by Aristotle
It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a probability, of a sign, [25] and of an evidence, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics7 a more explicit description has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings can be put into deductions and some cannot.
The example has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject-matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation is not that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When two statements are of the [30] same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an example. The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what [35] is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a [1358a1] bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative.
There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody—one that also subsists between the [5] deductions treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Hence they are not noticed by the audience . . . and, touching on them more than is appropriate, they get away from them.8 This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully. I mean that the [10] proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical deductions are the things with which we say the commonplaces are concerned, that is to say those that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the commonplace concerned with ‘the more or less’. On this it is equally easy to base a deduction or [15] enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects—right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. But there are also those special commonplaces which are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or deduction about ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which nothing can be based about natural [20] science. The same principle applies throughout. The general commonplaces have no special subject-matter, and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special commonplaces the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one’s science will be no longer [25] dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong. Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special kinds; comparatively few on the common kind. As in the Topics, therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with the enthymemes, the kinds and the common-places [30] on which they are to be founded. By kinds I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by commonplaces those common to all classes alike. We may begin with the kinds. But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ. [35]
3 · Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech’s [1358b1] end and object. The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events [while those who merely decide on the [5] orator’s skill are observers].9 From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory—deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.
Deliberative speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or [10] other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. Epideictic oratory either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The deliberative orator is concerned with the future: it [15] is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The epideictic orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to [20] recall the past and to make guesses at the future.
Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The deliberative orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; [25] and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one.
That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have [30] mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial. So too, deliberative orators often make [35] any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all. In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider whether his [1359a1] acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant [5] death, and that otherwise he need not die: yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.
It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of rhetoric are evidences, probabilities, and signs. Every kind of deduction is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a [10] deduction composed of the aforesaid propositions.
Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the [15] deliberative, the forensic, and the epideictic speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur. Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing or defending, attempt not only to prove the poin
ts mentioned but also to show that the [20] good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser—propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; [25] and so on.
Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them. We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in deliberative, in epideictic, and lastly in legal, oratory.
4 · First, then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or bad, [30] about which the deliberative orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place. Concerning things which exist or will exist inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take place, no counsel can be given. Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things which may or may not take place; for this class includes some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident; and about these it is useless to offer [35] counsel. Clearly counsel can only be given on matters about which people can deliberate; matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have [1359b1] reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not.
Now to enumerate and classify accurately the usual subjects of public business, and further to frame, as far as possible, true definitions of them, is a task which we must not attempt on the present occasion. For it does not belong to the art [5] of rhetoric, but to a more instructive art and a more real branch of knowledge; and as it is, rhetoric has been given a far wider subject-matter than strictly belongs to it. The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that rhetoric is a combination of the sciences of logic and of ethics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical [10] reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic or rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with [15] speeches. Even here, however, we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment falling to political science.
The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which deliberative speakers make speeches are five in number: ways and means, war and peace, [20] national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.
As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to know the number and extent of the country’s sources of revenue, so that, if any is being [25] overlooked, it may be added, and, if any is defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenditure of the country, in order that, if any part of it is superfluous, it may be abolished, or, if any is too large, it may be reduced. For men become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure. A comprehensive view of these questions cannot be gained solely from [30] experience in home affairs; in order to advise on such matters a man must study the methods worked out in other lands.
As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his [35] country, both actual and potential, and also the nature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, and that his own [1360a1] may have power to make war or not against those that are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that may affect their relative strength. With that end in view he must, besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, [5] and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results.
With regard to National Defence he ought to know all about the methods of defence in actual use, and also the strength and character of the defensive force and the positions of the forts—this last means that he must be well acquainted with the [10] lie of the country—in order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed if it is not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with special care.
With regard to the Food Supply he must know what will meet the needs of his country; what kinds of food are produced at home and what imported; and what articles must be exported or imported. This last he must know in order that [15] agreements and commercial treaties may be made with the countries concerned. There are, indeed, two sorts of state to which he must see that his countrymen give no cause for offence, states stronger than his own, and states with which it is advantageous to trade.
But while he must, for security’s sake, be able to take all this into account, he must before all things understand the subject of legislation; for it is on a country’s [20] laws that its whole welfare depends. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are; under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what circumstances, both proper and opposite, each of them tends to be destroyed. When I speak of destruction through proper circumstances I refer to the fact that all constitutions, except the best one of all, are destroyed both by not being [25] pushed far enough and by being pushed too far. Thus, democracy loses its vigour, and finally passes into oligarchy, not only when it is not pushed far enough, but also when it is pushed a great deal too far; just as the aquiline and the snub nose not only turn into normal noses by not being aquiline or snub enough, but also by being too violently aquiline or snub arrive at a condition in which they no longer look like [30] noses at all.
It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one’s own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited. From this we can see that books of travel are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn the laws and customs of different races. The deliberative speaker will also find the [35] researches of historians useful. But all this is the business of political science and not of rhetoric.
These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the deliberative speaker must possess. Let us now go back and state the premisses from which he [1360b1] will have to argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding these and other matters.
5 · It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to [5] sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever [10] creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.
We may define happiness as prosperity combined with excellence; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a [15] good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one’s property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.
From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, [20] large stature, athletic powers, together with fa
me, honour, good luck, and excellence. A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have. [25] (Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external.) Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure. Let us now, then, try to ascertain what each of [30] these things is.