by Jeremy Black
Severe weather episodes contributed to public concern. Thus, widespread flooding in inland areas in 2000 and 2008 after persistent heavy rain indicated the extent to which building on floodplains (for example near Tewkesbury and York), drainage policies and agricultural practices had combined to make large areas vulnerable; while anxiety in 2006 over higher temperatures and the availability of water reflected worry over global warming and rising population numbers. In 2009, the latter was related to anxiety about the future availability of food. Whereas that had not played a role in public discussion for decades, it became more central. In this case, one form of environmental consciousness clashed with another, notably concern about the likely consequences of the genetic modifications of crops deemed necessary to raise their productivity. Such clashes are likely to become more common.
The impact of climate change was wide-ranging. For example, the rising sea temperatures on Britain’s Atlantic coast were linked to the increase in the number of Atlantic hurricanes, and thus of the climate’s pressure on the westerly parts of Britain. Tourism, agriculture and public morale are affected, with, for example, the grain and hay rotting in wet fields, while roads and railways are greatly affected by landslides. In the North Sea, the average temperature has increased 1°C over the last forty years, an increase sufficient to lead to the departure for cooler waters of plankton, whose number in the North Sea has fallen by 60 per cent in this period, and thus to a decline in the cod that feed on them. The knock-on impact on the food chain is wide-ranging, with fewer cod ensuring the survival of more crabs and jellyfish, on which cod feed, and with more crabs in turn hitting plaice and sole stocks as they eat their young.
Climate change is scarcely unique to Britain, but there is a tendency to underplay it in accounts of national history. This is mistaken, for the degree to which Britain is changing as an environment for humans, other species and plants is crucial to its history, both to the experience, opportunities and problems of life, and to the potent images and ideas held of the country and of life there.
Images of the Country
The strength and endurance of the relationship between the ruralist tradition and Englishness derives from the fact that this tradition is not just conservative but has been able to accommodate and place the apparently irreconcilable ideals of the romantic right (country house, parish church, squire, parson and deferential society) and the romantic left (folk society, the village, rural crafts and honest peasantry): that there are in short several ruralist traditions which co-exist. Although there are strong loyalties to particular cities, there is no comparable sense of place for an alternative urban tradition drawing on all cities, not least because of the remorseless process of new building and destruction that has affected so much of the urban environment.
Yet, rural England (and Britain) have been under strong pressure from within and outside. Intensive agricultural land use is unfavourable to the traditional concept of the countryside. A standardization of farming practice and an obsession with agricultural tidiness have both been much in evidence.
Moreover, pressure from non-agricultural ‘development’ is also acute, notably new housing, shopping centres and theme parks, while the rise in rural house prices is such that locals cannot afford them. The love of the countryside threatens to destroy it, as the desire to live ‘in the countryside’, one encouraged by romantic television programmes about rural life, is matched by the building of very large numbers of new homes. At the same time, although the key image for many remains that of England as a ‘green and pleasant land’, and of the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish equivalents, the focus of government concern, of consumerism and of most people has been on urban life. Legislation, such as the hunting ban under the Hunting Act of 2004 and the ‘Right to Roam’ under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act of 2000, both introduced by the Blair government (1997–2007), demonstrates the determination to push through urban norms on the countryside. Yet, it is in the cities that the changing nature of the British has been seen most clearly; and, ironically, many of those who live in rural areas now share the attributes of the urban life from which they often distance themselves.
6
CHANGING PEOPLE
More inhabitants and a new people. That appeared to be the prospectus, welcome or otherwise, during the period, and this prospectus was seen from the outset. More people were readily apparent as suburbia spread, notably, but not only, from London. Yet, a warning about the dangers of a new people arising from the cult of technological progress without a moral framework was provided by Aldous Huxley (1894–1963) in his novel Brave New World (1932):
‘Stability’, said the controller, ‘Stability. No civilization without social stability. No social stability without individual stability. … Hence all this.’ With a wave of his hand he indicated … the huge buildings of the Conditioning Centre. … ‘Fortunate boys … No pains have been spared to make your lives emotionally easy – to preserve you, so far as that is possible, from having emotions at all.’
Population Growth
The period saw a major rise in the population of the United Kingdom, from 46 million in 1931 to 50.2 million in 1945, 52.8 million in 1961, 55.9 million in 1971, 56.4 million in 1981, 57.4 million in 1991, 58.7 million in 2001 and 61.4 million in 2008. That of England and Wales increased from 40 million in 1931 to 49 million in 1991 (Scotland: 4.8 to 5.0 million; Northern Ireland 1.2 to 1.6 million). In 2008, there were 51,446,000 people in England, 5,169,000 in Scotland, 2,993,000 in Wales and 1,775,000 in Northern Ireland. At present, other than in apocalyptic scenarios linked to epidemic disease and environmental catastrophe, there is no sign that this increase will end, and, indeed, immigration has ensured that the rate of population increase has risen.
