Appius Claudius and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus were elected consuls for 212, and the military commands in Sicily for that year were arranged as follows. Marcellus’ command was extended for the year within the limits of King Hiero’s former territories. Publius Lentulus was made propraetor and remained in charge of the rest of Sicily. Titus Otacilius, meanwhile, was placed in command of the fleet at Sicily.53 Marcellus’ spent his time enforcing the siege at Syracuse. It became apparent at some point that the city was simply too large to be starved into submission by the Roman forces available. The better part of a year spent attempting to stem all supplies from reaching the city seemed to have accomplished very little. Marcellus tried a different tack. Among the Romans were some of the more influential and powerful men of Syracuse who had been compelled to leave the city because of their pro-Roman leanings. Marcellus instructed these exiles to inform any supporters they might have inside the city that Syracuse would be left to govern itself if it surrendered to the Romans. Somehow, the exiles managed to get one slave accepted back into the city, claiming to have fled from the Romans. The slave made contact with Roman sympathizers in Syracuse. In return, some sympathizers slipped out of the city hidden on a fishing boat and made their way to the Roman lines. Through such clandestine meetings a number of Syracusans – Livy says eighty – were primed to betray the city to the Romans. A whisper of their plans was brought to Epicydes, however, and the conspirators experienced a painful death.54
Providence, however, seemed to be on the Roman side. Syracuse had sent an envoy named Damippus, a Spartan, to treat with King Philip of Macedon, against whom the Romans had declared war in 215. Damippus did not make it to the Balkan Peninsula; Roman ships patrolling the coast of Syracuse had captured him. Epicydes sent word to Marcellus that he wished to ransom the Spartan, and Marcellus was willing. A parley was arranged near the Trogili Harbour, to the north of the city, and negotiators met there several times to discuss the terms for ransom. One of the Roman negotiators, through sheer cleverness or the instructions of a superior, surreptitiously estimated the height of the northern walls of the city by estimating the size of one of the tiers of stone and counting the total number of tiers. This section of the city wall, in the estimation of the negotiator, was significantly lower than previously thought and indeed the lowest part of the whole defensive circuit. Therefore, the Romans wagered they could use reasonably sized scaling ladders to overcome the walls here.
The Syracusans apparently were aware of this weakness in their defences, however, for they kept this section of the wall under extra guard.55 Again, Providence seemed to favour the Romans. A Syracusan who had recently abandoned the city informed Marcellus that inhabitants were in the midst of celebrating the feast of Diana and that festivities would continue for three days. Epicydes, the Syracusan reported, had furnished extra wine to the whole populace to make up for the restrictions on food. In short, much of the adult populace was likely to be drunk and relatively senseless; this might just prove to be the opportunity the Romans needed.
Marcellus called his military tribunes together for a meeting and formed a plan. One maniple of soldiers would carry quickly constructed ladders to the short section of the walls, and a picked detachment of 1,000 men would mount the walls. The attempt would be made late at night at a time when, it was hoped, the inhabitants would have had their fill of wine and be drifting to sleep. Frontinus reported that Marcellus himself scaled the walls of Syracuse, killed the guards nearby and opened the gate to his forces.56 Perhaps, but it does seem a stretch. Polybius and Livy provide a far more plausible account. The tribunes picked the soldiers they thought best for the task, and when the time came, the scaling crews did their job effectively. The initial forces occupied a section of the wall and made their way to the Hexapylon gate undetected, the few Syracusans on the towers asleep or passed out. While additional troops climbed the walls, the initial raiding party targeted a small access gate nearby the Hexapylon and broke it open to allow easier access to the Roman forces outside. A sizeable Roman force was soon within the walls and at the agreed-upon blare of a trumpet began to occupy Epipolae near the gate openly. The Syracusans in the area reeled from the shock of the invasion, but the farther reaches of the enormous city were unaware that anything was amiss.57 When morning came, the Hexapylon gate was dismantled and Marcellus entered with the whole of the Roman army. Several miles away on the Island, Epicydes mustered a force of soldiers and moved to drive out the invaders. He had been wholly misinformed about the size of the invading force, however, and when he learned that the whole Roman army had entered Epipolae, he relinquished control of that city quarter and retired behind the walls of Achradina. The Romans shortly had control of Epipolae.
