Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic

by Nicholas Barker

  An example of the mood at home came from C-in-C Fleet:

  Minister of State at FCO, Luce, was questioned in Commons last night on the South Georgia incident and the subject was given wide coverage in today’s papers:

  The Daily Telegraph front page reported that Endurance was closing South Georgia at full speed to deal with Argies. Although the FCO was silent about Endurance’s movements, it was reported that the ship was poised to eject a handful of Argentine scrap merchants. The Argentine ship had left about ten Argies behind. It was also reported that the Endurance is on her final patrol before being withdrawn as economy measures to save £2 million.

  This was received with glee by Argentine press. The Endurance’s movements were kept secret to avoid alerting the Argentine Navy. FCO ministers in Commons last night said that arrangements were made for the Argentines early departure.

  Other reports in the nationals were headed, ‘NAVY GUN BOAT SAILS TO REPEL INVADERS,’ ‘CUT SHIP SAILS TO OUST INTRUDERS,’ and ‘MINISTER’S PLEDGE ON THE FALKLANDS.’ The Times Parliamentary Report was headlined: ‘CALLAGHAN WARNING ON SOUTH GEORGIA’. He said it would be gross dereliction of duty for the government to persist in withdrawing Endurance. Luce of the FCO said the incident was unhelpful.

  Denis Healey asked if action taken by the Argentines was supported. Luce said that the Argentine Government claimed it was not.

  Sir Bernard Brain said: ‘While it is important not to overreact, it is pointless to go on asserting that the islands will remain British while removing the signs of tangible support, such as Endurance.

  Other MPs asked Luce to ensure that Endurance remains on station. He said that this was a matter for MOD. Healey drew laughter with his comment that ‘the only option open to HMG was to ask Australia to allow the Invincible to visit the Falklands on her way to the Royal Australian Navy.

  It was now clear that the Argentine landing on South Georgia was not only front page news but that Endurance herself was in the national spotlight. But I was more concerned with maintaining the morale of my ship’s company. Later that day I signalled.

  There are three main constraints for the ship remaining on station – morale, food and fuel.

  1) Morale

  The company and their families are well aware that the ship is due to return UK 20 May. Important though this is there are no other constraints for returning to the UK as the ship is due to pay off anyway.

  2) Food

  The ship only has provisions for another three weeks before it will be necessary to replenish at Montevideo. Provisions in any quantity are not available at Stanley and storing had been planned for 24 March in Montevideo. Allowing for passage time it will therefore only be possible to remain in the South Atlantic region for a further 14 days.

  3) Fuel

  80% remains. This is sufficient for 25 days steaming at 12 knots, or 50 days at anchor. It would be highly desirable to fuel again at Stanley before leaving the station. My survey boat and survey party are still in the Falklands.

  Summary

  The ship could remain in South Georgia for a further two weeks before reprovisioning. There is no bar to the length of time on station, except morale. In order to return to UK by 20 May, with just two two-day stopovers en route, the ship would have to leave Stanley by 20 April. In short I would prefer to do the job quickly, and am fully prepared transport the Argentines to Stanley or Argentina, and to resume my original programme.

  * * *

  We were still at anchor on the 25th. I went ashore to speak to all the BAS men about the situation and to thank them for their sterling work; they were civilian scientists who had all performed beyond the call of duty and at some risk to themselves. They had set up the observation posts that had been the source of much of our information.

  In the afternoon I went over to Stromness harbour to watch ARA Bahia Paraiso using three LCVPs to unload plant. The Paraiso had come up from Southern Thule in the Antarctic with all this equipment, a fact which provided at least moral evidence of forward planning ahead of the arrival of the military, and all the necessary stores and equipment. Although the Buen Suceso had carried the basics, suddenly, out of nowhere appeared the Bahia Paraiso with all the right sort of kit and equipment with her military escort. A coincidence? I hardly think so.

