by Aristotle
2 · Why is it that we speak of men as incontinent in connexion with two only of the senses, namely, touch and taste? Is it because of the pleasures that result from these in us and in the other animals? Being then shared by the animals, they are held in least honour and so are regarded as the only pleasures deserving of reproach, [10] or at any rate more so than any others. So we blame a man who is a slave to them and call him incontinent and intemperate, because he is a slave to the worst pleasures.
3 · Why are men called incontinent in respect only of their desires, although incontinence is possible also in anger? Is it because an incontinent man is one who acts in some way contrary to reason, and incontinence is a mode of life which is [15] contrary to reason, and the desires are, generally speaking, contrary to reason? Feelings of anger, on the other hand, are in consonance with reason, not in the sense that reason prompts them, but in the sense that reason informs us of the insult or of the charge made against us.
[20] 4 · Why is it that we approve most of continence and temperance in the young and wealthy, and of justice in the poor? Is it because we feel most admiration if a man abstains from what he most needs, rather than from the contrary? Now a [25] poor man needs resources, while a rich young man needs enjoyment.
5 · Why can men tolerate thirst less easily than hunger? Is it because thirst is more painful? A proof that it is so is the fact that there is more pleasure in drinking when one is thirsty than in eating when one is hungry. Now the contrary of what is pleasant is more painful. Or is it because the heat whereby we live requires moisture [30] more?1 Or is it because thirst is a desire for two things, namely, drink and food, but hunger is a desire for only one, namely, food?
6 · Why can we endure thirst less than hunger? Is it because the former causes us more pain? A proof of the pain it causes is the fact that the pleasure it gives is more intense. Further, he who is thirsty needs two things, nourishment and [35] cooling, and drink provides both of these; but he who is hungry needs one of them only.
7 · Why are men called incontinent if they indulge to excess in the pleasures connected with touch and taste? (For those who are intemperate in sexual [950a1] intercourse and the enjoyments of eating and drinking are called incontinent; and in the joys of eating and drinking the pleasure is partly in the tongue and partly in the throat; hence Philoxenus longed for the throat of a crane.) And why is the term incontinent never extended to the pleasures of sight and hearing? Is it because the [5] pleasures of touch and taste are common to us and the other animals? Being, then, shared by the animals they are held in least honour and so are regarded as the only pleasures deserving of reproach, or at any rate more so than any others. So we blame a man who is a slave to them and call him incontinent and intemperate, because he is a slave to the worst pleasures. Now the senses being five in number, [10] the other animals find pleasure only in the two already mentioned; in the others they find no pleasure, or, if they do, it is only incidentally. For the lion2 rejoices when he sees or scents his prey, because he is going to enjoy it;3 and when he has satisfied his hunger, such things do not please him, just as the smell of dried fish gives us no [15] pleasure when we have eaten our fill of it, though, when we wanted to partake of it, it was pleasant.4 The scent of the rose, on the other hand, is always pleasant.
8 · Why are men less able to restrain their laughter in the presence of friends? Is it because, when anything is especially elated, it is easily set in motion? Now benevolence causes elation,5 so that laughter more readily moves us. [20]
BOOK XXIX
PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
1 · Why is it that, although injustice is greater according as the good which is injured is greater, and honour is a greater good, yet injustice in the matter of money seems to be more serious and those who are unjust as regards money are considered more unjust? Is it because men prefer money to honour, and money is [25] common to all, whereas honour comes only to a few and its enjoyment is a rare occurrence?
2 · Why is it a more terrible thing to rob a man of a deposit than of a loan? Is it because it is disgraceful to wrong a friend? Now he who robs another of a deposit does wrong to a friend; for no one places a deposit with another unless he trusts him. [30] A creditor, on the other hand, is not a friend; for, if a man is a friend, he gives and does not lend. Or is it because the injustice is greater, since, in addition to the loss inflicted, he also violates his good faith, for the sake of which, if for no other reason, he ought to abstain from doing the wrong? Further, it is base not to requite like with like; for the one party in making the deposit regarded the other as his friend, but the [35] latter in robbing him treated him as an enemy; but a lender does not lend in the spirit of friendship. Again, a deposit is handed over to be guarded and returned, whereas the lender lends for his own advantage as well. Now we are less angry at losing if we are in pursuit of gain, like fishermen when they lose their bait; for the [950b1] risk is obvious. Again, those who make deposits are generally the victims of plots or misfortune, but it is the rich who lend money; and it is more terrible to wrong the unfortunate than the fortunate.
3 · Why is it that in some law courts the jury give their verdict in accordance [5] with the birth of the litigants rather than the provisions of the will? Is it because about birth it is impossible to lie, but the truth must be declared, whereas before now many wills have been proved to be forged?
