He mused that France might sign a treaty with the United States and send 12,000 or 15,000 men to her aid, but he concluded that this would be the best way to ruin everything. He noted that even though America was at war with Britain, the Americans hated the French more than the British and that despite everything that France did and would do for them, they would prefer to reconcile with their former brothers than to find themselves among crowds of people they fear more.12
Congress responded immediately on November 17, by appointing Duportail to the rank of brigadier general; Laumoy and Radière, to that of colonel; and Gouvion, to that of lieutenant colonel. This was the turning point in their fortunes. They now had a rank that commanded respect and were soon indispensable to the commander in chief. They then took a leading part in every phase of the war and continued to be indispensable to the Continental Army for the duration of the war.13
2
VALLEY FORGE
General Duportail joined the Continental Army at Whitemarsh after its defeat at Germantown and attended his first council of war on November 24, 1777. The terrible winter of 1777–1778 was approaching, and the future of the United States seemed precarious. The army already lacked clothing, food, hospital accommodations, and transportation facilities. Military victories seemed more like defeats, contributing to poor morale. The commander in chief reported the state of affairs to the assembled generals (Armstrong, de Kalb, Duportail, Gates, Greene, Knox, Lafayette, Lee, Mifflin, Scott, Stirling, von Steuben, Wayne, and Woodford) and asked them to consider the question “What measures had best be pursued in the present emergency?” He asked them to put their responses in writing and to give their opinion regarding the “expediency of an attack upon Philadelphia.” Eleven of the generals were against making the attack, and only four (Scott, Stirling, Wayne, and Woodford) were in favor.1
Duportail’s memorial shows his skill of analysis and synthesis on this matter, a quality that stands out more clearly when his memorial is compared with those of the other council members. Washington was impressed. It was not simply that Duportail was a trained officer, as there were several other important European officers at the council, including de Kalb; Lafayette; and, later, von Steuben. But Washington wrote only of Duportail when he recorded, “I have a high opinion of his merit and abilities, and esteem him not only well acquainted with the particular branch he professes, but a man of sound judgment and real knowledge in military science in general.”2 This statement was not to disparage his other officers’ qualities, which he also valued, but Duportail stood out among them.
Duportail’s first memorial analyzes all aspects of the problem: the terrain, the report and preparation of the troops, the enemy, the motivation and level of training of the combatants, the weather conditions, and possible operations, among other things. He deemed that an attack would result in certain defeat and risk the reversal of any preceding gains. This first memorial (to be followed by many others of similar quality) is as follows:
Louis le Bègue de Presle, Duportail (1743–1802), by Charles Willson Peale, probably from life, c. 1781–1784. Duportail is wearing the uniform of a major general in the Continental Army. The ribbon attached at the second button on the coat facing bears the Croix de St. Louis (a reward for exceptional officers with at least ten years of service, notable as the first decoration that could be granted to non-nobles). Courtesy of Independence National Historical Park.
To attack the Enemy in their Lines appears to me a difficult and dangerous Project. It has especially this very considerable Inconvenience, the exposing our Army in case it does not succeed, to a total Defeat. This is easily demonstrated—one of the principal means proposed, is to throw two thousand men in the rear of the Enemy—if we do not succeed, these are so many men absolutely lost—as to the main body of the Army which is to attack in front, it must pass through the intervals left in the Abattis and Redoubts, which they say, form very narrow Passages—if after penetrating we should be repulsed, can Troops in disorder return easily by the Passages through which they were introduced?—Will it not be very easy for the English to cut off their Retreat—Our whole Army then may be destroyed or made prisoners—Now does it become this Army which is the principal one, to run such Risques—does it become it to stake the fate of America upon a single Action? I think not—for my part I never would place this Army in a Situation where its Rear was not perfectly free—much less where it will be inclosed on all sides without means of Retreat—to justify such an Enterprise the Success must be almost certain—to judge of this we have only to take a view of the dispositions which must be made for this attack—This view will render the Difficulties evident—first two thousand men are to be introduced by a River of which the Enemy are wholly Masters—if we embark them near the Enemy the noise may alarm them—if at a distance, the cold which they will undergo, will render the use of their arms exceedingly difficult in the morning—besides can we flatter ourselves that the River Side is unguarded—let us reflect that a single man is sufficient to make this Project miscarry and cause us the loss of two thousand men.
