By both word and act the Germans continued their effort to split the alliance. Soldiers on the eastern front, rightfully fearing above all else capture by the Red Army, which they knew would demand revenge for German atrocities in Russia, fought desperately. On the western front, soldiers surrendered at the first sight of an AEF unit. German civilians tried to flee to the West so that they would be inside the Anglo-American lines when the end came. And on May 1 Doenitz, in a radio address to the nation in which he announced Hitler’s death, said the Wehrmacht would “continue the struggle against Bolshevism until the fighting troops and the hundreds of thousands of families in Eastern Germany gave been preserved from destruction.”21 But by May 2 or 3 Doenitz realized that the British and Americans would not accept any general surrender in the West only; he thereafter tried to achieve the same end by surrendering armies and army groups to SHAEF while fighting on in the East.
The first important offer came from the Germans facing Montgomery, who indicated that they wanted to surrender to the British the army group in northern Germany facing the Red Army. There were hints that they would also be willing to surrender all of northwest Germany, Denmark, and even Norway to Montgomery. Eisenhower immediately informed General Susloparoff, the Russian liaison officer at SHAEF, and laid down instructions that if the more general surrender did occur he would arrange “for a more formal and ceremonial surrender with Russian representatives present.”22 Eisenhower also told Montgomery to refuse to accept the surrender of German armies facing the Russians, but he did allow Montgomery to tell the Germans that “individual soldiers of these Armies surrendering would be accepted as prisoners of war.” Montgomery, in discussing the matter with the German officers who came to negotiate with him, added that he personally would not turn over to the Russians any individual soldiers who surrendered.23 Doenitz then agreed to the smaller surrender—that is, of those German forces facing Montgomery—and on the afternoon of May 4 German representatives came to Twenty-first Army Group headquarters to capitulate unconditionally on the British front. The terms they signed, which went into effect on the morning of May 5, stipulated that the capitulation was independent of and would be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by the Allies and applicable to German armed forces as a whole.
Farther south, German generals appeared at Hodges’ headquarters and offered to surrender the remaining elements of two German armies still facing the Russians east of the Elbe. The U. S. Ninth Army representatives refused to accept and forbade German civilians to cross the Elbe and surrender to the American troops. The surrender of individual soldiers would be accepted. In fact, no real effort was made to prevent civilians from crossing the river, and thousands did so. In southern Germany and western Austria Von Kesselring was also ready to give up, but hopefully only to the West. On May 4 he notified SHAEF of his readiness to discuss terms. Eisenhower replied that unless Von Kesselring was willing to surrender all the forces under his command, and especially those facing the Red Army, he should go to Sixth Army Group headquarters, not SHAEF. Von Kesselring thereupon sent his representatives to Devers’ headquarters and on May 5 signed an instrument of surrender for only those German troops opposing Sixth Army Group.24
Doenitz, meanwhile, had sent Admiral Hans von Friedeburg to SHAEF with instructions to arrange for the surrender of the remaining German forces in the West. Eisenhower insisted that any general surrender take place on the eastern and western fronts simultaneously, and he invited Susloparoff to attend the negotiations.25 Smith and Strong, who had handled the Italian surrender negotiations, carried on the discussion with Von Friedeburg, as Eisenhower refused to see any German officers until the document of surrender had been signed. When Smith told Von Friedeburg that there could be no bargaining and showed him a short surrender document drawn up by the SHAEF staff, the German admiral said he had no power to sign. Smith then showed Von Friedeburg SHAEF situation maps to illustrate the hopelessness of the enemy situation, and even brought out some special maps on which imaginary attacks had been projected. The admiral was impressed, and he cabled Doenitz asking for permission to sign an unconditional and simultaneous surrender.26
Doenitz, shocked, decided to send Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of OKW, to Eisenhower’s headquarters in Reims to explain why a simultaneous surrender on both fronts was impossible. Jodl arrived on Sunday evening, May 6. After conferring with Von Friedeburg, he went into Smith’s office to talk with Smith and Strong. Jodl emphasized that the Germans were willing, indeed anxious, to surrender to the West, but not to the Red Army. The Germans, he said, would order all their troops remaining on the western front to cease firing no matter what SHAEF did about their offer to surrender. When Smith replied that the surrender had to be a general one, Jodl asked for forty-eight hours “in order to get the necessary instructions to all their outlying units.” Smith replied that such a course was impossible, and Jodl again asked to surrender to the West only. After the talks had dragged on for over an hour, Smith decided that Jodl was stalling and put the problem before Eisenhower.
Eisenhower felt that all Jodl was trying to do was gain time so that more German soldiers and civilians could get across the Elbe and escape the Russians. He told Smith to inform Jodl that “he would break off all negotiations and seal the western front preventing by force any further westward movement of German soldiers and civilians” unless Jodl signed the surrender document immediately.
