by Aristotle
These are Plato’s five arguments. Aristotle himself, as I have said, has used the two following arguments in the dialogue Eudemus. One goes thus: ‘Attunement’, he says, ‘has a contrary, lack of attunement; but the soul has no contrary. Therefore the soul is not an attunement’.. . . Secondly: ‘The contrary of the attunement of the body is the lack of attunement of the body; and the lack of attunement of the living body is disease, weakness, and ugliness—of these, disease is lack of attunement of the elements, weakness lack of attunement of the uniform parts, ugliness lack of attunement of the instrumental parts. Now if lack of attunement is disease, weakness, and ugliness, then attunement is health, strength and beauty; but soul is none of these—I mean, neither health nor strength nor beauty; for even Thersites, the ugliest of men, had a soul. Therefore the soul is not an attunement’.
F 45 R3 (Damascius, Commentarius in Phaedonem 383):
Aristotle in the Eudemus argues as follows: ‘Lack of attunement is contrary to attunement; but soul has no contrary—for it is a substance. And the conclusion is obvious. Again, if the lack of attunement of the elements of an animal is disease, their attunement must be health, not soul’.
F 46 R3 (Simplicius, Commentarius in de Anima 221.28–30):
And because of this he [sc. Aristotle] says in the Eudemus, his dialogue on the soul, that the soul is a sort of form. . .
F 47 R3 ([Plutarch], de musica 1139B):
On the theme that harmony is something noble, divine and grand, Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, says: ‘Harmony is heavenly, by nature divine, beautiful and inspired; having by nature four parts potentially, it has two means, the arithmetical and the harmonic, and the parts of it, their extents, and their excesses one over another, have numerical and proportionate relations; for tunes are arranged in two tetrachords.’
F 48 R3 (Olympiodorus, Commentarius in Phaedonem 9):
Proclus would have heavenly bodies possess only sight and hearing, as Aristotle also would; for of the senses they have only those which contribute to well-being, not those that contribute to being, which is what the other senses do. The poet testifies to this, saying, “Sun, who seest and hearest all things”—which implies that the heavenly bodies have only sight and hearing. Also because these senses, most of all, have knowledge by way of activity rather than of passivity, and are fitter for the unchanging heavenly bodies.
F 49 R3 (Simplicius, Commentarius in de Caelo 485.19–22):
That Aristotle has the notion of something above mind and substance is shown by his saying clearly at the end of his book On Prayer that god is either mind or something even beyond mind.
F 50 R3 (Stobaeus, Anthologium IV xxxii 21):
Zeno said that Crates, while sitting in a cobbler’s workshop, read [B 1]1 Aristotle’s Protrepticus which he wrote to Themison, king of Cyprus, saying that no-one had more goods than he for devoting himself to philosophy; for he had great wealth, so that he could spend money on this, and a good reputation as well.
F 57 R3 (Oxyrrhynchus Papyrus 666; cf. Stobaeus, Anthologium III iii 25):
[B2] . . . prevents them from choosing and doing what they should; hence, contemplating the misfortune of these men, we ought to avoid it and believe that happiness consists not in the acquisition of much property but rather in the manner of the disposition of the soul. For one would not say that it is a body adorned with splendid clothing that is blessed, but one which is healthy and has a good disposition, even if it has none of the things just mentioned; in the same way, if the soul is educated, such a soul and such a man must be called happy, not the man splendidly adorned with external goods but himself worthless. It is not the horse that has a golden curb-chain and costly harness but whose nature is bad that we think worth anything; rather we praise the one that has a good disposition. [B 3] Besides, when worthless men get abundant possessions, they come to value these even more than the goods of the soul; and this is the basest of all conditions. For just as a man would be a laughing-stock if he were inferior to his own servants, so too those for whom possessions are more important than their own nature must be considered miserable. [B 4] This is indeed so: surfeit, as the proverb says, breeds insolence; lack of education combined with power breeds folly. For those who are ill-disposed in soul neither wealth nor strength nor beauty is good; the more lavishly one is endowed with these conditions, the more grievously and the more often they hurt him who possesses them but lacks understanding.2 The saying ‘No knife for a child’ means ‘Do not give bad men power’. [B 5] But all men would agree that understanding comes from learning and from seeking the things that philosophy enables us to seek; surely, then, we should pursue philosophy unhesitatingly and. . .
