The Politics of Aristotle

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by Aristotle


  In oligarchical states the laws ought to distribute the magistracies impartially [1424b1] to all who possess the rights of citizenship; most of them should be bestowed by lot, but the most important should be assigned by secret vote under oath and with the strictest precautions. Under an oligarchy the penalties inflicted on those who offer affronts to any of the citizens ought to be very heavy, for the people are not so much [5] annoyed at being debarred from holding office as they are angered at being affronted. Differences between citizens ought to be settled as quickly as possible and not be allowed to continue. Nor ought the lower classes to be allowed to collect from the country into the city; for the result of such assemblages is that the populace unites and overthrows the oligarchy. Speaking generally, in democratic [10] states the laws ought to hinder the populace from entertaining designs on the property of the rich; in oligarchical states they ought to check the possessors of political rights from insulting those who are weaker than themselves and from imposing upon the citizens. From what I have said you will not fail to perceive what aims the laws and political constitution ought to keep in view. [15]

  Anyone who wishes to speak in favour of a law must show that it affects all equally, that it harmonizes with the rest of the laws, and that it is beneficial to the city, particularly in promoting concord; failing this, he must show that it will conduce to virtue among the citizens or that it will benefit the public revenue or the [20] good repute of the city as a whole, or that it will strengthen the power of the state, or that it will confer some similar advantage. If you are speaking against a law, you must consider whether it does not apply to all the citizens; and next, whether, so far from agreeing with the other laws, it is actually opposed to them; and further, whether it will conduce to none of the benefits which we have mentioned, being on [25] the contrary harmful. These considerations will provide us with abundant arguments for making proposals and speaking about laws and the political constitution.

  We will now proceed to deal with alliances and contracts with other states. Contracts and arrangements must necessarily be regulated by public agreements. [30] Alliances must be formed on occasions when one party is too weak by itself, or when a war is expected to break out or because they think they will thus prevent certain people from making war. These and a number of similar circumstances are the reasons which induce states to make allies.

  When you wish to support the formation of an alliance, you must make it clear [35] that the occasion for doing so exists, and show if possible that the proposed allies are just men, and that they have previously conferred some benefit upon the state, and that they are possessed of considerable power, and that they are situated near at hand. If all these advantages are not present, you must collect in your speech any of them which do exist. When you are trying to prevent an alliance, it is open to you to [1425a1] show in the first place that it is unnecessary at the moment; or again, that the proposed allies are not just men, or that they have wronged us on a previous occasion. . . .3 Failing that, you can object to them on the ground that they live too far away and are not in a position to help us at the proper moment. With these and [5] similar arguments we shall have abundant material for speaking against and in support of the formation of alliances.

  Again, on the subject of peace and war let us use a similar method to obtain our chief kinds of argument. The pretexts for making war on another state are as [10] follows: when we have been the victims of aggression, we must take vengeance on those who have wronged us, now that a suitable opportunity has presented itself; or else, when we are actually being wronged, we must go to war on our own behalf or [15] on behalf of our kindred or benefactors; or else we must help our allies when they are wronged; or else we must go to war to gain some advantage for the city, in respect either of glory, or of resources, or of strength, or of something similar.

  When we are exhorting anyone to go to war we must collect as many of these [20] pretexts as possible, and afterwards show that those whom we are exhorting possess most of the advantages which bring success in warfare. Now men are always successful either by the favour of the gods, which we call good fortune, or through the number and strength of their troops, or through the abundance of their resources or the wisdom of their general or the excellence of their allies, or through [25] their superiority of position. From these, then, and similar advantages we shall select and demonstrate those which are most applicable to the circumstances, when our advice is in favour of war, belittling the points of superiority possessed by the enemy and exaggerating those which we ourselves enjoy. If we are trying to prevent a war which is likely to take place, we must first of all show either that the pretexts [30] do not exist at all or else that the grievances are small and insignificant; next we must show that it is not expedient to go to war, dwelling on the disasters that befall men in warfare; and further, that the advantages which conduce to victory (which [35] have just been enumerated) are possessed by the enemy rather than by us. These are the means which we must employ to avert a war which is likely to occur. When we are trying to stop a war which has actually started, if those to whom our advice is offered are stronger than their foes, the first point on which we must insist is that sensible men ought not to wait until they have a fall, but should make peace while they are strong; also, that it is characteristic of war to ruin many even of those who [1425b1] are successful in it, but of peace to save the vanquished and to allow the victorious to enjoy the possessions which they have gained in warfare.4 We must also dwell upon the numerous and incalculable vicissitudes of warfare. Such are the methods by [5] which we must exhort to peace those who are victorious in war. Those who have already met with failure we must urge to make peace on the ground of actual events, and because they ought to learn from their misfortunes and not be exasperated by those who have already injured them, and because of the dangers which have already resulted from not making peace, and because it is better to sacrifice a part [10] of their possessions to an enemy stronger than themselves than to be conquered and lose their lives as well as their property. And, to put the matter briefly, we must realize that it is the universal custom of mankind to abandon mutual warfare, either when they think that the demands of the enemy are just, or when they are at [15] variance with their allies, or weary of war, or afraid of their enemy, or suffering from internal strife. If, therefore, you collect from amongst all these and similar arguments those which are most applicable to the circumstances, you will have no lack of material for speaking about peace and war.

