by Aristotle
Aristotle brought together in a single compilation the ancient writers on the art of rhetoric, going right back to their founder and inventor, Tisias; with great care he sought out the main tenets of each author name by name, wrote them down clearly, and meticulously expounded the difficult passages. And with the charm and brevity of his diction he so excelled the inventors themselves that no-one looks to learn their precepts from the original books, but everyone who wants to understand what they were resorts to Aristotle as a far more convenient expositor. Thus Aristotle published his own views and also those of his predecessors, so that from this work we become acquainted both with his own views and with the others.
F 137 R3 (Cicero, Brutus XII 46–48):
Eloquence is the companion of peace, the ally of leisure, and, so to say, the offspring of a well-ordered state. And for this reason, Aristotle says, it was when the tyrants in Sicily had been removed and restitution in private matters was after a long interval being sought in the courts, that for the first time—since that people was sharp and born to controversy—the Sicilians Corax and Tisias wrote Arts and Precepts of rhetoric; for before that no-one was accustomed to speak with the methodical application of technique, although there were several who spoke carefully and precisely. Some discussions of important topics—what are now called commonplaces—were written and prepared by Protagoras; Gorgias too did the same thing, writing speeches in praise and condemnation of particular topics, because he thought that the ability to inflate a topic with praise and again to belittle it with disparagement was the most essential part of being an orator; Antiphon of Rhamnous produced some similar works (and Thucydides, a reliable source, who actually heard him, says that no-one ever offered a better defence against a capital charge than he did when defending himself). Lysias indeed began by claiming to be versed in the art of rhetoric; but later, seeing that Theodorus was more sophisticated in matter of theory though weaker in his speeches, he took to writing speeches for others and abandoned theory; in a similar fashion, Isocrates began by denying that there was any art of rhetoric, during which period he wrote speeches for others to use in the law-courts; but when he found himself repeatedly in court on a charge of breaking the law against circumvention by judicial procedure, he gave up writing speeches for others and devoted himself entirely to composing Arts.
F I40 R3 (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Isocrates XVIII 576–77):
Let no-one suppose that I do not know either that Aphareus (who was an ancestor of mine and was adopted by Isocrates) claimed in his speech against Megacleides on the Antidosis that his father wrote no speeches for the law-courts. or that Aristotle says that a large number of volumes of Isocrates’ forensic speeches were published by the book-sellers. I am indeed aware of these men’s statements, and I neither believe Aristotle (because he wanted to discredit the man) nor fall in with Aphareus (who was putting together a fine-seeming speech on his behalf). I think that Cephisodorus the Athenian is a sufficient judge of the truth here: he lived with Isocrates, was a most faithful pupil, and made a splendid speech for the defence in the counter-pleas against Aristotle. And so I believe that Isocrates did write some speeches for the law-courts—but not many.
F 144 R3 (Athenaeus, 556DF):
One might be surprised, Aristotle says, that nowhere in the Iliad did Homer portray a concubine sleeping with Menelaus, yet presented everyone else with women. Indeed, even the old men—Nestor and Phoenix—sleep with women according to him. For they had not exhausted their bodies in their youth through drunkenness or sex or even through the dyspeptic effects of gluttony, and so not unnaturally they are enjoying a vigorous old age. Thus the Spartan seems to respect his wife Helen, on whose behalf he had actually collected the army; and this is why he avoids sleeping with any other women. Agamemnon is disparaged by Thersites as a womaniser. . . . But it is hardly likely, Aristotle says, that this number of women was for use—it was rather a mark of status; after all, it was not for getting drunk that he had a large supply of wine.
F 149 R3 (Porphyry, apud Scholiast to Homer, Iliad III 277):
Why, having said the sun looks over all things and hears all things, did Homer portray him as needing a messenger in the case of his oxen?. . .
