Cheatham's losing battle with the bottle predated Stones River and continued to the war's end. Writing his father as early as January 1862, a captain in the Second Tennessee complained that “Frank Cheatham drinks too much to rely upon.” And at Spring Hill, Tennessee, during the Franklin campaign, John Bell Hood missed an opportunity to crush the scattered army of John Schofield in detail, allegedly because Cheatham was off drinking and seducing women when he should have been directing his troops.
Because of Cheatham's popularity among Tennessee units and influence in the state, as well as a previously distinguished combat record, Bragg did not try to dismiss him. Instead, he convinced Polk to censure him and, in his official report of the battle, Bragg failed to commend him, as was customary. Cheatham returned Bragg's contempt, telling Governor Harris that he would not fight so long as Bragg commanded the Army of Tennessee.4
Having fewer friends in high places, John McCown was an easier target than Cheatham. Bragg blamed McCown for delaying the attack on the morning of 31 December by as much as two hours; McCown, in turn, criticized Bragg in public; Bragg countered by having him court-martialed.
The most damaging evidence at McCown's March 1863 court-martial came from Gideon Pillow, who eagerly responded to a request from Major William Clare of the general staff that he “reduce to writing the substance of vituperative language used in (his) presence by Major General McCown at Shelbyville.” McCown had visited his headquarters in late January, wrote Pillow. After they exchanged pleasantries, McCown sat down and launched into a denunciation of Bragg, whom he accused of placing artillery behind his division at Stones River in order to disgrace it and of subsequently robbing it of two of its finest regiments. But no matter, McCown concluded, his division had done the “only good fighting” at Stones River, and if Bragg sacked him, no matter either, as “he had four acres of land in East Tennessee” and “could go there and make potatoes.” At this point Pillow's narrative becomes suspect. Obviously angered at having been relieved of troop command and put out to pasture to raise conscripts for the western armies, Pillow perhaps saw in his testimony a chance at taking McCown's division and regaining Bragg's favor, which he had lost when he joined Breckinridge, Preston, and Trabue in expressing their lack of confidence in him. As Pillow assured Major Clare:
I was anxious to conciliate his feeling and said to (McCown), General, you have no right to complain. In the Mexican War, I was a major general and you were a lieutenant. In the beginning of this war, I was a major general commanding the whole Army of Tennessee and I assisted to have you appointed a lieutenant colonel of artillery. Now I am a brigadier general without any command at all, and you a major general with a fine division…. Yet you have not heard me complain, although I am now put on a most distasteful service—totally repugnant to my feelings. If you are as good a patriot as I am, you will cease abusing the general commanding.
But Pillow's self-serving testimony was not the only evidence against McCown. While in Columbus, Kentucky, McCown broadened his target to include the civilian leadership of the Confederacy, which he told several junior officers was a “damned stinking cotton oligarchy…gotten up for the benefit of Isham G. Harris and Jeff Davis and their damned corrupt cliques.” Exit John McCown, suspended from duty for six months.5
Bragg's skirmishes with Cheatham and McCown were mere sidelights to a longer, more bitter, yet ultimately inconclusive duel with Breckinridge—a duel of words that threatened from time to time to erupt into a duel of pistols.
Bragg shot first. In his official report he blasted the Kentuckian for failing to dispatch reinforcements across the river quickly on 31 December and for poor direction of the attack of 2 January, which Bragg implied would have succeeded had Breckinridge done his job better. To substantiate his accusations, Bragg extracted testimony from selected field commanders and staff officers. On 16 February, he requested Captain Felix Robertson to render a special report directly to army headquarters concerning the role played by artillery in the 2 January attack. Bragg's note was worded in such a way as to leave no doubt that he was less than satisfied with Breckinridge's handling of the charge and that he hoped to gather evidence to support his feeling. Robertson got the message. His original report, addressed to Breckinridge, had been simply a terse account of the movements of his guns; his revised report, however, clearly blamed the Kentuckian for the failure of the attack, at least from the standpoint of the artillery. Bragg was pleased. Similar accounts followed from Colonel Brent and Gideon Pillow, although one wonders how much of the attack Pillow could have witnessed from behind a tree.