As to the Attack in front—these are nearly the Dispositions which would be followed—We should march upon so many Columns as there are Roads leading to the Enemy—Upon our arrival in their presence, each Commanding officer of a Column, according to the size of the works before him, and the number of men which he judges are contained in them, divides his troops into two parts, one of which surrounds his works and attacks them vigorously while the other marches boldly through the Intervals and falls upon the Troops in the Rear—But every one sees how much harmony is required in all these dispositions—how much presence of mind in the Superior officers, how much firmness in the Troops who have to execute all their manoeuvers under the fire of an Enemy who are in a great measure covered.
If the Enemy Works are not inclosed, the Enterprise would be much less dangerous—if they are, the Enterprise is too hardy.
His Excellency, I think, desired us to say a word respecting the operations in Jersey. In general it seems to me that we can do nothing better than to endeavor to attack the Enemy’s Force there with superior numbers—but there is a very important observation to be made, which is that we should not weaken ourselves too much here, for we are to consider that the Enemy may recross their Troops in one night and attack us by daybreak with their whole force.
The Chevalier du Portail
P.S. If however an attack be determined upon, the Enemys Works should be more particularly reconnoitred.3
Duportail’s suggestion must have been acted upon, as Colonel John Laurens, Washington’s aide-de-camp, wrote in a letter to his father, then president of Congress, on November 26:
Our Commander-in-Chief wishing ardently to gratify the public expectation by making an attack upon the enemy yet preferring at the same time a loss of popularity to engaging in an enterprise which he could not justify . . . went yesterday [November 25], to view the works. . . . we saw redouts of a very respectable profile, faced with planks, formidably fraised, and the intervals between them closed with an abattis unusually strong. General Duportail declared that in such works with five thousand men he would bid defiance to any force that should be brought against him.4
WINTER QUARTERS
General Washington abandoned any immediate thought of attacking the enemy and turned his attention to selecting a site for winter quarters. He convened another council of general officers on November 30, in which many places were suggested and their various claims to acceptance discussed. They included Wilmington on the Delaware, positions back of Chester and Darby, Lancaster and Reading. These latter places were much farther removed from the enemy lines. Again, the commander in chief requested that his officers give their opinions in writing.
No minutes of the meeting have been found, but Robert Hanson Harrison, Washington’s aide-de-camp, summarized the officers’ preferences. Generals Armstrong, Duportail, Greene, Lafayette, Scott, Smallwood, and Wayne favored Wilmington. Generals de Kal
b, Knox, Maxwell, Muhlenberg, Poor, Sullivan, Varnum, Weedon, and Woodford favored the Lancaster-Reading line. Varnum preferred “Reading to Easton.” Lord Stirling was the only one to favor the “Great Valley or Trydruffin.” Generals Duportail and Irvine were “for hutting in a strong position,” and Pulaski favored a winter campaign.5
Duportail responded,
By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading, we abandon to the Enemy Jersey and all the Country adjacent to Darby, Chester and Wilmington, one of the richest Tracts in this part of the Continent—By establishing them at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so completely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia, nor even Jersey because our proximity to the Enemy and the ease with which we could throw ourselves upon the rear of their lines in case the Schuylkill should be frozen, will keep them in respect, and put it out of their power to send considerable detachments on the other side of the Delaware from the fear of weakening themselves too much. . . . The position then of Wilmington answers the end of making very difficult the subsistence of Genl. Howe. . . . This position further deprives him of the means of recruiting in the Country,—extending himself in it, adding to the number of his Partisans, in a word, gaining the Country—It has besides the advantage of rendering his communication with his fleet difficult. . . . I should not omit mentioning . . . should War be declared between France and England, and Genl. Howe, from a dread of finding himself blocked up in the Spring by a French Fleet, should wish to quit Philadelphia, we shall be within distance at Wilmington for hindering his embarcation. . . .
