by Jeremy Black
In the meantime, the British were unable to mount a serious challenge to the German position in Europe, and were obliged to continue a reliance on a peripheral strategy, hoping that blockade, air attack and sponsoring resistance in occupied Europe would weaken the Germans. This approach made the best of the current situation, but it did not promise much, and, ultimately, Churchill depended on something turning up, notably in the form of American intervention. It did, but it is interesting to consider what would have happened had the war not expanded in that fashion.
The total change in the situation in 1941 owed little to Britain. Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, launched on 22 June, and his declaration of war on the US, following his ally Japan’s attack on its base at Pearl Harbor (and on British and Dutch colonies) on 7 December 1941, were what led to the total defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945. Ultimately, this widening of the war was to be decisive in Allied victory, but, in late 1941 and 1942, German and Japanese advances were still very serious. The Germans made major gains at the expense of the Soviet Union. The British rapidly lost Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma to the Japanese, and the surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942, with 62,000 troops, was a major blow. The British had been outfought by a smaller Japanese army in the Malaya campaign, and the surrender shattered British prestige in Asia: it was later described by Churchill as the ‘greatest disaster in British military history’, and the defeat badly strained relations between Britain and Australia, already troubled by competing priorities over the use of imperial forces.
A general problem of excessive commitments hit the British hard. The Germans under Rommel pushed into Egypt, leading to criticism of the British Army and of Churchill’s war leadership. The fall of Tobruk and its large garrison on 20 June led to a parliamentary vote of confidence on 2 July 1942, which Churchill won by 476 to 25 votes, but there was considerable uneasiness about the management of the war alongside the enormous public respect for Churchill.
Moreover, German submarine attacks continued to inflict heavy losses in the Atlantic. By then, Britain’s role in the war was very much as part of an (unstable) alliance, with the Soviet Union the major opponent of Germany, in terms of German forces engaged, and the US that of Japan. Relations with the Soviet Union were characterized by mutual suspicion, with Churchill rightly concerned about Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe. There were also tensions over strategy and goals in the Anglo-American relationship, not least Churchill’s opposition to Roosevelt’s anti-imperialism and to his hostility to Imperial Trade Preference. Nevertheless, the relationship was pivotal to the successful prosecution of the war.
Hitler’s declaration of war on the US let Roosevelt off the geopolitical hook, since he agreed with Churchill that Hitler was a greater menace than the Japanese, although not all of American opinion shared this view. The declaration led to the ‘Germany-First’ strategy, which was to see the bulk of American land and air assets allocated to preparing for the invasion of Europe. Roosevelt supported this emphasis because of his concern that Britain might otherwise collapse in the face of German pressure.
After American entry into the war, the British continued to play the leading role on certain fronts: against Germany in Egypt and against Japan in Burma (and, later, providing much of the manpower for the war with Germany in Italy and France); while also being crucial to the air and sea wars against Germany. The sea war, which focused on anti-submarine operations in the Atlantic, was scarcely a peripheral struggle, as it was central to the eventual ability to build up British and American forces in Britain in preparation for an invasion of German-held France. In addition, the British conquest of Iraq, Lebanon and Syria in May–July 1941, the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Persia (Iran) from August 1941, and the British conquest of Madagascar in May–November 1942, all ensured that the worlds of German and Japanese expansion would be kept well apart, and that the Allied world would not be fractured. The Allies were able to pursue a global strategy but their opponents could not.
The Germans and Japanese advances were eventually held in 1942, including by the British in Egypt and on the India–Burma border respectively; and serious defeats were inflicted. The Americans beat the Japanese at Midway in the Pacific, the British defeated the Germans at El Alamein in Egypt, and the Soviets forced a German army to surrender at Stalingrad in early 1943. Germany and Japan were driven back in 1943, with the
Germans defeated at Kursk by Soviet forces and cleared from north Africa by Anglo-American forces which pressed on to invade Italy. The Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines was won in early 1943. The wartime peak of tonnage sunk by the Germans was reached in November 1942, but in 1943 success was won by the Allies with improved resources, tactics and strategy, including more effective anti-submarine air tactics and the extension of air cover over the Atlantic thanks to the use of long-range planes and the establishment of a base on the Azores. Moreover, the failure of the U-boat offensive was clarified by the massive scale of American shipbuilding which made it possible to cope with losses.
France was invaded with the D-Day landings on 6 June 1944. The British, Canadian and American forces benefited from absolute air and sea superiority and from a successful deception exercise, which ensured that the landings in Normandy were a surprise to the Germans. It proved difficult to break out of Normandy but, greatly helped by air power, the Allies finally succeeded in doing so at the close of July. This victory was followed by the speedy liberation of France and Belgium, before the Germans successfully stopped the Allied advance in late 1944, notably by defeating a British airborne force at Arnhem.
