"Patient too tired": JFK medical file, JFKL.
"ready to quit": Kraus files, JFKL.
"I'm sorry, doctor": Reeves, 396.
It was a short twenty-minute hop: Author's interview with Ruger Winchester, former B-47 pilot, February 2006.
Logan was totally unprepared: History of 509th Bombardment Wing, October 1962, and Special Historical Annex on Cuban Crisis, FOIA, Whiteman AFB.
The 509th would have had difficulty: Author's interview with Ross Schmoll, former B-47 navigator, December 2005.
"We shouldn't worry": Carlos Franqui, Family Portrait with Fidel (New York: Random House, 1984), 192.
Soviet commanders had been gathering: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 130.
Pliyev had accepted the Cuba post: M. A. Derkachev, Osoboe Poruchenie (Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1994), 24-28, 48-50; Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 79. For Pliyev's personality, see also Dmitri Yazov, Udary Sudby (Moscow: Paleya-Mishin, 1999), 183-5.
The general explained the situation: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 143; Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 306.
"Cuba si, yanqui no": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 234.
Orders had already gone out: Karlov interview.
The submarines were still: Mikoyan notes dictated in January 1963; see Mikoyan, 252-4.
"in the interests of the motherland": Vladimir Semichastny, Bespoikonoe Serdtse (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), 236.
CHAPTER THREE: CUBANS
Radiation detection devices: U.S. Navy message, November 14, 1962, from DNI to CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
The photo interpreters had identified: October 22, 1962, transcript, JFK 3, 64. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 542.
An initial shipment of ninety: The NSA incorrectly identified the Indigirka on September 25 as an "icebreaker," but correctly noted that she had left from the Murmansk area. See NSA Cuban missile crisis release, October 1998. For Aleksandrovsk shipment, see Malinovsky report for Special Ammunition for Operation Anadyr, October 5, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2. Details on the Indigirka shipment come from Karlov notes and interview. The Soviet officer in charge of the deployment, Col. Nikolai Beloborodov, said in 1994 that six nuclear mines were also sent to Cuba, but this claim has not been confirmed by documents--James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford: Routledge, 1998), 58.
nicknamed "Tatyanas": The formal name for the bomb was RDS-4. Author's interview with Valentin Anastasiev, May 2006.
The Tatyanas were an afterthought: CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 259. See also draft directive to commander of Soviet forces on Cuba, September 8, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.
The absence of security fences: Based on the details provided by Anastasiev, the storage site for the Tatyana bombs appears to have been 23deg1'13''N, 82deg49'56''W, on the coast about five miles west of Mariel.
Like the Indigirka: A January 1963 reconstruction by the CIA located the Aleksandrovsk at the Guba Okolnaya submarine facility near Severomorsk on October 5. See "On the Trail of the Aleksandrovsk," released under CIA historical program, September 18, 1995, CREST.
Three 37mm antiaircraft guns: Malinovsky report, October 5, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.
Demolition engineers had placed: See Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 208, for the story of the Indigirka crossing. Aleksandrovsk procedures were similar.
for "saving the ship": Report by Maj. Gen. Osipov, MAVI; Karlov interview.
The Aleksandrovsk kept radio silence: For the escort ship, see, e.g., NSA intercepts, October 23, 1962; Cuban missile crisis release, vol. 2, October 1998.
a "dry cargo" ship: See CIA memorandum on "Soviet Bloc shipping to Cuba," October 23, 1962, JFKARC. On October 24, after the Aleksandrovsk had already docked in La Isabela, the CIA gave an incorrect position for the ship, and said she was not expected in Havana until October 25--CIA memorandum, October 24, 1962, CREST. The Aleksandrovsk was located through electronic direction-finding techniques rather than visually.
"an underwater demolition attack": Mongoose memo, October 16, 1962, JFKARC.
The raiders later boasted: CIA report on Alpha 66, November 9, 1962, JFKARC; see also FBI report, FOIA release R-759-1-41, posted on Internet by Cuban Information Archives, www.cuban-exile.com. The Alpha 66 raid took place on October 8.
