Unlike the egalitarianism of the Pashtun tribal organization, the Baloch sardari system was hereditary and the sardar or tribal chief exercised absolute and unquestioned control over his fellow tribesmen. He functioned as chief executive, legislator and judge. The sardar even controlled the social life of his subjects; and consequently, out of fear or reverence, the Baloch gave unswerving loyalty to him. The sardar’s extraordinary authority within this structure probably stemmed from the essentially military character of early Baloch tribal society.32
From the sardar, power flowed downward to waderas, the section chiefs, and beyond them to the subordinate clan and sub-clan leaders of the lesser tribal units. Thus, for the tribesmen, the concepts of the nation state and obedience to the Central governments under which they lived have had little meaning. Ordinary Baloch were resigned to the rule by the sardars and were characterized by the British as ‘slaves of the sardars’.33 It is a land that is ruled so autocratically by its nawabs that, in the words of the historian Charles Chenevix Trench, ‘An oath of innocence taken with one’s hand on the Nawab’s head was always accepted.’34
The ‘jirga’ or tribal gathering is and remains an integral part of the tribal structure. Under the British, Sir Robert Sandeman introduced a new kind of jirga, the ‘Shahi Jirga’ (Grand Council or the council of the main tribal sardars) for the area under their control—British Balochistan. In this jirga, only sardars and aristocrats could be members. The Shahi Jirga was held at Quetta, Sibi and Fort Munro once or twice a year. The new jirga could impose taxes on property and labour; only the Political Agent could review the decisions of the jirga. As described by Janmahmad, ‘The Shahi Jirga was a shrewd mechanism of indirect rule with powers vested in a few carefully selected tribal elders loyal to the British and ready to act against their own people.’35
In 1968, under the Ayub Khan government’s, Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, the jirga system was legally recognised in ‘B’ area. All disputes would be settled through jirgas.36
The sardari system was outlawed on 8 April 1976, by prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This was an attempt to reduce the power of the various tribal chiefs so as to enable the forcible incorporation of the various tribes into the mainstream of Pakistan’s political, economic and social life. However, though weakened, the system continued to exist in Balochistan. Bhutto, moreover, did not repeal the 1968 Jirga Ordinance that was applicable in the ‘B’ areas that constituted 95 per cent of Balochistan. It was only in 1990 that the Balochistan High Court struck down the Ordinance of 1968, thereby abolishing the justice system administered through jirga.37
Interestingly, while the sardars are blamed for the continuation of the system, the reality is somewhat different. In June 1972, the Leader of the House, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, moved a resolution in the Balochistan Assembly demanding that the federal government abolish the sardari, the jirga and the tribal system since the provincial assembly did not have the authority to do so. The federal government took no action in this regard and about eight months later, on 14 February 1973, the National Awami Party government (which was responsible for presenting the resolution in the assembly) was overthrown and a military operation was launched in Balochistan.
The resolution moved by Attaullah Mengal read: ‘Now that the Tribal System has lost its advantages keeping it instated is going to act as a hurdle in the development of the people of these tribes.’ Speaking during the debate, Gul Khan Nasir, the nationalist poet, said, ‘Mr. Speaker! as long as this institution remains (even as a vestige) it will keep our nation divided into various tribes and sub-tribes which will render it impossible for us to achieve economic progress.’38
Ironically, the policy of the federal government to deny the essentials of provincial autonomy has strengthened the tribal system. The sardars continue to influence the justice system and the working of the police. The sardari system will not disappear unless the grievances related to provincial rights are removed. So long as this does not happen the people will continue to bear the load of archaic social structures despite their manifest unhappiness with them.39
Cultural Values
The collective character of the Baloch is manifested in what is called ‘Balochmayar’ (the Baloch code of honour). It is this that distinguishes them from others and thus forms an important feature of the Baloch identity.40 The honour code is not only strongly held but it has given the Baloch a consciousness that is above tribal, political and geographical boundaries. A Baloch would be willing to sacrifice his all—including his life—to protect it. Henry Pottinger, a nineteenth-century British officer who had extensively travelled in the area, thus described the Baloch adherence to their code of honour: ‘When they once offer, or promise to afford protection to a person who may require or solicit it, they will die before they fail in their trust.’41.