Aristotle resolves this by saying that it is either because the sun indeed sees all things but not at one and the same time; or because Lampetia was messenger to the sun in the way sight is to man; or because, he says, it was appropriate to speak in this way both for Agamemnon when swearing the oath in the Single Combat—‘and sun, you who look over all things and hear all things’—and for Odysseus when addressing his companions; for he does not also see what goes on in Hades.
F 160 R3 (Porphyry, apud Scholiast to Homer, Iliad X 153):
The placing of the spears on their spikes is thought to be poor; especially since a single one of them, by falling over, had already created panic everywhere at night. Aristotle resolves this by saying that Homer always portrays things as they were at that time. And the ancient practice was the same as present practice among the barbarians; and this is the custom of many of the barbarians.
F 161 R3 (Porphyry, apud Scholiast to Homer, Iliad X 252):
For example, it is agreed that the following is one of the old puzzles: ‘and now the star had advanced, and more than two parts of the night had passed, and a third part still remained’. For how is it that if two parts and more have gone, yet the third part is left and not a fraction of the third?. . . Aristotle thinks to resolve it as follows, where he says: ‘Division into two may in this case be division into equal parts. Now since1 what is more than half is indeterminate, when it is increased to such an extent that a third of the whole is left, a stickler for accuracy would determine this and indicate how much remains in order to make clear by how much the half of the whole has been increased. For example, 3 is half of 6. If 6 were divided into two equal parts, they will be 3. If one part is increased, it is unclear whether this is by a fraction or by a whole unit. Now if it becomes larger by a whole unit2, the part still remaining will be a third of the whole; and if you say “one of the two parts became more and left a third part,” you indicate that the increase has been by a unit—since the three have become four and there remain two, which is a third of the original six. Now since the twelve parts of night can be divided into two equal divisions—into sixes—and one of these parts was increased and became larger, and it was unclear by how many hours it had been increased (for the increase could have been by one, two, three, or more hours), the poet determines the size of this indeterminate “more” and, because it was increased by two hours, he adds that a third was left—since eight hours have gone by and four remain, which is a third of the whole. Thus too, if something had 18 parts (dividing into two nines) and you were to say that more than one part of the two-part division has gone and the third part remains, you would make clear, by saying that the third (i.e. 6) remains, that you mean that 12 have been taken. Suppose we ask the same question of the hours of a full day, and suppose someone to say that more than one part of the two-part division of the hours has passed—still without determining how much—and to add that the third part of the whole remains: it is clear that, since the two-part division is into 12 and 12 and a third of the whole (i.e. 8) remains, the “more” of the one part amounts to 4, so that 16 hours have passed in all and 8 remain. Thus when there is a division into two and into three equal parts, anyone who adds to one part of the two-part division and leaves a third of the three-part division, determines in how much more the increase consists. Thus the poet cleverly indicates how large the indeterminate part3 of the increase of the half was—that it consisted of two hours and that the eighth hour has passed4—by saying “and a third part still remained.” For, if you know that the night contains 12 hours in all, and that division into two parts gives 6 and 6, and division into three 4 and 4 and 4,5 and if you hear that more than one part of the two-part division has passed and then learn that a third of the three-part division, i.e. 4 hours, remain
s, you know at once that two hours have gone by since midnight’.
F 166 R3 (Porphyry, apud Scholiast to Homer, Iliad XXIV 15):
Why did Achilles go on dragging Hector around the tomb of Patroclus, treating the corpse contrary to established custom? There is a solution, Aristotle says, referring to the customs of the time—they were like that, since even today in Thessaly men drag [corpses] around the tombs.
F 170 R3 (Scholiast to Homer, Odyssey V 93):
‘And she mixed red nectar’:
If the gods drink nothing but nectar, why does Calypso give it to Hermes after mixing it? For if it has been mixed with water, they drink not only nectar but water also. And yet, he says, she served him plain ambrosia ‘and mixed red nectar’. Now Aristotle in resolving this says that ‘she mixed’ means either to combine one liquid with another one or to pour out; for ‘to mix’ means both. So here ‘and she mixed red nectar’ means not to combine but simply to pour out.
