Meanwhile, some two and a half miles up the Nashville Turnpike in the dilapidated log cabin that was the forward headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland, it had become apparent to Rosecrans that McCook had no intention of moving further that night. Exasperated by the delay, Rosecrans summoned his slothful lieutenant shortly after midnight. McCook received the order at 1:00 A.M. and, after groping through the darkness, arrived at headquarters at 3:30. Rosecrans repeated his instructions: McCook was to bring his left to rest on Negley's exposed right, extending his line southward, with his own right to rest on or near the Franklin road, facing east. A chastised McCook returned to his encampment, having promised to cross Overall's Creek at dawn.8
As was his custom in the field, Rosecrans rose early Tuesday morning, 30 December. Outside, his staff officers had constructed a makeshift annex to the log cabin headquarters consisting of a fire, a bench, and a canopy of rails with gum blankets overhead. Rosecrans walked over to the fire and sat down, while his staff officers went about their business at a respectful distance, some copying orders, others peering through field glasses in the hope of catching a glimpse of the enemy, a little more than a mile away down the Nashville Turnpike. If they really had expected to see much that morning they were disappointed, as the weather and terrain combined to render the Rebels invisible. From army headquarters the turnpike sloped gently downward, then upward as it neared the Round Forest. At the Round Forest it again dipped, blocking from view what lay beyond. Besides it had rained all night, so that a thick mist veiled the gathering, “obscuring vision and oppressing the senses.” All this was of little concern to Rosecrans as he conferred with Crittenden by the fire, despite the interest of his staff in the matter. What occupied his mind at the moment was not the enemy to the southeast but rather the progress of McCook's infantry along Overall Creek.
Fortunately for McCook, Rosecrans was unaware of the Right Wing's lack of progress. Although his troops had been awakened at 3:00 A.M., McCook dallied, waiting until 9:30 to begin the advance. When the Right Wing finally did move, it was Sheridan who led the way. Screened by a regiment of cavalry, the Irishman's division crossed Overall's Creek in column, followed by Davis and Johnson. At first the Federals encountered only sporadic resistance from pickets ensconced in the cedars east of the bridge. But with each step deeper into the woods the opposition grew heavier until, by the time Sheridan reached the Gresham farm, the combined efforts of his lead regiments, the Twenty-second and Forty-second Illinois, were needed to dislodge the enemy. As artillery was now being brought to bear against his advance as well, McCook thought it prudent to halt and deploy Sheridan's division in line of battle, ready to resume the advance upon Davis's arrival.
McCook fed Davis's infantry into line on Sheridan's right as it came up. Davis conducted a left wheel, Sheridan swung Sill's brigade eastward, and the two divisions made contact near the Harding house. Leaving Johnson's division in reserve (less the brigade of Edward Kirk, which had been sent forward to extend Davis's right), McCook threw out a strong skirmish line and recommenced the advance at 2:00 P.M. Immediately the Federals came under fire from McCown's skirmishers, posted in a belt of timber to the southeast. Eager to gain cover, McCook's infantry crossed the open fields rapidly and in good order, only to face a new peril as they tried to pry the enemy from among the cedars and limestone outcrops. Sergeant Lewis Day of the One Hundred First Ohio likened the fighting to a “cat and mouse” game in which the defender had the advantage, as he generally caught sight of his opponent first. The outcome of such a contest, noted Day, “depended largely on nerve and dexterity after discovery.”9
The men of the Twenty-first Illinois had an opportunity to demonstrate their nerve and dexterity, if not good judgment, as they pushed toward the Widow Smith house. While the remainder of their brigade halted two hundred yards short of the house, the Illinoisans kept on, seizing the six Napolean guns of Felix Robertson in a gallant rush. But it was a fleeting triumph. A sudden volley from McNair's front rank, concealed behind the split-rail fences near the Widow Smith house, drove the Twenty-first back across the field and into the woods.10
