by Aristotle
A further objection to the theory of Empedocles is that it makes growth impossible, unless it be increase by addition. For his Fire increases by Fire: ‘And [333b1] Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether.’18 These, however, are cases of addition; but it is not by addition that growing things are believed to increase. And it is far more difficult for him to account for the coming-to-be which occurs in nature. For the things which come-to-be by natural process all do so either [5] always or for the most part in a given way; while any exceptions—any results which occur neither always nor for the most part—are products of chance and spontaneity. Then what is the cause determining that man comes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) comes-to-be from wheat, either always or for the most part? Are we to say that bone comes-to-be if the elements be put together in such-and-such a manner? For, according to his own statements, nothing comes [10] to-be from their coming together as chance has it, but only from their coming together in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this? Presumably not Fire or Earth. But neither is it Love and Strife; for the former is a cause of association only, and the latter only of dissociation. No: the cause in question is the substance of each thing—not merely (to quote his words) ‘a combining and a [15] divorce of what has been combined’. And chance, not proportion, ‘is the name given to these occurrences;’19 for things can be combined as chance has it.
The cause, therefore, of the things which exist by nature is that they are in such and such a condition; and it is this which constitutes the nature of each thing—a nature about which he says nothing. What he says, therefore, tells us nothing About Nature.20 Moreover, it is this which is both the excellence of each thing and its good; whereas he assigns the whole credit to the combining. (And yet [20] the elements at all events are dissociated not by Strife, but by Love; since the elements are by nature prior to god, and they too are gods.)
Again, his account of motion is too simple. For it is not an adequate explanation to say that Love and Strife set things moving, unless the essence of Love is a movement of this kind and the essence of Strife a movement of that kind. He [25] ought, then, either to have defined or to have postulated these characteristic movements, or to have demonstrated them—whether strictly or laxly or in some other fashion. Moreover, since the bodies are seen to move naturally as well as by compulsion, i.e. in a manner contrary to nature (fire, e.g., moves upwards without compulsion, though by compulsion downwards); and since what is natural is contrary to that which is due to compulsion, and movement by compulsion actually [30] occurs; it follows that natural movement also occurs. Is this, then, the movement that Love sets going? No: for, on the contrary, the natural movement moves Earth downwards and resembles dissociation, and Strife rather than Love is its cause—so that in general, too, Love rather than Strife would seem to be contrary to nature. And unless Love or Strife is actually setting them in motion, the bodies themselves have absolutely no movement or rest. But this is absurd; and what is more, they do [334a] in fact obviously move. For though Strife dissociated, it was not by Strife that the Ether was borne upwards. On the contrary, sometimes he attributes its movement to something like chance (‘For thus, as it ran, it happened to meet them then, though often otherwise’),21 while at other times he says it is the nature of Fire to be [5] borne upwards, but ‘the Ether’ (to quote his words) ‘sank down upon the Earth with long roots’.22 With such statements, too, he combines the assertion that the Order of the World is the same now, in the reign of Strife, as it was formerly in the reign of Love. What, then, is the first mover and the cause of motion? Presumably not Love and Strife: on the contrary, these are causes of a particular motion, if at least we assume that first mover to be a principle.
[10] An additional absurdity is that the soul should consist of the elements, or that it should be one of them. How are the soul’s alterations to take place? How, e.g., is the change from being musical to being unmusical, or how is memory or forgetting, to occur? For clearly, if the soul be Fire, only such properties will belong to it as characterize Fire qua Fire; while if it be compounded, only the corporeal modifications will occur in it. But the changes we have mentioned are none of them corporeal.
7 · The discussion of these difficulties, however, is a task appropriate to a [15] different investigation:23 let us return to the elements of which bodies are composed. The theories that there is something common to all the elements, and that they are reciprocally transformed, are so related that those who accept either are bound to accept the other as well. Those, on the other hand, who do not make their coming-to-be reciprocal—who refuse to suppose that any one of the ‘elements’ comes-to-be out of any other taken singly, except in the sense in which bricks come-to-be out of a wall—are faced with an absurdity. How, on their theory, are [20] flesh and bones or any of the other compounds to result from the elements?
