by Aristotle
It is also a fault in deduction when a man proves something through a long chain of steps, when he might employ fewer steps and those already included in his [25] argument: suppose him to be showing (e.g.) that one opinion is more properly so called from another, and suppose him to postulate that a thing-itself is most properly called that thing and that there genuinely exists an object of opinion in itself, so that it is more properly called an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion; now what is called such-and-such relative to what is more properly called so-and-so is more properly called such-and-such; and there exists a [30] genuine opinion-in-itself, which will be more precise than the particular opinions. Now it has been postulated both that a genuine opinion-in-itself exists, and that a thing-in-itself is most properly called that thing; therefore this opinion will be more precise. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends.
[35] 12 · An argument is clear in one, and that the most ordinary, sense, if it is so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions necessary; in another sense, and this is the type most usually advanced, when the propositions assumed necessitate the conclusion, and the argument is concluded through premisses that [162b1] are themselves conclusions; moreover, it is so also if it claims less than some very reputable views.43
An argument is called false in four senses: first, when it appears to be brought to a conclusion, and is not really so—what is called a contentious deduction. Again, [5] when it comes to a conclusion but not to the conclusion proposed—which happens principally in the case of reductio ad impossibile. Or when it comes to the proposed conclusion but not according to the mode of inquiry appropriate to the case, as happens when a non-medical argument is taken to be a medical one, or one which is [10] not geometrical for a geometrical argument, or one which is not dialectical for dialectical, whether the result reached is true or false. Again, if the conclusion is reached through false premisses: of this type the conclusion is sometimes false, sometimes true; for while a false conclusion is always the result of false premisses, a [15] true conclusion may be drawn from premisses that are not true, as was said above as well.
Falsity in argument is due to a mistake of the arguer rather than of the argument; yet it is not always the fault of the arguer either, but only when he is not aware of it; for we often accept in itself in preference to many true ones an argument which demolishes some true proposition, if it does so from premisses as far as [20] possible generally accepted. For an argument of that kind does demonstrate other truths; for one of the premisses laid down ought never to be there at all, and this will then be demonstrated. If, however, a true conclusion were to be reached through premisses that are false and utterly childish, the argument is worse than many arguments that lead to a false conclusion—though an argument which leads to a [25] false conclusion may also be of this type. Clearly then the first thing to ask in regard to the argument in itself is whether it reaches a conclusion; the second, whether the conclusion is true or false; the third, on what kind of premisses does it depend. For if it depends on false but reputable premisses, the argument is dialectical; if on true but implausible premisses, it is bad; if they are both false and also entirely implausible, clearly it is bad, either without qualification or else in relation to the [30] particular matter in hand.
13 · Of the ways in which a questioner may postulate the point at issue and postulate contraries the true account has been given in the Analytics44; but an account on the level of opinion must be given now.
People appear to postulate the point at issue in five ways: the first and most obvious being if any one postulates the actual point requiring to be proved; this is [35] easily detected when put in so many words; but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of synonyms, and where a name and an account mean the same thing. A second way occurs whenever anyone postulates universally something which he has [163a1] to demonstrate in a particular case: suppose (e.g.) he were trying to prove that the knowledge of contraries is one, and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites in general is one—for then he seems to be postulating, along with a number of other things, that which he ought to have proved by itself. A third way is if anyone were to [5] postulate in particular cases what he has undertaken to prove universally: e.g. if he undertook to show that the knowledge of contraries is always one, and postulated it of certain pairs of contraries; for he seems to be postulating independently and by itself what, together with a number of other things, he ought to have proved. Again, if he divides up the problem and postulates its parts (supposing e.g. that he had to prove that medicine is a science of what leads to health and to disease, and were to [10] claim first the one, then the other); or if he postulates the one or the other of a pair of statements that necessarily follow one other (e.g. if he had to prove that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, and were to postulate that the side is incommensurable with the diagonal).
The ways in which people assume contraries are equal in number to those in which they postulate the point at issue. For it would happen, firstly, if any one were [15] to postulate opposites, affirmation and negation; secondly, if he were to postulate the contrary terms of an antithesis, e.g. that the same thing is good and evil; thirdly, suppose anyone were to claim something universally and then proceed to postulate its contradictory in some particular case, e.g. if having assumed that the knowledge of contraries is one, he were to claim that the knowledge of what makes for health or for disease is different; or suppose him, after postulating the latter view, to try to secure universally the contradictory statement. Again, suppose a man postulates the [20] contrary of what necessarily comes about through the premisses laid down—even without postulating the opposites themselves but postulating two premisses such that the opposite contradiction will follow from them. The securing of contraries differs from postulating the point at issue in this way: in the latter case the mistake [25] lies in regard to the conclusion (for it is looking at the conclusion that we say that the point at issue has been postulated); whereas contrary views lie in the propositions, viz. in a certain relation which they bear to one another.
