by Aristotle
Of these the friendship based on usefulness is that of the majority; men love [35] one another because of their usefulness and to the extent of this; so we have the proverb ‘Glaucus, a helper is a friend so long as49 he fights’, and ‘the Athenians no longer know the Megarians’. But the friendship based on pleasure is that of the young, for they are sensitive to pleasure; therefore also their friendship easily changes; for with a change in their characters as they grow up there is also a change [1236b1] in their pleasures. But the friendship based on excellence is that of the best men.
It is clear from this that the primary friendship, that of good men, is a mutual returning of love and choice. For what is loved is dear to him who loves it, but a man [5] loving in return is dear to the man loved. This friendship, then, is peculiar to man, for he alone perceives another’s choice. But the other friendships are found also among the brutes where utility is in some degree present, both between tame animals and men, and between animals themselves, as in the case mentioned by Herodotus of the friendship between the sandpiper and the crocodile, and the coming together and parting of birds that soothsayers speak of. The bad may be [10] friends to one another on the ground both of usefulness and of pleasure; but some deny them to be friends, because there is not the primary friendship between them; for a bad man will injure a bad man, and those who are injured by one another do not love one another; but in fact they do love, only not with the primary friendship. [15] Nothing prevents their loving with the other kinds; for owing to pleasure they put up with each other’s injury, so long as50 they are incontinent. But those whose love is based on pleasure do not seem to be friends, when we look carefully, because their friendship is not of the primary kind, being unstable, while that is stable; it is, however, as has been said, a friendship, only not the primary kind but derived from [20] it. To speak, then, of friendship in the primary sense only is to do violence to the phenomena, and makes one assert paradoxes; but it is impossible for all friendships to come under one definition. The only alternative left is that in a sense there is only one friendship, the primary; but in a sense all kinds are friendship, not as possessing a common name accidentally without being specially related to one another, nor yet [25] as falling under one species, but rather as in relation to one and the same thing.
But since the same thing is at the same time absolutely good and absolutely pleasant (if nothing interferes), and the genuine friend is absolutely the friend in the primary sense, and such is the man desirable for himself (and he must be such; for the man to whom51 one wishes good to happen for himself, one must also desire to [30] exist), the genuine friend is also absolutely pleasant; hence any sort of friend is thought pleasant. Again, one ought rather to distinguish further, for the subject needs reflection. Do52 we love what is good for ourselves or what is good absolutely? and is actual loving attended with pleasure, so that the loved object is pleasant, or [35] not? For the two must be harmonized. For what is not absolutely good, but perhaps53 bad, is something to avoid, and what is not good for one’s self is nothing to one; but what is sought is that the absolutely good should be good in the further sense of being good to the individual. For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, [1237a1] but for each individual his own; and these must agree. Excellence brings about this agreement, and the political art exists to make them agree for those to whom as yet they do not. . . .54 And one who is a human being is ready and on the road for this (for by nature that which is absolutely good is good to him), and man rather than [5] woman, and the gifted rather than the ungifted; but the road is through pleasure; what is noble must be pleasant. But when these two disagree a man cannot yet be perfectly good, for incontinence may arise; for it is in the disagreement of the good with the pleasant in the passions that incontinence occurs.
So that since the primary friendship is grounded on excellence, friends of this [10] sort will be themselves absolutely good, and this not because they are useful, but in another way. For good to the individual and the absolutely good are two, and as with the profitable so with habits. For the absolutely profitable differs from what is [15] profitable to an individual, as55 taking exercise does from taking drugs. So that the habit called human excellence is of two kinds, for we will assume man to be one of the things excellent by nature; for the excellence of the naturally excellent is an absolute good, but the excellence of that which is not thus good only to it. Similarly, then, with the pleasant. For here one must pause and examine whether friendship can exist without pleasure, how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and [20] on which of the two—goodness or pleasure—the loving depends, whether one loves a man because he is good even if not pleasant, and in any case not for his pleasantness. Now, loving having two senses, does actual love seem to involve pleasure because activity is good? It is clear that just as in science what we have recently contemplated and learnt is most perceptible because of its pleasantness, so [25] also is the recognition of the familiar, and the same account applies to both. Naturally, at least, the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and pleasant to those to whom it is good. From which it at once follows that like takes pleasure in like, and that nothing is so pleasant to man as man; and if this is so even before they are perfect, it is clear it must be so when they are perfect; and the good man is perfect. [30] But if active loving is a mutual choice with pleasure in each other’s acquaintance, it is clear that in general the primary friendship is a reciprocal choice of the absolutely good and pleasant because it is good and pleasant; and this friendship is the habit from which such choice springs. For its function is an activity, and this is not [35] external, but in the one who feels love. But the function of every faculty is external; for it is in something different or in one’s self qua different. Therefore to love is to feel pleasure, but not to be loved; for to be loved is the activity of what is lovable, but to love is the activity of friendship also; and the one is found only in the animate, the other also in the inanimate, for even inanimate things are loved. But since active [1237b1] loving is to treat the loved56 qua loved, and the friend is loved