by Tony Judt
much tied to the import-substitution model of the colonial era and it
had transformed itself into a major importer of raw materials from the
neighboring states and as an exporter of manufactured goods (partic-
ularly electrical goods) destined for Western markets.
Singapore’s unique ethnic profile and history also meant that its
identity was shaped by considerations informed by the colonial past:
the country’s Chinese majority population were mainly the descen-
dants of Chinese workers who had been brought to Southeast Asia by
the British to fulfill the needs of the British colonial economy, and
were thus beholden to the Western colonial authorities. With the sale
of Singapore to the British by the Sultan of Johor in the nineteenth
century, ethnic and political divisions appeared between the Chinese
community and the original Malay–Bugis inhabitants of the island
(then reduced to a minority) and these tensions have remained till
today. Singapore’s proximity to Malaysia and Indonesia—both of which
are often described as the two Malay “giants” surrounding the tiny
Chinese city-state—has also added to the anxiety of the Singaporeans
and was skillfully exploited by the country’s longest serving leader,
Lee Kuan Yew, in order to lay the foundations for a maximalist state
apparatus bent on social policing and the elimination of meaningful
political contestation in the state.
Singapore’s dealing with the “Muslim problem” was also colored
by the idiosyncrasies of its political elite from the PAP party and its
intellectual figurehead Lee Kuam Yew, who was widely regarded as
one of the most conservative and reactionary leaders of the region.
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231
Under Lee, Singapore had actively engaged and traded with South
Africa, had close links with Israel and was the only Third World country
that followed the United States and Britain (then under Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, respectively) out of UNESCO. Fearful
that Islamic activism might open the way for stronger ties between
Muslims in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Lee Kuan Yew and
the leaders of the Singaporean governmental, military, and intelli-
gence institutions sought to find ways to diffuse the “threat” of Islamic
resurgence and to isolate Singaporean Muslims from the influence of
Islamic radicalism abroad.
The opportunity to do so came with the “revelation” of Al Qaeda
documents in Afghanistan—whose authenticity remains disputed or
at least unverified—indicating the presence of Islamic militant cells in
Singapore, which were aiming to attack a number of Western targets
(such as the American and British embassies) and to cause discord and
strife between Malaysia and Singapore. In time, the Singaporean author-
ities began arresting and detaining a number of Singaporean Muslims
who were accused of being members of the Jama’ah Islamiyah group,
which was said to be working toward the reunification of Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia via militant means, with the objective of
creating an Islamic super-state in the heart of ASEAN. These arrests,
while courting international condemnation from civil society and
human rights NGOs the world over, were, nonetheless, carried out
and in due course, the profile of Singapore as a reliable ally in the war
against terror rose accordingly.
Like Singapore, Thailand has also used the rhetoric of war against
terror as a pretext for a closer realignment with the West (and the
United States in particular) and renewed repression of its Muslim
minority in the Southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Satun, and
Narathiwat. Though the conflict between Bangkok and the Southern
Thai–Muslim provinces bordering Malaysia had reached its peak in
the mid-1980s, violence and civil strife have returned to the area in the
wake of 9/11.
It should not, however, be assumed that this renewed violence is
mainly due to the activities of militant Islamic cells and groups oper-
ating in the provinces. Over the past few years, a number of contro-
versial developmental projects initiated by the Thai government, as
well as cross-border joint development projects between Malaysia and
Thailand, have resulted in popular unrest among the local population
in the areas. Compounding the problem has been the Thai police and
army’s reputation for siphoning off profits from such projects and
profiting from the racketeering operations that have been going on
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there for decades. Increased economic competition for finite resources,
Bangkok’s strong grip on the southernmost provinces, and the appalling
human rights record of local law enforcement agencies have all con-
tributed to a general decline in law and order in the area.
But the discourse of the war against terror served its purpose as it
allowed Bangkok to step up its campaign to eliminate local resistance
in the area and to impose harsh standards of policing—often unregu-
lated by a critical local media or watchdogs—in Pattani and the neigh-
boring provinces. This has merely led to a renewed cycle of violence
and the remobilization of Islamist forces, which had been dormant for
some time. The Thai government that had been installed in the wake of
the 1998 Asian financial crisis was widely regarded as a reformist-minded
administration peopled by pro-democracy civil society actors and
democrats. Following 9/11 and the adoption of the rhetoric of the
war against terror by the Thai leadership, it was clear that the democratic
claims and credentials of the Thai governmental elite had been com-
promised by their own dealings with the Muslim minority in the south of
the country. It is the Philippines, however, that stands out the most as far
as its own ideological U-turns and realignment of policies are concerned.
