by Aristotle
Is philosophy an excellence or not? It can become plain to us that it is an [5] excellence by merely looking at wisdom. For if wisdom is, as we maintain, the excellence of one of the two rational parts, and wisdom is inferior to philosophy (for its objects are inferior; for philosophy has to do with the eternal and the divine, as we maintain, but wisdom with what is expedient for man), if, then, the inferior thing is an excellence, it is reasonable that the better should be an excellence, so that it is [10] evident that philosophy is an excellence.
What is intelligence, and with what is it concerned? The sphere of intelligence is the same as that of wisdom, having to do with matters of action. For the intelligent man is doubtless so called from his capacity for deliberation, and in that he judges and sees a thing rightly. But his judgement is about small things and on [15] small occasions. Intelligence, then, and the intelligent man are a part of wisdom and the wise man, and cannot be found apart from these; for you cannot separate the intelligent from the wise man.
The case would seem to be the same with cleverness. For cleverness and the clever man are not wisdom and the wise man; the wise man, however, is clever, [20] hence cleverness co-operates in a way with wisdom. But the bad man also is called clever; for instance, Mentor was thought to be clever, but he was not wise. For it is the part of the wise man and of wisdom to aim at the best things, and always to choose and do these, but it is the part of cleverness and the clever man to consider by [25] what means each object of action may be effected, and to provide these. Such, then, would seem to be the province and sphere of the clever man.
It may raise a question and cause surprise that, when speaking of character and dealing with a department of state-craft, we are speaking about philosophy. Perhaps the reason is, firstly, that the inquiry about it will not appear foreign to our [30] subject, if it is an excellence, as we maintain. Again, it is perhaps the part of the philosopher to glance also at subjects adjacent to his main interest. And it is necessary, when we are speaking about the contents of soul, to speak about them all; now philosophy is also in soul; so that we are not going beyond our proper subject in [35] speaking about soul.17
But as cleverness is to wisdom, so it would seem to be in the case of all the excellences. What I mean is that there are excellences which spring up even by nature in different persons, a sort of impulses in the individual, apart from reason, to courageous and just conduct and the like behaviour; and there are also [1198a1] excellences due to custom and choice. But the excellences that are accompanied with reason, when they supervene, are completely praiseworthy.
Now this natural excellence which is unaccompanied by reason, so long as it remains apart from reason, is of little account, and falls short of being praised, but [5] when added to reason and choice, it makes complete excellence. Hence also the natural impulse to excellence co-operates with reason and is not apart from reason. Nor, on the other hand, are reason and choice quite completed as excellence without the natural impulse.
Hence Socrates was not speaking correctly when he said that excellence was [10] reason, thinking that it was no use doing brave and just acts, unless one did them from knowledge and rational choice. This was why he said that excellence was reason. Herein he was not right, but the men of the present day say better; for they say that excellence is doing what is good in accordance with right reason. Even they, indeed, are not right. For one might do what is just without any choice at all or [15] knowledge of the good, but from an irrational impulse, and yet do this rightly and in accordance with right reason (I mean he may have acted in the way that right reason would command); but all the same, this sort of conduct does not merit praise. But it is better to say, according to our definition, that it is the accompaniment by [20] reason of the impulse to good. For that is excellence and that is praiseworthy.
The question might be raised whether wisdom is an excellence or not. It will be evident, however, from the following consideration that it is an excellence. For if justice and courage and the rest of the excellences, because they lead to the doing of [25] right, are also praiseworthy, it is evident that wisdom will also be among the things that are praiseworthy and that rank as excellences. For wisdom also has an impulse towards those acts which courage has an impulse to do. For, speaking generally, [30] courage acts as wisdom ordains, so that if it is itself praiseworthy for doing what wisdom ordains, wisdom will be in a complete degree both praiseworthy and an excellence.
But whether wisdom is practical or not one might see from this, namely, by looking at the sciences, for instance at housebuilding. For there is, as we say, in [35] housebuilding one person who is called an architect, and another, who is subordinate to him, a housebuilder; and he is capable of making a house. But the architect also, inasmuch as he made the house, is capable of making a house. And the case is the same in all the other productive arts, in which there is a [1198b1] master-craftsman and his subordinate. The master-craftsman therefore also will be capable of making something, and that the same thing which his subordinate is capable of making. If, then, the analogy holds in the case of the excellences, as is likely and reasonable, wisdom also will be practical. For all the excellences are [5] practical, and wisdom is a kind of master-craftsman of them. For as it shall ordain, so the excellences and good men act. Since then the excellences are practical, wisdom also will be practical.