The overwhelming majority of the UK population lived, and lives, in England, and this is likely to become more marked. Immigrants focus on England in part because of the appeal of existing communities there, but also due to the extent to which nationalism elsewhere contributes to a less welcoming environment. The hostile treatment accorded to Romanian gypsies in Belfast in 2009 was especially notable, but, although less violent, the exclusivist nature of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, notably the emphasis on the Welsh language in the latter, is also significant.
England was, and is, the most densely populated of the major European countries, far more so than France, the country with which British people were most likely to compare their lot. The number of people per square kilometre was 244.2 in the UK in 2008 compared to 235.2 in Germany, 191.6 in Italy, 137 in China, 109.3 in France, and 31 in the US. This density has helped to define much of English history, both environmental and socio-political. Moreover, the density of England’s population is more marked because of its concentration in the south east. This concentration feeds directly into the focus on house prices in English society. In part, this focus is a symptom of the stress and anxiety caused by crowdedness and by a sense of over-crowdedness.
Although the population has risen greatly, this rise was below the general rate of increase in the world population, while, in addition, average rates of population growth in Britain have varied greatly during the period. Most notably, these rates were far lower in the inter-war period, when they fell to below replacement levels, than they had been in the nineteenth century. The number of children in an average family fell from three in 1910 to two in 1940. In addition, because childbearing was concentrated in the early years of marriage, the family-building period for most women fell in length, facilitating their employability or their role in voluntary activities. It became less common from the 1930s for women to have children after their mid-thirties.
The trend of fewer children, and of children being born earlier in marriage, began in middle-class groups but, in the inter-war period, spread to the working class. Repeated pregnancy became less common. There were significant economic consequences. The fall in the size of the average family cut expenditure on food and clothing, freeing funds for the con
sumer durables that were increasingly important, such as radios, but many (especially working-class) households did not experience such a fall.
Despite a post-war baby boom (birth peak) in 1947, and another in 1966, population growth rates continued to decline in the 1950s and 1960s, to almost a standstill in the 1970s and early 1980s, before rising. The population rose from 50 million in 1948 to 60 million by 2005. The higher birth rates in certain (but not all) immigrant groups in part reflected their adherence to different values, especially those of Islam; although, in practice, there was a range of Muslim views and these were implemented in terms of the particular family and communal practices of specific Muslim communities.
Birth control became more publicly discussed and available. The growing availability and acceptability of new or improved methods of contraception was important and included the growing use of the condom in the first half of the twentieth century, and of the pill, the coil and sterilization in the second half, as well as the legalization of abortion in 1967. Linking demographics and assumptions about gender, the pill became not only a symbol and means of the sexual revolution of the 1960s for women in particular, yet also for men, but also a fundamental aspect of the new, more planned, demographic regime, seen in particular in family planning clinics. From the 1960s, the ready availability of the contraceptive pill made it easier for women, both married and unmarried, to control their fertility. In 1961, the pill was made available on the NHS, and the NHS (Family Planning) Act passed in 1967 made no mention of marriage. This legislation was linked to the widespread breakdown in the relationship between sex and marriage, as well as to the rise of youth culture and the decline in the potency of the religious world view.
Key demographic, economic and cultural changes underlay the spread of effective contraceptive techniques, including lower levels of infant and child mortality; higher real incomes; the growing range of consumer goods and services, and the effect these had on spending patterns and expectations for ever higher standards of living; the increase in the proportion of married women in gainful employment; the growing willingness of the state to provide assistance for ill-health, unemployment and old age; and rises in the cost of educating and training children to meet the increasingly sophisticated demands of the workplace. Changing cultural values lessened the belief in childbearing as the major, if not sole, purpose of sexual intercourse, and instead, promoted a greater sense of individualism, especially for women, which, in turn, freed the individual from the traditional constraints of communal and family control.
Cultural changes were linked to shifts in religious practice. By the 1990s, only one in seven Britons was an active member of a Christian church, although more claimed to be believers. Both for most believers and for the less religious or the non-religious, faith became less important, not only to the fabric of life, but also to many of the turning points in individual lives, especially birth, marriage, dying and death. The failure in the 1990s of the ‘Keep Sunday Special’ campaign (heavily backed by the established Churches) to prevent shops from opening on the Sabbath confirmed the general trend. Churches used to play a major role in charitable functions and the provision of social welfare, but these have largely been replaced by the state, albeit with many gaps. Moreover, the lives of many politicians have ceased to be illuminated by religious values, although with Tony Blair (1953–) and Gordon Brown (1951–; Labour Prime Minister 2007–10) there was a shift back to earlier patterns of commitment. Margaret Thatcher also acknowledged her Methodist upbringing.
These shifts in religious practice took place alongside fundamental changes in personal and communal behaviour, with the 1960s, especially 1965–8, proving a turning point. An increasing percentage of the population, both male and female, had sex before marriage, and, on average, at a younger age. Cultural tropes and reference points, such as the significance of female virginity, changed dramatically, although, as with other changes, at differing rates.