  [20] Lastly, it remains for us to treat of the provision of resources. First, then, we must inquire whether any property belonging to the city is neglected, neither bringing in any revenue nor being dedicated to the gods: I mean, for example, any public lands which are neglected and might bring in revenue to the city if they were sold or leased to private persons; for this is a very common source of income. If this [25] expedient is lacking, we must impose taxes on rateable property, or order the poor to give their personal service in time of danger, the rich to pay money, and the craftsmen to provide arms. In a word, when we are treating of ways and means, we must say that they affect all the citizens equally and are permanent and ample, [30] while the exact opposite is true of our adversaries’ proposals.

  From what has now been said we are acquainted with the subjects on which we shall speak in public, when we are seeking to persuade or dissuade, and with their component parts, which will supply us with the material of our orations. Next in order let us set forth and treat of the eulogistic and the vituperative kinds of [35] oratory.

  3 · To speak generally, the eulogistic kind is the amplification of creditable choices, deeds, and words, and the attribution of qualities which do not exist; while the vituperative kind is the opposite of this and consists in the minimizing of creditable qualities and the amplification of those which are discreditable. Things worthy of praise are those which are just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant, [1426a1] and easy of execution. The nature of these
qualities and the sources from which we can obtain abundant material about them have already been stated. He who is eulogizing must show in his speech that one of these praiseworthy qualities is connected with a certain person because it has either been brought about by his [5] personal exertions, or has been produced through his agency, or has resulted from a certain action of his, or has been done for some object, or could not have come to pass except under certain circumstances which are due to him. Similarly he who is censuring must show that the contrary of this is true of the person whom he is censuring. . . .5 The following are examples of the results of action; bodily health is the result of a fondness for gymnastics; a man falls into ill-health as the result of not [10] caring for exercise, or becomes wiser as the result of studying philosophy, or lacks the necessities of life as the result of his own carelessness. The following are actions done with an object: men endure many toils and dangers with the object of being crowned by their fellow-citizens, or neglect everything else with the object of [15] pleasing those whom they love. Instances of things which can only take place under certain circumstances are the following: victories at sea can only take place when there are sailors to win them, and drunkenness can only occur as the result of drinking. By pursuing this method on the lines already laid down you will have abundant material for eulogy and vituperation.

  Generally speaking you will be able to amplify and minimize under all such [20] circumstances by the following method: first, by showing, as I explained just now, that many good or bad results have been caused by a certain person’s actions. This is one kind of amplification. A second method is to introduce something judged to be great—a great good, if you are eulogizing, and an evil if you are censuring—and [25] then set side by side with it what you have to say and compare the two together, making as much as possible of your own case and as little as possible of the other; the result will be that your own case is magnified. A third plan is to compare that about which you are speaking with the least thing which falls under the same [30] category; for the former will then appear magnified, just as persons of moderate height appear taller than they really are when they stand side by side with persons of unusually small stature. The following is another safe method of amplification: if a certain thing has been considered a great good, then its contrary, if you mention it, will appear to be a great evil, and similarly, if a thing is considered to be a great evil, [35] its contrary, if you mention it, will appear to be a great good. You can also magnify good and bad actions by showing that the doer of them acted intentionally, proving that he had long premeditated doing them, that he purposed to do them often, that he did them over a long period, that no one else ever tried to do them, that he acted in company with others with whom no one else ever acted, or following those whom [1426b1] no one else ever followed, or that he acted voluntarily or designedly, and that we should be fortunate, or unfortunate, if we all did as he did. You must also prove your point by drawing parallels and amplifying as follows, building them as it were one [5] on the top of another: ‘If a man cares for his friends, it is natural to suppose that he honours his parents, and he who honours his parents will also desire to benefit his fatherland’. Generally speaking: if you can prove that a man is the cause of many good or bad things, these things will appear to be important. You must also examine the topic on which you are speaking and see whether it appears to have more weight [10] when divided into parts or when treated as a whole, and you must treat it in the manner in which it appears to have more weight. By pursuing these methods you will be able to make the most frequent and effective amplifications.

