On November 24, 1997, as I had hoped, the key stakeholders jointly submitted their grant application to the Hewlett Foundation. It was signed by all five members of the Players’ Committee; by Pastreich as executive director; and by two board members, including Bechtle.
A Hewlett grant was forthcoming.
We began our project by tending to the people who were suffering the most: the musicians. I knew that until the orchestra began to heal its internal conflicts, we would make no progress elsewhere. In Janu-ary 1998, Gary Friedman facilitated three open meetings, during which musicians discussed their feelings about the strike and why they thought it had happened.
It was tough going at first. People were reticent. In the second session, Gary taught the musicians a method of “active listening” that we call “looping.” He conducted a practice exercise in which the musicians paired up. One member of the pair was asked to give her perspective on a particular topic, such as the strike. The other person was asked not to agree or disagree but instead simply to reflect back what he heard as accurately as possible, in his own words. The listener would then ask the speaker whether he had understood what had been said. The loop was complete only when the speaker confirmed that the listener had “gotten it.” After a few minutes, the pair would reverse roles so everyone could try their hand.
This exercise was remarkably effective in helping some musicians open up, first in pairs and then to the entire group. Several people broke down in tears. Some were able to communicate directly with colleagues they hadn’t spoken to in almost two years. In the group discussion, one member of the 1996–97 Negotiating Committee said she was afraid to express any views to the group because she felt she had made so many enemies during the strike. Another committee member said he had felt “confused” during the negotiations and had adopted the “safe route” of an extreme position, which he now recognized had escalated the conflict. He added that he felt he lacked the skills to negotiate effectively. Other musicians not only described their experiences of the strike, but their love of making music. Musicians who had previously seen each other simply as political opponents rediscovered their shared passion, and this helped them better tolerate their differences.
Another aspect of our early work was a two-day workshop at a retreat center in Marin County. We chose the participants carefully: there were sixteen musicians, including all the members of the Players’ Committee; nine trustees, including Bechtle; and seven managers, including Pastreich. We wanted to introduce them to interest-based bargaining, but above all we wanted them to have fun—to see each other as individuals and to begin the process of de-demonization.
Our negotiation simulations elicited the laughter we hoped for. These exercises had nothing to do with collective bargaining, which made the participants feel safer. In one exercise, Hemphill found himself in the same group as board member Len Kingsley and whispered playfully, “Hey, Len, let’s slime these guys.” And they did.
We also did a series of exercises on active listening and effective assertion. Through a simple pencil-and-paper exercise, we helped each participant learn more about his or her own tendencies when faced with conflict. Some people tend to be competitive—they do a whole lot of asserting without expressing much understanding of the other side. Others tend to be accommodating—they understand the other side’s interests so well that they have difficulty asserting their own interests. Still others tend to be conflict avoiders—they neither assert nor demonstrate understanding; they just withdraw. Competitors are often easy targets for demonization, especially by avoiders or accommodators who are not very assertive themselves. (I and everyone else could predict where Pastreich would come out: he scored as a competitor. So did Hemphill. Chris Gilbert was an avoider.) Our goal, however, was not to typecast anyone, but instead to help participants think about their default tendencies and how they might broaden their negotiation repertoire by becoming better listeners and more effective advocates.
Pastreich later reported: “I came to understand how important it was for me to listen to the other side. … It became clear to me that one of the things that the musicians were angry with me about was they felt … I wasn’t even listening to what they were saying. And I think it is true. Nor do I think they were listening to us.”
The next part of the workshop brought things a bit closer to home: a simulated negotiation between a school district and its teachers’ union.16 Each team included agents and principals. The union representatives had to deal with their constituents; management had to deal with the school board; and the two sides had to negotiate with each other. In making the role assignments, we mixed things up. Some musicians were assigned to management roles and some board members were assigned to the union. The idea was to increase everyone’s sensitivity to the perspectives of the other side, a key piece of any negotiation training. The board members, in particular, seemed delighted (and rather starstruck) to be working with the musicians. This generally worked, although one musician assigned to a management role dropped out of the exercise, saying she simply “couldn’t think that way.” I suspect at some level she thought she would jeopardize her own values or even soil her soul by trying to see the world through management’s eyes.
When we returned from the workshop, our next task was to help the Players’ Committee redesign the process by which the musicians would elect the next Negotiating Committee. These elections had typically been held in a perfunctory way, with no real opportunity for candidates to explain how they intended to approach the negotiations and what they saw as their role. The new process required candidates to explain, at a meeting of the orchestra as a whole, how they would approach the next negotiation. None of the Hard Liners from the old committee were nominated, and most of the candidates had attended our first workshop. Several made a point of expressing their commitment to interest-based bargaining—a broad term that puts the emphasis on a more collaborative, less adversarial process that focuses on the parties’ underlying interests, not simply their stated demands or positions.