F 51 R3 (Alexander, Commentarius in Topica 149.11–15):
E.g. if someone were to say that one should not philosophize, then, since [B 6] to philosophize is both to inquire into the very question whether one should philosophize or not, as he [sc. Aristotle] himself said in the Protrepticus, and also to pursue philosophical contemplation, by showing that each of them is proper for a man we shall wholly refute the view stated.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 37.13–22 Pistelli):
[B 9] Again, some kinds of knowledge produce the good things in life, others use the first kind; some are ancillary, others prescriptive; and in these last, as being more authoritative, rests the true good. If, then, only that kind of knowledge which involves correctness of judgment and uses reason and contemplates the good as a whole—that is to say, philosophy—can use all other kinds of knowledge and prescribe to them according to nature, we ought in every way to philosophize, since philosophy alone comprises right judgment and an infallible prescriptive understanding.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 49.3–51.6 Pistelli):
[B 11] Of things that come into being some come from some kind of thought or art, e.g. a house or a ship (for the cause of both of these is a certain art and process of thought), while others come into being through no art but by nature; for nature is the cause of animals and plants, and all such things come into being according to nature. But some things also come into being as a result of chance; for of most of the things that come into being neither by art nor by nature nor of necessity, we say that they come into being by chance. [B 12] Now of the things that come into being by chance none comes into being for the sake of anything, nor have they an end; but in the case of things that come into being by art there is an end and that for the sake of which (for he who possesses the art will always tell you the reason why he wrote, and for the sake of what he did so), and this is better than that which comes into being because of it. I mean the things of which art is the cause by its own nature and not by accident; for we should properly describe medicine rather as the art of health than as that of disease, and architecture as the art of building houses, not of pulling them down. Everything, therefore, that is according to art comes into being for the sake of something, and this is its best end; but that which comes into being by chance does not come into being for the sake of anything: something good might come into being by chance, yet in respect of chance and insofar as it results from chance it is not good—for that which comes into being by chance is always indeterminate.
[B 13] But that which comes into being according to nature does so for the sake of something and is always constituted for the sake of something better than the product of art; for nature does not imitate art, but art nature, and art exists to aid nature and to fill up what nature leaves undone. For some things nature seems able to complete by itself without aid, but others it does with difficulty or cannot do at all; an example close to hand is what happens when something comes into being: some seeds obviously generate without protection, whatever ground they fall into, others need the art of farming as well; similarly, some animals too attain their full nature by themselves, but man needs many arts for his preservation, both at birth and in the matter of nutrition later. [B 14] If, then, art imitates nature, it is from nature that the arts have derived the characteristic that
all their products come into being for the sake of something. For we should assume that everything that comes into being rightly comes into being for the sake of something. Now that which comes into being well, comes into being rightly; and everything that comes or has come into being according to nature, comes into being well, since that which is contrary to nature is bad and the opposite of that which is according to nature; natural coming into being, therefore, is for the sake of something. [B 15] This one can see from any one of our parts; if, for example you consider the eyelid, you would see that it has come into being not in vain but to aid the eyes, in order to give them rest and to ward off things that fall on to them. Thus that for which something has come into being is the same as that for which it should have come into being; e.g. if a ship ought to have been built to provide transport by sea, it is for the sake of that that it has come into being.
