by Aristotle
We shall cause a prejudice and feelings of envy against our opponents by employing the opposite method and pointing out that our hearers, or those for whom they care, have received undeserved ill-treatment, or are receiving it, or are likely to receive it at the hands of our opponents or their friends; for by such arguments they [15] will be induced to entertain feelings of hatred and anger against them. Where this is impossible, we shall collect together all the arguments by which we can create in our hearers a feeling of envy against our opponents; for envy is very near to hatred. They [20] will be objects of envy, to put the matter briefly, if we can show that they have met with undeserved prosperity and that no close ties bind them to our hearers, and point out that they have unjustly received, or are receiving, or are about to receive many benefits; or that they have never in the past been without some advantage, or are not without it now, or likely to be so in the future; or that they have never met [25] with some misfortune, or are not now meeting with it, or likely to do so, unless the judges punish them now. By these means then we shall in the peroration of our speech win favour for ourselves and disfavour for our opponents, and by following all the instructions given above we shall be able to arrange speeches for accusation and defence according to the rules of rhetoric.
[30] 37 · The inquisitive kind of oratory generally occurs, not separately, but in connexion with the other styles; it is especially useful in dealing with contradictions. However, in order that we may know the arrangement of this kind of speech also, when we have to inquire into the words or manner of life or deeds of men or the [35] administration of a city, I will describe it also in a summary manner. When conducting an inquiry of this kind we must begin in the same way as when refuting a prejudice; and so, after first adducing plausible pretexts so as to make our action appear reasonable, we shall then proceed to conduct our inquiry. The following are suitable pretexts: in political assemblies, that we are adopting such a course not [1445b1] from party-spirit but in order that it may not escape the attention of our hearers, or again, that our adversaries molested us first. In private suits our excuse will be a feeling of hatred or the bad character of the subjects of our inquiry or our friendship towards them in order to make them realize what they are doing and not do it again. [5] In public trials our pretexts will be legality, justice, and the general interest. After first treating of these and similar subjects we shall next in order set forth and inquire into each utterance or deed or intention of our opponents, showing that these [10] are opposed to justice and legality and private and public expediency, and examining them all to see whether in any respect they contradict one another or the practice of good citizens or probability. But, not to be tedious by going into details, the more we can prove to our hearers that the conduct of the subjects of our inquiry [15] is opposed to reputable pursuits, acts, words or habits, the greater will be the disrepute which attaches to them. We ought to conduct our inquiry not in a bitter but in a gentle spirit; for words if thus spoken will appear more persuasive to our hearers, and those who utter them will be less likely to bring prejudice upon [20] themselves. When you have carefully inquired into everything and amplified the results, you must conclude with a brief iteration and remind your hearers of what you have said. By arranging them thus we shall be able to employ all the various kinds of oratory according to the rules of rhetoric.
[25] 38 · Both in speaking and writing we must try as far as possible to make our words accord with the principles laid down above, and accustom ourselves to practise each principle readily, and we shall have many technical expedients to enable us to make speeches according to the rules of art in private and public suits and in conversation with others; but an orator ought to be careful not only about his [30] words but also about his personal behaviour, regulating it according to the principles already laid down; for the manner of a man’s life contributes to the persuasive influence which he exercises and to the establishment of a good reputation.
In the first place you must divide up your subject-matter according to the general system of division in which you have been instructed, and decide what you [35] must treat of first, secondly, thirdly, and fourthly. Next you must prepare your hearers to receive you, as I have described in dealing with the attitude to be taken towards your audience in proems. You will dispose them well towards you, if you are true to your promises and if you keep the same friends all your life and show yourself unchanging in your other habits and always following the same course. [1446a1] They will listen attentively to you, if you treat of great and noble deeds and such as promote the public good.
Their goodwill having been won, when you come to practical suggestions they will accept as expedient to themselves those which procure the avoidance of evils [5] and the provision of benefits, and reject those which involve the contrary results.
In order that your exposition may be quick and lucid and may command credit, you ought to make your practical suggestions as follows. You will perform [10] your task quickly, if you do not try to do everything at once, but take the first point first and then the next. You will speak lucidly, if you do not suddenly leave your subject and go on to other points before you have finished it. You will command credit, if you do not act contrary to your usual character, and further if you do not pretend that the same persons are your enemies and your friends. [15]
As regards proof, where we have sure knowledge, we shall prefer to follow its guidance in prescribing plans of action, but, where we lack knowledge, we shall take what holds for the most part as our guide; for it is safest in such cases to act with a view to what usually happens. [20]
When we have adversaries to contend with, if it is a question of words, we shall obtain confirmation in support of our case from the actual words uttered; in suits about contracts we shall do so by dealing with them in accordance with unwritten and written laws with the support of the best possible testimony and within definite [25] limits of time.