4 · Why is it that poverty is more commonly found amongst the good than [10] amongst the bad? Is it because, being universally hated and despised, she takes refuge with the good, thinking that with them she is most likely to find safety and a place of habitation; whereas she thinks that if she goes to the wicked, they would never remain content with the same condition but would steal or plunder, in which [15] case she could no longer remain with them? Or is it because she thinks that the good will treat her better than any one else and that she is least likely to be insulted by them? So, just as we place deposits of money with good men, so she of her own accord ranges herself with them. Or is it because, being of the female sex, she is [20] more helpless, so that she needs the assistance of the good? Or is it because, being herself an evil, she will not betake herself to that which is evil, since if she were to choose the evil, her position would be quite irremediable?
5 · Why is it that wrongs in other matters are not so liable to be committed on a large scale as those in respect of money?1 For example, a man who has spoken a light word would not therefore necessarily divulge a secret, nor2 would one who has [25] betrayed an individual also betray a city, as a man who has stolen an obol would steal a talent also. Is it because, though there are forms of unjust disposition which are worse, the acts resulting from them are less serious owing to lack of power?
6 · Why is it more disgraceful3 to rob a man of a small deposit than of a large loan? Is it because he who robs another of a deposit is deceiving a man who thought [30] him to be honest? Or is it because he who commits the one crime would commit the other also?
7 · Why is it that man, who of all animals has the advantage of most education, is yet the most unjust of all? Is it because he possesses the power of reasoning to the greatest degree, and has therefore most carefully estimated the [35] pleasures and happiness, and these are impossible of attainment without injustice?
8 · Why is it that wealth is more often found in the hands of the wicked than in those of the good? Is it because, being blind, it cannot read men’s hearts and choose the best?
[951a1] 9 · Why is it considered more just to defend the dead than the living? Is it because those who are alive can look after themselves, but a dead man can no longer do so?
10 · Why is it that a man who associates with one who is healthy does not himself become any healthier, nor does association with the strong or beautiful [5] improve a man’s condition, whereas association with the just and temperate and good does have this effect? Is it because some qualities can, and others cannot, be imitated by the soul, goodness being a q
uality of the soul and health of the body? A man can, therefore, accustom himself to feel pleasure and pain under the proper circumstances; but his association with the healthy does not produce this result, for health does not consist in taking pleasure or not in certain things, since none of these [10] things can produce health.
11 · Why is it more terrible to kill a woman than a man, although the male is naturally superior to the female? Is it because she is weaker and so he commits a greater4 injustice? Or is it because it is not a manly act to use one’s strength against that which is greatly inferior?
12 · Why is the defendant given the position on the right hand in a law [15] court? Is it from a desire to equalize matters? Since, then, the plaintiff possesses other advantages, the defendant is given the advantage of position. Further, as a rule defendants are under guard; and, if the defendant has the right-hand position, the guard is on his right.
13 · Why is it that, when the votes for the plaintiff and for the defendant are [20] shown to be equal, the defendant wins the case? Is it because the defendant has heard only during the course of the trial itself5 the charges against which he has to make his defence and produce the witnesses to refute the accusations,6 if any advantage is to be obtained from them? Now it is not easy for a man to foresee of what he ought to provide witnesses or some other kind of evidence to prove his [25] innocence. The plaintiff, on the other hand, can act as he pleases, and can begin to take action before having the summons issued; and even after he has summoned his opponent he can invent and bring against him any plausible accusation he likes. The lawgiver, then, recognizing that the defendant has the disadvantage in all these [30] respects, has given him any advantage which may accrue from the disagreement of the jury. And, indeed, that defendants are at a disadvantage is shown by the fact that when men are in a state of alarm they omit much of what they ought to have said or done, and defendants are, generally speaking, always in greater danger; and so, if they omit necessary parts of their defence, when they are put on a level with [35] their opponents in respect of their claims, they would clearly have been victorious if they had not omitted anything.
Further, any one of us would prefer to pass a sentence acquitting a wrong-doer rather than condemn as guilty one who is innocent, in the case, for example, of a [951b1] man being accused of enslavement or murder. For we should prefer to acquit either of such persons, though the charges brought against them by their accuser were [5] true, rather than condemn them if they were untrue; for, when any doubt is entertained, the less grave error ought to be preferred; it is a serious matter to decide that a slave is free; yet it is much more serious to convict a freeman of being a slave.
Further, if one man brings a charge and another disputes his claim to any piece [10] of property, we do not consider that we ought to award the disputed property immediately to the plaintiff, but that the man in possession ought to enjoy it until the matter is decided. Similarly, when a number of persons are involved in a case and the numbers of those who declare that a wrong has been committed and of those who deny it are equal—just as in the case cited above when one man brought an accusation, while another denied the truth of it—we consider that the lawgiver is [15] right in not handing over the disputed property to the accuser but allowing the defendant to remain in possession until the plaintiff7 has established some superiority. Similarly, when the votes of the jury are equal and so neither side has the superiority, the lawgiver has allowed matters to be left as they are.