As the twilight melted into darkness an uneasy silence fell across the lines. Only seven hundred yards separated McCook's wing, now in position, from Withers's front line. North of the Wilkinson Turnpike, Negley's division, having clawed its way through cedar brakes dense even in winter and over outcrops the height of a man, was also up and fronted east, about the same distance from Cheatham. Rousseau arrived at 4:00. Having no place to insert him, Thomas ordered Rousseau to bivouac in a small wood near Rosecrans's headquarters.11
On the left, where Crittenden had moved into position the night before, the day passed quietly. His men had little to do but sit or stand in line in the face of a driving rain. James Barnes of the Eighty-sixth Indiana has left a moving portrayal of that dismal Tuesday, passed in “anxious suspense” as the Hoosiers “stood shivering in the lines” near Stones River. Holding their rifles away from the rain, Barnes and his comrades watched as all around them the familiar yet foreboding preparations for battle went on: “The orders were to be ready at a moment's notice. The lines were forming. Batteries were being placed into position. Dark columns stood noiseless in the rain. Hospitals were established in the rear, and the musicians and other non-combatants were detailed to bear the stretchers and attend the ambulances. Medical stores were unpacked and countless rolls of bandages placed at hand for use. Provision trains were brought up and rations issued.”12
The anxiety was greater still down the Nashville Turnpike, where Bragg spent the day in the saddle, listening intently as the firing on his left grew louder, heralding the advance of McCook. In view of the relative quiet on the right, Bragg interpreted the Federal movement on his left as the prelude to a general attack in that sector. He was troubled. Terminating on the Franklin road, his left flank was in danger of being enveloped, should McCook choose to press his advantage. Consequently, he dispatched John McCown's division—his only real reserve—to this threatened part of the field with orders to extend the Confederate line below the Franklin road.13
As the afternoon wore on and the skirmishing to the south continued to grow in intensity, Bragg directed Hardee, then on the east bank of Stones River, to proceed at once to the left with Cleburne and his division and take charge of McCown's command as well. Hardee obeyed, but not before reminding Breckinridge that he alone was now responsible for the integrity of the army's right, to which Wayne's Hill was the key. The Kentuckian understood. He ordered the remainder of the Orphan Brigade to join their comrades of the Fourth Kentucky, who by their impetuosity had saved the hill the night before, and detailed one two-gun section from the Washington Artillery and another from Lumsden's battery to reinforce Cobb. Dan Adams's brigade came over from the extreme right to fill the gap created by Hanson's movement, and Preston and Palmer each shook out a company of skirmishers.14
Hardee arrived on the left at sundown to find McCown and Cheatham at odds over the nature of the ground to their front and how best to defend it. Perhaps because he had served longer with Cheatham, Hardee accepted his opinion and, after accompanying the two on a twilight inspection of the lines, ordered McCown to bring Brigadier General Evander McNair's brigade even with the left flank of Colonel J. Q. Loomis's Alabama-Louisiana brigade. Fearful of provoking a night engagement should he advance McNair, McCown demurred, suggesting instead that Hardee position the brigade personally or, at the very least, that he instruct Cheatham to point out the desired location. Hardee agreed to the latter request, and the two division commanders rode forward into the gathering darkness. Cheatham showed McCown the spot—a small, triangular field bordered on the north and west by the Franklin road and on the south and east by a small cedar thicket. McCown rode to McNair and, after talking briefly, ordered him forward. The Arkansans picked their way two hundred yards through the timber to the opposite edge of the thicket. Here they halted, their right refused along the woodline. Although his righ
t was not where Hardee and Cheatham had hoped it would be, McNair was in contact with Loomis and within three hundred yards of the Federal picket line. Although Bragg would censure McCown for holding back McNair's right, arguing that McCown wasted precious minutes the following morning in bringing up these units, Ector and McNair agreed with their division commander that any further movement that night most certainly would have brought about a general engagement.
