Not surprisingly, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, Pakistan’s states minister, explained to the Viceroy’s secretary George Abel: ‘The Pakistan Government would claim to succeed to the treaty obligations and rights of HM’s Government. Otherwise, if Kalat claimed like Indian states to be independent, it would also claim retrocession of leased areas …’17 Thus, it was to Pakistan’s advantage to accept Kalat’s independence but decline to accept the retrocession of the leased areas in its negotiations with Kalat. It was obvious that Pakistan only recognized Kalat as a non-Indian state to prevent the retrocession of the leased areas. As Yakoob Bangash puts it, ‘[T]he Government of Pakistan had no qualms about recognising Kalat as independent since they were sure that neither Britain nor India would recognize it as a separate country and hence a mere communiqué recognizing Kalat’s independence would do little harm.’18
The legal opinion of the British Foreign Office and the Political Department was that Pakistan only inherited the leases ‘on the basis that Kalat state is an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with HMG;’19 otherwise, the leases lapsed under the Indian Independence Act. The Khan tried in vain to argue that the leases were ‘personal’ to the British government and hence, with their departure, automatically lapsed. This was held to be untenable.
Thus, the Khan was faced with a double whammy: Mountbatten not signing the declaration and Pakistan signing it in bad faith only to get control of the leased areas. Once this was achieved, Pakistan would move to forcibly take over the rump Kalat state.
One of the problems that the Khan faced in the negotiations with Pakistan was that his prime minister Nawabzada Aslam Khan was also a member of the Pakistan civil service and perceived as ‘Pakistan’s man’ in Kalat. As events showed, Aslam’s loyalty towards Kalat was suspect and he was responsible for many problems relating to accession. For example, in early October 1947, he asked for ‘instructions’ from the Government of Pakistan. Aslam wrote to Foreign Secretary Ikramullah: ‘… I would request that I very kindly be guided with such further instructions in this regard as you may deem fit to give …’20
There is another interesting possibility of why Jinnah supported the idea of an independent Balochistan. According to the Khan of Kalat, Jinnah regarded Balochistan as his back-up plan in case the demand for Pakistan did not succeed. There was a secret plan with Jinnah and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (a senior Muslim League leader) that in case the demand for the creation of Pakistan did not materialize, an independent, sovereign Balochistan would help Indian Muslims in their armed struggle for their homeland—Pakistan.21
Whatever the reason, based on the 4 August agreement, the Khan declared the independence of Kalat in a formal proclamation on 12 August 1947 effective from 15 August. The Kalat state flag was raised as prayers were read out for the Khan of Kalat. The Government of Kalat State Act 1947 was promulgated as the new constitution of Balochistan. He established two houses of parliament to ascertain the will of the people concerning the future of the state. Elections were held shortly and though held on a non-political basis, the Kalat State National Party candidates won thirty-nine out of fifty-two seats in the Dar-ul-Awam (Lower House of parliament). While not ‘democratic’ in the modern sense, the Dar-ul-Awam and Dar-ul-Umra (Upper House) were broadly representative of public opinion in
the state.22
In October 1947 before the Khan went to Karachi to meet Jinnah, he, together with the prime minister and foreign minister, considered various options about the future of Kalat: merger with Iran or India or Afghanistan (all rejected on various grounds); becoming a British protectorate (rejected by the foreign minister), and finally a fifth option, that of independence, in which Kalat would maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and ensure sovereign equality.23 The option of merger with Pakistan was not even considered.
The Dar-ul-Awam held a session in mid-December 1947 when the issue of accession was debated. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo (later to be known as Baba-e-Balochistan) made his famous speech:
We can survive without Pakistan. We can remain without Pakistan. We can prosper outside Pakistan. But the question is what Pakistan would be without us …? If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people we are ready to extend the hand of friendship and cooperation. If Pakistan does not agree to do so, flying in the face of democratic principles, such an attitude will be totally unacceptable to us, and if we are forced to accept this fate then every Baloch son will sacrifice his life in defence of his national freedom.