by the friend qua friend and not qua musician or doctor, the pleasure coming from him merely as being himself is the pleasure of friendship; for he loves the object as himself and not for being someone else. So that if he does not rejoice in him for being good the [5] primary friendship does not exist, nor should any of his incidental qualities hinder more than his goodness gives pleasure. For if57 a man has an unpleasant odour he is left. For he must be content with goodwill without actual association.58 This then is primary friendship, and all admit it to be friendship. It is through it that the other friendships seem friendships to some, but are doubted to be such by others. For [10] friendship seems something stable, and this alone is stable. For a formed decision is stable, and where we do not act quickly or easily, we get the decision right. There is no stable friendship without confidence, but confidence needs time. One must then [15] make trial, as Theognis says, ‘You cannot know the mind of man or woman till you have tried them as you might cattle’. Nor is a friend made except through time; they do indeed wish to be friends, and such a state easily passes muster as friendship. For when men are eager to be friends, by performing every friendly service to one another they think they not merely wish to be, but are friends. But it happens with [20] friendship as with other things; as man is not in health merely because he wishes to be so, neither are men at once friends as soon as they wish to be friends. The proof is that men in this condition, without having made trial of one another, are easily made enemies; wherever each has allowed the other to test him, they are not easily [25] made enemies; but where they have not, they will be persuaded whenever those who try to break up the friendship produce evidence. It is clear at the same time that this friendship does not exist between the bad, for the bad man feels distrust and is malignant to all, measuring others by himself. Therefore the good are more easily deceived unless experience has taught them distrust. But the bad prefer natural [30] goods to a friend an
d none of them loves a man so much as things; therefore they are not friends. The proverbial ‘community among friends’ is not found among them; the friend is made a part of things, not things regarded as part of the friend. The primary friendship then is not found towards many, for it is hard to test many men, [35] for one would have to live with each. Nor should one choose a friend like a garment. Yet in all things it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two alternatives; and if one has used the worse garment for a long time and not the better, the better is to be chosen, but not in place of an old friend one of whom you do not know whether he is better. For a friend is not to be had without trial nor in a [1238a1] single day, but there is need of time and so ‘the bushel of salt’ has become proverbial. He must also be not merely good absolutely but good for you, if the friend is to be a friend to you. For a man is good absolutely by being good, but a [5] friend by being good for another, and absolutely good and a friend when these two attributes are combined so that what is absolutely good is good for the other, or59 else not absolutely good for the good man, but good to another in the sense of useful. But the need of active loving also prevents one from being at the same time a friend to many; for one cannot be active towards many at the same time. [10]
From these facts then it is clear that it is correctly said that friendship is a stable thing, just as happiness is a thing sufficient in itself. It has been rightly said, ‘for nature is stable but not wealth’, but it is still better to say ‘excellence’ than ‘nature’; and Time is said to show the friend, and bad fortune rather than good [15] fortune. For then it is clear that the goods of friends are common (for friends alone instead of things naturally good and evil—which are the matters with which good and bad fortune are concerned—choose a man rather than the existence of some of those things and the non-existence of others). But misfortune shows those who are not really friends, but friends only for some utility. But time reveals both sorts; for [20] even the useful man does not show his usefulness quickly, as the pleasant man does his pleasantness; yet the absolutely pleasant is not quick to show himself either. For men are like wines and meats; the pleasantness of them shows itself quickly, but if it continues longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and so it is with men. For the [25] absolutely pleasant must be determined as such by the end it realizes and the time for which it continues pleasant. Even the vulgar would admit this, judging not60 merely according to results but in the way in which, speaking of a drink, they call it sweeter. For this is unpleasant not61 for the result but from not being continuous, though it deceives us at the start.
[30] The first friendship then—by reason of which the others get the name—is that based on excellence and due to the pleasure of excellence, as has been said before; the other kinds occur also in children, brutes, and bad men; whence the sayings, ‘like is pleased with like’ and ‘bad adheres to bad from pleasure’. For the bad may [35] be pleasant to one another, not qua bad or qua neither good nor bad, but (say) as both being musicians, or the one fond of music and the other a musician, and inasmuch as all have some good in them, and in this way they harmonize with one another. Further, they might be useful and profitable to one another, not absolutely [1238b1] but in relation to their choice, or in virtue of some neutral characteristic. Also a good man may be a friend to a bad, the bad being of use to the good in relation to the good man’s existing choice, the good to the incontinent in relation to his existing [5] choice, and to the bad in relation to his natural choice. And he will wish for his friend what is good, the absolutely good absolutely, and conditionally what is good for the friend, so far as poverty or illness is of advantage to him—and these for the sake of absolute goods; taking a medicine is an instance, for that no one wishes,62 but wishes only for some particular purpose. Further, a good man and a bad man may [10] be friends in the way in which those not good might be friends to one another. A man might be pleasant, not as bad but as partaking in some common property, e.g. as being musical, or again, so far as there is something good in all (for which reason some might be glad to associate even with the good), or in so far as they suit each individual; for all have something of the good.