  Tony Ellerbeck flew me to the top of one of the mountains and we landed at 3,000 feet on a narrow section of flat ground with excellent binocular vision over Leith Bay. We spent much of the afternoon watching. Towards the end of our stint an Alouette helicopter from the Bahia Paraiso spotted our blue-painted red-nosed WASP. We were uncamouflaged and there was no ground cover. I have no doubt that the pilot had already spotted us making a pathetic attempt to look like boulder débris.

  The Alouette came down almost on top of us. We expected a present in the form of some incendiary device lobbed out of the open door. As it happened we had a greeting that was less explosive but just as warm. A large beaming face looked out of the helicopter and the hand gave me a cheery wave. I immediately recognized Captain Cesar Trombetta, the officer in charge of the Argentine Antarctic squadron. He waved again – using an international gesture roughly translated as ‘go away’ – as the Alouette turned and left us. This game of watching you watching us was gentlemanly enough, but we both knew that when hostilities were officially declared things would have to be rather different. Naturally I informed London of all I had observed.

  Following my earlier signal there were now urgent discussions about the logistics of keeping Endurance at South Georgia. C-in-C Fleet informed me:

  The decision may be made by HMG at short notice to extend the presence of Endurance in South Atlantic. That decision will entail provision of supplies. RFA Fort Austin is the most suitable vessel with Sea Kings embarked. Rendezvous could be Monday, March 29th. The intention is direct transit at 16 knots probably to South Georgia where Endurance is currently holding at Grytviken. Endurance is to signal operational spares requirements to C-in-C (Fleet).

  Meanwhile all we could do was to sit and watch. We noted the continuing disembarkation of stores from the Bahia Paraiso and it was clear to us that the operation had been long pre-planned.

  In his signal of 26 March Rex Hunt agreed that the operation had been planned by the Argentine Navy, if not the Argentine Government. He was also considering the possibility of giving 16-week entry permits to the Argentines if they presented their passports to the Base Commander. This was clearly some kind of diplomatic compromise suggested by HMG intended to defuse the situation, but at least maintain the principle that Davidoff and his men must have proper documentation. I imagined the frantic scuttling around the corridors of Whitehall that had induced this formula of retrospective approval. Before the outbreak of another war it had been called appeasement.

  The press summaries we were sent suggested widening political divisions at home. The campaign of some Conservative MPs to save Endurance was gathering new momentum: an Early Day Motion had won support from members of all parties. The Minister, Keith Speed, was now saying that the Government may change its view. Ministers were clearly embarrassed, particularly because the former Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan, was the most powerful voice in support of Endurance.

  And the newspapers were having a field day. The Daily Telegraph said that the UK had sent a Heave or we throw you out’ message to Argentina. But, as part of the diplomatic initiatives intended to avoid escalation, the Argentines were invited to send their own ship to take the men and equipment off South Georgia.

  Whitehall was refusing to give the UK press any information about the position of Endurance; this, however, was readily available from sources in Argentina. The Daily Express had perhaps the most predictable tabloid response. Readers were invited to send greetings to the Falkland islanders, by way of moral support, on St George’s Day. It was the beginning of the jingoism which was soon to create momentum for the deployment of the Task Force.

  On 26 March we intercepted a signal from Nava
l Attaché, Buenos Aires:

  The Minister at the Chilean Embassy informed us today that all submarines at the Argentine Naval base at Mar del Plata had recently put to sea. This event may not necessarily be sinister as a naval exercise is at present taking place with Uruguayan Navy, probably in River Plate area.

  This was as worrying as it was infuriating. It was also nonsense – ‘unlikely as water in River Plate is too shallow’. And it was scarcely believable that nobody had been dispatched from the Embassy to the Golf Club House at Mar del Plata with a brief to count the number of submarines at the base. Even by the standards of Embassy incompetence I had not anticipated this new low.

  In a signal to the Naval Attaché I suggested I would be grateful for periodic Situation Reports on the movements of both Argentine Naval and Air Force units.