McNair's Arkansans also objected to the movement, though for different reasons. In their new forward position, they were prohibited from kindling fires. Having left their blankets in the rear, the Arkansans suffered severely. But as in any army at any time, orders were made to be broken. “I got between two rocks, in the bushes, built me a fire, and in company with ten or twelve men, spread my blanket for sleep,” recalled the semiliterate but eminently resourceful Washington Gammage.15
With McCown's position at least partially corrected, Hardee dispatched staff officers to fetch Cleburne, who had been waiting with his division at the ford near the Franklin road. It was midnight before his four brigades, stumbling through the darkness over unfamiliar ground, were up and in line. Even then Cleburne was not completely certain where he was: “As well as I could judge from the camp fires, my line was a prolongation to the left of Cheatham's line, and was four hundred or five hundred yards in rear of McCown's division.”16
While Cleburne felt his way into position, Bragg conferred with his corps commanders. Having passed one tension-filled day awaiting a Federal attack that never came, Bragg resolved to seize the initiative. Assuming that Rosecrans had stripped his left to support McCook—from whom Bragg had expected the primary Union thrust to come—the Army of Tennessee's commander suggested that Rosecrans be attacked along the Nashville Turnpike. Polk disagreed. As the transfer of McCown and Cleburne to the army's left had greatly extended that part of the line, Polk proposed a turning movement directed against the Federal right flank. Bragg concurred, and the appropriate orders were drafted. Hardee would begin the attack with his two divisions of infantry and Wharton's brigade of cavalry, which was to gain the Federal rear rapidly and create as much confusion as possible. Polk would take up the attack in turn, executing a “constant wheel to the right” with his right flank acting as a pivot. The object was simple: Push the enemy back to Stones River and, by interposing Wharton's troopers on the Nashville Turnpike, cut him off from his supply base at Nashville. All present—except perhaps Bragg—knew that the execution would be infinitely more difficult. A wheeling movement of the sort Bragg had in mind was challenging enough in open terrain; over broken ground laced with cedar thickets and cut by fences and farms it might well prove impossible. Compounding the difficulty was Bragg's desire that the attack be made in successive lines that were expected to advance simultaneously while maintaining a uniform spacing. Lastly, his lieutenants would be working under unfamiliar command relationships. As the same broken ground that made a successful wheeling movement unlikely also rendered the supervision of four front-line brigades by a single commander impossible, Withers and Cheatham had agreed to split their commands: Cheatham would direct the movements of Loomis, Manigault, Vaughan, and Maney, while Withers led Donelson, Stewart, Anderson, and Chalmers. Each general would have a more compact force to command, allowing him “to give that immediate, personal supervision which would insure the supports being thrown forward when necessary and with the least delay,” as Withers explained it.17 Logical in theory, it remained to be seen whether this novel arrangement would work on the field of battle.
Meanwhile, two miles up the Nashville Turnpike in the little log cabin that William Bickham called “the most exposed position on the battlefield,” Rosecrans was putting the final touches on his own plan of battle. Like Bragg, he was determined to attack in the morning. And like Bragg's, his plan called for an assault against the enemy's right. Crittenden would initiate the action, crossing Van Cleve's division at the McFadden's Lane ford and sending it against Breckinridge. After fording Stones River just above Wayne's Hill, Wood was to join the advancing Van Cleve on his right and assist him in driving the enemy onto Murfreesboro. This done, Wood's artillery would unlimber on Wayne's Hill and pour an enfilading fire into the Confederates posted across the river; meanwhile, Palmer and Thomas would press them from the west, sweeping them across Stones River and through Murfreesboro. While Crittenden and Thomas crushed the Confederate right and center, McCook was to occupy the best defensive positions he could find, refuse his right, and accept Bragg's attack; if none came, he was to engage the enemy to his front with a force sufficient to prevent its movement to other parts of the field.
