by Aristotle
Nor is it possible to define any Idea. For the Idea is, as its supporters say, an individual, and can exist apart; and the formula must consist of words; and he who [10] defines must not invent a word (for it would be unknown), but the established words are common to each of a number of things; these then must apply to something besides the thing defined; e.g. if one were defining you, he would say ‘an animal which is lean’ or ‘white’, or something else which will apply also to some one other than you. If any one were to say that perhaps all the attributes taken apart may [15] belong to many subjects, but together they belong only to this one, we must reply firstly that they belong also to both the elements, e.g. two-footed animal belongs to animal and to the two-footed. And where the elements are eternal this is even necessary, since the elements are prior to and parts of the compound; what is more, they can also exist apart, if ‘man’ can exist apart. For either neither or both can. If, [20] then, neither can, the genus will not exist apart from the species; but if it does, the differentia will also. Secondly, we must reply that they are prior in being; and things which are prior to others are not destroyed when the others are.
Again, if the Ideas consist of Ideas (as they must, since elements are simpler than the compound), it will be further necessary that the elements of which the Idea consists, e.g. animal and two-footed, should be predicated of many subjects. If not, [25] how will they be known? For there will then be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more subjects than one. But this is not thought possible—every Idea is thought to be capable of being shared.
As has been said, then, people do not realize that it is impossible to define in the case of eternal things, especially those which are unique, like the sun or the [30] moon. For they err not only by adding attributes after whose removal the sun would still exist, e.g. ‘going round the earth’ or ‘night-hidden’ (for from their view it follows that if it stands still or is visible, it will no longer be the sun; but it is strange if this is so; for ‘the sun’ means a certain substance); but also by the mention of attributes which can belong to another subject; e.g. if another thing with the stated attributes comes into existence, clearly it will be a sun; the formula therefore is [1040b1] general. But the sun was supposed to be an individual, like Cleon or Socrates. Why does not one of the supporters of the Ideas produce a definition of an Idea? It would become clear, if they tried, that what has now been said is true.
[5] 16 · Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potentialities,—e.g. the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they are separated, then they too exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of them is one, but they are like a heap before it is fused by heat and some one thing is made out of the bits. One might suppose [10] especially that the parts of living things and the corresponding parts of the soul are both, i.e. exist both actually and potentially, because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature,—not by force or even by growing together, for such a [15] phenomenon is an abnormality.
Since the term ‘unity’ is used like the term ‘being’, and the substance of that which is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be the substance, but we seek what the principle is, that we may refer the thing to something more intelligible. Now of these things [20] being and unity are more substantial than principle or element or cause, but not even the former are substance, since in general nothing that is common is substance; for substance does not belong to anything but to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the substance. Further, that which is one cannot be in many things at the [25] same time, but that which is common is present in many things at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from the individuals.
But those who say the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in saying the Forms exist apart, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one in many is a Form. The reason for their doing this is that they [30] cannot say what are the substances of this sort, the imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and sensible substances. They make them, then, the same in kind as the perishable things (for this kind of substance we know)—man himself and the horse itself, adding to the sensible things the word ‘itself. Yet even if we had not seen the stars, none the less, I suppose, would there be eternal [1041a1] substances besides those which we knew; so that now also if we do not know what eternal substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that some should exist. Clearly, then, no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances. [5]
17 · We should say what, and what sort of thing, substance is, taking another starting-point; for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances. Since, then, substance is a principle and a cause, let us attack it from this standpoint. The ‘why’ is always [10] sought in this form—‘why does one thing attach to another?’ For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire—as we have said—why the man is musical, or it is something else. Now ‘why a thing is itself’ is doubtless a meaningless inquiry; for the fact or the existence of the thing must already be [15] evident (e.g. that the moon is eclipsed), but the fact that a thing is itself is the single formula and the single cause to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musical musical, unless one were to say that each thing is inseparable from itself; and its being one just meant this. This, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question. But we can inquire why man is an animal of [20] such and such a nature. Here, then, we are evidently not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable of something; that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing. [25] E.g. why does it thunder?—why is sound produced in the clouds? Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another. And why are certain things, i.e. stones and bricks, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is that for the sake of which, e.g. perhaps [30] in the case of a house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover; for this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being also.
The object of the inquiry is most overlooked where one term is not expressly [1041b1] predicated of another (e.g. when we inquire why man is), because we do not distinguish and do not say definitely ‘why do these parts form this whole’? But we must distinguish the elements before we begin to inquire; if not, it is not clear whether the inquiry is significant or unmeaning. Since we must know the existence [5] of the thing and it must be given, clearly the question is why the matter is some individual thing, e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, or this body in this state, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing. Evidently, then, in the case of simple things no inquiry nor teaching is possible; but we must [10] inquire into them in a different way.