  I was despondent at not being kept up to date with diplomatic moves and wrote in my diary on 27 March:

  Anthony Williams and Whitehall making ‘Tut! Tut!’ noises is not impressing the Argentines. Rex Hunt and a few others taking good firm stand. C-in-C (Fleet) is sailing some ships in support. In my view some Buccaneers are required.

  Meanwhile the Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires replied to my signal, although not to me directly. He signalled MOD UK with more news from the Argentine press concerning the deployment of ships on the exercise with Uruguay. The Bahia Paraiso, with a detachment of marines on board, was supposed to be anchored within sight of the Endurance and the Argentine corvettes Drummond and Granville had been despatched to South Georgia area with the Punta Mendanos, the Argentine Navy tanker, in support.

  It no longer seemed remarkable that the Naval Attaché was garnering most of his information from already outdated, and in some specifics (such as Bahia Paraiso being anchored in sight of Endurance) inaccurate information. It reminded me in some ways of how years before the police had kept in touch with the activities of the Kray brothers by reading the Sunday supplements.

  Even at this stage our Embassy considered this level of activity may still indicate nothing more sinister than a regular Naval exercise. The delusion was entirely consistent with both the Ambassador’s interpretation of Argentine intent and the sustained level of incompetence of key members of his staff. I noted my dissatisfaction in my diary. The situation is,’ I wrote, ‘a bloody shambles.’

  Chapter 9

  INVASION

  The days before the invasion were a busy time for signals and telegrams. One of some significance was sent from Anthony Williams in Buenos Aires via Rex Hunt to pass on to Endurance. It read:

  Costa Mendes and Ros being unobtainable, I have spoken accordingly to Ambassador Blanco. He is taking careful note but professes to be unaware of the specific journey of the Buen Suceso. Although of course, he knows in general about Davidoff, in the circumstances, he felt unable to give an immediate reaction, but was clear of the gravity of my message. I warned him that swift action would be needed if a reaction on our side was not to be set in train.

  Davidoff was never of course given any permission by this Embassy, but on the contrary, was warned personally in February by telegram and through his representative here on 11 March told that next time he must follow correct procedures. As seen from here there could well be an advantage in sending Endurance to the scene, but I suggest a great restraint be used at least until it is clear whether this is deliberate challenge authorized at high level, or just a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff’s well-known fecklessness.

  The political game of cat and mouse was continuing. Here we had an Argentine official prevaricating whilst his British counterpart covers his tracks. The ‘warning’ Anthony Williams refers to was issued by Richard Gozney, a fairly junior but very bright member of the Embassy staff. But inevitably it was so weakly worded it was no more discouraging than a few dandelions in the lawn of opportunity.

  A slightly more purposeful telegram was sent by Anthony Williams on 21 March:

  Blanco telephoned at midnight with an official Argentine response. He hoped the significance of the affair would not be exaggerated. The party and ship would be leaving South Georgia today. They were in no way official and had no serving personnel or military arms. I asked if they would call at Grytviken and what about the Argentine flag, defaced notices etc? Blanco was not sure about the first and said had no, repeat no, knowledge of the other matters. The BAS observers must have been mistaken about the shooting, since they were not accurate over the flag either. I said I would report what he said, and made it clear the party had left without regularizing their conduct at Grytviken.

  Even within this officialese there is complacency. BAS observers are the last kind of people you would expect to be mistaken about their ‘home ground’.

  At least Lord Carrington was reading the tea leaves. Pulling few diplomatic punches he said he would be grateful if those nations with missions in Buenos Aires, and those with Argentine missions in their capitals, would stress to Argentina the need to find a peaceful and diplomatic solution to this incident. He pointed out, quite properly, that any escalation would be in no one’s interest and would not be understood by international opinion. This was the right approach, albeit too little and too late. The chance of getting serious assistance from the international community at this stage was a very long shot.