One example of this relates to the Mughal emperor Humayun. In 1543, Humayun, who had been exiled, was forlornly wandering towards Kandahar with his pitiful troops. He entered the territory of the Magsis and set up camp in the chief’s village. The Magsi sardar was absent at that time. By the next morning, Humayun and his men realized that they were prisoners as the tribesmen refused to let them leave until their chief’s return. Late that night, the chief returned and met with Humayun. He showed him the farman that he had received from Humayun’s brothers, Mirza Kamran, ruler of Kandahar and Mirza Askari, requesting him to imprison the ousted emperor and deliver him to them in return for a generous reward. The Magsi chief admitted to Humayun that he had planned to attack him and his party with the intention of capturing him. But now that Humayun had chosen to camp at his home village, he was no longer an enemy but had become, by Baloch tradition, his honoured guest. Humayun’s sister writes in Humayun-Nama that the Magsi sardar told Humayun ‘… now I will sacrifice my life and the lives of my family, I have five or six sons, for your Majesty’s head, or rather for one hair of it. Go where you wish. God protect you.’ If the Magsi chief had not been loyal to the Baloch code, the history of Mughal India might have been dramatically altered.42
The key elements of the common code of honour are valuing loyalty, blood vengeance, believing in ‘an eye for an eye and a life for a life’ and adhering to the simple rule that ‘he shall take who has the power, and he shall keep who can,’43 protection of those seeking refuge, hospitality to guests, death to both parties in adultery, and women’s right to petition for peace and the pardon of offence.44 Inayatullah Baloch quotes a Baloch ‘Battal’ or proverb on the Baloch concept of revenge: ‘The Baloch’s revenge for blood remains as young for two hundred years, as a deer of two years.’45
The customary Baloch approach towards women is one of great respect. Even in anger, a man was not supposed to lay a hand on a woman. Any act of molestation is considered a heinous crime, the punishment of which was death. This explains the fierce Baloch reaction at the rape of Dr Shazia Khalid in 2005 that aggravated the current Baloch insurgency (details in the chapter on Insurgency). Tribal blood feuds were often resolved with women going bareheaded to the family of their rivals and pleading for resolution. As per Baloch custom, a man cannot refuse a request made by a bareheaded woman. Once the request for reconciliation was met, the patriarch of the rival faction had to ‘restore’ the woman’s dignity by placing a sari or dupatta over her head before she was returned to her family.46
The British were all praise for the courage and chivalry of their Bugti opponents. As Edward Oliver wrote in 1890, ‘War is looked upon as the first business of a gentleman, and every Balochi is a gentleman’. However, frustrated by the continuous attacks and raids on their cantonments, on 6 August 1846, the British declared the Bugti tribe outlaws and put a price of ten rupees (about fifteen shillings—quite a large sum at that time) on every man’s head, dead or alive.47
Baloch–Pashtun Divide
Though there are other ethnic groups present in the province such as Hazaras, Sindhis and Punjabis, the two dominant ethnic groups in Balochis
tan are the Baloch and the Pashtuns. In the northern districts of the province, the primary ethnic identity is that of the Pashtuns—the same ethnic group across the border in Afghanistan and KPK including the now defunct Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is believed that the term Pashtun or Pathan is derived from the Sanskrit word ‘Pratishthan’, which means people who are established and command respect in society.