At this point, Livy and Plutarch relate, tradition recorded that Marcellus, when he stood on high ground and surveyed the city that would, sooner or later, fall to Roman hands, wept both at the magnitude of his achievement and at the greatness of the city that would soon be subjected.58 A great literary moment, to be sure, but likely a fabrication. Even were there any reason to suspect he was more sentimental than the average Roman aristocrat – unlikely given his treatment of other enemy cities – he had hardly taken the city. True, Epipolae was under his control. But the formidable Euryalus fort at the apex of the triangle of Syracuse’s walls, the westernmost point of the city, was still in the hands of a Syracusan garrison commanded by one Philodemus.59 Marcellus opened negotiations with Philodemus, but Philodemus did not immediately agree to surrender the fort; according to Livy, he was biding his time, waiting for Himilco to arrive from Agrigentum, a not unreasonable assumption. How long he waited is not clear, but it cannot have been long, and either just before, or more likely just after the Roman plundered the occupied portions of the city, Philodemus surrendered Euryalus in return for safe conduct to Epicydes.60
Marcellus moved his army to camp in a less-populated section of the city on the south side and made plans to plunder the captured portions of the city. Plundering a captured city, the Roman way, was an exercise in organized violence and destruction that, despite the organization, must have included a great deal of chaos. When a city’s walls were first breached and the Roman soldiers entered the living areas, there was a real danger that looting and plundering would compromise the military objectives, not to mention result in the destruction of locations that the Roman commanders would rather have preserved – treasuries and the houses of allies, among other places. Instead, it was a common practice to prohibit soldiers from any looting when they were taking the city in return for the guarantee of a time reserved for plundering once the military objectives had been met.61 The Syracusans knew the Roman rituals; the occupied portions of the city sent representatives to discuss the terms for the Roman seizure with Marcellus, or rather to plead that the loss of life be kept to a minimum. Marcellus issued the order that while no free person in the city should be injured, everything else was rightfully the spoils of the soldiers. Then he gave the necessary instructions to secure the camp from attack while the soldiers were away, ordered that the signal be given, and let loose the soldiers on the city. According to Livy, they looted freely but followed the orders to spare all free-born life – one can imagine the fate of slaves was left up to the discretion of the soldiers, no doubt with often horrific consequences.62
With the plundering of the occupied sections complete and Euryalus now in the hands of a Roman garrison, Marcellus gave the orders to besiege Achradina. Three camps were set up and the quarter was hemmed in. Shortly thereafter, however, the Syracusans and their Carthaginian allies, made a counter-attack. Himilco and Hippocrates arrived from the west; Hippocrates moved with what must have been a detachment of troops against the old Roman camp at Olympium commanded by Crispinus. He was bolstered by troops that issued forth from Achradina. At the same time Epicydes led another segment of the Syracusan defenders to attack Marcellus’ guard posts in the city. Where exactly Himilco’s army was in these raids is not clear, but it appears he w
as hanging back cautiously, establishing a camp near the city. In any event, the raids did not achieve any particularly important strategic objectives.63 Now, however, the Roman armies were in a precarious position between Himilco’s forces to the west and the walls of Achradina to the east. At this point, catastrophe struck both the Roman and Carthaginian armies. Disease, that destroyer of armies and cities in antiquity, beset Roman, Carthaginian and Syracusan indiscriminately. Either due to chance or, more likely, to the Romans, experience at building functional camps, the Carthaginian army was the worst hit, disintegrating in the face of the deadly illness, its Sicilian allies forced to scatter back to their homes.64 Not even Himilco and Hippocrates were spared. The teetering Roman position had been righted.