14 · The best way to secure training and practice in arguments of this kind is in the first place to get into the habit of converting the arguments. For in this way [30] we shall be better equipped for dealing with the proposition stated, and from a few cases we shall know thoroughly several arguments. For conversion is taking the reverse of the conclusion together with the remaining propositions asked and so demolishing one of those that were conceded; for it follows necessarily that if the [35] conclusion is untrue, some one of the propositions is demolished, seeing that, given all of them, the conclusion was bound to follow. In dealing with any thesis, be on the look-out for a line of argument both pro and con; and on discovering it at once set [163b1] about looking for the solution of it; for in this way you will soon find that you have trained yourself at the same time in both asking questions and answering them. If we cannot find any one else to argue with, we should argue with ourselves. Select, moreover, arguments relating to the same thesis and range them side by side; for [5] this produces a plentiful supply of arguments for carrying a point by force, and in refutation also it is of great service, whenever one is well stocked with arguments pro and con—for then you find yourself on your guard against contrary statements. Moreover, as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic wisdom the power of [10] discerning and holding in one view the results of either of two hypotheses is no mean instrument; for it then only remains to make a right choice of one of them. For a task of this kind a certain natural ability is required: in fact real natural ability just is the power rightly to choose the true and shun the false. Men of natural ability can [15] do this; for by a right liking or disliking for whatever is proposed to them they rightly select what is best.
It is best to know thoroughly arguments upon those problems which are of most frequent occurrence, and particula
rly in regard to those theses which are primary; for in discussing these answerers frequently give up in despair. Moreover, [20] get a good stock of definitions; and have those of reputable and primary ideas at your fingertips; for it is through these that deductions are effected. You should try, moreover, to master the heads under which other45 arguments mostly tend to fall. For just as in geometry it is useful to be practised in the elements, and in arithmetic [25] having the multiplication table up to ten at one’s fingers’ ends makes a great difference to one’s knowledge of the multiples of other numbers too, likewise also in arguments it is a great advantage to be well up in regard to first principles, and to have a thorough knowledge of propositions by heart. For just as in a person with a trained memory, a memory of things themselves is immediately caused by the mere mention of their ‘places’, so these habits too will make a man readier in [30] reasoning, because he has his premisses classified before his mind’s eye, each under its number. It is better to commit to memory a proposition of general application than an argument; for it is not very difficult to get a supply of first principles and hypotheses.
Moreover, you should get into the habit of turning one argument into several, [35] and conceal your procedure as darkly as you can: this kind of effect is best produced by keeping as far as possible away from topics akin to the subject of the argument. This can be done with arguments that are entirely universal, e.g. that there cannot [164a1] be one knowledge of more than one thing—for that is the case with both relative terms and contraries and co-ordinates.
Records of discussions should be made in a universal form, even though one has argued only some particular case; for this will enable one to turn a single argument into several. (A like rule applies in rhetoric as well to enthymemes.) For [5] yourself, however, you should as far as possible avoid universalizing your deductions. You should, moreover, always examine arguments to see whether they rest on principles of general application; for all particular arguments reason universally as well, and a particular demonstration always contains a universal demonstration, [10] because it is impossible to deduce at all without using universals.
You should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young man, in deductive against an expert. You should try, moreover, to secure from those skilled in deduction their premisses, from inductive reasoners their parallel cases; [15] for this is the thing in which they are respectively trained. In general, too, from your exercises in argumentation you should try to carry away either a deduction on some subject or a solution or a proposition or an objection, or whether some one put his question properly or improperly (whether it was yourself or some one else) and the point which made it the one or the other. For this is what gives one ability, and the object of training is to acquire ability, especially in regard to propositions and [164a1] objections. For it is the skilled propounder and objector who is, speaking generally, a dialectician. To formulate a proposition is to form a number of things into one (for the conclusion to which the argument leads must be taken generally, as a single thing), whereas to formulate an objection is to make one thing into many (for the [5] objector either distinguishes or demolishes, partly granting, partly denying the statements proposed).
Do not argue with every one, nor practise upon the man in the street; for there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate. For against anyone who is ready to try all means in order to seem not to be beaten, it is indeed [10] fair to try all means of bringing about one’s conclusion; but it is not good form. Therefore the best rule is, not lightly to engage with the man in the street, or bad argument is sure to result. For you see how in practising together people cannot refrain from contentious argument. [15]
It is best also to have ready-made arguments relating to those problems in which a very small stock will furnish us with arguments serviceable on a very large number of occasions. These are those that are universal, and those in regard to which46 it is rather difficult to produce material from everyday experience.
