by Aristotle
Yes, but perhaps some one may say, ‘In what state must the passions be so as not to act as a hindrance, and when are they in this state? For I do not know’, This sort of thing is not easy to put into words, any more than the doctor finds it so. But when he has given orders that barley-gruel shall be administered to a patient in a fever, and you say to him, ‘But how am I to know when he has a fever?’—he replies, [25] ‘When you see him pale’. ‘But how am I to know when he is pale’? There the doctor . . . says,23 ‘Well, if you can’t perceive that much yourself, it’s no good talking to you any more’. The same thing applies in like manner to all such subjects. And the case is the same with regard to recognizing the passions. For one must contribute [30] something oneself towards the perception.
But perhaps one might raise the following sort of question also, ‘If I really know these things, shall I then be happy’? For they think they must be; whereas it is not so. For none of the other sciences transmits to the learner the use and exercise, [35] but only the faculty. So in this case also the knowing of these things does not transmit the use (for happiness is an activity, as we maintain), but the faculty, nor does happiness consist in the knowledge of what produces it, but comes from the use of these means. Now the use and exercise of these it is not the business of this [1208b1] treatise to impart, any more than any other science imparts the use of anything, but only the faculty.
11 · In addition to all that has gone before, it is necessary to speak about friendship, saying what it is, and what are its circumstances and sphere. For since [5] we see that it is co-extensive with life and presents itself on every occasion, and that it is a good, we must embrace it also in our view of happiness.
First, then, perhaps it will be as well to go through the difficulties and questions that are raised about it. Does friendship exist among the like, as is thought and said? For ‘Jackdaw sits by jackdaw’, as the proverb has it, and
[10] Unto the like God ever brings the like.24
There is a story also of a dog that used always to sleep upon the same tile, and how Empedocles, on being asked, ‘Why does the dog sleep on the same tile’? said, ‘Because the dog has something that is like the tile’, implying that it was owing to the likeness that the dog resorted to it.
But again, on the other hand, some people think that friendship occurs rather [15] among opposites. Take the line:
Earth loves the shower, what time the plain is dry.
It is the opposite, they say, that loves to be friends with the opposite; for among the like there is no room for friendship. For the like, they say, has no need of the like, and more to the same effect.
Again, is it hard or easy to become a friend? Flatterers, at all events, who [20] quickly gain a footing of close attendance, are not friends, though they appear to be.
Further, such difficulties as the following are raised. Will the good man be a friend to the bad? Or will he not? For friendship implies fidelity and steadfastness, and the bad man is not at all of this character. And will one bad man be a friend to [25] another? Or will this not be the case either?
First, then, we must determine what kind of friendship we are in search of. For there is, people think, a friendship towards god and towards things without life, but here they are wrong. For friendship, we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection, but friendship towards god does not admit of love being returned, nor at all of loving. For it would be strange if one were to say that he loved [30] Zeus. Neither is it possible to have affection returned by lifeless objects, though there is a love for such things, for instance wine or something else of that sort. Therefore it is not love towards god of which we are in search, nor love towards things without life, but love towards things with life, that is, where there can be a [35] return of affection.
If, then, one were to inquire next what is the lovable, it is none other than the good. Now there is a difference between the lovable and what is to be loved, as between the desirable and what is to be desired. For that is desirable which is absolutely good, but that is to be desired by each which is good for him; so also that [1209a1] which is absolutely good is lovable, but that is to be loved which is good for oneself, so that what is to be loved is lovable, but the lovable is not to be loved.
Here, then, we see the source of the difficulty as to whether the good man is a friend to the bad man or not. For what is good for oneself is in a way attached to the [5] good, and so is that which is to be loved to the lovable, and it depends as a consequence upon the good that it should be pleasant and that it should be useful. Now the friendship of the good lies in their loving one another; and they love one another in so far as they are lovable; and they are lovable in so far as they are good. ‘The good man, then’, it will be replied, ‘will not be a friend to the bad’. Yes he will. [10] For since the good had as its consequence the useful and the pleasant, in so far as, though bad, he is pleasant, so far he is a friend; again, being useful, then so far as he is useful, so far is he a friend. But this sort of friendship will not depend upon lovableness. For the good, we saw, was lovable, but the bad man is not lovable. [15] Rather such a friendship will depend on a man’s being one who is to be loved. For springing from the perfect friendship which exists among the good there are also these forms of friendship, that which refers to the pleasant and that which refers to the useful. He, then, whose love is based on the pleasant does not love with the love which is based on the good, nor does he whose friendship is based upon the useful. [20] And these forms of friendship, that of the good, the pleasant, and the useful, are not indeed the same, nor yet absolutely different from one another, but hang in a way from the same point. Just so we call a knife surgical, a man surgical, and knowledge [25] surgical. They are not called so in the same way, but the knife is called surgical from being useful in surgery, and the man from his being able to produce health, and the knowledge from its being cause and principle. Similarly, the forms of friendship are not all called so in the same way, the friendship of the good which is based on the good, the friendship depending on pleasure, and that depending on [30] utility. Nor yet is it a mere case of homonymy, but, while they are not actually the same, they have still in a way the same sphere and the same origin. If, therefore, some one were to say, ‘He whose love is prompted by pleasure is not a friend to so-and-so; for his friendship is not based on the good’, he is having recourse to the friendship of the virtuous, which is a compound of all these, of the good and the [35] pleasant and the useful, so that it is true that he is not a friend in respect of that friendship, but only in respect of the friendship depending on the pleasant or the useful.