[15] 3 · These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of them the word friendship implies a kind of equality. For even those who are friends through excellence are mutually friends by a sort of equality of excellence.
But another variety is the friendship of superiority to inferiority, e.g. as the excellence of a god is superior to that of a man (for this is another kind of [20] friendship)—and in general that of ruler to subject; just as justice in this case is different, for here it is a proportional equality, not numerical equality. Into this class falls the relation of father to son and of benefactor to beneficiary; and there are varieties of these again, e.g. there is a difference between the relation of father [25] to son, and of husband to wife, the latter being that of ruler to subject, the former that of benefactor to beneficiary. In these varieties there is not at all, or at least not in equal degree, the return of love for love. For it would be ridiculous to accuse a god because the love one receives in return from him is not equal to the love given him, or for the subject to make the same complaint against his ruler. For the part of a ruler is to receive not to give love, or at least to give love in a different way. And the [30] pleasure63 of the man who needs nothing over his own possessions or child, and that of him who lacks over what comes to him, are not the same. Similarly also with those who are friends through use or pleasure, some are on an equal footing with each other, in others there is the relation of superiority and inferiority. Therefore those who think themselves to be on the former footing find fault if the other is not equally useful to and a benefactor of them; and similarly with regard to pleasure. [35] This is obvious in the case of lover and beloved; for this is frequently a cause of strife between them. The lover does not perceive that the passion in each has not the same reason; therefore . . .64 a lover would not say such things. But they think that there is the same reason for the passion of each.
4 · There being, then, as has been said, three kinds of friendship—based on [1239a1] excellence, utility, and pleasantness—these again are subdivided each into two, one kind based on equality, the other on superiority. Both are friendships, but only those between whom there is equality are friends; it would be absurd for a man to be the [5] friend of a child, yet certainly he loves and is loved by him. Sometimes the superior ought to be loved, but if he loves, he is reproached for loving one undeserving; for measurement is made by the worth of the friends and a sort of equality. Some then, owing to inferiority in age, do not deserve to receive an equal love, and others because of excellence or birth or some other such superiority possessed by the other [10] person. The superior ought to65 claim either not to return the love or not to return it in the same measure, whether in the friendship of utility, pleasure, or excellence. Where the superiority is small, disputes naturally arise; for the small is in some cases of no account, e.g. in weighing wood, though not in weighing gold. But men [15] judge wrongly what is small; for their own good by its nearness seems great, that of another by its distance small. But when the difference is excessive, then not even those affected seek to make out that their love should be returned or equally returned, e.g. as if a man were to claim this from a god. It is clear then that men are friends when on an equality with each other, but we may have return of love without [20] their being friends. And it is clear why men seek the friendship of superiority rather than that of equality; for in the former they obtain both love and superiority. Therefore with some the flatterer is more valued than the friend, for he procures the appearance of both love and superiority for the object of his flattery. The ambitious [25] are especially of this kind; for to be an object of admiration involves superiority. By nature some grow up loving, and others ambitious; the former is one who delights rather in loving than in being loved, the other tends to be fond of honour. He, then, who delights in being loved and admi
red really loves superiority; the other, the [30] loving, is fond of the pleasure of loving. This by his mere activity of loving he must have;66 for to be loved is an accident; one may be loved without knowing it, but not love. Loving, rather than being loved, depends on lovingness; being loved rather depends on the nature of the object of love. And here is a proof. The friend would [35] choose, if both were not possible, rather to know than to be known, as we see women do when allowing others to adopt their children, e.g. Antiphon’s Andromache. For wishing to be known seems to be felt on one’s own account and in order to get, not to do, some good; but wishing to know is felt in order that one may do and love. [1239b1] Therefore we praise those who persist in their love towards the dead; for they know but are not known. That, then, there are several sorts of friendship, that they are three in number, and what are the differences between being loved and having love [5] returned, and between friends on an equality and friends in a relation of superiority and inferiority, has now been stated.
5 · But since ‘friendly’ is also used more universally, as was indeed said at the beginning, by those who take in extraneous considerations—some saying that the like is friendly, and some the contrary,—we must speak also of the relation of [10] these friendships to those previously mentioned. The like is brought both under the pleasant and under the good, for the good is simple, but the bad various in form; and the good man is ever like himself and does not change in character; but the bad and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning. Therefore unless the bad come to some agreement, they are not friends to one [15] another but are parted; but unstable friendship is not friendship. So thus the like is friendly, because the good is like; but it may also be friendly because of pleasure; for those like one another have the same pleasures, and everything too is by nature pleasant to itself. Therefore the voices, habits, and company of those of the same [20] species are pleasantest to each side, even in the animals other than man; and in this way it is possible for even the bad to love one another: ‘pleasure glues the bad to the bad’.