F 171 R3 (Scholiast to Homer, Odyssey V 334):
Aristotle asks why he speaks of Calypso and Circe and Ino alone as ‘having speech (αὐδἡεσσα)’; for all the others had voices. He did not want to solve this, but emends the text, in some places to αὐλἡεσσα—by which he says is meant that they were solitary—and in the case of Ino to οὐδἡεσσα—for this characteristic belonged to all and only these people since they all resided on earth.
F 172 R3 (Scholiast to Homer, Odyssey IX 106):
Aristotle asks how Polyphemus the Cyclops was a Cyclops himself when neither his father (who was Poseidon) nor his mother was a Cyclops. He himself solves it by reference to another myth; for horses were sired by Boreas, and the horse Pegasus had Poseidon and Medusa as parents.
F 175 R3 (Eustathius, 1717, on Homer, Odyssey XII 130):
It should be recognized that they say that Aristotle gives an allegorical account of these herds, and especially of the herds of oxen, associating them with the days of the twelve lunar months, which number three hundred and fifty; for that is also the number of the seven herds which each contain fifty beasts. That is why Homer says that they neither are born nor die; for those days never vary in amount.
IV • ETHICS
F 180–184 R3
F 182 R3 (David, Prolegomena Philosophiae 74. 17–25):
He [sc. Aristotle] also wrote on economy, where he discusses household management (he says there that four things must come together in a household: the relation of man to wife, love of father for children, fear of slaves for masters, and that expenditure be commensurate with income—for each lack of measure is ignoble: if income is found to be large, expenditure small, there is something ignoble—such a man is found to be miserly; if income is small, expenditure large, there is something ignoble—such a man is found to be extravagant).
F 183 R3 (Clement, Paedagogus III xii 84):
1 would advise even married men not to kiss their wives at home in front of the servants; for Aristotle does not even allow us to laugh in front of our slaves, still less to let our wives be seen to be embraced in their presence.
V • PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS
F 185–208 R3
F 185 R3 (Syrianus, Commentarius in Metaphysica 120.33–121.4):
That he [sc. Aristotle] has nothing more than this to say against the theory of Forms is shown both by the first book of this treatise [i.e. the Metaphysics] and by the two books he wrote On the Forms; for it is by taking everywhere practically these same arguments, and sometimes cutting them up and subdividing them, sometimes putting them forward more concisely, that he tries to correct his predecessors in philosophy.
F 186 R3 (Scholiast to Dionysius Thrax, 116.13–16 Hilgard):
And one must realize that it is of universals and things eternal that there are definitions, as Aristotle too has said in On Ideas, which he wrote against Plato’s Ideas. For while particular things all change and never remain in the same condition, universals are unchangeable and eternal.
(Alexander, Commentarius in Metaphysica 79.3–88.2):
They [sc. the Platonists] made further use of the sciences in establishing the Ideas, and in more ways than one, as he [sc. Aristotle] says in the first book of On Ideas; and the arguments he seems to have in mind at the present moment [i.e. [5] in the Metaphysics] are the following sort. If every science performs its task by referring to some one and the same thing and not to any of the particulars, then there will be with respect to each science something different apart from perceptible individuals, eternal and a pattern for the things produced in each science; and such a thing is the Idea. Again, the things of which there are sciences exist; the sciences are of certain different things apart from particulars (for the latter are infinite and indeterminate, while the sciences are of determinate things); so there are certain [10] things apart from particulars, and these are the Ideas. Again, if medicine is not a science of this particular health but of health simply, there will be a certain health-itself; and if geometry is not a science of this particular equal and this particular commensurate, but of equal simply and the commensurate simply, there will be a certain equal-itself and a commensurate-itself; and these are the Ideas. [15]
Now such arguments do not prove the thesis at issue, which was that there are Ideas; but they do prove that there are certain things apart from particulars and perceptibles. But it does not follow that if there are certain things which are apart from particulars, these are Ideas; for the common objects, which we say are also the objects of the sciences, are apart from the particulars. Again, these arguments show that there are also Ideas of the things that fall under the arts. For every art too [20] refers what is produced by it to some one thing, and things of which there are arts exist, and the arts are of certain different things apart from particulars. And the last argument, besides equally failing to prove that there are Ideas, will also be thought to establish Ideas of things for which they do not wish there to be Ideas. For [80.1] if, because medicine is not a science of this particular health but of health simply, there is some thing health-itself, then such will be the case also in each of the arts. For an art is not of the particular nor of this, but of that simply which is its concern, e.g. carpentry is of chair simply but not of this particular one, and of bed simply but [5] not of this particular one; and sculpture, painting, building, and each of the other arts are similarly related to the things that fall under them. So there will be an Idea of each of the things that fall under the arts—which they do not want.