  On Saturday 27 March Anthony Williams sent yet another telegram to the FCO:

  I hesitate to give a definite assessment as requested in your signal without seeing what is in the promised message from Costa Mendes. However, it seems almost certain that his new instructions contain something less than what is asked as a minimum. There is little comfort to be drawn from recent information from secret sources and I understand from my Naval Attache’s telegram that the Argentines could have a dominating Naval presence in the area by early next week. I suspect Argentine intentions may be the subject of debate within the Junta – the Navy being the most, and the Army the least, hawkish. I cannot, however, discount the possibility that any action on our part to disturb the Argentine working party at Leith will be taken as a trigger for armed action by the Argentines.

  Here Anthony Williams’ assessment was spot on.

  On the following day we came back from sea to anchor off Grytviken to take part in a quiet service in the little church.

  The Base Commander came on board in the afternoon. While he was with us things started to liven up a bit. A green helicopter, presumably from Bahia Paraiso, arrived at Leith during the afternoon. Later Bahia Paraiso was sighted to seaward by our helicopter recce flight. In the evening the long-awaited reply from the Argentine Foreign Minister was received by Ambassador Williams. The reply was little more than the standard Argentine dogma on the Falklands and Dependencies.

  Later on, sitting on my bunk, I dreamt up a way of boarding Bahia Paraiso personally in order to try to defuse the situation. First thing the following morning I signalled the MOD with my thoughts:

  Bahia Paraiso and Endurance are the ships which are physically in confrontation, and I am informed that Captain Trombetta, whom I know and like, is still on board.

  It occurs to me that there might be some mileage in attempting to defuse the situation at local level. This may sound somewhat far-fetched, but in the light of little progress in any other direction another line might be worth trying.

  Today I shall be at sea and within helicopter range of Bahia Paraiso. My suggestion is that I should be allowed to fly on board and talk to Trombetta. If approved, I recommend that I should go on board alone, unarmed, and put the following suggestion to Trombetta:

  The DIPCLEAR [Diplomatic Clearance] should be waived and both ships anchor for 24 hours in the vicinity Grytviken, and out of sight of Leith. Then Trombetta and I could be flown to Leith, in separate helicopters, to tell the leader of Davidoffs men at Leith that the whole party should embark either in Bahia Paraiso or Endurance, and be taken to Grytviken for the issue of proper immigration documentation. On completion the party should be taken to Leith and leg
ally allowed to remain for a further fifteen weeks and military support by the Argentines should be discontinued.

  During course of conversation with Trombetta it should be pointed out that we are well aware that the Argentine will have the greatest difficulty maintaining a frigate force at sea. Punta Mendanos is a very shaky old tanker. If the situation escalates further Bahia Paraiso could be faced with an SSN (nuclear submarine), surface or even air threat.

  Might it also be worth pointing out that the issue has only one thing in common with similar issues over sovereignty – it is designated a Falkland Island dependency. The Argentine has no historical territorial claim to this island and therefore the two issues should be considered in isolation.

  If Trombetta refuses to consider this eleventh hour offer, then it will be clear to everyone that this is a sovereignty issue involving the Navy and using Davidoff as a front.

  If this option is approved in part or whole it will be necessary to ask the Argentine Navy to instruct Bahia Paraiso to lift radio silence, at least on VHF, in order that I may suggest the initial move. I have not been able to raise His Excellency, the Governor of the Falklands this morning for our usual communications schedule, but I am of the opinion that he would approve this proposal in principle.

  Meanwhile the UK Sunday papers had highlighted the increasingly tense situation. The Sunday Telegraph put it like this:

  A confrontation between Endurance and several Argentine warships off South Georgia was threatened last night with warnings in Buenos Aires of the grave situation. Bahia Paraiso, with troops embarked, was off Leith to protect their party ashore. Reports from Buenos Aires said that their frigates, Granville and Drummond, both 950 tons, were on their way carrying Exocets. Waiting to meet them is the Endurance with her 21 Marines anchored in sight of Bahia Paraiso. It seemed last night that one government or the other would be compelled to retreat or lose face in a Naval showdown.