by Aristotle
So much, then, for the standard of nobility and goodness and the object of the absolute goods. [25]
**TEXT F. Susemihl, Teubner, Leipzig, 1884
1Omitting τίς.
2Reading ἔπειτα for ἐπὶ τó.
3Susemihl marks a lacuna.
4Excised by Susemihl.
5Reading καίτoι for καὶ τóτε.
6Reading τoῦτo for τoῦ.
7Susemihl marks a lacuna.
8Reading oὐσίᾳ τò αὐτó.
9Retaining καί.
10‘Moral’ translates ἠθικός: the word should be taken in the sense ‘concerned with character’.
11ἦθoς (‘character’) from ἔθoς (‘habit’).
12Reading πoι’ ἄττα for πoιότης τά.
13Text uncertain.
14Excised by Susemihl.
15Excised by Susemihl.
16Susemihl marks lacunae.
17Excised by Susemihl.
18Excised by Susemihl.
19Susemihl marks a lacuna.
20Reading καταλλακτικόν.
21Reading αὐτό for αὐτόν.
22Reading ἅμα κατά.
23Reading καὶ αἱ πράξεις for ἢ πράξεις.
24The text is uncertain.
25Ignoring Susemihl’s indication of a lacuna.
26Omitting ἐστι.
27Reading έκoύσια (Susemihl’s ἀκoύσια is a misprint).
28Omitting Susemihl’s ἤ.
29Reading διὰ στρoφήν.
30Reading διὰ στρoφήν.
31Reading λέγωμεν.
32Omitting μεγάλα καί, and reading φoβερά. ἡτὰ δὲ φoβερὰά φóβoν.
33Susemihl marks a lacuna.
34See Plato, Protagoras 360D.
35Iliad XXII 100.
36Reading ὅτι for ὅτε.
37Reading δoκoῦντα for τoιαῦτα.
38Reading μέγα γἀρ ἡγεῖσθαι.
39Reading τό for τῷ.
40Retaining καἱ.
41Reading ἤ for εἰ, and ignoring Susemihl’s lacuna.
42The text of this clause is uncertain.
43Omitting ἐπὶ τό.
44Reading ἐστι τῷ for ἐπὶ τό.
45Reading ὁ δυνάμενoς.
46Reading ἀλλήλoυς, δεῖ φίλoυς.
47Omitting oὔτε.
48Reading πᾶσιν for ἡμῖν.
49Reading τόσσoν φίλoς ἔστε.
50Reading ἕως for ὡς.
51Reading ᾧ for ὡς.
52Reading ἕχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν πότερoν.
53Reading ἄνπως for άπλως.
54Susemihl marks a lacuna.
55Reading αὐτῷ, oἷoν τό for τὀ καλὀν τoιoῦτoν.
56Reading τῷ φιλoυμένῳ.
57Reading εἰ for τἱ.
58Reading ἀγαπητòν γὰρ τò εὐνoιν, συζῆν δὲ μή.
59Reading τoῦτo τῷ ἄλλῳ ἢ καί.
60Retaining oὐκ for ὅτι.
61Reading oὐ διά.
62Ignoring Susemihl’s lacuna.
63Omitting oὐδέν.
64The text at this point is corrupt.
65Reading δεῖ for ἀεί.
66Reading ἀνάγκῃ ἐνεργoῦντι.
67Omitting μἠ τῷ τὀ εἶναι.
68Reading αὑτῷ for αὐτῷ.
69Text corrupt.
70Susemihl marks a lacuna.
71Susemihl marks a lacuna.
72Susemihl marks a lacuna.
73Reading νoεῖν καὶ for τò κινoῦν.
74Reading oὐδ’ εἰ for oὐ δεῖ.
75Reading ταὐτά for ταῦτα.
76Reading ὀργέων.
77Omitting ἔ τι πoλιτεῖαι.
78Omitting ἀρίστη.
79Reading αὐτὀ τό for τoῦτo.