Will the good man then be a friend to the good, or will he not? For the like, it is urged, has no need of the like. An argument of this sort is on the look-out for the [1209b1] friendship based on utility; for if they are friends in so far as the one has need of the other, they are in the friendship which is based on utility. But the friendship which is based on utility has been distinguished from that which is based on excellence or on pleasure. It is likely, then, that the good should be much more friends; for they [5] have all the qualifications for friendship, the good and the pleasant and the useful. But the good may also be a friend to the bad; for it may be that he is a friend in so far as he is pleasant. And the bad also to the bad; for it may be that they are friends in so far as they have the same interest. For we see this as a matter of fact, that, when persons have the same interest, they are friends owing to that interest, so that [10] there will be nothing to prevent the bad also having to some extent the same interest.
Now friendship among the good, which is founded on excellence and the good, is naturally the surest, the most abiding, and the finest form. For excellence, to which the friendship is due, is unchangeable, so that it is natural that this form of [15] friendship should be unchangeable, whereas interest is never the same. Hence the friendship which rests on interest is never secure, but changes along with the interest; and the same with the frien
dship which rests on pleasure. The friendship, then, of the best men is that which arises from excellence, but that of the common run of men depends upon utility, while that which rests on pleasure is found among vulgar and commonplace persons.
[20] When people find their friends bad, the result is complaint and expressions of surprise; but it is nothing extraordinary. For when friendship has taken its start from pleasure, and this is why they are friends, or from interest, so soon as these fail the friendship does not continue. Very often the friendship does remain, but a man treats his friend badly, owing to which there are complaints; but neither is this [25] anything out of the way. For your friendship with this man was not from the first founded on excellence, so that it is not extraordinary that he should do nothing of what excellence requires. The complaints, then, are unreasonable. Having formed their friendship with a view to pleasure, they think they ought to have the kind which is due to excellence; but that is not possible. For the friendship of pleasure [30] and interest does not depend on excellence. Having entered then into a partnership in pleasure, they expect excellence, but there they are wrong. For excellence does not follow upon pleasure and utility, but both these follow upon excellence. For it would be strange not to suppose that the good are the most pleasant to one another. For even the bad, as Euripides says, are pleasant to one another. ‘The bad man is [35] fused into one with the bad’. For excellence does not follow upon pleasure, whereas pleasure does follow upon excellence.
But is it necessary that there should be pleasure in the friendship of the good? Or is it not? It would be strange indeed to say that it is not. For if you deprive them of the quality of being pleasant to one another, they will procure other friends, who [1210a1] are pleasant, to live with, for in view of that there is nothing more important than being pleasant. It would be curious then not to think that the good ought above all others to live in common one with another; and this cannot be without the element of pleasure. It will be necessary, then, as it seems, for them above all to be [5] pleasant.
But since friendships have been divided into three species, and in the case of these the question was raised whether friendship takes place in equality or in inequality, the answer is that it may depend on either. For that which implies likeness is the friendship of the good, and complete friendship; but that which implies unlikeness is the friendship of utility. For the poor man is a friend to the rich owing to his own lack of what the wealthy man has in abundance, and the bad man [10] to the good for the same reason. For owing to his lack of excellence he is for this reason a friend to him from whom he thinks he will get it. Among the unequal then there arises friendship based on utility. So that Euripides says,
Earth loves the shower, what time the plain is dry,
intimating that the friendship of utility has place between these as opposites. For if [15] you like to set down fire and water as the extreme opposites, these are useful to one another. For fire, they say, if it has not moisture, perishes, as this provides it with a kind of nutriment, but that to such an extent as it can get the better of; for if you make the moisture too great, it will obtain the mastery, and will cause the fire to go [20] out, but if you supply it in moderation, it will be of service to it. It is evident, then, that friendship based on utility occurs among things the most opposite.