A resolution was passed demanding that ‘relations with Pakistan should be established as between two sovereign states through a treaty based upon friendship and not by accession’.24
On 4 January 1948, the Dar-ul-Umra, the Upper House comprising sardars, discussed the question of merger with Pakistan and reiterated the independence and sovereignty of Kalat, rejecting accession to Pakistan.25 It declared, ‘This House is not willing to accept a merger with Pakistan which will endanger the separate existence of the Baloch nation.’
Indian Role
Controversy surrounds the role, if any, played by India in the developments leading up to Kalat’s forced accession to Pakistan. The controversy circulates around reports that the Khan had sought to accede to India but was turned down.
After the signing of the 4 August 1947 standstill agreement between Kalat and Pakistan, Kalat drew the attention of New Delhi to it. This agreement, as noted earlier, had recognized the Khanate as an independent state. The Khanate invited India to enter into a similar agreement. Later, it also sent a request for permission to establish a trade agency in Delhi. However, the Indian government refused to consider these requests.26
These developments did not escape Pakistan. As early as November 1947, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Ikramullah had spoken about ‘rumours’ that the Khan was negotiating with both India
and Afghanistan.27
The Khan of Kalat in March 1946 had deputed Samad Khan—a member of the All India Congress Committee (AICC)—to plead Kalat’s case with the Congress leadership. Jawaharlal Nehru, however, totally rejected the contention of Kalat being an independent state and stated that the Congress would not accept, on any account, attempts to bring about such a deal. Presumably, this was due to the Congress’s antipathy to the princely states without, however, making a distinction between the state of affairs in Kalat and the other princely states. Nehru had noted in 1946: ‘The fact that Kalat is a border state adds to its importance from our point of view as frontiers are always strategic areas. An independent India cannot permit foreign forces and foreign footholds such as Kalat might afford near its own territories.’28
Subsequently, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, president of the Kalat State National Party, went to Delhi and met Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, president of the Congress. Azad agreed with Bizenjo’s contention that Balochistan had never been a part of India and had its own independent status governed by the Treaty of 1876. However, Azad argued that the Baloch would never be able to survive as a sovereign, independent state and would ask for British protection. If the British agreed and remained in Balochistan, the sovereignty of the subcontinent would become meaningless. Hence, though Azad admitted that the demands of the Baloch were genuine and that Balochistan had never been part of India, yet he could not help in maintaining Kalat’s independence.29
An All India Radio (AIR) broadcast of 27 March 1948 reported a press conference in Delhi addressed by V.P. Menon. According to the report, V.P. Menon stated that the Khan of Kalat had been pressing for Kalat’s accession to India instead of Pakistan and that India had not paid any attention to the suggestion and India had nothing to do with it. The Khan listened to the 9 p.m. AIR news and was extremely upset at the dismissive manner in which he had been treated. He is reported to have informed Jinnah to begin negotiations for Kalat’s treaty relationship with Pakistan. Significantly, the minutes of a cabinet meeting held on 29 March 1948 as well as Prime Minister Nehru’s reply to a question on 30 March 1948 in the Constituent Assembly sta
ted that V.P. Menon had, in fact, made no such comments and that there was an error in reporting by AIR. Despite this attempt at damage control, the harm had already been done.30 Quite possibly, pressing matters pertaining to Kashmir and Hyderabad occupied the attention of the Indian leadership who were thus unable to evaluate the strategic significance of a sovereign Balochistan. This also explains why India did not protest at the Pakistan Army’s occupation of Kalat.