Indeed, the point we have raised constitutes a problem even for those who generate the elements out of one another. In what manner does anything other than, and beside, the elements come-to-be out of them? Let me illustrate my meaning. Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water; for their substratum is something common to them both. But flesh too, presumably, and marrow [25] come-to-be out of them. How, then, do such things come-to-be? For how is the manner of their coming-to-be to be conceived by those who maintain a theory like that of Empedocles? They must conceive it as composition—just as a wall comes-to-be out of bricks and stones; and this mixture will be composed of the elements, these being preserved in it unaltered but with their small particles juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, in which flesh and [30] every other compound results from the elements. Consequently, it follows that Fire and Water do not come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh. For instance, although a sphere might come-to-be out of this part of a lump of wax and a pyramid out of some other part, it was nevertheless possible for either figure to have come-to-be out of either part indifferently: that is the manner of coming-to-be when both come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh. Those, however, who maintain the theory in question, are not at liberty to conceive things in that manner, but only as a stone and a brick both come-to-be out of a wall—viz. each out of a different [334b1] place or part. Similarly even for those who postulate a single matter of their elements there is a certain difficulty in explaining how anything is to result from two of them taken together—e.g. from cold and hot, or from Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and is neither of them, nor again is a composition of them in [5] which they are preserved unaltered, what alternative is left except to identify the resultant of the two elements with their matter? For the passing-away of either element produces either the other or the matter.
Now since there are differences of degree in hot and cold, then although when either is actual without qualification, the other will exist potentially; yet, when [10] neither exists in the full completeness of its being, but both by combining destroy one another’s excesses so that there exist instead a hot which (for a hot) is cold and a cold which (for a cold) is hot; then there will exist neither their matter, nor either of the contraries in actuality without qualification, but rather an intermediate; and this intermediate, according as it is potentially more hot than cold or vice versa, will [15] in accordance with that proportion be potentially twice as hot or as cold—or three times or whatever. Thus all the other bodies will result from the contraries, or from the elements, in so far as these have been combined; while the elements will result from the contraries, in so far as these exist potentially in a special sense—not as matter exists potentially, but in the sense explained above. And when a thing [20] comes-to-be in this manner, the process is combination; whereas what comes-to-be in the other manner is matter. Moreover contraries also suffer action, in accordance with the definition established in the early part of this work.24 For the actually hot is potentially cold and the actually cold potentially hot; so that hot and cold, unless they are equally
balanced, are transformed into one another (and all the other contraries behave in a similar way). It is thus, then, that in the first place the [25] elements are transformed; and that out of the elements there come-to-be flesh and bones and the like—the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they have been brought to the mean. For at the mean is neither hot nor cold. The mean, however, is of considerable extent and not indivisible. Similarly, it is in virtue of a mean condition that the dry and the moist and the rest produce flesh and bone and [30] the remaining compounds.
8 · All the compound bodies—all of which exist in the region belonging to the central body—are composed of all the simple bodies. For they all contain Earth because every simple body is to be found specially and most abundantly in its own place. And they all contain Water because the compound must possess a definite outline and Water, alone of the simple bodies, is readily adaptable in shape; [335a1] moreover Earth has no power of cohesion without the moist. On the contrary, the moist is what holds it together; for it would fall to pieces if the moist were eliminated from it completely.
They contain Earth and Water, then, for the reasons we have given; and they [5] contain Air and Fire, because these are contrary to Earth and Water (Earth being contrary to Air and Water to Fire, in so far as one Substance can be contrary to another). Now comings-to-be result from contraries, and one pair of the contrary extremes is present; hence the other pair must also be present, so that every compound will include all the simple bodies.
[10] Additional evidence seems to be furnished by the food each compound takes. For all of them are fed by what they are constituted from, and all of them are fed by more things than one. Indeed, even plants, though it might be thought they are fed by one thing only, viz. by Water, are fed by more than one; for Earth has been mixed with the Water. That is why farmers too endeavour to mix before watering. Although food is akin to the matter, that which is fed is the figure—i.e. the [15] form—taken along with the matter. Hence it is reasonable that, whereas all the simple bodies come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one of them which (as our predecessors also assert) is fed. For Fire alone—or more than all the rest—is akin to the form because it tends by nature to be borne towards the limit. Now each of them naturally tends to be borne towards its own place; but the figure—i.e. the [20] form—of them all is at the limits.
Thus we have explained that all bodies are composed of all the simple bodies.
9 · Since some things are such as to come-to-be and pass-away, and since coming-to-be in fact occurs in the region about the centre, we must explain the [25] number and the nature of the principles of all coming-to-be alike; for a grasp of any universal facilitates the understanding of its specific forms.
The principles, then, are equal in number to, and identical in kind with, those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of matter, and a second in the sense of form; and, in addition, the third must be present [30] as well. For the two are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things.
Now cause, in the sense of matter, for the things which are such as to come-to-be is that which can be and not be; and this is identical with that which can come to be and pass away, since the latter, while it is at one time, at another time is not. (For whereas some things are of necessity, viz. the eternal things, others of necessity are not. And of these two sets of things, since they cannot diverge from the [335b1] necessity of their nature, it is impossible for the first not to be and impossible for the second to be. Other things, however, can both be and not be.) Hence coming-to-be and passing-away must occur within the field of that which can be and not be. This, therefore, is cause in the sense of matter for the things which are such as to [5] come-to-be; while cause, in the sense of their end, is their figure or form—and that is the formula expressing the substance of each of them.