His plan of battle formulated to his satisfaction, Rosecrans awaited the arrival of his lieutenants, whom he had summoned earlier. Thomas came first. After receiving his orders, he related to Rosecrans his belief that the enemy was preparing to attack McCook. Already concerned himself with the vulnerability of the Right Wing, Rosecrans sent a message to McCook at 6:00 P.M., directing him to build “large and extended” campfires beyond his right so as to give the impression of a large troop concentration. His business now completed, Thomas retired for the night. Crittenden, with whom Rosecrans had spoken at length during the afternoon, was “excused at the request of his chief of staff, who sent word that he was very much fatigued and was asleep.” McCook rode up at 9:00, accompanied by Captain Gates Thruston, his ordnance officer, and General Stanley. Waiting outside, Stanley and Thruston listened intently to the conversation between Rosecrans and McCook. According to Thruston, Rosecrans articulated his desires methodically, underscoring the need for McCook to hold his ground for at least three hours.
“You know the ground; you have fought over it; you know its difficulties. Can you hold your present position for three hours?” Rosecrans was skeptical.
“Yes; I think I can,” McCook answered.
“I don't like the facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you, who know the ground,” added Rosecrans. “If you don't think your present the best position, change it. It is only necessary for you to make things sure.”
With that the conference adjourned, and the three officers returned to the Right Wing.18
Alone now with his staff, Rosecrans reflected on his plans and composed a lofty exhortation to the army. Composed as a general order, it read, in part, as follows:
Soldiers, the eyes of the whole nation are upon you; the very fate of the nation may be said to hang on the issue of this day's battle. Be true, then, to yourselves, true to your own manly character and soldierly reputation, true to the love of your dear ones at home, whose prayers ascend to God this day for your success.
Be cool! I need not ask you to be brave. Keep ranks. Do not throw away your fire. Fire slowly, deliberately; above all, fire low, and be always sure of your aim. Close steadily in upon the enemy, and, when you get within charging distance, rush on him with the bayonet. Do this, and the victory will certainly be yours.
Rosecrans's general order never reached the men of Johnson's division, out on the far right of the Army of the Cumberland. Perhaps it was just as well, as they would never have a chance to execute it.19
The weather worsened as the night deepened. A northerly wind whipped up, chilling the moist air and whistling dismally through the trees. Rosecrans's Bluecoats, already soaked to the skin, wrapped themselves tighter in their equally wet blankets. An intrepid few started fires, playing a sort of cat-and-mouse game with their officers: “No sooner had the fires been started when they were discovered and an order immediately followed ‘put out those fires.’ Many of the men, however, did not propose to miss their coffee, so picked up burnt embers, held their cans over this, blowing the coal to keep it alive, they succeeded in boiling their much needed stimulant.”20
Up and down the line, units prepared for battle. The thoroughness of a unit's preparations depended on the ability and concern of its commanding officer. On the left, Wood directed that three days’ rations and an additional twenty ro
unds of ammunition be distributed to every man in the division. In the center, Thomas ordered Rousseau to break camp no later than 6:00 A.M.; he wanted the Kentuckian ready to move in behind Negley at a moment's notice.21 But on the right, where the need for vigilance was the greatest, an air of indifference had taken hold. Perhaps it was their ignorance of the strength and dispositions of the Confederate infantry laying a mere three hundred yards away that paralyzed the generals of the Right Wing and prevented them from taking reasonable precautions, or perhaps it was their certainty that Crittenden's attack would eliminate any threat to their end of the line. Whatever the reason, there were indications of the whirlwind to come. That afternoon, Stanley had sent McCook a garrulous and apparently cooperative civilian, discovered near his home on the Franklin road, who provided surprisingly accurate intelligence. “I was up to the enemy's line of battle twice yesterday and once this morning,” he told McCook. “The right of Cheatham's division rests on the Wilkinson pike; Withers is on Cheatham's left, with his left resting on the Franklin road; Hardee's corps is entirely beyond that road, and his left extending toward the Salem pike.” McCook sent the man to army headquarters and, now somewhat concerned for his extreme right, directed Johnson to deploy Willich's brigade beside Kirk's. But apart from this, McCook took no other action except to assemble his division commanders long enough to relay Rosecrans's plan of battle.
No Better Place to Die- The Battle of Stones River Page 10