[B 16] Now either absolutely all animals belong to the class of things that have come into being by nature and according to nature, or the best and most honourable of them do; for it makes no difference if someone thinks most animals have come into being contrary to nature because of some destruction and evil. The most honourable of the animals in the world is man; so that clearly he has come into being by nature and according to nature.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 51.16–52.5 Pistelli):
[B 17] If, then, the end of each thing is always better than the thing (for everything that comes into being does so for the sake of its end, and that for the sake of which is better and the best of all things), and if a natural end is that which is completed last in order of generation when this proceeds continuously; now the bodily parts of man are completed first, the parts concerned with the soul later, and the completion of the better is somehow always later than its generation; now soul is later than body, and understanding is what emerges last in soul (for we see that it is by nature the last thing to come into being for men, and this indeed is why old age lays claim to this alone of good things): therefore, some form of understanding is by nature our end and the exercise of it the final activity for the sake of which we have come into being. Now if we have come into being, clearly we also exist to understand and to learn.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 51.6–15 Pistelli):
[B 18] Then what is it among existing things for the sake of which nature and god have brought us into being? Pythagoras, when asked about this, answered, ‘To observe the heavens’, and used to say that he was an observer of nature and had come into life for the sake of this. [B 19] And when somebody asked Anaxagoras for what end one would choose to come into being and to live, he is said to have answered the question by saying, ‘To observe the heavens and the stars, moon and sun in them’, everything else being worth nothing.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 52.6–16 Pistelli):
[B 20] According to this argument, then, Pythagoras was right in saying that every man has been made by god in order to acquire knowledge and contemplate. But whether the object of this knowledge is the universe or some other nature we must consider later; what we have said suffices as a first conclusion; for if understanding is our natural end, to understand must be the best of all things. [B 21] Therefore the other things we do we ought to do for the sake of the goods that are in man himself, and of these those in the body for the sake of those in the soul, and excellence for the sake of understanding; for this is the supreme end.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 34.5–35.18 Pistelli):
[B 23] As possessing reason, nature of every kind does nothing at random but everything for an end, and banishing chance cares for the end in a higher degree than the arts—for they are, as we know, imitations of nature. Since man is by nature composed of soul and body, and soul is better than body, and that which is inferior is always servant to that which is superior, then the body must exist for the sake of the soul. Recalling that the soul has a rational and an irrational part, we conclude that the irrational part exists for the sake of the rational part. Mind belongs to the rational part: the demonstration thus compels us to state that everything exists for the sake of mind. [B 24] The activities of mind are thoughts, and thinking is the seeing of objects of thought, just as the activity of the faculty of sight is seeing the objects of sight. It is, then, for the sake of mind and thinking that everything is desirable for man; for other things are desirable for the sake of the soul, mind is the best part of the soul, and the other things exist for the sake of the best. [B 25] Again, of thoughts, those are free which are pursued for their own sake, but those which bring about1 knowledge for the sake of something else are like slaves; a thing pursued for itself is always superior to one pursued for something else, so that2 that which is free is superior to that which is not. [B 26] Now if in our actions we use our intellect, even though we take into account our own advantage and consider things from that point of view, yet we follow the guidance of our intellect; we also need our body as a servant and are exposed to chance too. . . .3 [B 27] Of acts of thought, then, those which are done just because of pure contemplation itself are more honourable and better than those useful for some other ends. Contemplative thinking is in itself honourable and wisdom of the mind is in this kind of thinking desirable; but thinking which involves understanding is honourable because of the actions it produces. The good and the honourable, then, is found in contemplation involving wisdom, but certainly not in every kind of contemplation. . . . [B 28] Man deprived of perception and mind is reduced to the condition of a plant; deprived of mind alone he is turned into a brute; deprived of irrationality but retaining mind, he becomes like god.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 36.7–13 Pistelli):
[B 29] For what distinguishes us from the other animals shines through in this sort of life alone, a life in which there is nothing ordinary or of little value. For animals too have some small sparks of reason and understanding, but are entirely deprived of contemplative wisdom . . . ;1 as to sense-perception and impulses, man has less exactness and strength than many animals.