Still the siege was not yet complete; the most heavily populated sections of the city, Achradina and Ortygia, remained outside Roman control. In addition, the remnants of Hippocrates’ Sicilian forces had occupied several fortified towns near Syracuse and gathered allies and supplies. At about the same time, the Carthaginian commander Bomilcar returned to Carthage to seek reinforcements for Syracuse and returned with a fleet of warships and troop transports. The fleet was stalled by unfavourable winds, however, and unable to sail round the southeastern tip of Sicily, Pachynum, and arrive at Syracuse. Word of the fleet had apparently reached both Epicydes and the Romans. Epicydes, for his part, boarded a ship, and left the city to meet with Bomilcar. Marcellus, on the other hand, sent his smaller fleet to engage the larger Carthaginian one. For reasons that are unknown – Livy does not even venture a guess – Bomilcar caught sight of the Roman fleet and, despite his greater numbers, quit Sicily for Tarentum in southern Italy. The transports he ordered to return to Africa. It was a stroke of luck for the Roman forces, to say the least. At this point Epicydes showed his practical estimate of Syracuse’s future by abandoning the city and continuing on to seek safety in Agrigentum.65
With Epicydes fled and the hope of Carthaginian reinforcements dashed, the Sicilian armies sent messengers to discuss terms for the surrender of the remaining sections of Syracuse. Marcellus agreed with them that the Romans should directly control all that Hiero had controlled, but the rest of Sicily should retain its own local laws and magistrates. The lead Sicilian negotiators then asked permission to enter the rebel sections and include those inside the city in negotiations. Once inside, they rose up against the lieutenants Epicydes had placed in command and killed them. These negotiators then persuaded the Syracusans to look favourably on a settlement with the Romans. The Syracusans elected representatives to seek terms from Marcellus.66
When all seemed resolved and the formal surrender of the city but a step away, the Roman deserters in Syracuse, who feared the capital punishment which would certainly be imposed on them when the city surrendered to the Romans, reacted. They persuaded the mercenary forces in the city that the Romans would treat them just as harshly – unlikely, but persuasive enough to soldiers who had fought the Romans for years. Together, the deserters and mercenaries rebelled against the newly elected magistrates of Syracuse, indiscriminately slaughtered civilians within their reach, if Livy is to be trusted, and seized control of Achradina and Ortygia.67 Once again, Marcellus had to look for a connection within the city to make further progress. As it happened, a Spanish mercenary by the name of Moericus was one of the mercenary leaders in charge of the forces at Ortygia, and he was open to dealing. Marcellus’ negotiators focused much of their energy on persuading Moericus that the mercenaries, in Marcellus’ mind, were a wholly different matter than those who had deserted from the Roman army and would not meet the deserters’ fate.68 No doubt, they also assured Moericus that he would receive a handsome award. Satisfied and likely seeing no good alternative, Moericus agreed to aid the Romans in seizing the city.
Livy is a bit unclear about several details of the final operation to capture the great city. Moericus arranged to surrender Ortygia to a small force of Romans who crossed the Great Harbour late in the night by transport and gained entry within the walls. When the sun rose, the forces directly under Marcellus assaulted Achradina’s walls in an effort to draw the attention of the enemy forces there away from the Island. Apparently, their efforts were so successful that a number of the defenders from Ortygia left the island to aid their comrades in defending Achradina. Now that the attention of the defenders was fully drawn toward Marcellus, a squadron of Roman ships deposited additional soldiers on Ortygia. These troops gained entry into that quarter through the very gates the mercenaries on the island had opened to leave for Achradina.