In May 1998, the musicians elected a new Negotiating Committee. Chris Gilbert was elected chairman, and all members expressed interest in further negotiation training. Pastreich said he thought it was the most positive committee in twenty years.
That same spring, Pastreich dropped a bombshell by announcing that he planned to retire in 1999, after the next round of contract negotiations. I wondered: Had Bechtle and the trustees eased him out, or had Pastreich simply decided that after twenty-some years it was time to move on? I have never learned. For my purposes, what I found most significant was that Bechtle and the board were giving him one more chance to negotiate. I was glad they did, because by this time I was persuaded that Pastreich was going to be part of the solution: he had thrown himself into the training, was a quick study, and seemed eager to demonstrate he could be an effective problem solver. (My only concern now was that in trying to shake his reputation as a devil, he might make too many concessions, because he wouldn’t have to live with the financial consequences.)
Our second two-day workshop focused on the special features of collective bargaining and was designed for a smaller group: the sixteen people who would play the most active roles in the next round of negotiations. Half were musicians, including all the members of the new Negotiating Committee. Management included Pastreich, five of his key managers, and two trustees: Bechtle and Len Kingsley, who chaired the Labor-Management Committee. Again we conducted a labor-management simulation in which each side included constituents as well as negotiators.
At the end of the workshop, we told the participants it was time to put their new skills to use on symphony business. Although the existing contract would not expire until November 1999, both management and the Negotiating Committee wanted to negotiate the new contract well before the deadline, perhaps by the end of 1998. What prepara-tion must be done separately by each side? What preparation might best be done jointly?
The group decided to use joint tas
k forces, composed of labor and management, to develop basic factual information, define issues, and generate options. The use of joint task forces to prepare for negotiations isn’t typical in collective bargaining, but recent surveys suggest that about one in five labor negotiations use them.17 Our group created several joint task forces by the end of the summer of 1998.
One group was charged with gathering factual information about the latest contract terms of other major American orchestras. This information was critical to both sides. Some issues, such as minimum weekly salary, are negotiated by reference to other orchestras. Having common information would avoid needless arguments about basic facts.
A second task force was created to conduct preliminary research on pension and retirement issues. This was a long-simmering issue at the SFS. Some musicians liked the current pension plan. Others preferred the one sponsored by the AFM. Which was better? Should musicians be given a choice? These seemingly simple questions raised financial, accounting, and legal questions that were too complicated for laymen to answer, and the negotiators had not made much progress in the past. This time the workshop participants decided that each side would retain its own pension consultant to assist the task force.
A third task force was created to investigate the possibilities of “string relief.” This had been a difficult issue in every previous negotiation. String players spend more time onstage playing their instruments than other orchestra members. As a result, many string players claimed, they were much more prone to developing serious stress-related injuries. The issue had been a priority for the string players, of course, but not for some other musicians. The issue had not advanced very far in the past. The task force would try to lay a foundation for approaching this problem in more creative ways.
In the next phase of our project we worked behind the table with the Negotiating Committee. With our help and support, the committee set about designing a process to identify the orchestra’s most important priorities. There would be no laundry list this time. The committee wanted to involve the orchestra in the process of preparation, but they now understood the importance of exercising leadership. As representatives, how could the committee guide the musicians as well as being responsive to them? Although it was no easy task, the committee did a superb job.
First, the members spent many hours together discussing their own sense of the orchestra’s interests and priorities. In the process, they learned how to solve problems within the committee—to negotiate effectively with one another. Gilbert, the chairman, came to understand that it was essential for the committee to work by consensus and not simply decide by majority rule. Operating by consensus means that everyone makes a good-faith effort to meet the interests of all the committee members. Consensus is ordinarily reached when everyone agrees they can live with whatever is proposed, after every effort has been made to meet the interests of the parties. While consensus-building aims at seeking unanimous agreement, it does not necessarily require unanimity. Unanimity would allow an individual member to hold out and veto a course of action. Instead, consensus-building requires that everyone’s viewpoint be taken seriously and that every effort be made to meet everyone’s interests.
Once the committee reached some preliminary conclusions about what the issues should be and what interests lay under those issues, they sent a survey to the orchestra. But unlike their approach in 1996, when they had essentially gone around inviting demands indiscriminately, this survey laid out the committee’s recommendations and asked for specific feedback. Because this was so well done, it bears quoting it at length. The preamble stated:
After many hours of active discussion, we have come up with a list of areas/issues, which we believe are the most important to the orchestra. We then divided this list into categories: Class I, issues that are of primary importance to this negotiation; and Class II, issues that we will address vigorously, but are of somewhat lesser importance. … Also, in keeping with our commitment to an “interest-based” bargaining process, we have identified what we believe are the orchestra’s underlying interests for each area/issue.