This Position [of Wilmington] then unites great Military Advantages—but . . . to ask whether it is eligible is to ask whether we should expose ourselves to an Action, and perhaps more than one— . . . at present . . . if we should gain an advantage we should be unable to pursue it—if we experience a check we run the risque of seeing our army dissipated in the rude marches consequent on a defeat. Consistently with the plan which we ought to form of putting our army in good condition this winter and preparing it for a good Campaign we ought not to have its Repose preceeded by a Defeat.
As to the other points to be considered in this Question, whether Wilmington or Lancaster will be the most proper situation for furnishing the Army with every necessary, I cannot decide, being ignorant of the Country, but it appears to me in general that this point deserves our most serious attention—it is much better to lose Soldiers in Combats with the Enemy to whom we cause a loss at the same time than to lose them by Disorders or Desertion arising from their Misery. Misery, destroys part of an Army and leaves the other without Vigour, without Courage and without good will—we should find ourselves then in the Spring with a Body of an Army incapable of anything, and consequently have no right to expect a successful campaign.6
COUNCIL OF WAR
As a brigadier general, Duportail was present at every council of war convened by the commander in chief and gave his opinion in writing, along with the other generals, regarding every matter discussed. Lafayette was impressed with his abilities and called him one of the most honest officers upon this continent.7
Washington sent the following circular letter to his general officers on December 3, 1777:
WHITEMARSH
Sir;
I wish to recall your attention to the important matter recommended to your consideration sometime ago—namely the advisability of a Winter’s Campaign, and practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia with the aid of a considerable body of Militia, to be assembled at an appointed time and place—Particular reasons urge me to request your Sentiments on this matter by the morning, and I shall expect to receive them in writing accordingly by that time.8
Surviving responses to the circular include letters from Generals Cadwalader, Duportail, Greene, Kalb, Knox, Lafayette, Stirling, and Varnum on December 3 and from generals Armstrong, Irvine, Maxwell, Muhlenberg, Patterson, Poor, Potter, Scott, Smallwood, Sullivan, Wayne, Weedon, and Woodford on December 4. Joseph Reed also presented an opinion on December 4.
Duportail analyzed the situation and provided a concise response in less than an hour in his memorial:
I have examined anew with all the attention of which I am capable, the Project of attacking the English and it still appears to me too dangerous,—the great body of Militia with which we might be reinforced for this purpose does not give me any additional hope of succeeding—it is not the number of troops which is of importance in this case, but it is the quality, or rather, their nature and manner of fighting. The Troops wanted are such as are capable of attacking with the greatest vivacity, the greatest firmness—Troops that are not astonished at suffering a considerable loss at the first onset, without causing any to the Enemy—for this must be the case in an attack of Intrenchments—although when the Works are carried the Chance turns and the loss is on the side of the intrenched.—now, are the Militia or even our Continentals capable of undergoing this trial, in which the best Troops in the world cannot always support themselves—I am very sorry, in giving the motives for my opinion to be obliged to speak so unfavorably of our Army But the Battle of German Town ought to be a Lesson to us—if our Army had proceeded with vigour on that occasion, would not the English have been completely defeated? The Disposition was excellent—Your Excellency in that instance really conquered General Howe, but his troops conquered yours—if then notwithstanding the advantage of a complete Surprise, notwithstanding the advantages of ground we were repulsed—what would happen before a Line of Redoubts well disposed in all appearance, and the Intervals of which are closed with Abbatis.
There is, however, a case in which I think we might attack the Enemy with Success—I mean if the Schuylkill should be sufficiently frozen below their left to admit of our throwing our greatest Force on their Rear at the same time that we should make an attack in front. Gentlemen acquainted with the Country must decide this point—if indeed the Schuylkill is sufficiently frozen every year to afford a passage for Columns of Troops with Artillery—my opinion is fixed—I think the Army ought to be marched to the other side of the Schuylkill, to be reinforced with all the militia that can be collected, while we wait for the favorable moment.