80Susemihl marks a lacuna.
81Text corrupt.
82Reading ᾗ κατ’ ἰσότητα.
83Sophocles, frag. 684 Nauck.
84Reading τί ἀντἰ τἰνoς for παντί τινoς.
85Susemihl marks a lacuna.
86Frag. 882 Nauck.
87Reading όπoἱῳ δἡ for όπoῖoς δεῖ.
88Ignoring Susemihl’s lacuna.
89Ignoring Susemihl’s lacuna, placing a comma after τoὑτῳ φἰλoς, and putting a full stop after αὐταρκέστατoς.
90Reading μηθενὀς δεoμένῳ for oὔτε μηθἐν δεσπότoυ.
91Reading ό δι’ ἀρετήν.
92Ignoring Susemihl’s lacuna.
93Reading αὐτoῖς for αὐτὀ τoῖς.
94Reading τoιαῦται γάρ oὐχ όμιλίαι.
95Susemihl marks a lacuna.
96Susemihl marks two lacunae.
97Reading ἂν ἀνάγκη for ἀνάγκαι.
98Susemihl marks a lacuna.
99Susemihl begins a new book here, so that VII 13–15 become VIII 1–3.
100The text is uncertain.
101Reading ἢ ἔστι δῆλoν for ή**σφι**δῆλoν.
102Reading τ’ oὐ for τό.
103Reading oὐ for ό.
104Reading ἀγαθoί, ἐκεῖναι δ’ ἄλλoυ.
105Susemihl marks a lacuna.
106Reading τῷ τoδἰ τoιoνδἰ ἔ χειν.
107Reading ᾠδικoί for ἄδικoι.
108Reading ᾗ ή φὑσις.
109Reading ᾄσoνται for ἔσoνται.
110Reading ἐβoύλoντo ἄλλo ἢ ἔλαβoν.
111Reading τυχῇ, ή δ’ αὐτoῦ αἱτία oὖσα, αὕτη.
112Placing καἰ τὑχη διττἡ after εὐτυχἱαι.
113Reading ᾗ for ἥ.
114Reading ῴ for **τo.
115Omitting oἱ.
116Reading oἳ oἷ.
117Text uncertain.
118Reading oὗτoι for oὗτoς.
119Reading αἱ σώφρoνες.
120Reading καλὰ κἀγαθά for καλoὶ κἀγαθoί.
121Reading δι’ αὐτά.
122Reading ὑγιεινόν for εὖ ὑγιαῖνoν.
123Reading καί for κατά.
ON VIRTUES AND VICES**
J. Solomon
[1249a25] 1 · The noble is the object of praise, the base of blame: at the head of what is noble stand the excellences, at the head of what is base the vices; the excellences, then, are objects of praise, but so also are the causes of the excellences and their [30] accompaniments and results, the opposites are objects of blame.
If in agreement with Plato we take the soul to have three parts, then wisdom is [1249b25] the excellence of the rational, gentleness and bravery of the passionate, temperance and continence of the appetitive; and of the soul as a whole, justice, liberality, and magnanimity. Folly is the vice of the rational, irascibility and cowardice of the [1250a1] passionate, intemperance and incontinence of the appetitive; and of the soul as a whole, injustice, illiberality, and small-mindedness.
2 · Wisdom is an excellence of the rational part capable of procuring all that [5] tends to happiness. Gentleness is an excellence of the passionate part, through which men become difficult to stir to anger. Bravery is an excellence of the passionate part, through which men are difficult to scare by apprehension of death. Temperance is an excellence of the appetitive part, by which men cease to desire [10] bad sensual pleasures. Continence is an excellence of the appetitive part, by which men check by thinking the appetite that rushes to bad pleasures. Justice is an excellence of the soul that distributes to each according to his desert. Liberality is an excellence of the soul re
ady to spend on noble objects. Magnanimity is an excellence of the soul, by which men are able to bear good and bad fortune, honour [15] and dishonour.