As regards our peroration we shall remind our hearers of what has been said by a summary repetition of the facts; while we shall remind them of our past deeds by reference to our present deeds, when we are undertaking actions identical with, or similar to, former actions.
Our hearers will be well disposed to us, if we follow a course of action which [30] will result in their thinking themselves well treated in the past, present, or future. We shall add weight to our actions, if we deal with transactions which are likely to produce great credit.
Such then is the manner in which an orator must regulate his personal [35] behaviour; while he must practice the art of oratory according to the principles already laid down.
33[Sacrifices must be conducted, as we have already indicated, so as to be reverent towards the gods, moderate in costliness, splendid from a spectacular point of view, and likely to bring advantage to the citizens. They will be reverent towards the gods, if we sacrifice according to ancestral custom; they will be moderate in [1446b1] costliness, if the accompaniments of the ceremony are not used up as well as the money actually expended; they will be splendid from a spectacular point of view, if they are magnificently appointed; they will be beneficial to the citizens, if horsemen [5] and infantry in full panoply accompany the procession. Our dealings with the gods will be reverently performed if carried out thus.
We shall establish friendly relations with those who are of like character to our own and have the same interests, and with whom we are obliged to co-operate in matters of great importance; for such friendship is most likely to be permanent. We [10] must make those men our allies, who are most righteous and are possessed of considerable power and live near at hand; those who are the contrary must be our enemies. We must undertake war against those who are trying to injure the state or her friends or her allies. The protection of the state must be secured either by [15] personal service or by the help of allies or by mercenaries; the first method is preferable to the second, and the second to the third.
As regards the supply of resources, we mu
st provide them first and foremost from our own revenues and possessions, secondly by taxes on rateable property, and thirdly by personal service on the part of the poor, and the provision of arms by the [20] craftsmen, and of money by the wealthy.
As for political constitution, the best form of democracy is that under which the laws bestow the posts of dignity on the best citizens, and the people are not deprived of the rights of electing and voting; the worst form is that under which the [25] laws deliver up the wealthy to the insolence of the mob. Oligarchies are of two kinds, being based either on political partisanship or on a property qualification.
Alliances must be formed when the citizens are unable by themselves to protect their own territory and strongholds or hold the enemy in check. An alliance [30] must be dispensed with when it is unnecessary or when the proposed allies are too far distant and unable to arrive at the opportune moment.
A good citizen is one who provides the state with useful friends and few and feeble foes, and who procures for her the greatest revenue without confiscating the [35] property of a single private citizen, and who, while conducting himself righteously, exposes those who attempt any injury to the state.
Men always bestow presents either in the hope of benefiting themselves or in grateful return for previous services. Service is always given either for gain or [1447a1] honour or pleasure or fear. All dealings are carried out either by choice or unwillingly; for all facts are done either under compulsion or through persuasion or fraud or on some pretext.
In war one side gains the upper hand either through luck, or superiority of numbers or strength or resources, or advantage of position, or excellence of allies, or [5] skill on the part of a general. It is generally held that men should abandon their allies either because it is expedient to do so or because they have brought the war to a close. [1447b1]
To act justly is to follow the common customs of the state, to obey the laws, and to abide by one’s personal promises.
Physical advantages are good condition, beauty, strength, and health; mental [5] advantages are wisdom, prudence, courage, self-control, and justice. Wealth and friends are advantages alike to mind and body. The opposites of these are disadvantageous. To a state a multitude of good citizens is an advantage.]
**TEXT. M. Fuhrmann, Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica, Teubner, Leipzig, 1966
1Fuhrmann brackets the introduction as a later addition.
2The text of this sentence is uncertain.
3Fuhrmann marks a lacuna here.
4Reading ἐᾶν ὧν.
5Fuhrmann marks a lacuna here.
6Fuhrmann marks a lacuna here.
7The text of the obelized passage is uncertain.
8Fuhrmann obelizes the ‘since’ clause.
9Fuhrmann obelizes this clause.
10Fuhrmann marks a lacuna.
11Fuhrmann marks a lacuna.
12The text of this clause is uncertain.
13Frag. 794 Nauck.
14Fuhrmann obelizes this sentence.
15Fuhrmann obelizes this clause.
16The examples make sense in Greek, where τoῦτoν τὐπτειν τoῦτoν is ambiguous.
17Fuhrmann marks a lacuna.
18The text of this example is uncertain.