I would go more minutely into the Subject, if Your Excellency did not order me to send my Answer this morning I did not receive Your Excellency’s letter until half after twelve and it is now half after one.9
The lesson was “Patience, and train your army before you attempt deliberately to attack seasoned troops.” Duportail and the ministry in France both realized that the Americans possessed, in General Washington, not only a military genius but also a man of such character that he could endure apparent defeat with equanimity and that his foundation principles were such that he could be relied on to lead the army through all difficulties to final success.
While the army was waiting at Whitemarsh, uncertain regarding the movements of the British, Duportail went to reconnoiter the positions at Chester and Darby for possible fortification. Two undated pencil sketches from his hand, with explanations, are in the Washington papers in the Library of Congress. The report was not sufficiently favorable for these locations to receive further attention.
On Monday afternoon, December 8, 1777, after having hovered about for several days as though intending to attack Washington, General Howe “changed front and by two or three routes marched his army back to Philadelphia.”10 Washington left Whitemarsh on the twelfth. The engineers first constructed a bridging train during the night of December 11–12, 1777. It consisted of two bridges over the Schuylkill River at Swede’s Ford. One comprised a roadbed laid across floating rafts; the other involved thirty-six wagons in the shallow water of the ford with rails across them. The engineers later constructed more sophisticated flat-bottomed pontons with special wheeled carriages at Albany. (These pontons accompanied the troops to Yorktown in 1781.)
The artillery park at Valley Forge was placed at the center of the inner line of defense so the guns could be moved quickly to wherever
they were needed. Photo courtesy of the author.
GULPH MILLS
By sunrise, the army had crossed the river and stopped at a place known as the Gulph Mills. Here, General Washington decided on Valley Forge for winter quarters. His camp overlooked a bleak and desolate winter landscape with a beating rain driving in on the men, who had pitched tents to make themselves a little more comfortable. Heartbroken at abandoning his plan of action for 1777 and fully realizing the hardships they both already endured and were yet to face, he wrote an address to the army with heart and mind buoyed by confidence. Nowhere does the simplicity and moral grandeur of the character of this great man shine forth more strikingly:
Head Quarters at the Gulph,
Dec. 17. 1777—
The Commander-in-Chief with the highest satisfaction expresses his thanks to the officers and soldiers for the fortitude and patience with which they have sustained the fatigues of the campaign—Although in some instances we unfortunately failed, yet upon the whole Heaven hath smiled on our Arms and crowned them with signal success; and we may upon the best grounds conclude, that by a spirited continuance of the measures necessary for our defence we shall finally obtain the end of our warfare—Independence—Liberty and Peace—These are blessings worth contending for at every hazard—but we hazard nothing. The power of America alone, duly exerted, would have nothing to dread from the power of Britain—Yet we stand not wholly upon our ground—France yields us every aid we ask, and there are reasons to believe the period is not very distant, when she will take a more active part, by declaring war upon the British Crown. Every motive therefore, irresistibly urges us—nay commands us to a firm and manly perseverance in our opposition to our cruel oppressors—to slight difficulties, endure hardships, and contemn every danger—The General ardently wishes it were now in his power to conduct the troops to the best winter quarters—But where are these to be found? Should we retire to the interior parts of the State we should find them crowded with virtuous citizens, who, sacrificing their all, have left Philadelphia, and fled thither for protection. To their distresses humanity forbids us to add—This is not all; we should leave a vast extent of fertile country to be despoiled and ravaged by the enemy, from which they would draw vast supplies, and where many of our firm friends would be exposed to all the miseries of the most insulting and wanton depredations—A train of evils might be enumerated, but these will suffice—These considerations make it indispensably necessary for the army to take such position, as will enable it most effectually to prevent distress and to give the most extensive security, and in that position we must make ourselves the best shelter in our power—with activity and diligence Huts may be erected that will be warm and dry—In these the troops will be compact, more secure against surprises than if in a divided state, and at hand to protect the country. These cogent reasons have determined the General to take post in the neighborhood of this camp; and influenced by them he persuades himself, that the officers and soldiers, with one heart, and one mind, will resolve to surmount every difficulty, with a fortitude and patience, becoming their profession, and the sacred cause in which they are engaged. He himself will share in the hardship, and partake of every inconvenience.—
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