  You will minimize good and bad things in your speeches by following the [15] opposite method to that which we have prescribed for amplification. The best thing is to show that a man’s action has produced no result at all, or, if that is impossible, only the smallest and most insignificant results. From these instructions we know how to amplify or minimize any point which we are bringing forward, when we are eulogizing or censuring. These materials for amplification are useful in other kinds [20] of oratory, but they are most effective in eulogy and vituperation. We shall thus be provided with ample material on these topics.

  4 · Let us next similarly define the kinds of oratory employed in accusation [25] and defence and the elements of which they are composed and the uses to which they are to be put. The oratory of accusation is, to put the matter briefly, the exposition of errors and crimes; defensive oratory is the disproving of errors and crimes of which a man is accused or suspected. Both styles, then, having these [30] qualities, he who is accusing, when he charges his opponents with wickedness, must declare that their acts are unjust and illegal and detrimental to the interests of the mass of citizens; when he is accusing an adversary of folly, he must declare his acts to be both inexpedient for the actual doer of them and disgraceful and odious and [35] impracticable. These and similar arguments are those which should be directed against the wicked and foolish. Accusers should also observe against what kinds of offences the punishments ordained by the laws are directed and for what offences juries impose penalties. Where the law has laid down a definite punishment, the accuser must make it his sole object to prove that the offence has been committed. When the jury has to assess the penalty, . . .6 then the errors committed by one’s [1427a1] opponents must be amplified, and, if possible, it must be shown that the offence was committed voluntarily, and not with ordinary intent but after every possible preparation. If you cannot do this, and think that your opponent intends to show [5] that he has somehow made a mistake or that he intended to act honourably in the matter but met with misfortune you must deprive him of any claim to pardon by telling your hearers that evil-doers, instead of declaring that they have made a mistake after they have acted, ought to be careful before they act; and further that, [10] even if he has made mistakes or met with misfortune, he is more deserving of punishment for his misfortunes and mistakes than one who has done neither of these things. Moreover the legislator has not let those who make mistakes go free, but has made them liable to punishment, in order to prevent them from making mistakes again. You must also point out that if they listen to one who makes this kind of [15] defence, they will have many persons doing wrong by choice; for if they are successful, they will simply do what they like, while, if they are unsuccessful, they will declare that they have met with ill-fortune, and they then will be excused from punishment. By such arguments must accusers deprive their adversaries of any claim to pardon, and by means of the amplifications already described their acts [20] must be shown to have caused many evils. These are the component parts of which the oratory of accusation is made up.

  Defensive oratory consists of three methods. A man who is defending himself must either prove that he committed none of the acts of which he is accused; or if he [25] is forced to admit them, he must try to show that what he has done is lawful and just and honourable and expedient for the state; if he cannot prove this, he must attribute his acts to an error or to misfortune and show that the harm which has resulted from them is small, and so try to gain pardon. You can define a crime, an [30] error, and a misfortune thus: you must regard as a crime a wicked deed done deliberately, and you must urge that the heaviest penalty be exacted for such deeds; a harmful act done because of ignorance must be called an error; while the failure to [35] accomplish some good intention, not through one’s own fault but owing to some one else or to luck, is to be accounted a misfortune. The commission of crime you must declare to be confined to wicked men, while error and misfortune in action are not peculiar to oneself but are common to all men, including those who are sitting in [40] judgement upon you. You must ask for pardon if you are forced to admit that you have committed faults of this kind, pointing out that your hearers are as liable to error and misfortune as you are. A man who is making his defence must observe all [1427b1] the offences for which the laws have laid down punishment and juries assess penalties. When the law fixes a definite punishment, he must show that he
has not committed the offence at all, or that he has acted legally and justly. But when the [5] jury is empowered to assess the penalty, he must not follow the same course and deny that he has committed the offence, but rather he must try to prove that his action has caused little harm to his adversary and that it was done involuntarily. If [10] we follow these and similar methods, we shall have abundant material in cases of accusation and defence. It remains for us still to deal with the style of oratory employed in an inquiry.

  5 · Inquiry may be summarily described as the elucidation of choices, acts, and words which are contradictory to one another or to the rest of a man’s mode of [15] life. He who is making an inquiry must try to discover whether either the statement which he is examining or the acts or choices of the subject of his inquiry are in any respect contradictory to one another. The method to be pursued is as follows: he must consider whether in the past the person in question, after having been originally the friend of another man, next became his enemy and then again the friend of the same person, or whether he has acted, or is likely in the future, if [20] opportunities should occur, to act in a manner which contradicts his former acts. Similarly, you must observe whether †in making some statement now, he is speaking in contradiction of his former words or whether he might speak in contradiction of what he is saying or has said before†,7 and likewise whether he has [25] formed any choice which contradicts his former choices, or would do so if opportunities should arise. By a similar process you must deal with the contradictions which occur in the mode of life of the person whom you are examining in respect of his other and highly esteemed habits of life. If you thus pursue this [30] branch of oratory, there is no method of examination which you will leave untried.

 

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