If the new political elite of Bangkok was regarded as being liberal
and democratic in its profile and outlook, the political elite of Manila
were thought to be even more so in the wake of the fall of Ferdinand
Marcos. Yet, a cursory survey of Filipino politics from 1986 onward
would suggest that the presence of the United States in the Philippines
is as strong today as it ever was.
Corazon Aquino took over as president of the Philippines immedi-
ately after the fall of Marcos, but even under her government, the
stamp of U.S. political, economic, and military interests was clear. Her
period of government was characterized by growing instability, the
inability of the Philippines government to steer the country away from
dependency on U.S. direct capital investment, and growing discontent
and insurgencies in the central and southern island provinces.
In 1986, Aquino proclaimed the setting up of a new national
Constitution, but even that could not help to contain growing dis-
content among the population. One major populist move she attempted
to perform was to support the anti-U.S. air and naval base
s campaign,
which had grown popular in the country. Under Aquino, the Americans
were asked to vacate their naval and air bases in Subic Bay and Clarke
Air Base, but this in turn, plunged the country into further economic
crisis because, in retaliation, the United States merely moved its bases
of operations to Okinawa, Korea, and Singapore, while depriving the
Philippines of much needed foreign revenue income. Further instability
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Uncle Sam to the Rescue?
233
led to an attempted coup d’e-tat against the government in 1989,
which in turn forced Aquino back into the hands of the Americans.
Faced with rebellious military units and commanders, Aquino had no
choice but to ask for American help. American military intervention
came in the form of U.S. war planes and aerial maneuvers, which
helped control the 1989 failed coup against her government. In the
end, Aquino was forced to step down by the very same groups that
supported her. In 1992, she was replaced by Fidel Ramos.
Fidel Ramos was a supporter of Ferdinand Marcos for more than
two decades. Ramos’s adherence to both free market ideology and
U.S. military dominance was evident in his support for the Pentagon’s
policy of rest and recreation in the Philippines (widely understood as
the U.S. military’s use of Philippine women as prostitutes). He also
supported and promoted further U.S. capital/business penetration
into the Philippines. He formulated the “Industrial Philippines 2000
vision” project, which was aimed at making the Philippines an indus-
trialized country by the year 2000, and to this end, he actively courted
further U.S. investment. He hosted the 1996 APEC conference in
Manila, where he openly supported the U.S. line of argument. Less
known are the efforts he and his administration have made on behalf
of the U.S. military in the Philippines.30
To renew its presence in the Philippines, the Pentagon turned to
the policy of military access. This operated through an executive
agreement implemented by the military forces of the United States
and the host country. Executive agreement also governed the U.S.
and Philippine military in matters concerning the bases during the
Marcos regime. In the eyes of many Filipinos the present access agree-
ment violated the post-Marcos constitution that requires Senate
approval of a U.S. military presence in the Philippines. As a high-ranking
military official of the Marcos dictatorship, Ramos supported the U.S.
bases; as President Aquino’s Minister of defense, he continued this
support; as a candidate for president in 1992, he declared for access,
and shortly after his election, the Pentagon got its access agreement.31
Fidel Ramos also followed the lead of Ferdinand Marcos, in his will-
ingness to open the Philippines to foreign capital, with minimal
restraint. Like Marcos, he paid solicitous attention to the claims of the
U.S. military, covered over when politically expedient by gestures of
nationalist intent. Due to his openly pro-U.S. and pro-capitalist ori-
entation, opposition against Ramos also grew and he was later voted
out of office. He was then replaced by Joseph Estrada.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Erap) rose to power on a wave of populist
support and anti-Americanism, which he tried to use to his advantage.
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But, in time, he proved to be just as corrupt and ineffective as the
previous leaders and was forced out of office, on corruption and embez-
zlement charges. During his period of office, he was actively courting
U.S. support to help suppress the Moro resistance movement in the
south, which only led to worsening of ties between the Christian and
Muslim communities. He was later forced out of office and put on
trial on corruption charges. He was replaced by Gloria Macapagal
Aroyyo, daughter of the former president Diosdido Macapagal.