Breckinridge was handicapped in responding to these charges by Bragg's unwillingness to share the contents of his report before he submitted it to the Department of War. When Breckinridge finally did read the report in Richmond newspapers in late March, he immediately wrote the Inspector General of the Confederacy, Samuel Cooper, requesting a court of inquiry be convened to investigate all charges raised against his division by the commanding general. Bragg endorsed Breckinridge's request with a comment that the Kentuckian's own report of the battle was “both full of errors and misstatements.”
A month passed with no response from Richmond. Breckinridge again begged Cooper to convene a court of inquiry. The press was largely behind him. The Knoxville Register considered the criticism of Cheatham, McCown, and Breckinridge undignified and unjust: “My impression is that they made only venial mistakes, and that heroism displayed is a sufficient shield against even the official criticism of General Bragg,” wrote the Register's Richmond correspondent. The Richmond Examiner agreed, adding that simple justice demanded the publication of the reports of the censured generals, which Bragg had delayed.6
Breckinridge never did get his court of inquiry, and his bitterness smoldered until late May, when he was transferred to Mississippi. Hardee followed Breckinridge to Mississippi in July, and for a time it appeared that the anti-Bragg forces had been subdued.
Bragg's victory, however, was more apparent than real. The discord was merely dormant, awaiting a new battlefield setback to release it. The damage done the high command of the Army of Tennessee and Confederate fortunes in the West was permanent. The dissension sown by the twin defeats of Perryville and Stones River had all but wrecked the army from within. Bragg, Polk, Cheatham, and—until their transfers—Hardee and Breckinridge were so absorbed with their internecine feud that they neglected what should have been the sole object of their attention, the defense of what remained of Confederate Tennessee against Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland. From late January until the end of June, the Army of Tennessee lay idle along the Duck River line while its commanders sparred with one another. No plan of strategy was developed, no strong defensive line established. The results were predictable. When Rosecrans advanced from Murfreesboro in late June, Bragg conceded Middle Tennessee without having fired scarcely a shot in its defense. A paralyzed Army of Tennessee fell back on Chattanooga, and Tennessee was lost. The ghost of Stones River continued to haunt the army. At a time when the high command should have been united in an effort to deny Rosecrans the Confederate heartland, the anti-Bragg faction was renewing its efforts to unseat the commanding general.
By September, the clique had been revitalized by the addition of three new and powerful members. Daniel Harvey Hill had joined the army in July to replace Hardee. In September, Kentuckian Simon Buckner assumed command of the new Third Corps, and James Longstreet arrived from the Army of Northern Virginia at the head of two divisions.
Hill was much like Bragg, easily affronted and quick to criticize others; that the two should come into conflict was inevitable. But while Hill's opposition to Bragg grew out of personal contact, Buckner and Longstreet were prejudiced against the commanding general before they arrived by their understanding of Stones River. Buckner was angered by Bragg's treatment of Kentuckians and by his anti-Kentucky invective after Perryville and Stones River. The slaughter of 2 January only deepened his hostility toward Bragg. Bu
ckner thus was a natural successor to Breckinridge as leader of the implacably anti-Bragg Kentucky faction. In Virginia, Longstreet had heard and fully accepted the anti-Bragg interpretation of Stones River. Echoing Polk and Hardee, he told Lee as he prepared to leave for the West that the Army of Tennessee utterly lacked confidence in Bragg and that, as a consequence, Bragg could not be expected to “do a great deal for us.” And if the presence of three such formidable opponents was not enough to cripple Bragg, Joseph Johnston returned Breckinridge to the Army of Tennessee in August.