3 · Folly is a vice of the rational part, causing evil living. Irascibility is a vice of the passionate part, through which men are easily stirred to anger. Cowardice is a vice of the passionate part, through which men are scared by apprehensions, [20] especially such as relate to death. Intemperance is a vice of the appetitive part, by which men become desirous of bad sensual pleasures. Incontinence is a vice of the appetitive part, through which one chooses bad pleasures, though reason opposes this. Injustice is a vice of the soul, through which men become covetous of more than [25] they deserve. Illiberality is a vice of the soul, through which men aim at gain from every source. Small-mindedness is a vice of the soul, which makes men unable to bear alike good and bad fortune, alike honour and dishonour.
4 · To wisdom belongs right deliberation, right judgement as to what is good [30] and bad and all in life that is to be chosen and avoided, noble use of all the goods that belong to us, correctness in social intercourse, the grasping of the right moment, the sagacious use of word and deed, the possession of experience of all that is useful. Memory, experience, tact, good judgement, sagacity—each of these either [35] arises from wisdom or accompanies it. Or possibly some of them are, as it were, subsidiary causes of wisdom (such as experience and memory), while others are, as it were, parts of it, e.g. good judgement and sagacity.
To gentleness belongs the power to bear with moderation accusations and1 [40] slights, not to rush hastily to vengeance, not to be easily stirred to anger, to be without bitterness or contentiousness in one’s character, to have in one’s soul quietude and steadfastness.
To bravery belongs slowness to be scared by apprehensions of death, to be of good courage in dangers and bold in facing risks, and to choose a noble death rather [1250b1] than preservation in some base way, and to be the cause of victory. Also it belongs to bravery to labour, to endure, and to play the man. And there accompanies it readiness to dare, high spirits, and confidence; and further, fondness for toil and [5] endurance.
To temperance belongs absence of admiration for the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, absence of desire for all base sensual enjoyment, fear of ill-repute, an ordered course of life, alike in small things and in great. And temperance is [10] accompanied by discipline, orderliness, shame, caution.
5 · To continence belongs the power to restrain by reason the appetite when it rushes to base enjoyment of pleasures, endurance, steadfastness under natural want and pain. [15]
To justice belongs the capacity to distribute to each his deserts, to preserve ancestral customs and laws and also the written law, to be truthful in matters of importance, to observe one’s agreements. First among acts of justice come those towards the gods, then those to deified spirits, then those towards one’s country and [20] parents, then those towards the departed: amongst these comes piety, which is either a part of justice or an accompaniment of it. Also justice is accompanied by purity, truth, trust, and hatred of wickedness.
To liberality it belongs to be profuse of money on praiseworthy objects, to be [25] generous in spending on a proper purpose, to be helpful and kind in disputed matters,2 and not to take from improper sources. The liberal man is also clean in his dress and house, ready to provide himself with what is not strictly necessary but [30] beautiful and enjoyable without profit, inclined to keep all animals that have anything peculiar or marvellous about them. Liberality is accompanied by a suppleness and ductility of disposition, by kindness, by pitifulness, by love for friends, for strangers, for what is noble.
[35] It belongs to magnanimity to bear nobly good and bad fortune, honour and dishonour; not to admire luxury or attention or power or victory in contests, but to have a sort of depth and greatness of soul. The magnanimous is one who neither [40] values living highly nor is fond of life, but is in disposition simple and noble, one who can be injured and is not prompt to avenge himself. The accompaniments of magnanimity are simpleness, nobleness, and truth.
6 · To folly it belongs to judge things badly, to deliberate badly, to be bad in social intercourse, to use badly present goods, to think erroneously about what is [1251a1] good and noble as regards life. Folly is accompanied by ignorance, inexperience, incontinence, tactlessness, shortness of memory.
Of irascibility there are three species—promptness to anger, peevishness, [5] sullenness. It is the mark of the irascible man to be unable to bear small slights or defeats, to be ready to punish, prompt at revenge, easily moved to anger by any chance word or deed. The accompaniments of irascibility are a disposition easily excited, ready changes of feeling, attention to small matters, vexation at small [10] things, and all these rapid and on slight occasion.