British Balochistan
According to the Indian Independence Act, the fate of British Balochistan and the Baloch tribal areas that included Marri, Bugti, Khetran and Baloch tribal areas of Dera Ghazi Khan was to be decided by a referendum. The referendum was, however, to be limited to the British-nominated council of tribal elders, the Shahi Jirga, and the Quetta municipality. It was decided to hold the Jirga on 30 June 1947 but it was deviously held a day earlier without informing all the members. Thus, only eight out of a total of fifty-five representatives (forty-three of the Shahi Jirga and twelve from the Quetta municipality) were present. According to Axmann, ‘It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the Jirga did actually cast votes. Even today the validity of the referendum is contested, and the circumstances that led to its members voting in favour of Pakistan are controversial. Some Baloch scholars maintain that the Shahi Jirga did not vote at all, and claim that a conspiracy between the British and the supporters of the Muslim League against the Baloch and their demand for “national liberation” was contrived.’31
With this referendum as its basis, British Balochistan, including the leased and tribal areas that were constitutionally part of the Khanate, were quite controversially acceded to Pakistan on 15 August 1947.
Some Pakistan historians have tried to argue that the Khan’s stand of resisting accession was flawed and point as evidence to the so-called referendum of the Shahi Jirga held in Quetta on 29 June 1947. However, the participants were those who had been appointed by the British and the Jirga’s recommendation related only to British Balochistan.32 It did not in any way compromise the Khan’s sovereignty or suggested that he had acceded to Pakistan.
Accession of Kalat
To recap, by 1948 the Khan of Kalat had declared independence, both Houses of the Kalat parliament had endorsed this decision and rejected accession with Pakistan; the Muslim League had acknowledged the independence of Kalat as late as in August 1947. Despite all this, and despite the close personal relationship that Jinnah had with the Khan of Kalat and despite the Khan having made large financial contributions to the Muslim League, on 27 March 1948 the Pakistan Army invaded Kalat. The Khan surrendered and signed the instrument of accession. This was accepted by Pakistan on 30 March 1948. Thus ended the 227-day independence of the Kalat confederacy formed by Mir Ahmad Khan’s ancestors almost 300 years ago. During its brief independence, Kalat had its own embassy in Karachi where its ambassador to Pakistan functioned and displayed the Kalat state flag.
What explains this sudden somersault? Why, after becoming Governor-General, did Jinnah begin to pressurize Kalat to accede to Pakistan?
The Khan had been in direct touch with Jinnah since 1936 when the Khan asked him to advise on constitutional matters concerning the Kalat state. The relationship was to continue till 1948 when Jinnah died.
In his memoirs, the Khan writes that he played host to Jinnah several times in Quetta, Mastung and Kalat. The Quaid and his sister used to be duly accorded a royal reception each time they came, including a 21-gun salute just as the viceroys of India used to be greeted. They were given an equally hearty send-off when they left. Great care was taken to provide them with the best of amenities during their stay.
The Khan further writes that after weighing Jinnah in gold, ‘I had the personal satisfaction of presenting a necklace to Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sentimental value of which, needless to say, exceeded by far the paltry amount of Rs 1,00,000 which it really cost.’
The Khan also sent out his personal bodyguard to Bombay in 1943 for the Quaid’s personal protection after an unsuccessful attack on Jinnah. He remained with him faithfully as his bodyguard right up to 7 August 1947.
Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi: Khan-E-Azam-XIII, Karachi: Royal Book Company 1975, pp. 136–38.