The anti-Bragg group was thus nearing its apogee as the army entered the battle of Chickamauga in late September. Arrayed against Bragg, ready to exploit his slightest failing, was virtually the entire high command of his army. Bragg did not disappoint them. His performance throughout Chickamauga was that of a man who had lost all faith in himself. Bragg neglected to issue the specific orders needed to ensure a coordinated attack against the Army of the Cumberland on the first day of battle, and his plan to envelop the Federal left was doomed from the outset. That night, after the army had dissipated its strength in a series of uncoordinated assaults, Bragg decided upon a complete reorganization of the army in the face of the enemy. He created two wings, placing Longstreet in command of the left and Polk the right. D. H. Hill was relegated to corps command. Bragg's stated reason for these changes was to avoid trouble in the high command. The shadow of Stones River loomed dark.
The Confederate victory at Chickamauga did nothing to silence Bragg's critics within the army. Bragg had failed to follow up the victory with a pursuit of Rosecrans. To compensate for this and other shortcomings during the battle, Bragg already was conniving to fix blame on his subordinates. On 22 September and again on 25 September, he sent Polk sharply worded notes demanding an explanation for Polk's failure to launch an early morning attack as ordered on 20 September. And, unknown to the group, Bragg had sent two letters to Davis similarly critical of Polk.
Polk could see the handwriting on the wall. He was determined not to repeat Breckinridge's mistake after Stones River of allowing Bragg to deliver the first and ultimately decisive blow. Hill, Buckner, and Longstreet supported Polk. On 26 September, they met secretly to plot what amounted to mutiny. All present agreed to begin a letter-writing campaign to unseat Bragg.
Events moved rapidly to a climactic release of pressures that had been building since Stones River. On 29 September, Bragg removed Polk. The public outcry caused Davis to hurry west. On 10 October, the anti-Bragg group attempted a countermove. In Bragg's presence, all four corps commanders—Longstreet, Hill, Buckner, and Cheatham (commanding in Polk's absence)—told Davis emphatically that Bragg must go.
Again Bragg's opponents had miscalculated. Confronted with this open display of insubordination and near mutiny, Davis sided with Bragg. Together, they broke up the anti-Bragg bloc. On 15 October, Davis authorized the removal of Hill. Eight days later, Polk was exiled to the Department of Mississippi. Buckner lost his corps and was reduced to division command. And on 5 November, Longstreet was detached with seventeen thousand men on independent service against Burnside in East Tennessee.
With the demotion or exile of their leaders, the subordinate members of the anti-Bragg group were an easy mark. William Preston, who had felt no “compunction or pity” for Bragg's predicament after Stones River, was reduced in rank to brigadier general. Cheatham saw his division of twenty-two Tennessee regiments, the core of Polk's support within the army, broken up until only six remained. Breckinridge's division was likewise reorganized, and each of his brigades reassigned.
In the final analysis, this reshuffling accomplished nothing. As at Tullahoma after Stones River, Bragg's preoccupation with the enemy within caused him to neglect the Federal army. With each passing day, the enemy at Chattanooga grew stronger. By the time Bragg realized the weakness of his own line, it was too late. This time, however, the price of neglect was much higher. Not only were sixty-seven hundred irreplaceable veterans lost in the battles around Chattanooga, but control of the gateway to the Deep South passed forever to the Union. On 1 December, Bragg resigned as commander of the Army of Tennessee, but not before blaming the defeat on cowardice within the army and on Breckinridge's alleged drunkenness.7
The chaos of Chickamauga and the ignominy of Chattanooga were still months in the future as winter gave way to spring in 1863. Reflecting on what had happened since Stones River, Bragg may have been satisfied with himself: he had retained his command; McCown was gone, at least for the time being; Hardee, Breckinridge, Cheatham, and Polk were chastised; and Johnston had lauded the fine condition of the army. But the soldiers knew otherwise. Riding with Colonel Urquhart near Tullahoma, Bragg encountered a straggling Tennessean. Noticing his Butternut clothing, the general asked offhandedly if he belonged to Bragg's army. “Bragg's army? He's got none; he shot half of them in Kentucky, and the other got killed up at Murfreesboro.”8 The general rode on.