For example, under “Compensation” two interests were identified:
Compensation commensurate with industry standards in light of our artistic achievement; and
Ability to attract and retain the best players.
The survey asked each musician to indicate whether he or she agreed or disagreed that compensation, pension, string relief, and health benefits should be the Class I issues, and whether they agreed or disagreed with the committee’s characterization of the underlying interests.
The survey also listed the Class II issues and asked whether the respondent
agreed with the Class II characterization;
thought the issue should instead be Class I; or
thought this was an issue that need not be included in the bargaining.
Respondents were also asked to add other issues to the list, along with an explanation of underlying interests.
The survey results showed—and a subsequent orchestra meeting confirmed—that a substantial majority agreed with the committee’s priorities. The committee concluded that compensation, pension, and string relief would be Class I issues. The players were satisfied with their existing health plan, so the committee decided not to bring this issue to the table but agreed that if management raised it, it would be a Class I issue. The Class II issues were scheduling, auditions, the treatment of past retirees, the possibility of personal leave, and the public use of the San Francisco Symphony’s name in a way that included the musicians and not simply the corporate body. Management accepted this classification of issues and asked that health insurance be discussed because of management’s concerns about costs.
In addition to setting priorities and building a mandate, the Negotiating Committee also carefully considered what role it wanted its lawyer to play. In the 1996 negotiations, the musicians had used their attorney as their primary spokesman and negotiator. This time, the committee preferred that labor and management deal directly with one another instead of acting through counsel. After confirming that management found this approach acceptable, the committee decided to retain a lawyer who supported the concept of interest-based bargaining. In a highly unusual move, the committee also decided to look for a lawyer who would find it acceptable not to be at the table. After interviewing candidates, the committee retained an experienced labor lawyer who later comfortably played just that role. This proved to be a significant decision for the committee—a signal to both sides that the Negotiating Committee would be in control of the bargaining process for the musicians.18
By November 1998, the parties had been in negotiation training, on and off, for fourteen months. Now they were ready to negotiate across the table. This negotiation took place in two stages and required only six days in total. Note the ratio. We and the parties had spent over 90 percent of our time on preparation behind the table and in joint committees. For a complex negotiation, with critical conflicts behind the table, this is an appropriate ratio.
In November, during this first phase of the actual negotiations, Gary and I met with the parties for two days—to clear out the underbrush, so to speak, and to identify the precise issues that needed to be resolved. One important issue the parties identified was whether the contract term should be longer than the usual three years, to provide more stability. They preliminarily agreed that they would aim for a contract that would not expire until November 2005—nearly six years later. They also developed a detailed schedule for the negotiations and agreed on basic ground rules concerning confidentiality and statements to the press. They even reached substantive agreement concerning two Class II issues relating to “past retirees” and the use of the symphony’s name.19
The parties also laid a foundation for addressing the nettlesome issue of string relief. At our suggestion, everyone present was arbitrarily assigned to one of three groups, each containing both musicians and managers. The groups were charged wi
th an identical task: to create a statement of the goals of string relief. The groups then pooled their results and agreed on the following joint statement:
The goals of string relief are to raise morale, promote a sense of physical and mental well being, and improve the already high level of performance of the San Francisco Symphony’s string players. Solutions will be sought to reduce the time on stage and physical demands on string players and to make stage time more rewarding. All elements of the symphony, including the music director, musicians, staff, and board will work together to accomplish these goals.
The entire group then engaged in brainstorming to generate options that might contribute to string relief. We set two ground rules for brainstorming: no evaluation (that is, no judging ideas as good or bad) and no ownership of ideas. Crazy ideas were welcome! They stimulated creativity. Among the ideas generated: a smaller string section, more substitutes, more comfortable clothing, and on-site tai chi or physical therapy. Based on this work, the group decided to develop concrete proposals for the final negotiating session in December.
The effect of this work on the string players was profound. For the first time, everyone was focusing on their problem—not just the entire orchestra, but management as well. On this issue, at least, the string players were finally being heard. (The contract would ultimately include innovative provisions for string relief. Said Gilbert: “We might never have to talk about string relief again.”)
The parties set aside five full days in December to address the core issues. During this period, they successfully negotiated all the terms of a new agreement, including a six-year term. Gary and I facilitated these meetings and acted as mediators. The following anecdote illustrates the problem-solving spirit in which both sides approached these negotiations.
Bargaining with the Devil Page 24