The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  Something I fain would say to thee,

  Only shame restraineth me, [10]

  Sappho wrote

  If for things good and noble thou wert yearning,

  If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning,

  No load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh;

  What thou with honour wishest thou wouldst say.

  Those things, also, are noble for which men strive anxiously, without feeling fear; [15] for they feel thus about the good things which lead to fame. Again, one excellence or action is nobler than another if it is that of a naturally finer being: thus a man’s will be nobler than a woman’s. And those qualities are noble which give more pleasure to other people than to their possessors; hence the nobleness of justice and just actions. It is noble to avenge oneself on one’s enemies and not to come to terms with them; [20] for requital is just, and the just is noble; and not to surrender is a sign of courage. Victory, too, and honour belong to the class of noble things, since they are desirable although they yield no fruits, and they prove our superiority in good qualities. Things that deserve to be remembered are noble, and the more they deserve this, the nobler they are. So are the things that continue even after death; [those which are [25] always attended by honour]21 those which are exceptional; and those which are possessed by one person alone—these last are more readily remembered than others. So again are possessions that bring no profit, since they are more fitting than others for a gentleman. So are the distinctive qualities of a particular people, and the symbols of what it specially admires, like long hair in Sparta, where this is a [30] mark of a free man, as it is not easy to perform any menial task when one’s hair is long. Again, it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free man not to live at another’s beck and call. We are also to assume, when we wish either to praise a man or blame him, that qualities closely allied to those which he actually has are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is [35] cold-blooded and treacherous, and that the stupid man is an honest fellow or the thick-skinned man a good-tempered one. We can always idealize any given man by drawing on the virtues akin to his actual qualities; thus we may say that the [1367b1] passionate and excitable man is frank; or that the arrogant man is superb or impressive. Those who run to extremes will be said to possess the corresponding good qualities; rashness will be called courage, and extravagance generosity. That will be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs [5] into danger needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause; and if a man is open-handed to anyone and everyone, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody.

  We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience.22 If the audience esteems a given quality, we must say that our hero has that quality, no matter whether we are addressing [10] Scythians or Spartans or philosophers. Everything, in fact, that is esteemed we are to represent as noble. After all, people regard the two things as much the same.

  All actions are noble that are appropriate to the man who does them: if, for instance, they are worthy of his ancestors or of his own past career. For it makes for happiness, and is a noble thing, that he should add to the honour he already has. [15] Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be; for instance, if one who was just an average person when all went well becomes a hero in adversity, or if he becomes better and easier to get on with the higher he rises. Compare the saying of Iphicrates, ‘Think what I was and what I am’; and the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games,

  In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven;

  and the encomium of Simonides,

  [20] A woman whose father, whose husband, whose brethren were princes all.

  Since we praise a man for what he has actually done, and fine actions are distinguished from others by being chosen, we must try to prove that his acts are [25] based on choice. This is all the easier if we can make out that he has often acted so before, and therefore we must assert coincidences and accidents to have been chosen. Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that they are signs of excellence and choice.

  23 [[Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man’s good qualities, and therefore we must display his actions as the product of such qualities; [Encomium refers to what he has actually done]24 the mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our story credible—good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. [30] [Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him.]25 Yet the actual deeds are evidence of the doer’s character: even if a man has not actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. [To call any one blest is the same thing as to call him happy; but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him; the two latter are a part of calling happy, just as [35] goodness is a part of happiness.]26

  To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case become encomiums when [1368a1] differently expressed. Since we know what action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. Thus the statement ‘A man should be proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself, if put like this, amounts to a suggestion; [5] to make it into praise we must put it thus, ‘Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself. Consequently, whenever you want to praise anyone, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite forms of expression accordingly.27]] [10]

  There are, also, many useful ways of heightening the effect of praise. We must, for instance, point out that a man is the only one, or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or that he has done it better than anyone else; all these distinctions are honourable. And we must, further, make much of the particular season and occasion of an action; and these must be used when the action was inappropriate. If a man has often achieved the same success, we must mention this; that is a strong point; he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. So, too, [15] if it is on his account that observances have been devised and instituted to encourage or honour such achievements as his own [[and if the first encomium was made for him, as in the case of Hippolochus]],28 as Harmodius and Aristogeiton had their statues put up in the market-place. And we may censure bad men for the opposite reason.

  Again, if you cannot find enough to say of a man himself, you may pit him against others, which is what Isocrates used to do owing to his familiarity with [20] forensic pleading. The comparison should be with famous men; that will strengthen your case; it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great. It is only natural that methods of heightening the effect should be attached particularly to speeches of praise; they aim at proving superiority over others, and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. Hence if you cannot compare your hero with [25] famous men, you should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence. And, in general, of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this heightening of effect is most suitable for declamations, where we take the actions as admitted facts, and our business is simply to invest these with dignity and nobility. Examples are most suitable to [30] deliberative speeches; for we judge of future events by divination from past events. Enthymemes are most suit
able to forensic speeches; it is the past which, because of its obscurity, most admits of explanation and demonstration.

  The above are the general lines on which all, or nearly all, speeches of praise or [35] blame are constructed. We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and censures are made. Knowing the above facts, we know their contraries; and it is out of these that speeches of censure are made.

  [1368b1] 10 · We have next to treat of Accusation and Defence, and to enumerate and describe the ingredients of the deductions used therein. There are three things we must ascertain—first, the nature and number of the incentives to wrong-doing; [5] second, the state of mind of wrongdoers; third, the kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition. We will deal with these questions in order. But before that let us define the act of wrong-doing.