The Aleksandrovsk and the Almetyevsk: Ship's log inspected by Karlov, arrival recorded as 1345 Moscow time. The NSA located the Almetyevsk twenty-five miles from La Isabela at 3:49 a.m., NSA Cuban missile crisis release, vol. 2, October 1998.
"The ship Aleksandrovsk... adjusted": Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 254. The authors incorrectly report that the Aleksandrovsk arrived later in the day.
"So you've brought": Author's interview with Gen. Anatoly Gribkov, July 2004.
The port soon became: Author's interview with Rafael Zakirov, May 2006; Zakirov article in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, October 5, 2007. See also report by former nuclear weapons chief Beloborodov in Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 204-13. Writing three decades after the crisis, Beloborodov is unreliable on dates and some other details, but his report is the most authoritative account available about the handling of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba.
The six RF-8 Crusader jets: U.S. Navy records, NPIC Photographic Interpretation Reports, CREST; raw intelligence film for Blue Moon missions 5001, 5003, and 5005, NARA; author's interviews with Comm. William Ecker, Lt. Comm. James Kauflin, and Lt. Gerald Coffee in October 2005. Ecker flew mission 5003.
One thousand feet was the ideal: Author's interview with John I. Hudson, who flew Crusaders over Cuba, October 2005. Other pilots remember taking photographs from lower altitudes, but Arthur Lundahl and Maxwell Taylor told JFK on October 24 that the previous day's photographs were taken from "around 1,000 feet"--JFK3, 186-7. The raw film, now at NARA, has numerous markings stating that it was shot at 1,000 feet.
"Chalk up another chicken": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 374.
"You're a pilot": Ecker interview.
Fernando Davalos: Davalos, 15.
Valentin Polkovnikov: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 189.
"Why can't we retaliate?": Anatoly I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1993), 57.
"Only someone with no": Ibid., 55.
By October 23, 42,822 Soviet: Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 100.
Overnight, the missile sites: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 173; blast information provided by Gen. Viktor Yesin--interview, May 2006.
"Other people are deciding": Tomas Gutierrez Alea and Edmundo Desnoes, Memories of Underdevelopment (Pittsburgh: Latin American Literary Review Press, 2004), 171.
"The poster": Adolfo Gilly, Inside the Cuban Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), 48.
"It looks like it's going": I have relied on Stern, Averting "The Final Failure," 204, for the unexpurgated version of this exchange.
"I fought in three": Abel, 116.
"Here lie the Soviet diplomats": Reeves, 397.
"Why is it": David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 269.
"In the Navy, the ethos": Author's interview with Capt. William D. Hauser, Gilpatric naval aide, May 2006.
"Keep a firm grasp": Time magazine profile of Anderson, November 2, 1962.
"From now on": Anderson memo to McNamara, October 23, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
"locking the barn door": Transcript of Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, Havana 2002, vol. 2.
The admiral resented McNamara's: George Anderson OH, USNHC.
"We'll hail it": Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 64.
"It's all in there": Abel, 137; Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 115. Abel and other writers misidentified the publication cited by Anderson as the Manual of Naval Regulations. As B
ouchard points out, this manual contains no guidance on the conduct of blockades. Law of Naval Warfare is available through USNHC, no. NWIP 10-2.
"This is none of your goddamn": Roswell Gilpatric OH, JFKL. Anderson denied using strong language, but conceded making "a good-humored remark" about the Navy knowing how to run blockades.
"You heard me": McNamara interview.
The clash between: Following Abel, 135-8, most authors say this scene took place on the evening of Wednesday, October 24, despite McNamara's recollection that it was the evening of October 23, prior to the imposition of the quarantine. The records show that Anderson left the Pentagon at 2035 on October 24; McNamara visited Flag Plot at 2120, where he met with one of Anderson's deputies--CNO Cuba files, CNO Office logs, USHNC; see also McNamara office diaries, OSD.
"I don't know how": Sources for this scene include Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 65-6; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995), 81-2; and the reports filed by both men immediately afterward. RFK's version is reprinted in FRUS, Vol. XI, 175; an English trans. of Dobrynin's October 24, 1962, cable can be found in CWIHP, 5 (Spring 1995), 71-3.