F 52 R3 (Iamblichus, Protrepticus 37.22–40.1 Pistelli):
[B 31] Moreover, since everyone chooses what is possible and expedient, we must admit that these two characteristics are found in philosophy, and also that the difficulty of acquiring it is more than outweighed by its usefulness; for we all do with greater pleasure that which is easy. [B 32] It is easy to show that we are capable of acquiring the sciences that deal with the just and the expedient and also those that deal with nature and the rest of reality. [B 33] The prior is always more knowable than the posterior, and that which is better by nature than that which is worse. For knowledge is more concerned with things that are defined and ordered than with their contraries, and more with causes than with effects. Now good things are more defined and ordered than bad things, just as a good man is more defined and ordered than a bad man: there must be the same difference. Besides, things that are prior are causes rather than things that are posterior; for if the former are removed, the things that have their substance from them are removed—lines if numbers are removed, planes if lines are removed, solids if planes are removed, the so-called syllables if letters are removed. [B 34] Therefore, if soul is better than body (being by nature more able to command), and there are arts and forms of understanding concerned with the body, namely medicine and gymnastics (for we reckon these as sciences and say that some people possess them), clearly with regard to the soul too and its excellences there is a care and an art, and we can acquire it, since we can do this even with regard to things of which our ignorance is greater and knowledge is harder to come by.
[B 35] So too with regard to nature; for it is far more necessary to have understanding of the causes and elements than of things posterior to them; for the latter are not among the highest realities, and the first principles do not arise from them, but from and through the first principles all other things manifestly proceed and are constituted. [B 36] For whether it is fire or air or number or any other natures that are the causes and principles of other thin
gs, if we are ignorant of them we cannot know any of the other things; for how could one recognise speech if one did not know the syllables, or know these if one knew none of the letters? [B 37] So much, then, on the theme that there is a science of truth and of the excellence of the soul, and that we can acquire these.
[B 38] That it [sc. understanding] is the greatest of goods and the most useful of all will be clear from what follows: we all agree that the best man and he who is by nature strongest ought to rule, and that the law alone is ruler and has authority; and the law is a sort of understanding and a formula based on understanding. [B 39] Again, what accurate standard or what boundary-marker of what is good do we have apart from the man of understanding? For the things that such a man will choose if his choice follows his knowledge are good and their contraries bad. [B 40] Now since all men choose what accords with their own dispositions (the just man choosing to live justly, the brave man to live bravely, the temperate man to live temperately), similarly it is clear that the man of understanding will choose above all things to understand; for that is the task of this capacity. It is clear, then, that according to the most authoritative opinion understanding is the greatest of goods.
(Iamblichus, Protrepticus 41.6–11 Pistelli):
[B 41] One would see the same point more clearly from the following argument. To understand and to come to know is in itself desirable for men (for it is not possible to live a human life without these activities), and useful too for life; for no good comes to us unless it is accomplished after we have calculated and acted in accordance with understanding.
F 58 R3 (Iamblichus, Protrepticus 52.16–54.5 Pistelli):
[B 42] To seek from all knowledge a result other than itself and to demand that it must be useful is the act of one completely ignorant of the distance that from the start separates good things from necessary things; for they differ completely. For the things that are loved for the sake of something else and without which life is impossible must be called necessities and joint-causes; but those that are loved for themselves, even if nothing else follows from them, must be called goods in the strict sense; for this is not desirable for the sake of that, and that for the sake of something else, and so ad infinitum—there is a stop somewhere. It is really ridiculous, then, to demand from everything some benefit besides the thing itself, and to ask ‘What is the gain to us’? and ‘What is the use’? For in truth, as we maintain, such a man is in no way like one who knows the noble and the good or who distinguishes causes from joint-causes. [B 43] One would see the absolute truth of what we are saying if someone as it were carried us in thought to the Isles of the Blest. For there there would be need of nothing and no profit from anything; and there remain only thought and contemplation, which even now we describe as the free life. If this is true, would not any of us be rightly ashamed if when the chance was given us to settle in the Isles of the Blest, he were by his own fault unable to do so? The reward that knowledge brings men is, then, not to be despised, nor is the good that comes from it slight. For as, according to the wise among the poets, we receive the gifts of justice in Hades, so, it seems, we gain those of understanding in the Isles of the Blest.