To cowardice it belongs to be easily moved by chance fears, especially if relating to death or maiming of the body, and to suppose preservation in any manner to be better than a noble death. Its accompaniments are softness, [15] unmanliness, despair, love of life. Beneath it, however, is a sort of caution of disposition and slowness to quarrel.
To intemperance it belongs to choose the enjoyments of hurtful and base pleasures, to suppose that those living in such pleasures are in the highest sense [20] happy, to love laughter, jeering, wit, and levity in word and deed. Its accompaniments are indiscipline, shamelessness, disorder, luxury, ease, negligence, contempt, dissipation.
To incontinence it belongs to choose the enjoyment of pleasures though reason [25] forbids, to partake of them none the less though believing it to be better not to partake of them, and while thinking one ought to do what is noble and profitable still to abstain from these for the sake of pleasures. The accompaniments of incontinence are effeminacy, negligence, and generally the same as those of intemperance.
[30] 7 · Of injustice there are three species—impiety, greed, outrage. Impiety is wrong-doing towards gods, deified spirits, the departed, one’s parents, and one’s country. Greed is wrong-doing in regard to agreements, claiming a share of the object in dispute beyond one’s deserts. Outrage occurs when in providing pleasure [35] for oneself one brings shame on others, whence Evenus says of it: ‘That which while gaining nothing still wrongs another’. It belongs to injustice to violate ancestral customs and laws, to disobey enactments and rulers, to lie, to commit perjury, to violate agreements and pledges. The accompaniments of injustice are quibbling, [1251b1] boasting, unsociability, pretence, malignity, unscrupulousness.
Of illiberality there are three species, pursuit of disgraceful gain, parsimony, stinginess: pursuit of disgraceful gain, in so far as such men seek gain from all [5] sources and think more of the profit than of the shame; parsimony, in so far as they are unready to spend money on a suitable purpose; stinginess, in so far as, while spending, they spend in small sums and badly, and are more hurt than profited from not spending in season. It belongs to illiberality to value money above everything, [10] and to think no reproach can ever attach to what yields a profit. The life of the illiberal man is servile, suited to a slave, and sordid, remote from ambition and liberality. The accompaniments of illiberality are pettiness, sullenness, small-mindedness, [15] self-humiliation, lack of measure, ignobility, misanthropy.
It belongs to small-mindedness to be able to bear neither honour nor dishonour, neither good nor ill fortune, but to grow braggart when honoured, to be elated at small prosperities, to be unable to bear even the smallest deprivation of honour, to regard any ill-success whatever as a great misfortune, to complain and to [20] be impatient over everything. Further, the small-minded man is such as to call every slight an outrage and a dishonour, even such as are inflicted through ignorance or forgetfulness. The accompaniments of small-mindedness are pettiness, grumbling, hopelessness, self-humiliation. [25]
8 · In general it belongs to excellence to make the condition of the soul good, using quiet and ordered motions and in agreement with itself throughout all its parts: whence the condition of a go
od soul seems a pattern of a good political constitution. It belongs also to excellence to do good to the worthy, to love the good; [30] not to be prompt either to chastise or seek vengeance, but to be complaisant, kindly, and forgiving. Its accompaniments are worth, equity, indulgence, good hope, and further all such qualities as love of home, love of friends, love of comrades, love of [35] strangers, love of men, love of the noble: all these qualities are among the laudable. The marks of vice are the opposites, and its accompaniments the opposites; and all these marks and accompaniments of vice belong to the class of the blameable.
**TEXT: F. Susemihl, Teubner, Leipzig, 1884
1Omitting μετρίας.
2Omitting Susemihl’s καὶ φιλάνθρωπoν.
POLITICS**
B. Jowett
BOOK I
[1252a1] 1 · Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or [5] political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, [10] and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the [15] government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.