They also use the following argument to establish the Ideas. If each of the many men is a man, and each of the animals is an animal, and similarly in the other [10] cases; and if in the case of each of these it is not that something is predicated of itself but that some one thing is being predicated of all of them while not being the same as any one of them, then there will be something which is apart from the particulars which exist, separated from them and eternal; for it is predicated always alike of all [15] the changing particulars. And that which is one over many, both separated from them and eternal, is an Idea; so there are Ideas.
This argument, he [sc. Aristotle] says, establishes Ideas even of negations and of things that do not exist. For one and the same negation is predicated of many things and of things which do not exist, and is not the same as any one of the things which it is truly predicated of. For ‘not-man’ is predicated of horse and of dog and of [20] everything apart from man, and for this reason is one thing over many and is not the same as any one of the things of which it is predicated. Again, it always remains alike true of like things; for ‘not-musical’ is true of many things (of everything [81.1] non-musical), and similarly ‘not-man’ of non-men; consequently, there are Ideas also of negations. But that is absurd; for how could there be an Idea of non-being? For if one were to accept that, there would be a single Idea for things that are of different kinds and that differ in every respect—of, as it might be, line and man; for [5] all these are non-horses. Again, there will be a single Idea both of things that are i
ndeterminate and of things that are infinite. But also of what is primary and what is secondary; for both man and animal are non-wood, of which the one is primary, the other secondary—and they did not want there to be either genera or Ideas of such things. Clearly, this argument too fails to show that there are Ideas; but it too [10] tends to show that what is commonly predicated is other than the particulars of which it is predicated. Again, the very people who wish to prove that what is commonly predicated of several things is some single thing and in fact an Idea, try to establish it from negations. For if someone in denying something of several things will do so by referring to some single thing (for someone who says of a man that he is not white and of a horse that it is not white is not in each case denying something [15] peculiar to it but is making reference to some single thing and denying the same white of each), then someone in affirming the same thing of several things will not be affirming something different in each case but there will be some single thing which he is affirming, e.g. man, with reference to some one and the same thing; for as with negation so with affirmation. So there is something that is different apart from what is in the perceptibles, which is the cause of the affirmation that is both true of several things and common, and this is the Idea. Now this argument, he says, [20] produces Ideas not only of things that are affirmed but also of things that are denied; for in both cases there is a similar reference to something single.
The argument that tries to establish that there are Ideas from thinking is as [25] follows. If whenever we think of man or footed or animal, we are thinking of something that is both among the things that exist yet is not one of the particulars (for when the latter have perished the same thought remains), clearly there is something apart from particulars and perceptibles, which we think of whether the latter exist or not; for we are certainly not then thinking of something non-existent. [82.1] And this is a Form and an Idea. Now he says that this argument also establishes Ideas of things that are perishing and have perished, and in general of things that are both particulars and perishable—e.g. of Socrates, of Plato; for we think of these men and keep some image of them even when they no longer exist. And indeed we also think of things that do not exist at all, like a Hippocentaur, a Chimaera: [5] consequently neither does this argument show that there are Ideas.