From the 1930s to the early 1970s, age at marriage fell and marriage rates rose: the spinster ceased to be a characteristic feature of society, as did specific social arrangements for both spinsters and bachelors. From the 1970s, however, marriage rates fell, and there was an increase in the average age of marriage, because marriage in part has been replaced by a growth in co-habitation. Divorce was disapproved of in inter-war society, and indeed Edward VIII’s proposed marriage to a divorcee led to the Abdication Crisis of 1936: it was made clear to him by Baldwin, the Prime Minister, that he could not choose the personal life he wished, an approach that had the full backing of the Church of England and the editor of The Times, and the king, insistent on marrying the woman he loved, abdicated.
In contrast, divorce became much more common after the Second World War, especially from the 1960s, with the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 matching a powerful demand that reflected increasing expectations of marital harmony and higher standards for this harmony. Edward VIII’s niece, Princess Margaret, had not been allowed to marry a divorcee in the 1950s, but she herself divorced in the 1980s.
Due, in large part, to divorce, the percentage of single-parent households headed by a woman rose: from 8.3 per cent of households with children in 1971 to 12.1 per cent in 1980. By 1990, the divorce rate had risen to 44 per cent of marriages contracted, and there was much talk of the breakdown of marriage.
Yet, in 1995, 71 per cent of families still consisted of couples living with their own children. Despite the increased frequency of step-parents, a frequency amply reflected in the plots of novels and television and radio dramas, such as EastEnders and The Archers, three-quarters of children grew up in families with both their natural parents. Furthermore, three-quarters of births outside marriage in 1995 were registered by both parents, a point that tended to be overlooked in the negative coverage of single parents.
In the 1990s, later births became more common and fashionable for a section of the population. This demographic was linked to significant changes in women’s role in society and to economic factors. In 1975–2005, whereas the number of babies born to women aged twenty to twenty-four has more than halved, in 1995–2005 more women aged thirty to thirty-four have given birth than any other group.
A more fundamental shift, one common to the developed world, was rising life expectancy. It rose from 46 for men and 50 for women in the 1900s to 70 for men and 75 for women in 1979, to 77 for men and 81 for women by 2001, and in England to 77.7 for men and 81.9 for women by 2006–8. Whereas a sixty-year-old British man could anticipate another seventeen years of life in 1984, by 2006 the figure was twenty-one years: for women the figures were twenty-one years in 1984 and twenty-four years in 2006. By 2008, there were 1.3 million people aged eighty-five in the UK. As a result, the age pyramid altered. In County Durham, 45.5 per cent of the population in 1911 were under twenty, but only 32.3 per cent in 1971, whereas the percentage for those aged over seventy rose from 2 to 7.5. In 2009, the Office for National Statistics estimated that by 2033 nearly a quarter of the population would be over sixty-five and 18 per cent under sixteen.
Indeed, there was speculation that the likely impact of genetic knowledge and engineering was such that many (possibly a quarter of) babies born in 2009 will live till 100 and some might live till 150. This possibility has fundamental consequences for living arrangements and for individual family, community and state finances. Indeed, it is unclear how far society will be able to respond. The need, already, in terms of new facilities and changes in pension provision is readily apparent, but it is unclear that the political system will be able to provide the leadership and solutions necessary for overcoming the resulting strains.
It is all too easy to consider population shifts in aggregate terms, at the level of the nation, and, indeed, the basic character of change is similar across the country. This is especially true of the experience of ageing and the greatly increased use of contraceptives. Yet, there were also important social and geographical variations. Life expectancy was higher among the middle than
the working class. Furthermore, in part due to age structure, birth rates were higher among communities based on immigration from New Commonwealth countries, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Jamaica, than among older-established groups. At the geographical level, population numbers in Scotland, Wales and north-east and north-west England did not grow markedly and, for much of the last twenty years, fell, but the situation was very different in southeast and south-west England.
Across Britain, the great mobility of the population affected demographic structures. The larger percentage of the population above sixty-five, greater disposable wealth on the part of much of the population, and enhanced mobility, combined after 1945 to ensure that a number of towns became especially associated with retirement to the seaside. This was true, for example, of Worthing, Hove, Eastbourne, Exmouth and Sidmouth on the south coast of England, and of Colwyn Bay in north Wales.
Furthermore, British membership in the European Economic Community – later European Union (EU) – from 1973 was followed in the 1980s by large numbers of British retirees emigrating elsewhere in Europe, especially to Spain. This movement was greater in scale than that in other European countries and reflected both opportunities and also a choice to leave a country that appeared crowded and troubled to many. The ability to move funds abroad that stemmed from the economic liberalism of the Thatcher government was important, as was the strength of sterling that resulted from North Sea oil and a monetarist fiscal policy with its control of the money supply. In part, moving abroad was an equivalent to the retirement of large numbers to the countryside or seaside. Each involved a departure from the cities that entailed a measure of cashing in on house values there as well as of ‘white flight’ from ethnically mixed urban neighbourhoods.