  We may describe wrong-doing as injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. Law is either special or general. By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere. We do things [10] voluntarily when we do them with knowledge and without constraint. (Not all voluntary acts are chosen but all chosen acts are done with knowledge—no one is ignorant of what he chooses.) The causes of our choosing harmful and wicked acts contrary to law are vice and incontinence. For the wrongs a man does to others will [15] correspond to the bad quality or qualities that he himself possesses. Thus it is the mean man who will wrong others about money, the intemperate in matters of physical pleasure, the effeminate in matters of comfort, and the coward where danger is concerned [his terror makes him abandon those who are involved in the [20] same danger].29 The ambitious man does wrong for the sake of honour, the quick-tempered from anger, the lover of victory for the sake of victory, the embittered man for the sake of revenge, the stupid man because he has misguided notions of right and wrong, the shameless man because he does not mind what people think of him; and so with the rest—any wrong that anyone does to others corresponds to his particular faults of character.

  However, this subject has already been cleared up in part in our discussion of [25] the excellences and will be further explained later when we treat of the emotions. We have now to consider the motives and states of mind of wrong-doers, and to whom they do wrong.

  Let us first decide what sort of things people are trying to get or avoid when they set about doing wrong to others. For it is plain that the prosecutor must [30] consider, out of all the aims that can ever induce us to do wrong to our neighbours, how many, and which, affect his adversary; while the defendant must consider how many, and which, do not affect him. Now every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself. Of those not due to himself some are due to chance, the others to necessity; of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others [35] to nature. Consequently all actions that are not due to a man himself are due either to chance or to nature or to compulsion. All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to desire; and of the latter, some are [1369a1] due to rational desire, the others to irrational. Rational desire is wishing, and wishing is a desire for good—nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational desire is twofold, viz. anger and appetite.

  Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, [5] compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. It is superfluous further to distinguish actions according to the doers’ ages, states, or the like; it is of course true that, for instance, young men do have hot tempers and strong appetites; still, it is not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite. Nor, again, [10] is action due to wealth or poverty; it is of course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it, and that rich men, being able to command needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures: but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or poverty but to appetite. Similarly, with just men, [15] and unjust men, and all others who are said to act in accordance with their states, their actions will really be due to one of the causes mentioned—either reasoning or emotion: due, indeed, sometimes to good dispositions and good emotions, and sometimes to bad; but that good qualities should be followed by good emotions, and bad by bad, is merely an accessory fact—it is no doubt true that the temperate man, [20] for instance, because he is temperate, is always and at once attended by healthy opinions and appetites in regard to pleasant things, and the intemperate man by unhealthy ones. So we must ignore such distinctions. Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together; for while there are no definite [25] kinds of action associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old, just or unjust. And, generally speaking, all those accessory qualities that cause distinctions of human character are important: e.g. the sense of wealth or poverty, of being lucky or unlucky. This will [30] be dealt with later—let us now deal first with the rest of the subject before us.

  The things that happen by chance are all those whose cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor for the most part nor in any fixed way. The definition of chance shows just what they are. Those things happen by nature which have a fixed and internal cause; they take place [1369b1] uniformly, either always or for the most part. There is no need to discuss in exact detail the things that happen contrary to nature, nor to ask whether they happen in some sense naturally or from some other cause; it would seem that chance is indeed [5] the cause of such events. Those things happen through compulsion which take place contrary to the desire or reason of the agents themselves. Acts are done from habit which men do because they have often done them before. Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as contributing to an end, and are performed for that reason—for [10] intemperate men too perform a certain number of useful actions, but because they are pleasant and not because they are useful. To passion and anger are due all acts of revenge. Revenge and punishment are different things. Punishment is inflicted for the sake of the person punished; revenge for that of the punisher, to satisfy his [15] feelings. (What anger is will be made clear when we come to discuss the emotions.) Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant. Things familiar and things habitual belong to the class of pleasant things; for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either [20] good or pleasant. Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant; for I reckon among [25] goods escape from evils or apparent evils and the exchange of a greater evil for a less (since these things are in a sense desirable), and likewise I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange of a greater pain for a less. We must ascertain, then, the number and nature of the things that are [30] useful and pleasant. The useful has been previously examined in connexion with deliberative oratory; let us now proceed to examine the pleasant. Our various definitions must be regarded as adequate, even if they are not exact, provided they are clear.

  11 · We may lay it down that pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and that [1370a1] pain is the opposite. If this is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or to cause the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful. It must therefore be pleasant for the most part to move towards a natural state of being, particularly when a [5] natural process has achieved the complete recovery of that natural state. Habits also are pleasant; for as
soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often. Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us; for force is unnatural, and that is why what is [10] compulsory is painful, and it has been rightly said

  All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul.30

  So all acts of concentration, strong effort, and strain are necessarily painful; they all involve compulsion and force, unless we are accustomed to them, in which case it is custom that makes them pleasant. The opposites to these are pleasant; and hence ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep belong to the class of [15] pleasant things; for these are all free from any element of compulsion. Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the appetite within us, since appetite is desire for pleasure. [[Of the appetites some are irrational, some associated with reason. By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind. Of [20] this kind are those known as natural; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the appetite for nourishment, [namely hunger and thirst]31 and a separate kind of appetite answering to each kind of nourishment; and those connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. Rational appetites are those which we are induced to have; there are many [25] things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good.]]32 Further, pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something the imagination of what he remembers or expects. If this is so, it is clear that memory [30] and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected, since we perceive present things, remember past ones, and expect future ones. Now the things that are pleasant to remember are [1370b1] not only those that, when actually present, were pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good. Hence the words