Jodl then sent a cable to Doenitz, who replied, enraged, that Eisenhower’s demands were “sheer extortion.” He nevertheless felt impelled to accept them because Jodl, who was the strongest opponent of surrender in the East, now insisted that there was no choice. Doenitz was consoled somewhat by the thought that he could still save many troops from the Russians during the forty-eight-hour period Eisenhower had granted before the capitulation went into effect. Early on Monday morning, May 7, therefore, he telegraphed Jodl: “Full power to sign in accordance with conditions as given has been granted by Grand Admiral Doenitz.”27
At 2 A.M. Jodl, accompanied by Von Friedeburg and an aide, marched into the small recreation hall of the Ecole Professionelle et Technique de Garçons. It served as the SHAEF War Room. Generals Smith, Morgan, Bull, Spaatz, Strong, Susloparoff, and a half dozen others were already there.
While the somewhat elaborate procedures for the signing went on, Eisenhower waited in his office, pacing and smoking. The signing took more than a half hour, so he had time to think. In the War Room Jodl was delivering the German nation into the hands of the Allies and officially acknowledging that Nazi Germany was dead; outside, spring was bursting forth, promising new life.
Eisenhower had a wealth of accomplishments to think about, as well as the long path he had followed to reach this office at this momentous time. Smith’s call that brought him to Washington in December 1941 and the work under Marshall in OPD, for example, or the disappointment he felt at not being able to do anything to save the Philippines, or the moment he always considered the critical one in his career, the day he told Marshall that he was willing to spend the war working as a staff officer and did not give a damn about promotions. The moment was dramatic, as many had been throughout the war, such as the dripping cave that served as an office in the bowels of Gibraltar, the Mess Room at Portsmouth and the decision to launch OVERLORD, or the barracks room with the old potbellied stove in Verdun during the crisis of the Bulge.
He had dealt with a remarkable group of people throughout the war. Henri Giraud, the ponderous old soldier who never seemed to understand what was going on. Charles de Gaulle, with his preposterous, haughty manner and his deep, indomitable patriotism. Churchill, clamping his teeth down on his cigar and sticking out his chin, frowning, growling, fighting to preserve the Empire he loved and to destroy the guttersnipe Hitler he hated. Roosevel
t, almost casually telling Eisenhower he would command OVERLORD. Montgomery, always lecturing, always condescending, and Brooke, forever critical.
Eisenhower liked to emphasize his Abilene childhood and was constantly amazed at his good fortune. He had established friendships with a widely disparate group of strong-willed men. He had worked side by side with the great and the near great. It had been, by any standard, a challenge to live in close association with such a body of men, powerful in their own right, accustomed to having their own way, and responsible for the fate of their nations. The issues were always critical, so when men like De Gaulle, Churchill, Brooke, Montgomery, Bradley, and the others discussed a subject with Eisenhower, they did everything they could to swing him to their point of view. Eisenhower could not afford to insult any of them, and he had to give each an opportunity to state his case fully. The Supreme Commander had a legendary temper, but he had even greater self-control, and he drew on his enormous fund of patience to hold things together.
He was able to do so because it was his deepest conviction that victory depended upon making the alliance work and he would do anything to achieve that purpose. His basic method was to approach all problems objectively himself, and to convince others that he was objective. Equally important, he had the ability to see matters from other peoples’ point of view. He did not dismiss De Gaulle as an egotist who wanted to become a dictator; had he done so, he could never have achieved the successes he did in dealing with the French. Some American officers were darkly suspicious of Churchill, seeing him as a meddlesome old man whose only aim was to promote the interests of the British Empire. Eisenhower did not make that mistake, nor did he assume, as others did, that Montgomery was motivated by considerations of personal advancement. Rather, Eisenhower believed these men to be honest. This attitude made it possible for him to base his decisions on the issues, not on personalities.
But he did not ignore the personalities. No one could have. People like Patton, Churchill, De Gaulle, Montgomery, and scores of others all had habits, mannerisms, and idiosyncrasies that set them apart and demanded attention. But, in a way, dealing with such men, responding to them at different levels, helped Eisenhower get through the war. He looked upon the relationships as challenges and found them intensely interesting. He had been given an opportunity to work with some of the most fascinating men of the century, and he made the most of it. No matter how bitter the struggle over an issue, Eisenhower always maintained good personal relations. He was able to do so because he enjoyed being with such men.
Eisenhower was by nature a modest man. He knew he had been decisive when he had to be, that he had been able to build an effective organization and hold the alliance together, that he was an accomplished diplomat, that he had proven himself as a soldier, especially during the Bulge and the Rhineland battles. But he had been heard to say that these were the tasks he had been trained for, as had all other senior officers in the U. S. Army, and it was to be expected that he would do them well.