As regards that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one—not like a heap, however, but like a syllable,—the syllable is not its elements, ba is not the same as b and a, nor is flesh fire and earth; for when they are dissolved [15] the wholes, i.e. the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth. The syllable, then, is something—not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else; and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, b
ut also something else. Since, then, that [20] something must be either an element or composed of elements, if it is an element the same argument will again apply; for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something still further, so that the process will go on to infinity; while if it is a compound, clearly it will be a compound not of one but of many (or else it will itself be that one), so that again in this case we can use the same argument as in the case [25] of flesh or of the syllable. But it would seem that this is something, and not an element, and that it is the cause which makes this thing flesh and that a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the substance of each thing; for this is the primary cause of its being; and since, while some things are not substances, as [30] many as are substances are formed naturally and by nature, their substance would seem to be this nature, which is not an element but a principle. An element is that into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter, e.g. a and b are the elements of the syllable.
BOOK VIII (H)
1 · We must draw our conclusions from what has been said, and sum up our results, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry. We have said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are the object of our search. And some [5] substances are recognized by all thinkers, but some have been advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized are the natural substances, i.e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple bodies; secondly, plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals; and finally the heavens and the parts of the [10] heavens. Some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances. And it follows from our arguments that there are other substances, the essence and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more substantial than the species, and the universal than the particulars. And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected; it is in virtue of the same argument [15] that they are thought to be substances. And since the essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication. Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had to consider with respect to the notion of part, what are parts of the substance [20] and what are not, and whether the same things are also parts of the definition. Further, then, neither the universal nor the genus is a substance; we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics; for some say these exist apart from sensible substances.
But now let us resume the discussion of the generally recognized substances. These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have matter. The [25] substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a ‘this’ actually, is potentially a ‘this’), and in another sense the formula or form (which being a ‘this’ can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of matter and form, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, [30] without qualification, capable of separate existence; for of substances in the sense of formulae some are separable and some are not.
But clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere, and in respect of increase that which is now of one [35] size and again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again diseased; and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is [1042b1] now being generated and again being destroyed, and now underlies the process as a ‘this’ and again underlies it as the privation of positive character. In this last change the others are involved. But in either one or two of the others this is not involved; for [5] it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation and destruction.
2 · The difference between becoming in the unqualified sense and becoming in a qualified sense has been stated in the Physics. Since the substance which exists as substratum and as matter is generally recognized, and this is that which exists [10] potentially, it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of actuality, of sensible things. Democritus seems to think there are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i.e. shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in inter-contact, i.e. [15] order. But evidently there are many differences; for instance, some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their matter, e.g. the things formed by mixture, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, e.g. a bundle; and others by being glued together, e.g. a book; and others by being nailed together, e.g. a casket; and others in more than one of these ways; and others by position, e.g. [20] the threshold and the lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time, e.g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e.g. the winds; and others by the affections proper to sensible things, e.g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some things by some of these qualities, others [25] by them all, and in general some by excess and some by defect. Clearly then the word ‘is’ has just as many meanings; a thing is a threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things will be defined by all these qualities, because some parts of them are mixed, others are [30] fused, others are bound together, others are solidified, and others possess the other differentiae; e.g. the hand or the foot. We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for these will be the principles of the being of things), e.g. the things characterized by the more and the less, or by the dense and the rare, and by other such qualities; [35] for all these are characterized by excess and defect. And everything that is characterized by shape or by smoothness and roughness, is determined by the straight and the curved. And for other things their being will mean their being [1043a1] mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite. It is clear then from these facts that if its substance is the cause of each thing’s being, we must seek in these differentiae the cause of the being of each of these things. Now none of these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter, yet in each there is [5] something analogous to substance; and as in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles full actuality. E.g. if we had to define a threshold, we should say ‘wood or stone in such and such a position’, and a house we should define as ‘bricks and timbers in such and such a position’ (or we may name that for the sake of which as well in some cases), and if we define ice we say ‘water frozen or solidified in such [10] and such a way’, and harmony is ‘such and such a blending of high and low’; and similarly in all other cases.
Obviously then the actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different; for in some cases it is the juxtaposition, in others the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes we have named. And so, in defining, those who define a [15] house as stones, bricks, and timbers, are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who define it as a covering for bodies and chattels, or add some other similar differentia, speak of the actuality; and those who combine both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed of matter and form. [20] For the formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form and the actuality, while that which gives the components is rather an account of the matter. And the same is true with regard to the definitions which Archytas used to accept; for they are accounts of the combined form and matter. E.g. what is still weather? Absence of motion in a large extent of air; air is the matter, and absence of motion is the actuality and substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of sea; the material substratum is the sea, and the actuality or form is smoothness. It is [25] obvious then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is and how it exists—one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality; while the third kind is
that which is composed of these two.
3 · We must not forget that sometimes it is not clear whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form, e.g. whether ‘house’ is a sign for [30] the composite thing, ‘a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus and thus’, or for the actuality or form, ‘a covering’, and whether a line is twoness in length or twoness, and whether an animal is a soul in a body or a soul. For soul is the substance or actuality of some body; but animal might be applied to both, not that [35] both are definable by one formula but because they refer to the same thing. But this question, while important for another purpose, is of no importance for the inquiry into sensible substance; for the essence certainly attaches to the form and the [1043b1] actuality. For soul and to be soul are the same, but to be man and man are not the same, unless indeed the soul is to be called man; and thus on one interpretation the thing is the same as its essence, and on another it is not.