The mass media had always: Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: William Morrow, 1986), 465. I have relied on Szulc for most of Castro's early biographical details.
"Fatigued by talking": "The Fidel Castro I know," Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Cuba News, August 2, 2006.
The streets of Havana: Prensa Latina dispatch by Sergio Pineda, October 24, 1962.
"They were geared": Maurice Halperin, Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 191.
"We have won the war": Szulc, 30.
"a much bigger": Ibid., 51. Castro later claimed that he wrote this letter at a time of great emotion and that it did not reflect his true feelings toward America. His argument is unconvincing, and seems geared to an international audience. Copies of the letter to Sanchez are prominently displayed in Cuban museums for the domestic audience.
"We are going ahead": Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 445.
"an illiterate and ignorant": Halperin, 81.
The sugar harvest: Ibid., 124-5, 160.
"sectarianism": See, e.g., report of Hungarian ambassador Janos Beck, December 1, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.
When Khrushchev first broached: See, e.g., Alekseev quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 179.
"many mobile ramps": Mary McAuliffe, CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 105. The pilot's name was Claudio Morinas. The report was disseminated within the CIA on September 20, 1962.
"missiles on Cuban territory": Henry Brandon, Special Relationships (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 172.
"the pass at Thermopylae": Szulc, 445.
Carved out of the soft limestone: Author's visit to Cueva de los Portales, March 2006. The caves have been turned into a museum and shrine to Che.
"an extraordinary man": Jorge Castaneda, Companero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Knopf, 1997), 83.
"our old, much lamented": Ibid., 62.
"too much freedom": Ibid., 71.
Castro had reserved half: Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 398.
Timur Gaidar: The father of Yegor Gaidar, Russia's first post-Communist prime minister. Decades later, Yevtushenko gleefully told the story of how, as a small boy living with his father in Havana, the father of Russian capitalism "pissed on my beautiful white suit"--author's interview, June 2006. See also Yevtushenko, article in Novaya Gazeta, July 11, 2005.
"Has Moscow called?": Timur Gaidar, Grozi na Yuge (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatelstvo, 1984), 159.
CHAPTER FOUR: "EYEBALL TO EYEBALL"
The previous evening, he and other: NYT, October 24, 1962; Foy Kohler cable to State Department 1065, October 24, 1962, SDX.
"Why, that's Karl": Knox notes on meeting, JFKL.
"If I point a pistol": Beschloss, 496.
"disappear the first day": Roger Hilsman memo to secretary of state, October 26, 1962, OSD.
"Saying Grace": Reeves, 410.
"He opened and closed": RFK, 69-70.
"probably the most memorable day": Dobrynin, 83.
"massive uncertainty": NYT, October 28, 1962.
"sat around wondering": Clinton Heylin, Bob Dylan: Behind the Shades Revisited (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 102-3; see also Dylan interview with Studs Turkel, May 1, 1963.
"We're eyeball": Rusk, 237.
"The meeting droned on": RFK, 72.
"SECRET. FROM HIGHEST": CINCLANTFLT message 241523Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC. The order was also passed on by single sideband radio from Navy Plot--Vice Adm. Griffin notes, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
The Kimovsk was nearly: The Kimovsk's position at 0930, October 24, was 27deg18'N, 55deg42'W, according to CINCLANTFLT message 241950Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC. The Essex's position at 0900 on October 24 was 23deg20'N, 67deg20'W, according to ship logs now at NARA. Erroneous accounts of Soviet ship positions are given in Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 233, 348-9, and Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 477, 615. The U.S. Navy concluded on October 25 that the Soviet ships had turned around at 0700 Zulu time on October 23, 3:00 a.m. in Washington, 10:00 a.m. in Moscow--CNO Office logs, October 25, USNHC. According to Soviet records, the turnaround orders began going out at 6:00 a.m. on October 23--see notes in chapter two.
"turned around when confronted": McAuliffe, 297. McCone's information was incorrect. JFK noted at the ExComm meeting that an intercept attempt would be made between 10:30 and 11:00.
only "a few miles" apart: RFK, 68-72; see also Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 537, which draws on RFK's account.