**TEXT: J. Brunschwig, Budé Paris, 1967 (Books I–IV)
W. D. Ross, OCT, Oxford, 1958 (Books V–VIII)
1Brunschwig excises this sentence.
2See II 7.
3Literally not ‘raised’ but ‘light’ (κoῦφoς): here, as often, Greek and English ambiguities do not march together.
4Literally, ‘white and black’.
5Literally ‘garment’.
6This sentence is excised by Brunschwig.
7Literally: ‘the man who hopes for good things is hopeful (εὔελπις)’.
8Brunschwig excises this sentence.
9Reading πρῶτoν.
10Reading τῶν ύπό τι εἶδoς τῆς κινήσεως ὄντων.
11See Theaetetus 181 D.
12See I 15.
13See 113b15–26.
14This sentence is excised by Brunschwig.
15Literally, ‘to-something and of-something and the rest’. No grammatical terms appear in the Greek: ‘double . . . takes a genitive’ (perhaps rather: ‘ ‘double’ takes a genitive’) renders τò διπλάσιoν τινός—the double is of-something’.
16E.g. ‘Aristotle is in excess of Plato in wisdom’—the Greek verb ύπερέχειν takes a genitive and a dative (and the Greek sentences Aristotle hints at here are perfectly natural, unlike the English sentences suggested by the translation).
17Brunschwig excises this sentence.
18Excised by Brunschwig.
19Frag. 81 Diels-Kranz.
20Some scholars place this paragraph after 129a16.
21Retaining τò μή.
22This paragraph, which is a doublet of the succeeding paragraph, was excised by Pacius.
23Reading τò βαδίζειν … ἤ τò ἄνθρωπoς.
24Greek sciences are female; i.e. ὲπιστήμη (‘science’) is a feminine noun.
25Reading τoιoύτoυ.
26Reading καὶ τῆς τινòς γῆς κατὰ τὴν γῆν.
27Reading τῆς φάσεως ἴδιoν. ἡεἰ γὰρ μὴ τῆς φάσεως, ἴδιoνά εἴη … (Wallies).
28See 114b6–15.
29Reading εἰ δ’ ἐστιν ἴδιoν φρόνησις τoῦ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι καλoῦ oὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιoν τoῦ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι αἰσχρoῦ.
30Omitting μή (Verdenius).
31See 101b19.
32Phaedrus 245E.
33Excised by Düring.
34See 103a23.
35See 102a11.
36Some scholars see a reference to Posterior Analytics II 13.
37Reading φανῇ for φανερὀς ᾖ.
38See 148a1 4ff.
39See 105a16.
40Reading ἢ διά.
41See 100a22.
42See Prior Analytics II 2.
43Reading ἐλλεὶπει σφόδρα ἐνδόξων.
44See Prior Analytics II 16.
45Reading oὶ ἄλλoι λόγoι.
46Reading πρὀς oὓς πoρὶζεσθαι.
SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS**
W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
[164a20] 1 · Let us now discuss sophistical refutations, i.e. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead. We will begin in the natural order with the first.
That some deductions are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is [25] evident. This happens with arguments, as also elsewhere, through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. For physically some people are in a vigorous condition, while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out [164b20] like the tribal choruses; and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty, while others seem to be so, by dint of embellishing themselves. So it is, too, with inanimate things; for of these, too, some are really silver and others gold, while others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense; e.g. things made of litharge and tin seem to [25] be of silver, while those made of ye
llow metal look golden. In the same way both deduction and refutation are sometimes genuine, sometimes not, though inexperience may make them appear so—for inexperienced people obtain only, as it were, a [165a1] distant view of these things. For a deduction rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated; a refutation is a deduction to the contradictory of the given conclusion. Now some of them do not really achieve this, though they seem to [5] do so for a number of reasons; and of these the most prolific and usual is the argument that turns upon names. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them; and we suppose that what follows in the names, follows in the things as well, just as people [10] who calculate suppose in regard to their counters. But the two cases are not alike. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of accounts, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same account and a single name signify several things. Accordingly just as, in counting, those who are not clever in manipulating [15] their counters are taken in by the experts, in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others. For this reason, then, and for others to be mentioned later, there are both deductions and refutations that appear to be genuine but are not really so. Now for some people it is better worth while to seem to [20] be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality, and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom); for them, then, it is clearly necessary to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so. To reduce it to a single point of contrast, it is the business of one who knows [25] a thing, himself to avoid falsities in the subjects which he knows and to be able to show up the man who makes them; and of these accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to produce an argument, and the other upon the faculty to exact one. Those, then, who would be sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid; for it is worth their while; for a faculty of this kind will make a man seem [30] to be wise, and this is the purpose they actually have in view.