When Eisenhower talked about the root causes of his personal success, he usually spoke immediately not of himself but of three men, Walter B. Smith, Omar N. Bradley, and George C. Marshall. Smith had been at his side since the late summer of 1942, the driving force behind AFHQ and SHAEF, the man who made the staff function. Smith did more than build and run the staff, too, although God knew that was essential. It was Smith, not the civilian representatives at AFHQ and SHAEF, to whom Eisenhower turned for guidance through the tortuous maze of French and Italian politics, for advice in dealing with field subordinates, for help in composing an answer to a Churchill demand. Eisenhower thought him the perfect chief of staff.28
Bradley had joined up in the spring of 1943. In Tunisia, Sicily, Normandy, at the Bulge, crossing the Rhine, overrunning Germany, he had always been the man Eisenhower could turn to, the one he trusted implicitly, the general who never let him down. Eisenhower thought Bradley was the best field soldier America produced, a man without whom the plans, no matter how good, would not have worked.
Most of all, there was Marshall. The Chief of Staff had stood like a rock through crisis after crisis. When criticism of the Darlan deal mounted, it was Marshall who had protected Eisenhower. During the long, disappointing Tunisian winter, Marshall was the one who gave Eisenhower the encouragement he needed, sent him the generals he wanted, saw that AFHQ got the trucks and reinforcements it had to have. When the Patton slapping incident threatened to deprive Eisenhower of one of his best tactical commanders, Marshall arranged matters so that Eisenhower could keep Patton. During the struggle with the airmen over the Transportation Plan, Marshall was the CCS member most responsible for Eisenhower’s success in getting the plan adopted. During the long, arduous argument with Churchill over the invasion of the south of France, Marshall was the one who made it possible for Eisenhower to stand firm by letting him know that he had total support from the JCS.
During the last few months Marshall’s support had, if possible, been even greater. The pressure on Eisenhower to give in to Churchill and make Alexander the single ground commander in Europe was enormous; Marshall, realizing this, did everything in his power to help the Supreme Commander, even to the point of saying he would resign if the organization did not remain as Eisenhower wanted it. Eisenhower had made the plans for fighting the Rhineland battles, for crossing the river, and for overrunning Germany, but he could not have held to them had it not been for Marshall, who protected Eisenhower from Brooke and gave SHAEF all possible support.
Always, when Eisenhower needed him, Marshall was there, giving him everything he needed, by both word and deed. Marshall had been the sustaining force.
A day or so after the war ended, Eisenhower tried to sum up his feelings in a cable to Marshall. “I feel a compulsion to attempt to tell you some things personally that have been very real with me during this war,” Eisenhower began. “Since the day I first went to England, indeed since I first reported to you in the War Department, the strongest weapon that I have always had in my hand was a confident feeling that you trusted my judgment, believed in the objectivity of my approach to any problem and were ready to sustain to the full limit of your resources and your tremendous moral support, anything that we found necessary to undertake.” The knowledge that Marshall stood behind them, Eisenhower said, “had a tremendous effect on my staffs and principal subordinate commanders.”
The conviction that Marshall “had basic faith in this headquarters and would invariably resist interference from any outside sources, has done far more to strengthen my personal position throughout the war than is realized even by those people who were affected by this circumstance.” Eisenhower said Marshall had an unparalleled place among the leaders and peoples of the alliance, as well as with the American Army. “Our army and our people have never been so deeply indebted to any other soldier.”
As Eisenhower finished dictating, a cable came in from Marshall. “You have completed your mission with the greatest victory in the history of warfare,” Marshall began. “You have commanded with outstanding success the most powerful military force that has ever been assembled. You have met and successfully disposed of every conceivable difficulty incident to varied national interests and international political problems of unprecedented complications.” Eisenhower, Marshall said, had triumphed over inconceivable logistical problems and military obstacles. “Through all of this, since the day of your arrival in England three years ago, you have been selfless in your actions, always sound and tolerant in your judgments and altogether admirable in the courage and wisdom of your military decisions.
“You have made history, great history for the good of mankind and you have stood for all we hope for and admire in an officer of the United States Army. These are my tributes and my personal thanks.”29
It was the highest possible praise from the best possible source, and it had been earned.
Whatever Eisenhower thought of as he waited for notification that the surrender document had been signed, his
mood was broken at two forty-one when Smith led Jodl into Eisenhower’s office and announced that the war was over. Eisenhower sternly asked Jodl if he understood the terms and was ready to execute them. Jodl said yes. Eisenhower then warned him that he would be held accountable officially if the terms were violated. Jodl bowed stiffly and left.
Eisenhower gathered the SHAEF officers around him and some photographers took pictures. The Supreme Commander then made a short newsreel and radio recording. When all the newsmen had left, Smith said it was time to send a message to the CCS. Everyone had a try at drafting an appropriate document. “I tried one myself,” Smith later recalled, “and like all my associates, groped for resounding phrases as fitting accolades to the Great Crusade and indicative of our dedication to the great task just completed.” Eisenhower quietly watched and listened. Each draft was more grandiloquent than the last. The Supreme Commander finally thanked everyone for his efforts, rejected all the proposals, and dictated the message himself.
“The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local time, May 7, 1945.”30
Glossary
AAF Army Air Forces
ABDA Australian-British-Dutch-American Command
ACC Allied Control Commission
ACCOLADE Planned operations in the Aegean, 1943
The Supreme Commander Page 86