The predominant Pashtun tribes in Balochistan include Kakar, Ghilzai Tareen, Mandokhel, Sherani, Luni, Kasi and Achakzai. Even though the figures are contested, Pashtuns form the second-largest ethnic group in Balochistan, ranging from 29 per cent as per the 1998 census to 50 per cent as claimed by Pashtun nationalists. Quetta, the capital, has a multiethnic population while one ethnic group or the other inhabits other parts of the province. Even in Quetta, different ethnic groups live in separate areas.
There is a historical background to the Baloch–Pashtun divide in Balochistan. Britain’s strategic interest of keeping Afghanistan as a buffer against Russian expansion dictated that they develop road and rail links in the northern parts of Balochistan. The infrastructure links developed during the British time enabled the Pashtun-inhabited areas to achieve greater economic progress than the Baloch areas within the province.
The warped economic development during the colonial era was reinforced after the creation of Pakistan when little attention was paid to the province. The situation was further complicated because of the continuous influx of refugees from Afghanistan, first due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and later during the Taliban rule. This has been facilitated due to the porous border between Balochistan and Afghanistan. The southern Afghan city of Kandahar, a stronghold of the Taliban, is just 120 km from the Pakistani border city of Chaman.
For example, the population of the area shot up from just over 85,000 in 1941 to over four million by 1981. As per Balochistan government figures, the province hosts around 784,000 Afghans of which 337,045 are registered Afghan migrants while the rest are illegal migrants living in the province.48 The refugee influx provoked Baloch apprehension that the demographic balance in the province was getting altered. As a counter, the Pashtun leadership in Balochistan has argued that the Afghans have merely moved around within their own ‘watan’ or homeland. They have not settled in the Baloch areas so the Baloch should not have a problem.
The presence of the Taliban, and Quetta becoming their de facto capital in Pakistan, brought an extra presence of the army and paramilitary troops in the province. This has raised further concerns among the Baloch for whom the additional presence of security forces is problematic due to the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan Army’s history of repression.
In the run-up to the creation of the province in 1970, the Pashtun nationalists, led by Samad Khan Achakzai, wanted the merger of the Pashtun territories (largely consisting of the former British Balochistan) with the then North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) to create a united Pashtun province. The Pakistan Muslim League, Balochistan chapter, led by Qazi Isa and Nawab Jogezai, wanted the restoration of the former British Balochistan and the Kalat state as separate provinces. The National Awami Party favoured merging the two units into a single province.49 In the event in July 1970, the boundaries of contemporary Balochistan were announced that merged the erstwhile Kalat Division and Quetta Division into one province.
Samad Khan’s son, Mehmood Khan Achakzai, formed the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) in 1989 to articulate the viewpoint of the Pashtuns of Balochistan. He agrees with the Baloch that ‘Pakistan is a Punjabi empire subjugating other nationalities’. However, the PkMAP believes that it has three options: (1) Balochistan should be declared a two-nation province (Baloch and Pashtun), with equal representation and rights for both; (2) a new province for the Pashtuns of Balochistan should be created; or (3) Pashtun areas of Balochistan should be made part of the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—KPK).
But the Pashtun–Baloch political differences have seldom escalated into conflict and they have coexisted for years, mainly because the two ethnic groups live in different areas. There is very little intermix of population, except in Quetta, Sibi and parts of Loralai. Moreover, the nationalists among both the ethnic groups have a common dislike for Punjabi exploitation, a shared history of cooperation and engagement with left-wing politics.
The one issue that could have created tensions was the census. Last held in 1998, the census could not be held till 2017 due to ‘security concerns’. At the time of writing, the detailed results of the 2017 census have not been made available. For the Baloch, the holding of the census in the presence of Afghan refugees was problematic. For the Pashtun nationalists, the possibility of local Pashtuns being ignored in the name of Afghan refugees was an issue of concern. Consequently, the census could have been a tense time for Baloch–Pashtun relations. However, the provisional results of the census show that the Baloch continue to retain their majority in the province and hence the protests have been muted.