Again, in serious crimes the punishments are also heavy, so that, if the jury [20] pass an unjust sentence and then change their mind,8 it is impossible to take the opportunity of remedying the mistake; if, on the other hand, they acquit the accused when they ought not to do so, if he lives so circumspectly as never to commit any crime again, how can the jury have made a serious mistake in failing to condemn such a man to death? If, however, he subsequently commits a crime, the law would [25] consider that he ought to be punished for both crimes.
Or is it because it is the mark of a more unjust man to commit acts of injustice for which one is less likely to be unjustly accused.9 For wrong-doing may be due to anger or fear or desire and to many other causes, and not only to intent, but an [30] unjust accusation is generally due to intent. So when the votes have proved equal, indicating both10 that the accuser has brought an unjust charge and that the defendant is in the wrong, the unjust accuser being judged the offender, the lawgiver has awarded the legal victory to the defendant.
Again, we ourselves adopt the attitude towards our servants that, when we [35] suspect that they have committed a crime and have no certain knowledge, but nevertheless think that they have done the deed, we do not immediately proceed to punish them; and when we cannot pursue our inquiries any further, we acquit them [952a1] of blame.
Further, he who from intent commits a crime does a greater wrong than he who does not act from intent. Now the man who brings a vexatious charge against another always does wrong from intent, whereas he who commits any other crime may happen to do so either under compulsion or through ignorance or by some other [5] chance. But when the votes are equal, the prosecutor has been judged by half the jury to be committing a wrong from intent, while the defendant is considered by the remainder to be in the wrong, but not from intent; and so, since the prosecutor is judged guilty of a more serious wrong than the defendant, the lawgiver has rightly decided that he who has committed the less serious wrong wins the case.
Further, a man is always more unjust who does not expect to escape the [10] observation of the man whom he wrongs and nevertheless commits the wrong, than he who expects to remain undiscovered. Now he who brings a vexatious charge against another does not expect to escape the observation of the man whom he falsely accuses, whereas those who commit any other crime usually try to commit an injustice with the expectation of doing so without the knowledge of their victims, so that plaintiffs ought to be regarded as more unjust than defendants. [15]
14 · Why is it that, if a man steals from the baths or the wrestling-school or the market or any similar place, he is punished with death, whereas if he steals from a house he merely pays back double the value of what he has stolen? Is it because in houses it is possible in some way or other to safeguard one’s property? For the wall [20] is strong and there is a key, and it is the business of all the slaves in the house to see that the contents of the house are kept safe. At the baths, however, and in places which are similarly public, it is easy for any one who wishes to commit a crime; for those who place their property there have no sure means of guarding it except their [25] own eyes, so that, if one takes one’s eye off it for a moment, it is immediately placed at the mercy of the thief. Hence the lawgiver, considering that bathers are not able to guard their property, has set the law to guard against thieves by threatening that they shall lose their lives if they appropriate the possessions of others.
Further, the owner of a house is responsible for admitting into it whom he [30] wishes and for introducing into it any one whom he does not trust; but the man who deposits any property in a bath cannot prevent any one from coming in, nor can he prevent him, when he has entered, from placing his garments next to his own when he has stripped himself; but, contrary to his wishes, the clothing of the thief and of [35] the man who is about to be robbed lie together in a confused heap. Therefore the lawgiver has prescribed not very heavy penalties to help the man who of his own free will and by his own mistake has admitted the thief to his house, but has clearly fixed [952b1] heavy penalties for theft to aid those who are obliged to share with others the right of entrance and the promiscuity of the baths.
Further, it is obvious that all those who commit theft in places the entrance to which is open to any one who wishes to come are bad men,11 and so, if they are [5] allowed to live, do not desire to have the semblance of honest men even for the future advantage which they can gain from it, regarding it as useless to pretend to be honest in the eyes of those who know their real character;
they therefore continue henceforward to be openly wicked. Those, on the other hand, whose wickedness is known to one person only, try to persuade that person by bribery not to make known [10] their real character to the rest of the world; they are not likely therefore to be completely wicked for ever, and so the penalty which the lawgiver has fixed for them is less severe.
Further, of all crimes those which are committed in the most crowded [15] meetings and assemblies bring most disgrace upon the city, just as public orderliness brings the greatest credit; for it is at public gatherings that the citizens are most conspicuous to each other and the rest of the world. The result, therefore, of such thefts is that not only is the man who loses his property personally injured, but also abuse is heaped upon the city. This is why the lawgiver has fixed heavier [20] penalties for such thieves than for those who abstract property from a private house.