"en route to the Baltic": CIA report, October 25, 1962, CREST.
The naval staff suspected: Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 391. Some of the reported positions for Soviet ships, including the Aleksandrovsk and the Poltava, were clearly false. For accuracy of direction fixes, see JFK3, 238.
He had visited Flag Plot: CNO, Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, USNHC.
Communications circuits were overloaded: CNO Office logs, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
That afternoon, NSA received: Message from director, NSA, October 24, 1962, NSA Cryptotologic Museum, Fort Meade, MD.
"in a position to reach": JFK3, 41.
"surprise attacks": Anderson message 230003Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
"I give you my word": Kohler cable to State Department, 979, October 16, 1962, SDX.
"the appearance of": CINCLANT (Dennison) message to JCS 312250Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
"Initial class probable sub": U.S. Navy messages 241610Z and 250533Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC, also available through "The Submarines of October," Electronic Briefing Book 75, NSAW. The submarine was located at 25deg25'N, 63deg40'W. It was dubbed "C-18" by the Navy.
What had started off: See Gary E. Weir and Walter J. Boyne, Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines That Fought the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 79-98, for an account of the B-130 journey, based on interviews with Capt. Nikolai Shumkov.
"special camps are being prepared": Savranskaya, "New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Journal of Strategic Studies (April 2005).
Shumkov understood the power: Weir and Boyne, 79-80; Aleksandr Mozgovoi, Kubinskaya Samba Kvarteta Fokstrotov (Moscow: Voenni bibliography Entryd, 2002), 69.
"If they slap you": Savranskaya, "New Sources." See this article also for conflicting evidence over whether Soviet submarine captains had the authority to use nuclear torpedoes if attacked.
The information on the overhead screens: SAC historians jotted down the daily totals and recorded them in Strategic Air Command Operations in the Cuban Crisis of 1962, SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, NSA. Photographs of the SAC control room are in Vol. 2, FOIA.
By the time SAC reached: SAC Historical St
udy No. 90, Vol. 1, 58.
"high priority Task 1 targets": William Kaufmann memo, Cuba and the Strategic Threat, October 25, 1962, OSD.
At 11:10 a.m.: Cuba crisis records, 389th Strategic Missile Wing, FOIA.
"This is General Power speaking": SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, vii.
It was received loud and clear: G. M. Kornienko, Kholodnaya Voina (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnesheniya, 1994), 96. It is unclear whether the Soviets intercepted the DEFCON-2 order, in addition to Power's message. The DEF CON-2 order was classified top secret; Power's address was unclassified. See Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 62.
tried as "a war criminal": Quoted in Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 21.
"SAC bases and SAC targets": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 262-5.
"They're smart": Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 265.
"mean," "cruel": Gen. Horace M. Wade OH, AFHRA.
"The whole idea": Kaplan, 246.
Using maps and charts: Kaufmann memo, Cuba and the Strategic Threat, OSD.
Just to move the 1st Armored Division: USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, NSAW, 79-88, 119-21. USCONARC briefing to House Appropriations Committee, January 21, 1963.
"Soon military police": Dino Brugioni, "The Invasion of Cuba," in Robert Cowley, ed., The Cold War (New York: Random House, 2006), 214-15.
The British consul in Miami: British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (London: Archival Publications, 2001), 278; "Air Force Response to the Cuban Crisis," 6-9, NSAW; NYT, WP, and LAT reports from Key West, October 1962.
Military shipments did not always: USCONARC, 117.
Fidel Castro had spent the night: Author's interview with Rafael Del Pino, former Cuban air force aide to Castro, September 2005. Unpublished MS by Del Pino.
"Our greatest problem": Notes on meeting between Castro and Cuban military chiefs, October 24, 1962, released by the Cuban government, Documentos de los Archivos Cubanos, Havana 2002.
This stretch of coastline: Szulc, 474-6.
A thirty-minute drive: Author's visit to Tarara beach and SAM site, March 2006. Both the SAM site and the antimissile site are still visible on Google Earth at 23deg09' 28.08''N, 82deg13' 38.87''W.
One minute to midnight Page 49