What is particularly odd about this account is that the initial small force that entered the city in the night is not mentioned. Though there might be any number of solutions to explain Livy’s inconsistency here – he may have misunderstood his source or his source itself made the confusion – it is reasonable to suppose that, in reality, the advance squad had played a role in securing access for the larger force that tried the walls of the island later in the day.69 Another oddity; without further detail, Livy asserts that Marcellus received word that both the island and a part of Achradina had been occupied. Again, it is not clear how this happened in Livy’s account; presumably, the force that occupied Ortygia made its way to Achradina. It is also possible that some of Marcellus’ force gained access to Achradina, though that would certainly have been a much harder task since it would involve scaling the defended walls of the quarter from the landward side. Whatever the exact tipping point, once Marcellus learned that his forces had seized access to the last resisting section of the city, he recalled his forces in order to prevent the looting of Hiero’s treasury.70
There were no options left for the Syracusans. Their attempt to seek peace after a long rebellion had been thwarted by the coup of the deserters and mercenaries. Part of Achradina was occupied by Roman forces and there were no walls left to shield the inhabitants of the city. They had nothing with which to bargain, nothing they had could not be readily seized by the Romans. Aware of the reality, envoys from the captured city met with Marcellus, asking only that the lives of the city inhabitants be spared. Marcellus acquiesced; if the Syracusans had dared hope for more, they certainly were disappointed. Marcellus, according to Livy, sternly rebuked the defeated at this point, to the effect that the wrongs Syracuse had committed against the Roman people far outweighed the services, but that those who had been the ringleaders had already received their punishments. Then, according to Livy, he noted that the Syracusans could have resisted the deserters and mercenaries as Moericus had.71 Regardless of whether his exact words are known, it is difficult to believe that after years of siege, Marcellus refrained from any admonishment of the citizens at this most opportune moment when they had surrendered.
Arrangements were made yet again for Roman troops to plunder, this time the older, wealthier district of Achradina. The precision of the plundering operation is striking to modern eyes when one considers the ultimate goal was to ravage the city. A quaestor was dispatched with a unit of Roman troops to guard the royal treasury of Hiero; after all, plundering did not extend to robbing the Republic of its rightful spoils. Then guards were positioned to protect houses and possessions of all those who had defected to the Romans before the city fell. Once these critical points were secured, the army was sent in to loot and plunder the city freely.72 Livy, as that gentle man of words often did, reproves the behaviour of the Roman soldiers by noting ‘many shameful examples of anger and many of greed were given.’73 He does not elaborate on the horrific details, but given references by sources to other cities taken by Romans, assault, rape, and murder would have been at the top of the list. In the midst of the pillaging, some Roman soldiers found the great Archimedes. Some say he was intent on studying a mathematical problem and either refused to go with a Roman soldier or failed to hear him altogether. Either way, one of the Roman pillagers murdered him during that chaotic day.74
Roman tradition had it that the spoils from Syracuse were unbelievably rich, a match p
erhaps, Livy speculates, for the wealth of the great enemy Carthage itself. Statues and paintings, countless works of art, all were carried off by the Romans and brought back to their city. Marcellus apparently used a number of artworks plundered from Syracuse to decorate public areas in Rome, especially the future temple to Honos and Virtus. Indeed, he apparently had not built the temple and used the spoils from Syracuse to finance the actual construction.75 These spoils served to commemorate the magnitude of his achievement in taking the grand city of Syracuse. Interestingly enough, a tradition was preserved or invented by Cicero much later that Marcellus took nothing of the loot for himself, with the exception of a globe constructed by Archimedes.76 All other sources are silent on the matter, however, and it remains up to the reader to decide the likelihood of this.
After the surrender and sacking of the city, the time came to hammer out the details of the peace. Typically, in such situations where the Romans had defeated an enemy, it fell to the highest magistrate on site to make the provisional arrangements for peace with the defeated. These arrangements were termed acta, the ‘deeds’ of the general, and it would remain for the senate and people to ratify any major arrangements made by a field commander into formal treaty provisions. In this case, the proconsul Marcellus established arrangements not only with the Syracusans but with the other city states of Sicily, which sent envoys to set terms with the Romans. The details of the arrangements Marcellus made with these various peoples are essentially lost to us. In general, Livy suggests that Marcellus reaffirmed the status of socius, or ally, for those states that either had not rebelled against Rome or had returned to the Roman side before Syracuse was taken. Livy asserts that those states that attempted to join the Roman cause only after Syracuse was taken were treated as defeated enemies receiving terms from a conqueror.77 Livy, with his usual moral hyperbole, asserts that Marcellus was a model of integrity and fairness as he arranged matters in Sicily. Even so, there is no reason to suspect his arrangements were corrupt either.
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