3
Religion
Islam
ISLAM CAME TO BALOCHISTAN VIA Mohammad bin Qasim’s
invasion of Sindh in ad 711 and by the ninth century, the population had been converted. Before converting to Islam, the Baloch were believed to be Mazdaki and Zoroastrian.1 The remnants of a few Zoroastrian traditions are still evident among some Baloch tribes. While the bulk of the Baloch are Hanafi Sunnis, there is a sizeable Shia Hazara community, primarily in Quetta, who had migrated to the area from Bamiyan in Afghanistan to escape the brutal persecution of Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century. There is also a significant Zikri population in Makran.
The intermix of religions is primarily due to the Baloch having shunned religious extremism or sectarianism. Consequently, Hindus, Shias and Zikris have till recently lived in harmony and without prejudice, fear or hatred. Intermarriage between the Sunni-Baloch and the Zikri-Baloch, despite their different religious beliefs, do take place. It is common to find among the Baloch that one brother is a Zikri while the other is a Sunni.2
Religion has not played an important role in the daily life of the Baloch who have been averse to mixing religion with politics.3 As E. Oliver pointed out, the Baloch ‘… has less of God in his head, and less of the devil in his nature’ and prefers to have his prayers said for him.4 In another instance, in the late nineteenth century, when British authorities asked Baloch and Pashtuns how their civil cases should be decided, the Baloch replied: ‘Rawaj’ (Baloch customary law); the Pashtun answered: ‘Sharia’ (Islamic law).5
The Baloch approach to religion is also demonstrated by this interesting story: ‘Once, a Baloch was asked why he did not keep the fast of Ramzan. Replied the Baloch that he was excused as his chief was keeping it for him. “What are you doing?” he asked a practising Muslim about his evening prayers. He was answered: “Praying in the fear of God.” Rejoined the Baloch: “Come along to my hills where we don’t fear anybody.”’6
Thus, historically speaking, the Baloch always have had a more secular and pluralistic view on religion than their neighbours. As has been well put: ‘It is not by chance that the Baloch enjoy the unenviable reputation of being “bad Muslims”.’7 Even in traditional Baloch society, the mullah was looked upon as a functional figure rather than a revered one.8 While they accept Islam as an important facet of their life conditioning their existence, they do not see it as the most important part of their identity and have not accepted the ascendancy of religion over sociocultural values. As observed by Nina Swidler, ‘… religion does not distinguish Baloch identity’.9 So far, they have been largely impervious to the persistent efforts at Islamization. They have also not allowed Islamists of any variety to gain traction in their area even though references to the Quetta shura of the Taliban can confuse many. As such, the view that the Baloch nationalist sentiments are being overridden by Islamist politics is perhaps incorrect.
However, this could be changing due to the continued support of radicalization and e
ncouragement of terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the sectarian terrorist group the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) by the Pakistan state. Thus, Wahabism that was alien to Balochistan has made an entry and is impacting an increasing number of people.
It was Gen. Zia-ul-Haq who sowed the seeds of extremism in Balochistan. Zia had a twofold objective in his Islamization policies. One, he wanted to use it as a weapon against the Baloch insurgency that had ended in 1977. As a result, there was an influx of ‘tablighi’ activities and a mushroom growth of madrassas. According to a recent report, 85,000 students were studying in 1,095 madrassas across Balochistan.10 Second, in order to prevent another Bangladesh, Zia also saw Islam as an effective unifying force that would subsume the Baloch ethnic identity into a larger Islamic identity.11 As a result of Islamization, radicalization has increased in the once secular province. There has also been a corresponding rise in the activities of sectarian groups with a phenomenal increase in the number of sectarian killings, especially of the Shia Hazaras in Quetta carried out by the LeJ.
Under Gen. Musharraf, further encouragement was given to the setting up of madrassas in order to access Baloch areas that were stubbornly opposed to the mullahs. These efforts were at the expense of secular education. The budget of the ministry of religious affairs of the province was much higher than that of the ministry of education.
Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum Page 6