But does this hold sway over all things in the soul, as is held and also [10] questioned? Surely not! For it would not seem to do so over what is superior to itself; for instance, it does not hold sway over philosophy. But, it is said, this has charge of all, and is supreme in issuing commands. But perhaps it holds the same position as the steward in the household. For he is supreme over all and manages everything. But it does not follow that he holds sway over all; instead of that he is procuring [15] leisure for the master, in order that he may not be hindered by necessary cares and so shut out from doing something that is noble and befitting. So and in like manner with him wisdom is, as it were, a kind of steward of philosophy, and is procuring leisure for it and for the doing of its work, by subduing the passions and keeping [20] them in order.
BOOK II
[25] 1 · After this we must inquire into equity. What is it? And what is its field and sphere? Equity and the equitable man is he who is inclined to take less than his legal rights. There are matters in which it is impossible for the lawgiver to enter into exact details in defining, and where he has to content himself with a general statement. When, then, a man gives way in these matters, and chooses those things [30] which the lawgiver would have wished indeed to determine in detail, but was not able to, such a man is equitable. It is not the way with him to take less than what is just absolutely; for he does not fall short of what is naturally and really just, but only of what is legally just in matters which the law left undetermined for want of power.
2 · Considerateness and the considerate man have to do with the same things as equity, with points of justice that have been omitted by the lawgiver owing to the [35] inexactness of his definitions. The considerate man criticizes the omissions of the lawgiver, and knows that, though things have been omitted by the lawgiver, they are nevertheless just. Such is the considerate man. Now considerateness is not found [1199a1] apart from equity. To the considerate man it belongs to judge, and to the equitable man to act in accordance with the judgement.
3 · Good counsel is concerned with the same things as wisdom (dealing with matters of action which concern choice and avoidance), and it is not found apart [5] from wisdom. For wisdom leads to the doing of these things, while good counsel is a state or disposition or something of that sort, which leads to the attainment of the best and most expedient in matters of action. Hence things that turn out right spontaneously do not seem to form the subject of good counsel. For where there is no [10] reason which is on the look-out for what is best, you would not in that case say that a man to whom something turned out as it should be was well counselled, but lucky. For things that go rig
ht without the judgement of reason are due to good luck.
Is it in the part of the just man to put himself on a level with everybody in his intercourse (I mean in the way of becoming all things to all men)? Surely not. For [15] this would seem to be the part of a flatterer and obsequious person. But to suit his intercourse to the worth of each, this would seem to be the part of the man who is absolutely just and good.
Here is also a difficulty that might be raised. If doing injustice is hurting somebody voluntarily and with full knowledge of the person and the manner and the [20] end, and harm and injustice are in and concerned with good things, it follows that the doer of injustice and the unjust man will know what kind of things are good and what bad. But to know about these things is a peculiar property of the wise man and of wisdom. The absurdity then follows that wisdom, which is the greatest good, is [25] attendant upon the unjust man. Surely it will not be thought that wisdom is attendant upon the unjust man. For the unjust man does not discern and is not able to judge between what is good in itself and what is good for him, but makes a mistake. But this is the province of wisdom, to be able to take a right view of these [30] things (just as in matters of medicine we all know what is absolutely wholesome and what is productive of health, that hellebore and an aperient and surgery and cautery are wholesome and productive of health, and yet we do not possess the science of medicine), for without it we no longer know what is good in particular cases, just as [35] the doctor knows for whom a given thing is good and when and in what disposition; for herein the science of medicine displays itself. Now we may know things that are absolutely wholesome, and yet not have the science of medicine attendant upon us; and the same is the case with the unjust man. That in an absolute sense autocracy [1199b1] and government and power are good, he knows; but whether they are good for him or not, or when, or in what condition, that is what he does not also know. But this is just the business of wisdom, so that wisdom does not attend upon the unjust man. [5] For the goods which he chooses and for which he commits injustice are what are absolutely good, not what are good for him. For wealth and office are good absolutely, but for him perhaps they are not good; for by obtaining wealth and office he will do much evil to himself and his friends, for he will not be able to make a right use of office.
[10] Here also is a point which presents a difficulty and suggest inquiry. Can justice be done to a bad man or not? For if injustice consists in hurt, and hurt in the deprivation of goods, it would seem not to hurt him. For the goods which he supposes to be good for him are not really so. For office and wealth will hurt the bad [15] man who is not able to make a right use of them. If then they will hurt him by their presence, he who deprives him of these would seem to be doing him an injustice. This kind of argument indeed will appear a paradox to the many. For all think that they are able to use office and power and wealth, but they are not right in this [20] supposition. This is made plain by the lawgiver. For the lawgiver does not allow all to hold office, but there is a standard of age and means which must be possessed by him who is to hold office, implying that it is not possible for every one to do so. If then some one were to make it a grievance that he does not hold office or that he is [25] not allowed to steer the ship, the answer would be, ‘Well, you have nothing in your soul of a kind which will enable you to hold office or steer the ship’. In the case of the body we see that those cannot be in good health who apply to themselves things that are absolutely good, but if a man is to have his bad body in health, he must first [30] apply to it water and a low diet. And when a man has his soul in a vicious state, in order that he may not work any ill must we not withhold him from wealth and office and power and things of that sort generally, the more so as soul is easier to move and more ready to change than body? For as the man whose body was bad was fit to be [35] dieted in that way, so the man whose soul is bad is fit to live thus, without having any things of this sort.