All the forms of friendship, both those in equality and those in inequality, are referred to the three in our division. But in all the forms of friendship there is a difference that arises between the partners when they are not on a level in love or in [25] benefaction or in service, or whatever else of the kind it may be. For when one exerts himself energetically, and the other is in defect, there is complaint and blame on the score of the defect. Not but that the defect on the part of the one is plain to see in the case of such persons as have the same end in view in their friendship; for instance, if [30] both are friends to one another on the ground of utility or of pleasure or of excellence. If, then, you do me more good than I do you, I do not even dispute that you ought to be loved more by me; but in a friendship where we are not friends with [35] the same object, there is more room for differences. For the defect on one side or the other is not manifest. For instance, if one is a friend for pleasure and the other for interest, that is where the dispute will arise. For he who is superior in utility does not think the pleasure a fair exchange for the utility, and he who is more pleasant does [1210b1] not think that he receives in the utility an adequate return for the pleasure which bestows. Hence differences are more likely to arise in such kinds of friendship.
When men are friends on an unequal footing, those who are superior in wealth or anything of that sort do not think that they themselves ought to love, but think [5] that they ought to be loved by their inferiors. But it is better to love than to be loved. For to love is a pleasurable activity and a good, whereas from being loved there results no activity to the object of the love. Again, it is better to know than to be [10] known; for to be known and to be loved attach even to things without life, but to know and to love to things with life. Again, to be inclined to benefit is better than not; now he who loves is inclined to benefit, just in so far as he loves, but this is not the case with him who is loved, in so far as he is loved.
But owing to ambition men wish rather to be loved than to love, because of [15] there being a certain superiority in being loved. For he who is loved has always a superiority in pleasure or wealth or excellence, and the ambitious man reaches out after superiority. And those who are in a position of superiority do not think that they themselves ought to love, since they make a return to those who love them, in those things in which they are superior. And again the others are inferior to them, for which reason the superiors do not think they themselves ought to love but to be [20] loved. But he who is deficient in wealth or pleasures or excellence admires him who has a superiority in these things, and loves him owing to his getting these things or thinking that he will get them.
Now such friendships arise from sympathy, that is, from wishing good to some one. But the friendship which takes place in these cases has not all the required [25] attributes. For often we wish good to one person and like to live with another. But ought we to say that these things are characteristics of friendship or of complete friendship which is founded on excellence? For in that friendship all these things are contained; for there is none other with whom we should wish to live (for [30] pleasantness and usefulness and excellence are attributes of the good man), and it is to him that we should most wish good, and to live and to live well we should wish to none other than he.
Whether a man can have friendship for and towards himself may be omitted for the present, but we shall speak of it later. But all the things that we wish for a [35] friend we wish for ourselves. For we wish to live along with ourselves (though that is perhaps unavoidable), and to live well, and to live, and the wishing of the good applies to none so much. Further, we are most sympathetic with ourselves; for if we meet with a defeat or fall into any kind of misfortune, we are at once grieved. So looking at the matter in this way it would seem that there is friendship towards oneself. In speaking then of such things as sympathy and living well and so on we [1211a1] are referring either to friendship towards ourselves or to complete friendship. For all these things are found in both. For the living together and the wish for a thing’s existence and for its well-being and all the rest are found in these. [5]
Further, it may perhaps be thought that wherever justice is possible, there friendship may exist too. Hence there are as many species of friendship as there are of just dealing. Now there can be justice between a foreigner and a citizen, between a slave and his master, between one citizen and another, between son and father, between wife and husband, and generally every form of association has its separate [10] form of friendship. But the firmest of friendships would seem to be that with a foreigner; for they have no common aim about which to dispute, as is the case with fellow-citizens; for when these dispute with one another
for the priority, they do not [15] remain friends.
It will be in place now to speak about this, whether there is friendship towards oneself or not. Since then we see, as we said just a little above, that the act of loving is recognized from the particulars, and it is to ourselves that we should most wish the particulars (the good, and existence, and well-being; and we are most sympathetic [20] with ourselves, and we most wish to live along with ourselves); therefore, if friendship is known from the particulars, and we should wish the particulars to belong to ourselves, it is plain that there is friendship towards ourselves, just as we maintained that there is injustice towards oneself. Though, indeed, as it takes one [25] person to inflict and another to receive an injury, while each individual is the same person, it appeared for that reason that there was no injustice towards oneself. It is possible, however, as we said on examining the parts of the soul, when these, as they are more than one, are not in agreement, that then there should be injustice towards oneself. In the same way then there would seem to be friendship towards oneself. [30] For the friend being, according to the proverb—when we wish to describe a very great friend, we say ‘my soul and his are one’; since then the parts of the soul are more than one, then only will the soul be one, when the reason and the passions are in accord with one another (for so it will be one): so that when it has become one [35] there will be friendship towards oneself. And this friendship towards oneself will exist in the good man; for in him alone the parts of the soul are in proper relation to one another owing to their not being at variance, since the bad man is never a friend to himself, for he is always at odds with himself. At all events the incontinent man, when he has done something to which pleasure prompts, not long afterwards repents [1211b1] and reviles himself. It is the same with the bad man in other vices. For he is always fighting with and opposing himself.