Meanwhile, the Soviets advanced across Eastern Europe, and the Americans ‘island hopped’ towards Japan. In 1945, Germany was invaded from west and east, Anglo-American forces crossing the Rhine in March and reaching the Elbe in April. Hitler committed suicide on 30 April as the Soviets fought their way through Berlin, and Germany was forced to surrender unconditionally on 7 May. If the Soviets played the key role on land against the Germans from June 1941, the British, too, played an important part, particularly at sea and in the air. Japan was driven to surrender on 14 August 1945 by the American use of atomic bombs, but the Japanese had already been outfought on land: by the British in Burma as well as by the Americans in the Philippines and by the Soviets in Manchuria.
The empire continued to play a major role until the war’s end. By 1942, 500 Canadian warships were in commission. Canadian troops played a major part in European operations in 1944–5, and Canada at the close of the conflict had the world’s third largest navy and the fourth largest air force. It also provided Britain with crucial financial support, and on more generous terms than the US.
The war had underlined Britain’s vulnerability. The preservation of national independence had traditionally required a strong fleet, but insistent German aeroplane attacks from 1940, and, with the coming of the V-1, missiles revealed that command of the sea could no longer protect Britain from bombardment, even if it could still thwart or inhibit invasion. Although the Germans did not develop a long-distance heavy bomber force, their bombers could attack Britain from bases in north-western Europe, while the V-2 rockets, which could travel at up to 3,000 mph (4,828 kph), could be fired from a considerable distance. The Germans also bombarded Dover with long-range guns from the other side of the Channel. The defensive perimeter of the country was thus extended.
Over 60,000 civilians were killed in air and missile attack, nearly half of them in London. The strain was heavy. Swansea was bombed forty-four times in 1940–3, with 1,238 people killed or wounded, over 7,000 made homeless, and the town centre destroyed. In 1942, three of the twelve houses in the Exeter street in which I live were destroyed, as was much of the city centre.
In response to the air attacks, there were large-scale evacuations of children. Indeed, these evacuations were the biggest state-directed movement of civilians in British history. At the start of the war, 690,000 children were evacuated from London alone. The
re were problems with homesickness and with parents missing children, while evacuation revealed the gap between the life experiences of inner-city children and those of rural Britain.
Wartime disruption hit family life and affected social behaviour. Notably, there was more freedom for women because far more were employed while there was a general absence of partners, as well as more flexible attitudes to sexual behaviour. Despite the wartime problems, the black market encouraged by shortages and rationing, and a surprisingly troubling level of labour disputes and strikes, especially among the miners, there was a high degree of acceptance of the need for sacrifice, and morale and popular resolve were strong.
The midwife of change, war boosted the role of the state and the machinery of government. It was necessary to produce formidable amounts of equipment, to raise, train, clothe and equip large numbers of men, to fill their place in the workforce, and to increase the scale and productivity of the economy. The experience of state intervention in the First World War ensured that it was more effective in the Second. The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, rapidly passed on 22 May 1940, gave the government power to order anyone to perform any action, the power being exercised through defence regulations. Censorship was imposed and the general election due for 1940 postponed. The Churchill government greatly expanded the hitherto limited mobilization of national resources, which was necessary because the war savaged the economy. Free trade and hitherto largely unregulated industrial production were both brought under direction; and consumption and the manufacture of consumer goods were successfully cut in order to free labour and other resources for wartime goals. Indeed, despite war damage, production of war matériel rose, that of aircraft from 7,940 in 1939 to 26,461 in 1944.
Conscription was introduced more rapidly than in the First World War: of men in 1939 and of women in 1942. The size of the armed forces rose to 4.7 million men and 437,000 women by 1945. At its peak, 1.79 million people served in the Home Guard and many joined other voluntary organizations such as the Royal Observer Corps. Many young women served in the Land Army.
Moreover, government regulation became ubiquitous and the number of non-industrial civil servants rose from 400,000 in 1939 to 722,000 in 1944. Food rationing began in January 1940, and the Ministry of Food encouraged consumption patterns and recipes that would make the best use of scarce foodstuffs; whale meat was one recommended dish. Clothes rationing followed in 1941, and indeed the combination of the Depression followed by the war created a generation focused on thrift. All areas of life were regulated. For example, the hospital sector was reorganized under the Emergency Medical Service.
New ministries were created in 1939 for economic warfare, food, home security, information, shipping and supply. Later additions included aircraft production (1940), fuel and power (1942) and production (1942). These creations were aspects of an impressive and generally effective administrative machinery. There were still serious problems. National wage negotiating machinery was established in the coal industry, and a National Coal Board was created to supervise production, but these measures did not prevent a serious miners’ strike in early 1944. Indeed, 55.7 per cent of the days lost to strikes in the war occurred in the coal industry. Government expenditure and taxation rose markedly.
What the post-war world would bring was unclear. Imperial power was still a major theme. In April 1944, the Admiralty discussed plans for a big heavy cruiser; discussion of new battleships and carriers followed in May. In 1945, authority was reimposed in areas that had been conquered by Japan, such as Hong Kong and Malaya. Britain still had the largest empire in the world, and there were even ideas of extending British power, both north from India and into the former Italian empire, notably Somalia and Libya. In 1946 Admiral Willis (1889–1976), Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, could write about his optimism for a long-term, albeit smaller-scale, British presence in Egypt.