This also presents a difficulty. For instance, when it is not possible at the same time to do brave and just acts, which is one to do? Now in the case of the natural [1200a1] excellences we said that there existed only the impulse to right without reason; but he who has choice has it in reason and the rational part. So that as soon as choice is present, complete excellence will be there, which we said was accompanied by [5] wisdom, but not without the natural impulse to right. Nor will one excellence run counter to another, for its nature is to obey the dictates of reason, so that it inclines to that to which reason leads. For it is this which chooses the better. For the other excellences do not come into existence without wisdom, nor is wisdom complete [10] without the other excellences, but they co-operate in a way with one another, attending upon wisdom.
No less will the following present itself as a difficulty. Is it in the case of the excellences as it is in the case of the other goods, whether external or bodily? For [15] these when they run to excess make men worse; for instance, when wealth becomes great it makes men supercilious and disagreeable. And so also with the other goods—office, honour, beauty, stature. Is it, then, thus in the case of excellence also, so that, if one comes to have justice or courage to excess, he will be worse? Surely not! But, it will be said, from excellence comes honour, and when honour [20] becomes great, it makes men worse, so that it is evident that excellence when progressing to a great extent will make men worse. For excellence is the cause of honour, so that excellence also, if it becomes great, will make men worse. Surely this cannot be true! For excellence, though it may have many other functions, as it has, has this among the most special, to be able to make a right use of these and the like [25] goods when they are there. If therefore the good man on there coming to him high honour or high office shall not make a right use of these, it shows that he is not a good man. Therefore neither honour nor office will make the good man worse, so that neither will excellence. But generally, since it was laid down by us at the start [30] that the excellences are mean states, it follows that the more any state is an excellence, the more it is a mean; so that not only will excellence as it becomes great not make a man worse, but it will make him better. For the mean in question was found to be the mean between excess and defect in the passions. So much then for these matters.
4 · After this we must make a new start and speak about self-control and [35] incontinence. But as the excellence and the vice are themselves of a strange nature, so the discussion which will ensue about them must necessarily be strange also. For this excellence is not like the rest. For in the rest reason and passion have an impulse [1200b1] towards the same objects and are not opposed to one another, but in the case of this reason and passion are opposed to one another.
There are three things in the soul in respect of which we are called bad—vice, [5] incontinence, brutality. About excellence and vice, then, their nature and their sphere, we have spoken above; but now we must speak about incontinence and brutality.
5 · Brutality is a kind of excessive vice. For when we see some one utterly degraded, we say that he is not even a man but a brute, implying that there is a vice [10] of brutality. Now the excellence opposed to this is without a name, but this sort of thing is above man, a kind of heroic and divine excellence. But this excellence is without a name, because excellence does not belong to god. For god is superior to excellence and it is not in the way of excellence that his goodness lies. For, if it were, [15] excellence would be better than god. For this reason the excellence which is opposed to the vice of brutality is without a name. But the usual antithesis to this kind of vice is divine and superhuman excellence. For as the vice of brutality transcends man, so also does the excellence opposed to it.
6 · But with regard to incontinence and self-control we must first state the [20] difficulties and the arguments which run counter to appearances, in order that, having viewed the matter together from the point of view of the difficulties and counter-arguments, and having examined these, we may see the truth about them so far as possible; for it will be more easy to see the truth i
n that way.
[25] Now Socrates the elder used to reject and deny incontinence altogether, saying that no one would choose evil who knew it to be such. But the incontinent seems, while knowing things to be bad, to choose them all the same, letting himself be led by passion. Owing to such considerations he did not think that there was [30] incontinence. But there he was wrong. For it is absurd that conviction of the truth of this argument should lead to the rejection of what credibly occurs. For men do display incontinence, and do things which they themselves know to be bad.
Since, then, there is such a thing as incontinence, does the incontinent possess some knowledge whereby he views and examines his bad acts? But, again, this [35] would not seem so. For it would be strange that the strongest and surest thing in us should be vanquished by anything. For knowledge is of all things in us the most permanent and the most constraining. So that this argument again runs counter to there being knowledge.18
Is it then not knowledge, but opinion? But if the incontinent man has opinion, [1201a1] he will not be blameworthy. For if he does something bad with respect to which he has no exact knowledge but only an opinion, one would make allowances for his siding with pleasure and doing what is bad, if he does not know for certain that it is bad, but only has an opinion; and those for whom we make allowances we do not [5] blame. So that the incontinent, if he only has opinion, will not be to blame. But he is to blame. Such arguments then land us in difficulties. For some denied knowledge on the ground of absurd consequences, and others again denied opinion on the ground that there were absurd consequences from that also.