But the third principle must be present as well—the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors, definitely stated by none of them. On the contrary some amongst them thought the nature of the Forms was adequate to account for coming-to-be. Thus Socrates in the Phaedo first blames everybody else for having [10] given no explanation;25 and then lays it down that some things are Forms, others participants in the Forms, and that while a thing is said to be in virtue of the Form, it is said to come-to-be qua sharing in, to pass-away qua losing, the Form. Hence he thinks that assuming the truth of these theses, the Forms must be causes both of [15] coming-to-be and of passing-away. On the other hand there were others who thought the matter was adequate by itself to account for coming-to-be, since the movement originates from the matter.
Neither of these theories, however, is sound. For if the Forms are causes, why is their generating activity intermittent instead of perpetual and continuous—since there always are participants as well as Forms? Besides, in some instances we see [20] that the cause is other than the Form. For it is the doctor who implants health and the man of science who implants science, although Health itself and Science itself are as well as the participants; and the same principle applies to everything else that is produced in accordance with a capacity. On the other hand to say that matter [25] generates owing to its movement would be, no doubt, more scientific than to make such statements as are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For what alters and transfigures plays a greater part in bringing things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the products of nature and of art alike, to look upon that which can initiate movement as the producing cause. Nevertheless this second theory is not right either.
30 For, to begin, with, it is characteristic of matter to suffer action, i.e. to be moved; but to move, i.e. to act, belongs to a different power. This is obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and in those that come-to-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal; and it is the art, not the wood, that makes a bed. Nor is this their only error. They make a second mistake in omitting the more controlling cause; for they eliminate the essential nature, i.e. the form. [336a1] And what is more, since they remove the formal cause, they invest the forces they assign to the simple bodies—the forces which enable these bodies to bring things into being—with too instrumental a character. For since (as they say) it is the nature of the hot to dissociate, of the cold to bring together, and of each remaining [5] contrary either to act or to suffer action, it is out of such materials and by their agency (so they maintain) that everything else comes-to-be and passes-away. Yet it is evident that even Fire is itself moved, i.e. suffers action. Moreover their procedure is virtually the same as if one were to treat the saw (and the various instruments of [10] carpentry) as the cause of the things that come-to-be; for the wood must be divided if a man saws, must become smooth if he planes, and so on with the remaining tools. Hence, however true it may be that Fire is active, i.e. sets things moving, there is a further point they fail to observe—viz. that Fire is inferior to the tools or instruments in the manner in which it sets things moving.
10 · As to our own theory—we have given a general account of the causes in an earlier work,26 and we have now explained and distinguished the matter and the [15] form. Further, since the change which is motion has been proved to be eternal, the continuity of coming-to-be follows necessarily from what we have established; for the eternal motion, by causing the generator to approach and retire, will produce coming-to-be uninterruptedly. At the same time it is clear that we were also right when, in an earlier work,27 we called motion (not coming-to-be) the primary form of [20] change. For it is far more reasonable that what is should cause the coming-to-be of what is not, than that what is not should cause the being of what is. Now that which is being moved is, but that which is coming-to-be is not: hence motion is prior to coming-to-be.
We have assumed, and have proved, that coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously; and we assert that motion causes coming-to-be. That [25] being so, it is evi
dent that, if the motion be single, both processes cannot occur since they are contrary to one another; for nature by the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect, so that either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. The movements must be more than one, and they [30] must be one another either by the sense of their motion or by its irregularity; for contrary effects demand contraries as their causes.
This explains why it is not the primary motion that causes coming-to-be and passing-away, but the motion along the inclined circle; for this motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a duality of movements as well. For if coming-to-be and passing-away are always to be continuous, there must be some [336b1] body always being moved (in order that these changes may not fail) and moved with a duality of movements (in order that both changes, not one only, may result). Now the continuity of this movement is caused by the motion of the whole; but the approaching and retreating of the moving body are caused by the inclination. For the consequence of the inclination is that the body becomes alternately remote and [5] near; and since its distance is thus unequal, its movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and by its proximity, it—this very same body—destroys by retreating and becoming remote; and if it generates by many successive approaches, it also destroys by many successive retirements. For contrary effects demand contraries as their causes; and the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time. Hence, too, the [10] times—i.e. the lives—of the several kinds of things have a number by which they are distinguished; for there is an order for all things, and every time (i.e. every life) is measured by a period. Not all of them, however, are measured by the same period, but some by a smaller and others by a greater one; for to some of them the period, which is their measure, is a year, while to some it is longer and to others [15] shorter.