The Cold War and the End of Empire
Post-war politics, however, were to lead to very different priorities. Britain had lost about 25 per cent of its national wealth during the war, as well as key export markets, for example in Eastern Europe, and merchant shipping, and its dependence upon wartime loans (mainly from the US) made it the world’s greatest debtor nation in 1945. This was not the best basis for the formidable challenge that was to be posed by confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War that followed the Second World War and lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Already, in mid-1944, planners for the Chiefs of Staff were suggesting a post-war reform of Germany and Japan so that they could play a role against the Soviet Union. By early 1945, differences with the Soviets over the fate of Eastern Europe, especially Poland, were readily apparent, while British troops were opposing the Communists in Greece. In March 1946, Churchill, then in opposition to the Labour government, claimed that an Iron Curtain was descending from the Baltic to the Adriatic, dividing Europe between free and unfree.
In response, an American alliance appeared essential, not least because the other Western European states were weak. In 1947, the British acknowledged that they could no longer provide the military and economic aid deemed necessary to keep Greece and Turkey out of Communist hands. Instead, the British successfully sought American intervention, in Europe and South-East Asia. This policy was criticized from the left of the Labour Party, especially in the ‘keep left’ campaign of May 1947 when what was seen as a dependence on the US was castigated.
Confrontation with the Soviet Union did not drown out two other themes: first, a period of fundamental change in the empire and, secondly, faltering steps with regard to European cooperation. The Second World War was far more damaging than the First for the empire. Churchill considered the annexation of Libya, as well as acquiring the Kra peninsula from Thailand; but such views were now anachronistic, not least because they were inimical to the new world order of independent, capitalist democracies which the US wished to see. Instead, much of the empire was given independence in 1947–8. The granting of independence to the Indian subcontinent, which became the separate states of India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma, in 1947–8, was followed by the ending of the Palestine mandate in 1948, a key step in the troubled origins of Israel.
These steps, however, were not intended to mark the end of empire, but, rather, Indian independence was viewed as providing the means for continued informal control in south Asia, while, elsewhere, a major effort was made to keep both the idea and practice of empire alive. Indeed, the government sent troops to maintain the British position in the economically crucial colony of Malaya, in the face of a Communist insurrection: it took 300,000 men to defeat a Communist force that never exceeded 6,000. The government also hoped to use imperial economic and military resources to make Britain a less unequal partner in the Anglo-American alliance, while major efforts were made to improve relations with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.
Nevertheless, India had been the most populous and important part of the empire and the area that most engaged the imaginative attention of the British. Once India had been granted independence, it was difficult to summon up much popular interest in the retention of the remainder of the empire. Yet Britain did not join what was initially called the Common Market – European Economic Community (EEC) – the basis of the modern European Union, because it was seen as a means to reintegrate the economies of Continental Europe, which Britain had never seen as economically crucial to its interests.
Instead, British politicians saw the US and the empire as more vital economic and political links. This view was strengthened by the economic, political and military weakness of the Western European states, and by the willingness of the US to avoid isolation, unlike after the First World War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949 and of which Britain was a crucial founder member, replaced the idea of a Western European ‘Third Force’. Britain became a major NATO military base, with American planes joining the RAF in eastern England, providing the key force wi
th which the Soviet Union was to be bombed in the event of war.
There was a deeper reason, however, for distance from Europe. In Western Europe, old elites and many earlier political parties, especially those on the right, had been discredited by the events of the 1930s and 1940s, and political structures, notably the powerful state, had been found inadequate. This created a situation of political and governmental fluidity, and led to a sense that change was necessary. The creation of the EEC under the Treaty of Rome of 1957 was part of a process in which the political structures and party politics of France, Germany and Italy were transformed between 1945 and 1958.
In contrast, Britain was separate from this process. It also lacked the direct experience of territorial invasion and devastation that affected France and Germany. In political and institutional terms, therefore, the creation of the EEC was both cause and effect of a divergence between Britain and the leading western European states. The difference was seen further when the British inspired a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of countries not in the EEC, established by the Stockholm Convention of 1960. It initially included Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. EFTA was restricted to commercial matters, and lacked the idealistic and federalist flavour of the EEC.
The Cold War gathered pace from 1947, as Britain and the US responded to the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Clement Attlee, the Labour Prime Minister, also decided by 1947 to develop a British nuclear bomb, a policy regarded as necessary for Britain’s security and influence: the bomb was ready by 1952. The Cold War certainly entailed heavy costs. Under American pressure, Britain embarked in 1950 on a costly rearmament programme that undid the economic gains made since 1948 and that strengthened the military commitment that was to be such a heavy post-war economic burden. The British were to devote a higher percentage of national resources to defence than economic rivals such as Germany, which handicapped the British economy. Furthermore, high defence spending was to influence economic policy.