APPENDIX
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE STONES RIVER CAMPAIGN
The following list was assembled from War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. With respect to officer casualties, (k) signifies killed, (mw) mortally wounded, (w) wounded, and (c) captured.
Army of the Cumberland
(Fourteenth Army Corps)
Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Commanding
Artillery
Col. James Barnett
Provost Guard
10th Ohio Infantry
General Escort
Anderson Troop, Pennsylvania Cavalry
RIGHT WING
Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook
First Division
Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis
Escort
36th Illinois Cavalry, Company B 2d Kentucky Cavalry, Company G
First Brigade
Col. P. Sidney Post
59th Illinois 75th Illinois
74th Illinois 22d Indiana
Second Brigade
Col. William P. Carlin
21st Illinois 101st Ohio
38th Illinois 15th Wisconsin
Third Brigade
Col. William E. Woodruff
25th Illinois 81st Indiana
35th Illinois
Artillery1
2d Minnesota Battery 8th Wisconsin Battery
5th Wisconsin Battery
Second Division
Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson
First Brigade
Brig. Gen. August Willich (c)
Col. William Wallace
Col. William H. Gibson
89th Illinois 15th Ohio
32d Indiana 49th Ohio
39th Indiana
Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. Edward N. Kirk (mw)
Col. Joseph B. Dodge
34th Illinois 30th Indiana
79th Indiana 77th Pennsylvania
29th Indiana
Third Brigade
Col. Philemon P. Baldwin
6th Indiana 1st Ohio
5th Kentucky 93rd Ohio
Artillery2
5th Indiana Battery 1st Ohio, Battery E
1st Ohio, Battery A
Cavalry
3d Indiana, Companies G, H, I, and K
Third Division
Brig. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan
Escort
2d Kentucky Cavalry, Company L
First Brigade
Brig. Gen. Joshua W. Sill (k)
Col. Nicholas Greusel
Second Brigade
Col. Frederick Schaefer (k)
Lieut. Col. Bernard Laiboldt
44th Illinois 2d Missouri
73d Illinois 15th Missouri
Third Brigade
Col. George W. Roberts (k)
Col. Luther P. Bradley
22d Illinois 42d Illinois
27th Illinois 51st Illinois
Artillery3
1st Illinois, Battery C 1st Missouri, Battery G
4th Indiana Battery
CENTER
Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas
Provost Guard
9th Michigan Infantry
First Division
Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau
First Brigade
Col. Benjamin F. Scribner
38th Indiana 94th Ohio
2d Ohio 10th Wisconsin
33d Ohio
Second Brigade
Col. John Beatty
42d Indiana 15th Kentucky
88th Indiana 3d Ohio
Third Brigade
Col. John C. Starkweather
24th Illinois 1st Wisconsin
79th Pennsylvania 21st Wisconsin
Fourth Brigade
Lieut. Col. Oliver L. Shephard
15th United States, 1st Battalion
16th United States, 1st Battalion and Company B, 2d Battalion
18th United States, 1st Battalion and Companies A and D, 3d Battalion
18th United States, 2d Battalion and Companies B, C, E, and F,
3d Battalion
19th United States, 1st Battalion
Artillery4
Kentucky, Battery A 5th United States, Battery H
1st Michigan, Battery A
Cavalry
2d Kentucky (six companies)
Second Division
Brig. Gen. James S. Negley
First Brigade
Brig. Gen. James G. Spears
1st Tennessee 5th Tennessee
2d Tennessee 6th Tennessee
3d Tennessee
Second Brigade
Col. Timothy R. Stanley
19th Illinois 18th Ohio
11th Michigan 69th Ohio
Third Brigade
Col. John F. Miller
37th Illinois 74th Ohio
21st Ohio 78th Pennsylvania
Artillery
Kentucky, Battery B 1st Ohio, Battery M5
1st Ohio, Battery G
No Better Place to Die- The Battle of Stones River Page 27