Documents available now show that it was British advice that greatly influenced Jinnah to force the accession of Kalat to Pakistan in 1948. Initially, the British policy was to respect the independence of Kalat under the 1876 treaty. Such a policy was predicated on using an independent Kalat as a base for their activities in the region. Maj. Gen. R.C. Money, in charge of strategic planning in India, had formulated a report in 1944 titled ‘Post-War Reconstruction—Baluchistan’ on the post-war scenario.33 The report suggested that ‘Baluchistan is the right place for a considerable imperial garrison after the war.’ It added that after the transfer of power in British India, ‘Baluchistan is the most suitable location for the British Garrison’ on the ground that Baluchistan ‘is not part of British India’. Secretary of State Leo Amery’s appreciative letters to Money dated 18 November 1944 and to Lord Wavell, dated 23 November 1944 showed his agreement with Money about his defence scheme in which Baluchistan was regarded as a separate country like Afghanistan and Tibet.34
However, by 1947 the British felt that instead of locating a base in a weak Balochistan, such a base could be established in Pakistan that was more than willing to accommodate the British. Hence, it was in British interests to ensure that Balochistan was kept within Pakistan and did not become an independent entity.35
After the Second World War, Britain was concerned about the rise of the Soviet Union as a great power. Hence, Pakistan became of great importance for the defence of the Persian Gulf and the ‘wells of power’, i.e., oil. Given the anti-imperialist movement in Iran against the British-supported king Reza Shah, and an apparently pro-Soviet Union Afghanistan, Britain felt it necessary to strengthen Pakistan. Occupation of Balochistan by Pakistan was among the strategic moves in this respect, writes Axmann.36
Initially, there was some thinking about controlling the crescent of territory from the Gilgit agency to the deserts of Balochistan. Sir Olaf Caroe, the then governor of the NWFP, for example, had even suggested that a long strip from the Gilgit to Balochistan should be carved into a separate territory and administered directly by Britain. This idea was not accepted and instead Pakistan was chosen to be the bulwark for Western interests against the Soviet Union in southern Asia.37 A Pakistan without the state of Jammu and Kashmir (especially Gilgit–Baltistan) and Balochistan would not have served the purpose.
Narendra Singh Sarila in his book The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition has quoted British documents to show how Pakistan was to become the lynchpin in British defence plans for the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area. ‘A top secret British Chiefs of Staff report of 7 August 1947, stated: “The area of Pakistan [West Pakistan and the north-west of India] is strategically the most important in the continent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements could be met ... by an agreement with Pakistan alone. We do not therefore consider that failure to obtain an agreement with India would cause us to modify any of our requirements.”’38
For this purpose, it was necessary that Pakistan was viable. Without Balochistan, it would have been difficult to give a proper geographical and strategic viability to Pakistan. Thus, the British changed tracks and worked out a strategy to ensure Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan instead of becoming an independent entity. Accordingly, the British authorities pressed upon the Pakistani leaders to take practical steps for the incorporation of Kalat into the newly created state.39
Secretary of State Lord Listowell advised Mountbatten in September 1947 that because of its location, it would be too dangerous and risky to allow Kalat to be independent. An extract of a secret memorandum prepared by the British minister of state for commonwealth relations office on 12 September clearly indicates Britain’s
masterminding role in the events leading to the occupation of Kalat by Pakistan in 1948:
Pakistan has entered into negotiations with Kalat on the basis of recognizing the state’s claim to independence and of treating the previous agreements between the Crown and Kalat providing for the lease of Quetta and other areas, which would otherwise lapse under section 7(I) (6) of the Indian Independence Act, as international agreements untouched by the lapse of paramountcy. The Khan of Kalat, whose territory marches with Persia, is, of course, in no position to undertake the international responsibilities of an independent state, and Lord Mountbatten, who, before the transfer of power, was warned of the dangers of such a development, doubtless passed on this warning to the Pakistan Government [emphasis added]. The UK High Commissioner in Pakistan is being informed of the position and asked to do what he can to guide the Pakistan government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve recognition of the state as a separate international entity.40
Referring to a telegram of 17 October 1947 from Grafftey-Smith, the British high commissioner in Karachi, the Political Department, in a note on Pakistan–Kalat negotiations, held that Jinnah had second thoughts regarding the recognition of Kalat as an independent sovereign state, and was now desirous of obtaining its accession in the same form as was accepted by other rulers who joined Pakistan. The same note mentioned that an interesting situation was developing as Pakistan might accept the accession of Kalat’s two feudatories, Lasbela and Kharan.41
Significantly therefore, Mountbatten had been advised even before the transfer of power of the danger of Kalat being independent. This perhaps explains why he did not sign the 4 August 1947 document. Likewise, as early as October 1947, even before Jinnah had broached the issue of Kalat’s accession with the Khan, the British high commissioner reported about Pakistan tempting Lasbela and Kharan to accede to Pakistan.
Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum Page 11