19Fuhrmann obelizes this clause.
20Reading συμβoυλεὑῃ λὑειν.
21Fuhrmann marks a lacuna.
22Obelized by Fuhrmann.
23Obelized by Fuhrmann.
24Reading καἰ αὐτoὐς κατ’ ἴσoν for καἰ αὐτὀν ἴσoν.
25The text is uncertain.
26Excised by Fuhrmann.
27Fuhrmann marks a lacuna.
28The text of this paragraph, which Fuhrmann obelizes, is uncertain.
29Deleting the comma after ἄνθρωπoν.
30Reading μέλλωσιν for ὦσιν.
31Reading μoχθηρoὐς δoκoῦντας εἶναι νόμoυς.
32Fuhrmann marks a lacuna.
33Excised by Fuhrmann.
POETICS**
I. Bywater
[1447a10] 1 · I propose to speak not only of poetry in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with first principles.
Epic poetry and tragedy, as also comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and most [15] flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But they differ from one another in three ways, either in their means, or in their objects, or in the manner of their imitations.
Just as colour and form are used as means by some, who (whether by art or [20] constant practice) imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by others; so also in the above-mentioned group of arts, the means with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and harmony—used, however, either singly or in certain combinations. A combination of harmony and rhythm alone is the means in [25] flute-playing and lyre-playing, and any other arts there may be of the same description, e.g. imitative piping. Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer’s imitations; for even he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may represent men’s characters, as well as what they do and suffer. There is further an art which imitates by language alone, and one which imitates by metres, either one or a plurality of metres. These forms of imitation are still nameless today. We have no [1447b10] common name for a mime of Sophron or Xenarchus and a Socratic Conversation; and we should still be without one even if the imitation in the two instances were in trimeters or elegiacs or some other kind of verse—though it is the way with people to tack on ‘poet’ to the name of a metre, and talk of elegiac poets and epic poets, [15] thinking that they call them poets not by reason of the imitative nature of their work, but generally by reason of the metre they write in. Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be put forth in a metrical form, it is usual to describe the writer in this way; Homer and Empedocles, however, have really nothing in common apart from their metre; so that, if the one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a physicist rather than a poet. We should be in the same [20] position also, if the imitation in these instances were in all the metres, like the Centaur (a rhapsody in a medley of all metres) of Chaeremon; and Chaeremon one has to recognize as a poet. So much, then, as to these arts. There are, lastly, certain other arts, which combine all the means enumerated, rhythm, melody, and verse, [25] e.g. dithyrambic and nomic poetry, tragedy and comedy; with this difference, however, that the three kinds of means are in some of them all employed together, and in others brought in separately, one after the other. These elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation.
2 · The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are [1448a1] necessarily either good men or bad—the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since it is by badness and excellence men differ in character. It follows, therefore, that the agents represented must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are; in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than [5] we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves. It is clear that each of the above-mentioned arts will admit of these differences, and that it will become a separate art by representing objects with this point of difference. Even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such diversities are possible; and [10] they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, prose or verse without harmony, as its means; Homer’s personages, for instance, are better than we are; Cleophon’s are on our own level; and those of Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Diliad, are beneath it. The same is true of the dithyramb and the nome: the personages may be presented in them with the difference exemplified . . .1 in the C
yclopses of Timotheus and Philoxenus. This [15] difference it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also; the one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day.
3 · A third difference in these arts is in the manner in which each kind of object is represented. Given both the same means and the same kind of object for [20] imitation, one may either speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as Homer does; or one may remain the same throughout, without any such change; or the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described.2
As we said at the beginning, therefore, the differences in the imitation of these arts come under three heads, their means, their objects, and their manner. [25]
So that as an imitator Sophocles will be on one side akin to Homer, both portraying good men; and on another to Aristophanes, since both present their personages as acting and doing. This in fact, according to some, is the reason for plays being termed dramas, because in a play the personages act the story. Hence too both tragedy and comedy are claimed by the Dorians as their discoveries; [30] Comedy by the Megarians—by those in Greece as having arisen when Megara became a democracy, and by the Sicilian Megarians on the ground that the poet Epicharmus was of their country, and a good deal earlier than Chionides and [35] Magnes; and Tragedy is claimed by certain of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In support of this claim they point to the words ‘comedy’ and ‘drama’. Their word for the outlying hamlets, they say, is comae, whereas Athenians call them demes—thus assuming that comedians got the name not from their comoe or revels, but from their strolling from hamlet to hamlet, lack of appreciation keeping them out of the [1448b1] city. Their word also for ‘to act’, they say, is dran, whereas Athenians use prattein.