Like her father, Gloria Macapagal Aroyyo has proven to be a close
ally and supporter of U.S. interests in the Philippines and the region.
Like all her predecessors—Marcos, Aquino, Ramos, Estrada—she
has not been able to deal with the chronic problem of economic
underdevelopment, dependency on foreign (especially American)
capital, and the growing unrest in the central and southern island
provinces. By turning to the United States, Aroyyo hoped to win its
support and investment in order to help build the country’s economy
and contain the threat of militant uprisings in the outer islands.
Even before the 9/11 bombings in New York and Washington,
which the Bush administration has been using as a basis for launching
its global war against terror, the Aroyyo government was busy trying
to win American military and economic support. Arroyo and her
defense secretary Angelo Reyes tried to negotiate with the Americans
over expanding U.S. military presence in the Philippines as part of a
larger security network in Asia, poised against regional security threats
including anti-American “terrorist groups” and China. Philippine
military leaders supported this move in order to increase the level
of U.S. arms spending and aid into the country, which was at only
$US2 million a year. Many senior Philippine commanders were keen to
initiate and follow up on the country’s arms modernization program.
Following the Abu Sayyaf kidnapping incident on Basilan island on
May 27, 2001, the Philippine government and army were given the
chance to renew their links with the U.S. government and armed forces.
U.S. officials immediately agreed on joint counter-terror and surveil-
lance cooperation tactics, and both sides agreed that further U.S.-
Philippines cooperation in the field of arms and information gathering
would be intensified. Three months later, Arroyo offered to open
Subic Bay port facilities for the resupply, repair, and maintenance of
U.S. warships.
After the 9/11 bombings, a 25-member U.S. Special Operations
assessment team visited the Philippines for two weeks in October to
review Filipino forces fighting the Abu Sayyaf. The visit led to the
offer of attack helicopters, advanced communication gear, night vision
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Uncle Sam to the Rescue?
235
equipment, surveillance capabilities, and even bloodhounds to track
and destroy the Abu Sayyaf members. The Pentagon also promised a
10-fold increase in military assistance—from $1.9 to $19 million in
2002 and every year thereafter. In a subsequent Manila visit, Admiral
Dennis Blair, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, also
pledged to increase intelligence sharing.
Prodded by her defense and military advisers during her Washington
visit, Arroyo pledged a deeper and long-term cooperation with Bush
in his antiterrorist campaign. This deeper and long-term cooperation,
which practically goes beyond fighting the Abu Sayyaf, led to further
deals that extended military rights that the American forces used to
enjoy under the U.S.-Philippine bases p
act. A joint statement said
that the two presidents discussed an integrated plan including a joint-
training package, equipment needed for increased troop mobility, a
maintenance program to enhance overall military capabilities, specific
targeted law enforcement and counter-terrorism cooperation, and a
new bilateral defense consultative mechanism. The Bush government
then increased defense and economic aid commitments to $US40
million.
Between 1999 and 2003, the government of Aroyyo has overturned
many of the post-Marcos constitutional blocks and legal restrictions
that would allow the Americans to come back and establish their power
in the country. The most recent infringement of the post-Marcos con-
stitutional set up was the war games between U.S. and Philippine forces
code-named Kalayaan-Aguila 2002 or Mindanao Balikatan 02-1, held
in Basilan and Zamboanga and led by the American Special Operations
Forces (SOFs). Kalayaan-Aguila 2002 marks the largest U.S. military
intervention engaged in actual combat against real human targets
on Philippine soil since the Philippine–American War (1899–1901).
It deployed the largest number of U.S. troops for combat in the
Basilan–Zamboanga area since the Moro Wars (1901–1911).32
Arroyo, who was actively courting the political support of the
United States for the 2004 presidential elections, completely disre-
garded the post-Marcos Constitution, which prohibits foreign military
troops on Philippine soil, unless covered by a treaty to be concurred
in by the Senate. All the existing security agreements of the Philippines
and the United States—Mutual Defense Treaty, Military Assistance
Agreement, Visiting Forces Agreement—do not have provisions for
the deployment of foreign military forces, advisers, foreign military
trainers, or coordinators in actual combat operations. Philippine under-
secretary for foreign affairs Lauro Baja admitted that this form of
operation in an actual combat zone is not even covered by any
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Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries. But
by then, the Philippines’ realignment back into the fold of U.S.